Book Review: Marc Sageman's Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century

Reviewed by Lauren Bean, Editor

Film can provide an alternate perspective on complex global issues such as terrorism through a creative medium with a mass appeal that differs from newspapers or non-fiction books. If developed properly, the construction of different storylines and character perspectives can reveal patterns and intricacies that would otherwise remain hidden if examined in isolation. Gillo Pontecorvo’s 1967 film, The Battle of Algiers, is one example of how this medium can effectively inform broader understanding of terrorism. Still powerful and pertinent after four decades, The Battle of Algiers was studied by the US military in 2003 at the outset of the Iraq war and has been referenced by newspapers, journals, and bloggers since for its insight into insurgency and counterinsurgency (note the French commander and former French Resistance fighter "Lieutenant Colonel Mathieu’s" use of a metaphor to characterize terrorism: "Terrorist groups are like tapeworms—they keep reviving unless you destroy the head..."). However, events of the last seven years demarcate a distinctively changed threat from that of the past. Al Qaeda is no longer the central coordinating force with one leader: it has become an organizational model to be aspired to and replicated by independent local terrorist groups led by different heads. What we already know about terrorism remains relevant; however, a steady emergence of new information requires new thinking.

In his latest book Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century, Dr. Marc Sageman offers readers an organized framework for how to think about terrorism, based in part on the personal stories of terrorists. Using scientific empirical research (data collected from his study of approximately 500 Islamist terrorists), Sageman dismantles the paradox of terrorism’s apparent unpredictability to reveal patterns and intricacies that seem commonsense in reader hindsight. Although scientific research and data may not sound like best-seller material, Sageman’s compelling analysis of the twenty-first century threat will surely inform a new dimension of the "war" film genre.

Since September 11, 2001, Sageman has challenged what we thought we knew about terrorists, terrorism as a means, and terrorism as a movement. With an M.D. and a Ph.D., seven years of service with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and a robust career in the forensic and clinical psychiatry fields, he has established himself as a leading expert on what makes a terrorist. Sageman has created a movement to enlarge public understanding of terrorism, and perhaps more importantly, to inform preventitive US counterterrorism strategy. Leaderless Jihad is an accessible ‘one-step-further’ analysis of Understanding Terror Networks (2004). (See Marc Sageman’s most recent article in Foreign Policy, "The Next Generation of Terror".)

Sageman argues that the US lacks an effective national strategy to counter the global Islamist threat, which he characterizes as disconnected ("leaderless jihad"), in some cases homegrown, highly networked via the Internet, but "self-limiting in terms of both structural capability and appeal." An effective counterstrategy must incorporate the study of the individual, external influences, and group dynamics, and it must also address the process of radicalization, which Sageman breaks out into four phases. The first phase is a sense of moral outrage, for example over an incident in which Muslims are discriminated against and/or subjected to violence. Typically, these events reinforce the perception that Islam and the West are at war. Next, the global becomes personal, and then the individual fuses broader context with personal plight. This frustration is then shared with others, via the Internet or offline. In the final step, the individual joins a terrorist cell, which provides a sense of family and community. It is in this phase that the Islamist terrorist ideology is implanted and nurtured.

To begin, developing a more effective strategy requires enlarging the current understanding of terrorists’ demographics (the poor, uneducated, "brainwashed" Muslim male youth predisposed to violence) and how to contain the threat, which he characterizes as "the vanguard trying to establish a certain version of the Islamist utopia", and later in the book with more specificity, as "al Qaeda Central, the remnant of the organization that committed the 9/11 atrocities, and the leaderless al Qaeda social movement."

"Contain" is the operative word, and as Sageman argues, the only feasible strategy. He contends that aiming to "win the war of ideas" using an ideology-driven approach (to advance democracy) is an evidently deficient strategy. While he agrees democracy is a "worthwhile goal by itself…it will not affect terrorism." Besides, he explains, credibility is needed to win the battle for hearts and minds in the Muslim world, and the US is losing this battle.

Some of Sageman’s suggestions are not new, such as securing the homeland and diminishing moral outrage in the Muslim world. With regard to the latter, Sageman endorses withdrawing from Iraq, which he qualifies as "the main fuel" for young Muslim outrage. (He does not elaborate on a withdrawal strategy, and one can’t help but implore, "Do tell Dr., do tell".) Other recommendations include countering the enemy’s appeal by bolstering "alternative" (to terrorists) local Muslim heroes to serve as role models in Muslim countries. The goal would be to diminish the appeal of terrorist violence. A supplemental step is to improve reporting of terrorism to limit sensationalism. Also, Sageman echoes the need for greater cooperation between local and federal law enforcement to eliminate terrorist networks and deny terrorists the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction.

Sageman’s call for the inclusion of science in the study of terrorism is most revealing in terms of the fundamental challenges to an effective national strategy.

Science and national security have an inconsistent past - periods of close collaboration followed by disjunction. The current relationship between the academic community and the US government appears tenuous. However, the value of cooperation is evident, at least at a glance: science adds certain credibility to policy, and policy adds a sense of nationalistic purpose to science. However, this reciprocity seems to have diminished since the end of the Cold War, and the explanations generated by both sides are loaded.

Sageman recommends the creation of government-funded terrorism research projects that apply social science methodology and data collection (similar to the 1950s and 60s government-initiated Soviet studies projects) led by Ph.D.s from the "academy" (the academic community) -- not young graduates for hire with little or no formal social science training. However, the overarching barrier to the creation of such programs, Sageman explains, is prejudice in government funding (a preference for "modeling" over data collection) and government secrecy surrounding the acquisition of information about terrorism. As a result, scholars are limited in their analysis of new developments in the field. How this issue might be resolved remains to be seen.

Leaderless Jihad is an insightful, comprehensive analysis of the global Islamist threat and options for containment. Dr. Sageman knows a great deal about terrorists and his social science background adds a critical perspective on how the West should be thinking about terrorism. At times his recommendations reflect well-worn arguments. However, he can’t be faulted for ambiguity on such issues as Iraq’s future and the issue of data collection and government secrecy. These topics have their own extensive bibliography. Still, the reader is left with an additional thought after reading Leaderless Jihad: We now know why individuals join terrorist movements, but why do they leave? And what might a counterterrorism strategy look like that factors in the exit variables as well? •