Smart Soft Power: An Essential Tool for the Next Administration

By Raja Kamal

"Strategic Outlook 2008: National Security Issues for the Next Administration" / Winter 2008 Vol. 18 / No. 1

Raja Kamal is associate dean at the Harris School for Public Policy Studies at the University of Chicago.

In the last eight years, the Bush administration has exhibited very little effective use of soft power in the Middle East. As we approach a change in the administration in January, the adoption of some "smart" soft power should be on the agenda of the next administration. Soft power, thoroughly discussed by Harvard’s Joseph S. Nye, is culture, values, and ideas as opposed to "hard power" which includes more coercive measures such as military action.

Since September 11, the image of the United States has been deteriorating in much of the Arab world. With the onset of Iraq war in 2003, America’s perception in the Arab world has eroded to a record low. Determined to reverse the trend, on February 14, 2004, the United States government launched Alhurra (Arabic for "The Free One"), a satellite broadcasting station aimed at 22 countries in the Middle East. Alhurra is an example of a failed soft power policy. Transmitting in Arabic from its Springfield Virginia offices, Alhurra was intended as a tool to promote a positive image of the United States. However, in fact, Alhurra has contributed to undermining the image of the United States and can be criticized for misusing taxpayer dollars.

Funded by the taxpayers, with nearly $500 million spent to date, Alhurra was supposed to provide the US perspective on world events to counter the wave of international criticism of the Bush administration. In the Arab world, people naturally and passionately gravitate to news sources, such as the Aljazeera, which has been (and continues to be) highly critical of U.S. policies. Alhurra was viewed as an essential counter-balance. Instead, Alhurra has emerged as a dysfunctional operation with little or no oversight. While the station’s staff is generally composed of Arabs, its management is mostly American. Management speaks no Arabic and has little or no understanding of the complex world they are trying to reach. With no language fluency and no real experience with the Middle East, they are not able to effectively analyze the actual content of the station’s transmissions before they are aired. As a result, Alhurra has actually aired programs that were inconsistent with US policy positions and undermine the image of the U.S. in the Arab world. For example, many of the Lebanese editors and reporters at Alhurra are admirers of Michel Aoun of Lebanon. Aoun is one of many Lebanese powerbrokers who aspires to be the President of Lebanon. He is also an ally of Hassan Nasrallah, the Leader of Hezbollah and a self-confessed enemy of the U.S. As a result, Alhurra has a disproportionate amount of coverage of Nasrallah’s speeches, which present policy positions that are not aligned with those of the U.S.; moreover, they are critical of the U.S. and its leadership.

It is estimated that at best, only two percent of the viewers in the Arab world are watching Alhurra, after four years of operations funded by a substantial investment by U.S. taxpayers. For Alhurra, penetrating the Arab world media is an uphill battle for two key reasons--lack of credibility and tough competition. Despite the fact that Alhurra airs programming that is inconsistent with U.S. policy, the perception in the Arab world is that Alhurra is a propaganda vehicle for the U.S. government. Therefore, it lacks the credibility necessary to attract viewers from the Arab street. Moreover, the majority of Arab households access satellite broadcasting. In the Arabian Gulf, 95 percent of households own digital receivers; and even in the poorer Arab nations such as Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia, satellite broadcasting penetration tops 75 percent. It is estimated that there are more than 300 available satellite channels in the Arab world. And Alhurra is not only competing against Arab-sourced networks, but against highly reputable European sources such as the BBC (British Broadcasting Corporation) that have had a presence in the Arab world for decades. With such a large menu to choose from, Alhurra’s odds of success in attracting sufficient viewers to effectively promote U.S. interests in the Arab world are close to zero.

The U.S. government could improve Alhurra and make it a "smart" soft power tool. Alhurra could be given a broader mission. It could be restructured as a promoter of U.S. values rather than just a distributor of news. Instead of competing ineffectively with Aljazeera, the BBC and the many numerous news outlets operating in the region, Alhurra could use cultural programming to be a vehicle for better defining U.S. values in a region in which numerous polls suggest there is serious misinformation about U.S. values. An expensive news service would be replaced by a less expensive transmitter of exciting entertainment and cultural programming dubbed in Arabic and geared to help the Arab world better understand U.S. democracy, Americans, and our way of life. In the Arab world, while "democracy," "pluralism," "transparency," and "separation of powers," might be complex and foreign concepts, Alhurra could explain these concepts in a pragmatic way that would connect with the Arab street. For example, the new Alhurra would air the well produced and award winning series about John Adams, which would give the Arab audience an appreciation for how the United States evolved as a nation with emphasis on the separation of powers and individual rights. And airing the legendary movie, 12 Angry Men, would help explain the benefits of our legal system and the importance of a jury of our peers. Such content would be an eye opener in most Arab countries. Such programming could be followed by discussions led by prominent legal scholars and policy specialists, from the U.S. and the Middle East. This sort of programming could open millions of eyes and cause populations to readjust their vision of the United States and its leadership in a lasting way.

A reformed and restructured Alhurra could play a vital role in changing hearts and minds. Supporting Alhurra in its present format is throwing good money after bad. If soft power is to be effective it must be delivered in a medium that will be persuasive for the intended audience. If we want to promote American values in the Arab world and elsewhere in trouble spots around the world, we must redefine Alhurra. Soft power is important. Smart soft power is effective. •