

The
NATIONAL STRATEGY FORUM REVIEW

An Online National Security Journal Published by the National Strategy Forum

Strategic Challenges Near and Far

Fall 2009 Volume 18, Issue 1

[August 2009 Publishers Note](#)

The U.S. & Mexico: Mutual Problems, Joint Solutions

[Reasons of State that Sustain Mexico's Strategy Against Organized Crime](#)

Eduardo Medina-Mora

[The Mexico-United States Border: A Fragmented Agenda](#)

Luis Herrera-Lasso M.

[The Mérida Initiative: A New Security Cooperation Partnership](#)

David T. Johnson

[Mexico's Strategy](#)

Iñigo Guevara Moyano

[Mexico's Polity and Economy: Security vs. Progress and Our Failed Integration](#)

José Luis Valdés-Ugalde

Special Report

[American Foreign Policy Toward Pakistan](#)

Frank Schell, Richard E. Friedman, Lauren Bean

Regions at a Glance

[War in Afghanistan: Achieving a Successful Civilian Surge](#)

Catherine Dale

NSF Insider Views

[Trying Terrorists](#)

Richard E. Friedman

[The Iranian and North Korean Nuclear Programs and International Law](#)

John Allen Williams

Speaker Summary

[Ilan Berman and Winning the Long War](#)

Eric S. Morse

August 2009 Publisher's Note

By Richard E. Friedman

Richard E. Friedman is the President of the National Strategy Forum and Publisher of the National Strategy Review.

In sport competition, the difference between winners and losers is measured by preparation and the ability to plan for future events and the unforeseen consequences of contemporary events. In business and commerce, the same metric applies: the acquisition of applicable information, future planning, and positioning for rapid adaptation to unforeseen events. Most successful businesses rely on strategic planning. However, this was not the case for financial institutions that invested in toxic mortgages for quick profit.

In brief, there is a critical difference between tactics—how immediate events are handled—and long-range strategy. Only infrequently do policymakers consider the consequences of tactical decisions. Today's fires may be extinguished, but the causation and likelihood of future fires is rarely addressed.

There is a political reason for focusing on tactics and ignoring strategy. Elected officials and government policymakers are constrained by the election cycles.

The administration in power is evaluated by voters on their performance. Consequences are rarely discussed and do not motivate voters. Politicians do not want to be held responsible for short term political consequences. In a business example, for many years very few U.S. railroads invested in their roadbed infrastructure. The result was severe infrastructure deterioration. Railroad executives failed to invest in infrastructure because it was thought that this would reduce annual profitability and diminish executive compensation. This “not on my watch” mentality is present in international affairs and national security.

In this issue of the *National Strategy Forum Review*, we have focused on Mexico and its national security strategy and how the U.S. and Mexico's national security strategies could complement each other. Many examples of failed long-term strategy exist, providing potent lessons for policymakers as they consider the shape and the direction of U.S. efforts throughout the world:

- Iran began its nuclear enrichment program in 2002 when it acquired centrifuges to make fissionable nuclear material.

NSF EDITORIAL BOARD

Richard E. Friedman
Publisher

John Allen Williams
Editor

Lauren Bean
Managing Editor

Eric S. Morse
Editorial Assistant

Editorial Board
John Allen Williams
Marilyn Diamond
Frank Schell
Endy Zemenides

53 West Jackson Blvd.
Suite 516
Chicago, IL 60604
312-697-1286

- North Korea began exporting nuclear weapons technology and long-range missile development technology in the 1990's.
- The U.S. demand for Latin American drugs has been increasing for many years and the drug trafficking route through Mexico into the U.S. is obvious. In addition, U.S. immigration policy has been cyclical, depending on U.S. prosperity and the need for low-wage immigrant workers.
- U.S. dependency on imported oil has been apparent since 1973. Scarce water resources in the western U.S. have been an enduring agricultural and demographic problem for more than a decade. Energy discussion has not reached the policy level and there is no anticipation that there will be informed discussion of scarce water resources in the immediate future.
- The issue of how to handle battlefield detainees in Afghanistan and Iraq was identified immediately before the invasion of these states. Eight years later, the U.S. is deciding how and where to try terrorists.
- The U.S. has provided billions of dollars in aid to Pakistan since 1953. After 1979, the tactical objective was to interfere with and degrade Russia's invasion of Afghanistan. At that time, the consequences were not recognized—training and equipping the *mujahideen* which developed into a leadership cadre for the Taliban. Ever since, U.S. aid money to Pakistan has fed an insatiable appetite for governmental, NGO, and police corruption. Post 9/11, the U.S. has spent over \$12.3 billion in aid to Pakistan, with roughly 1/3 going to economic and development aid sources. The result is that Pakistan is a kleptocracy where aid will be used, in large part, for corruption rather than for the purposes intended.
- For at least the past five years, it has been apparent that critical U.S. information infrastructure has been successfully attacked by cyber hackers—in the guise of both foreign states and lone individuals. Yet, the U.S. is focusing on offensive cyber-warfare capabilities and bureaucratic turf battles over control of the program, rather than organizing an effective defense against cyber attacks on critical U.S. infrastructure.

These are examples of limited tactics, failure to consider the consequences of tactics, and an absence of over-arching, long-range strategy.

We have asked NSF friends and scholars to examine regions and issues in search of a cogent U.S. strategy.

Reasons of State that Sustain Mexico's Strategy Against Organized Crime

By Eduardo Medina-Mora

Attorney General of Mexico

From the beginning of his administration in December 2006, President Felipe Calderón resolved to line-up the whole strength of the State to radically sever the growth of drug trafficking and organized crime in Mexico. This decision, although questioned by some, for the most part has been highly praised at home and abroad.

The President's decision was firmly anchored in several reasons: the commitment of every government to ensure the security of its citizens; to slash the corruption caused by the criminal organizations; to guarantee the integrity of public institutions; and to eradicate the growing violence. But the deepest, most basic *raison d'Etat* was to confront and weaken an organized crime that had expanded without bounds, to the extent that the lives of hundreds of thousands of Mexicans have already suffered an unacceptable tragedy. Many of them slept, awoke, and passed their days living in fear of crime, violence, and death.

It was impossible to hear about Mauricio and do nothing. He was a kid of only nine years old who was becoming an addict since the criminals gave away drugs at the entrance of his school to sow future clients for their deadly trade. How can we avoid feeling Elena's story as if it were our own? She was a brilliant university student, adored by her parents and with a promising future, who yielded to the pressures of friends to try drugs because "nothing bad will happen." Now she sells her body to support her addiction, her health already showing irreversible damage.

It was impossible not to feel a deep compassion for the thousands of youths who lost their lives believing that crime provided the easy way to make money, and who chose that route to live in communities where delinquency had become power, a culture, and the way to climb to a superior social status.

How could we possibly accept without doing anything that many policemen and officials in charge of public security had been corrupted by organized crime?

It was clear from the beginning that this was not a problem of bad Mexicans or bad officials but of social values corrupted by the enormous economic, social, and cultural power wielded by the criminals.

Too many people had lost any trace of shame to commit crimes, to corrupt, and to kill. Meanwhile, society had been losing its capacity to feel righteous anger about such a grim situation, a deadly combination for the future of any nation.

For all these reasons we embarked on this struggle, since it was our historical and generational duty, and because we rejected being indifferent to thousands of Mexicans that had become hostages, directly or indirectly, of organized crime and drug addiction.

Drugs and organized crime are challenges of enormous consequence for the Mexican State, which is the reason behind the broad and consistent policy adopted by President Calderón.

Mexico suffers a vicious drug cycle of production, trafficking, distribution, and consumption. In the first two, production and trafficking, we already face a very real war. Regarding distribution, we are waging a constant fight. And with respect to consumption, we can see a dangerous increase in the number of youths who, at the start of their addictions, become victims of social pressures, of the “nothing will happen” argument, or the “I can quit whenever I want” excuse.

In order to prevent the first cause of addiction, the “imitation effect” and the pursuit of fitting-in socially, children and young people must take care of each other, being conscious that drugs hurt and that they have consequences in the form of violence and death in exchange for fleeting moments of pleasure. For this purpose there is nothing better than the good collaboration among the young to defend themselves, to restore the social status in their social circle of a drug-free and healthy life, which are as relevant and positive as the defense of the environment, the involvement in just social causes, or the taste for pop music that is so enthralling in those stages of life.

Drugs have both a homicidal and a suicidal logic. They kill when they are produced and distributed, but they also do away with those who consume them. They have the perverse potential of connecting the most vital forces of the nation, its children and its youth, with the worst elements of society. Consumers generate a link with the criminals that distribute the drugs on the streets, the same thugs capable of using an automatic gun in any public place and shooting thirty blasts against an opponent.

The death and violence associated with drug distribution webs are real and dramatic. They are suffered by the families that have lost one of their dear members to the bullets of crime, including the more than one thousand exemplary policemen, soldiers, and marines that have sacrificed their lives for Mexico, for its society, and for its values.

To restore peace to the Mexican people, we have worked hard to take peace away from the criminals, as well as their impunity, making solid and certain inroads to strengthen the rule of law. The Mexican strategy is the right one and has a comprehensive perspective, which includes causes and trends as well as internal and foreign effects. It acts in an orderly and simultaneous way on all fronts, combining and structuring the capacities of the government and the society through solid domestic and international coordination.

We decided to go after the criminals and to deprive them of the advantages of their business, to interfere with the freedom with which they move, and to take away their weapons, merchandise,

transportation, and money, as well as to capture their paid assassins and their business managers and to dismantle their front corporations, their protection webs, and the assets of their criminal system.

The unprecedented results reached by these policies, followed by the Mexican government, and affirmed by the overwhelming support of its society, have led to the seizure of 176 thousand pounds of cocaine, 72,363 detainees, more than \$337 million, and 44,490 weapons taken away from the criminals.

The results of the efforts and sacrifices of the Mexican citizenry have been reflected in the world supply and demand for drugs and in the control and operational webs of the criminal organizations, as has been acknowledged by the United Nations and the Organization of American States.

We have recovered important portions of our country's territory and we are in the process of eliminating the drug cartels. We are rebuilding our institutions, and in the ultimate and most complex phase of this battle, all Mexicans must reaffirm our essential nature as responsible citizens.

We want to attain a lasting peace for our country, a goal that will be possible to accomplish only in the long run by fostering strong moral and cultural barriers to the negative values that the criminals created and multiplied. It is not possible to accept lawlessness and corruption as "normal" behavior. To be indifferent when confronted with such delinquency and to accept that cohabitation with the criminals would represent a U-turn to an insecure, violent, and terrorized Mexico that nobody wants.

This is why President Calderón, the state governors, society in general, and every one of us are so distraught that the narco-subculture and music attracts the eyes and ears of our young people.

We are concerned that the policies to contain the flows of money and the traffic of arms in the world are occasionally used merely as rhetorical schemes in international forums and that cooperation does not translate into concrete results. We are worried that other countries of our continent have enormous structural weaknesses when confronted with the immense corrupting and intimidating power of organized crime.

The historic phase in which we live today offers us a clear lesson: organized crime attracts with "silver," then with "silver or lead," but in the end it resorts to only "lead and more lead." Crime, violence, and death are its fundamental rules.

As President Calderón has highlighted, we still have many things to do. It will demand enormous effort, persistence, and time to arrive at a safe harbor, but our vision and strategy are the correct ones. Only by persevering we will reach the supreme purpose of the Mexican State, which is to restore peace and wellbeing to our families. Only then will we have a free and

peaceful conscience and the satisfaction of having acted for Mexico's good, as well as to deliver to the future generation, our children and youth of today, the option of being better human beings and living in a much improved country.

The Mexico-United States Border: A Fragmented Agenda

By Luis Herrera-Lasso M.

Luis Herrera-Laso M. is a Mexican expert in international relations and a specialist in national and international security issues. He is currently Director of the Mexican government's School of Intelligence for National Security (ESISEN).

The Mexico – United States border is one of the busiest international borders in the world. Nearly one million persons, around 224,000 motor vehicles (2007),¹ and over 70 percent of bilateral trade cross every day through 42 ports of entry.² Many types of illegal merchandise also pass through it, especially drugs from Mexico to the United States and weapons in the opposite direction. In addition, hundreds of thousands of undocumented workers, mostly Mexican, make their way across every year.

In spite of the importance of the border for both countries, one finds that there is not one single official document that speaks of a shared strategic vision regarding the border. There is no clear-cut answer to the question: What type of border do we wish to have, or to construct together?

This situation leads us to the conception of a border with fragmented agendas: each country defines its own approach. In the absence of a shared strategic vision, every issue or problem is addressed in an isolated manner. In the absence of institutional mechanisms possessing an integral vision and mission regarding the border (in both countries), each agency attends to its own issues. In the absence of funds assigned for joint bilateral actions, each country determines the amount and distribution of the resources allocated. Thus, the bilateral border agenda is built on fragments—segments of visions, missions and answers that are presented in an isolated fashion and scarcely constitute a national border policy. There is no unity.

An expert in international relations would tell us that, by definition, border policy falls within the realm of States' sovereign rights. Strictly speaking, this is a solid argument. However, two facts stand out in the current international arena. First of all, almost no country in the world, with the exception of the United States, expects to attain a greater level of security through the physical

¹ "U.S.-Mexican Border Land-Passenger Gateways: Entering the United States", Bureau of Transportation Statistics, http://www.bts.gov/publications/national_transportation_statistics/html/table_01_45.html.

² Estimated in 1 039 355 million dollars a day in 2008. Source of data: *Instituto Nacional de Geografía y Estadística* (INEGI), www.inegi.org.mx.

control of each and every segment of its borders. The tendency in other states is to concentrate on security agendas that address issues that transcend physical borders, as is the case of the European Union—the clearest but not the only example. Secondly, one must consider the gradual loss of control by States, in terms of the innumerable transactions and interactions that take place in an increasingly globalized world. With these arise security threats that cannot be addressed with traditional methods. The cybernetic world is just one example.

The relationship between Mexico and the United States regarding security issues is not immune to fragmentation, which becomes manifest when situations or realities are only conceived and managed as fractions and not as parts of a larger unit; they are reduced to their components and are dealt with as if they constituted the whole, but without an integral vision. I will briefly attempt to explain how fragmentation affects four of the core issues on the security agenda: drugs, weapons, terrorism, and illegal crossings. For this, I will concentrate on the realm of perceptions, where most fragmentations originate.

For most actors in the United States, having a border with Mexico is more of a problem than an advantage. Because of its language, culture, level of development, and social behavior, Mexico is seen as distant from the *American Way of Life*. For many United States citizens, the main or only reference they have of Mexico is that of undocumented workers, who are located on the lowest socio-economic strata of the country. With Canadians, they have a greater level of empathy, although Mexicans are not considered equal in this case either. For Mexicans, the United States is a similarly foreign country. It represents a source of employment and creator of wealth, a situation that they admire and take advantage of, but also a country with political, social, and cultural codes very different from their own.

From the United States' perspective, the border with Mexico is a source of concern due to the illegal merchandise that crosses the border every day. Most of this merchandise is comprised of drugs, which are perceived as a harmful factor for society. Cocaine from South America, as well as marijuana and synthetic drugs produced in Mexico make their way across the border. From the Mexican point of view, the drug production and traffic phenomenon is fueled by consumption habits in the United States.

The drug problem has remained one of the most important issues on the bilateral agenda at least since 1985, when a DEA agent was murdered in Mexico. Many actions and programs have been put in place since then to attempt to reduce drug flows. There have been some positive results, but the problem has not been eradicated. To complicate the issue, powerful criminal organizations, which sustain and propel drug trafficking, have become one of the main security threats for both countries. In spite of this, perceptions have evolved favorably in this arena, and drug trafficking has lost force as the main contaminant of bilateral relations, to be replaced by organized crime and associated violence, mostly along the border. The core issue of drugs is aggravated by higher levels of violence associated with organized crime. This is due, in large part, to the crackdown on drug trafficking during the Calderón administration.

Gone are the days when the United States blamed Mexico for the problem. It is now openly accepted that the driving force of the drug trafficking problem is consumption. Differences in perceptions have narrowed and cooperation has increased. This is good news, and yet cooperation remains fragmented. Both countries unilaterally determine their policies, although there is greater convergence of perceptions and objectives, which has resulted in more specific programs that currently form part of the Mérida Initiative.

The Mérida Initiative reflects this fragmentation. Despite the fact that it originated as a genuine binational initiative, in the United States it has become part of an assistance program for a foreign country instead of being part of an *ad hoc* cooperation mechanism created by both countries. It is possible to agree on common objectives, but the rules for the management and allocation of funds are entirely determined by the United States Congress. Without a doubt, one of the most notable elements of progress is the awareness on both sides of the border that as long as drugs are illegal, and as long as their production, transport and sale constitute one of the most lucrative businesses in history, the phenomenon will not disappear. This issue is now present in the minds of politicians and experts, and slowly receiving higher priority in official positions.

The issue of arms trafficking is another aspect of the security relationship in which there has been progress, albeit incipient. Any expert on the subject knows very well that violence in Mexico, increasingly associated with organized crime, is exercised mainly with weapons that have originated in the United States, where the right to legally purchase and possess firearms is part of the national culture. In Mexico, there is a similar culture, but it is not legal—it ceased being so in 1968. Since then, the illegal smuggling and possession of firearms bear severe penalties. Smuggling of any forbidden weapon, even a pistol, is punished with 10 years in jail.

Until recently, there was no talk in the United States of the need to control arms trafficking to Mexico, because it would be tantamount to limiting the free purchase and possession of firearms. This would potentially violate the Second Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, ferociously defended by the National Rifle Association (NRA), a conservative organization with heavy sway in Washington. Broaching the subject would constitute a significant risk for any politician.

This situation has not changed much, except for one particular fact that profoundly affects Mexico. The need to take measures to limit arms trafficking to Mexico has, for the first time, appeared in U.S governmental discourse, and specific programs are proposed for this purpose. Nevertheless, as long as the laws regarding the purchase and possession of weapons are not modified, particularly in the state of Texas, the outcome of these efforts will be limited. Even so, they represent progress, and they are part of the Mérida Initiative commitments.

The third issue to appear on the bilateral security agenda is terrorism. Ever since 2001, this topic has been regarded as the main national security threat. The border with Mexico was not exempt from consideration. It is difficult, however, to prevent illegal crossings over a border which is daily transited legally by one million people, and illegally by several hundreds of thousands of undocumented individuals each year.

Until now, there have been no registered cases of individuals belonging to international terrorist organizations using Mexican territory to prepare routes or operations targeting the United States. It would be bold, however, to ascertain that this has been the result of border control programs, and without a doubt, the potential threat remains.

For Mexicans, international terrorism has a different connotation than it does for United States citizens. Until now, Mexico has not been a target for international terrorism, and the occurrence of such an attack on Mexican soil is considered unlikely. In terms of international terrorism, what may happen in the United States is what concerns Mexico the most. If a terrorist act were committed on United States soil by an individual having entered the country through its southern border, the implications for Mexico would be enormous. It is very likely that in a matter of hours, a virtual shut-down of the border would take place, and the consequences for legal transit and border operation would be disastrous.

Mexico reacted in a positive manner from the beginning in regard to this new threat, which led to the improvement of information systems on passenger entries and exits; to the introduction of methods for the safe transit of merchandise; and, perhaps the most important elements of progress, better internal coordination mechanisms for Mexican intelligence work and increased bilateral cooperation in a field that has proven to be the most effective arena for combating terrorism. Perceptions have come to coincide and there is increased cooperation between both countries.

In comparison to the subject of terrorism, when it comes to migration issues, perceptions and agendas become even more fragmented. From the United States' point of view, since 2001, immigration has become a security issue. In the last eight years, most immigration policies that have been implemented come from a security perspective. Along the Mexico – U.S. border, the number of agents, detection systems, and resources for stricter law enforcement have all been increased. While undocumented flows have diminished, the numbers remain in the hundreds of thousands. Is the United States' southern border safer today than it was eight years ago? The answer is not clear.

Mexicans have never considered themselves a security threat to the United States, and they are offended if treated as such, as is the case of many among the hundreds of thousands of undocumented workers and their families—estimated today to amount to at least six million—that reside in the United States in order to benefit from employment opportunities. The Mexican government advocates a legal, orderly flow, but cannot do much to change policies within the U.S. Experts in the field believe that current policies have only increased the costs and risks associated with crossing the border and have also stimulated the proliferation of crimes associated with migrant smuggling. As is the case of drug traffic, the illegality of undocumented migrant flows provides business opportunities for criminals. Smugglers have never complained about tougher border enforcement measures.

Regardless of the experiences along other international boundaries, the complex Mexico – United States border relationship bears social, historical, and cultural characteristics which make fragmentation almost inevitable.

Experts believe that the primary incentive for cooperation is the perception that one country cannot resolve its problem without the other's cooperation. One might also say that there is desired cooperation and there is necessary cooperation. Collaboration between Mexico and the United States seems to fall within the second category, at least as far as Mexico is concerned. There is also a third, inevitable type of cooperation: sometimes, it is preferable to cooperate than to face the consequences of *not* cooperating, which seems to have been the United States' approach so far.

A radical change of agenda would have to involve profound changes in perception, which is unlikely in the short term. But in order to progress on the matter, taking the current state of bilateral relations as a starting point, three fundamental steps would have to be carried out: first, the joint design of a strategic vision for the border; secondly, the joint design of more efficient border management methods; and third, the joint design of a binational mechanism for the collection and allocation of resources for joint actions along the border. Until such steps are taken, any qualitative change in the bilateral relationship is unlikely to be significant. Furthermore, how long will it take us to get to that point? It is hard to predict, as it will depend on the politicians involved, their perceptions and abilities. It will also depend on the circumstances, which are usually the ones that motivate or exert pressure upon politicians.

The Mérida Initiative: A New Security Cooperation Partnership

By David T. Johnson

Assistant Secretary, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, U.S. Department of State

The Mérida Initiative is the U.S. Government's security cooperation partnership to combat transnational narcotics trafficking and organized crime in Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean. This article will focus on Mexico, the largest recipient of Mérida Initiative assistance.

Some 90% of cocaine, and a high percentage of all imported methamphetamine and marijuana, enter the U.S. through Mexico. Reducing this illegal flow has long been a key U.S. goal, and it is one component of the Mérida Initiative. The Initiative is at least as concerned, though, with the rising levels of violence and lawlessness associated with the Mexican drug trade. To counter these multiple threats, the Initiative seeks to bolster the capacity of Mexico's police, prosecutors, judiciary, prisons, and various other government entities.

The seriousness of drug-related violence in Mexico cannot be overstated, but the context in which that violence has flared must be recognized. The government of President Calderón is engaged in a determined effort to put an end to the impunity of the cartels, and the cartels are responding with a vicious campaign of murder and intimidation. By some estimates, Mexico last year sustained over 6,200 drug-related murders. As of June 30, drug-related murders in 2009 had already topped 2,600. Many of these killings were cartel-on-cartel, as rival criminals tried to fill the voids left by the Mexican government's disruption of existing networks. However, the cartels have also killed hundreds of brave Mexican police and a number of senior government officials. Innocent bystanders have also been victims, gunned down for no other reason than having been in the wrong place at the wrong time.

Cartels have meanwhile established distribution networks in many U.S. cities, and they have brought with them the violence that was once limited primarily to internecine cartel rivalries or sporadic confrontations with U.S. Border Patrol and Customs agents. Cartels have kidnapped and murdered U.S. citizens on U.S. soil, and have engaged in weapons smuggling from the United States into Mexico. The U.S. Department of Justice has recognized the cartels as the greatest organized crime threat to the United States. Though the level of violence pales in comparison to that in Mexico, the challenge for U.S. law enforcement is substantial. We cannot afford to ignore it.

A Multi-faceted Response

The U.S. Government has launched a multi-faceted response. The Departments of Homeland Security (DHS) and Justice (DOJ) are moving aggressively to disrupt illegal flows of weapons and bulk cash to Mexico and to ensure that our border security remains as resistant as possible to the flow of drugs and violence to the United States.

Closely related to our efforts on the border is the U.S. Government's commitment to reduce the demand for illegal drugs here at home. The U.S. Government committed approximately \$5 billion in 2008 to reduce illicit drug use within our borders. This amount included additional funding for drug courts that bring judicial, law enforcement, and treatment communities together with the goal of diminishing the drug addiction of non-violent offenders.

Finally, cooperative U.S.-Mexican efforts have also become imperative, and the Mérida Initiative responds to this need. The government of Mexico is not backing down from its efforts to rein in the cartels. It is pushing even more aggressively to strengthen security and the rule of law in Mexico, and our assistance is vital. The transnational nature of this threat clearly makes addressing the violence in Mexico through cooperation with, and assistance to, Mexican authorities a top priority.

Why We Need the Mérida Initiative

A key element of our success in addressing the challenge of border violence is our ability to combine our domestic enforcement efforts with those of our international partners, effectively

creating a defense in depth. Our experience in law enforcement in the United States has taught us that effective efforts against narcotics trafficking require cooperation at all levels, from the local cop on the beat to specially trained and resourced investigative units. By working with countries in the region, we can disrupt drug production and supply chains before the narcotics cross our border. The Mérida Initiative provides sorely needed support to Mexico and other partner nations, at a critical juncture in their fight.

Mexican President Calderón, since his inauguration in December 2006, has taken decisive action against transnational criminal organizations. Under his leadership, counter-narcotics and law enforcement operations have expanded throughout Mexico, and he has begun the arduous task of large-scale police and rule of law reform. His efforts to combat corruption, to confront powerful criminal syndicates, to improve coordination among security agencies, to modernize law enforcement agencies, and to professionalize their staff are without precedent. Violence has climbed markedly as President Calderón confronts the transnational drug trafficking organizations that threaten Mexico and the region. We in the U.S. must remember that horrific murders in Mexico, are not the result of the Government of Mexico's inaction, but rather of the determination of President Calderón and his administration to root out corruption and to end the influence and impunity of the cartels.

The Mérida Initiative is having an impact that goes beyond the fight against organized crime. It is beginning to transform United States-Mexico relations. President Calderón's unprecedented request for cooperation and assistance signals a break with the past and the beginning of a broader and deeper partnership – one that extends across communities and government agencies on both sides of the border. The U.S. Department of State and its Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs are working closely with key U.S. agencies such as USAID, the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, Justice, and Treasury, as well as with Mexican counterparts. State governments in the U.S. have also partnered with Mexican authorities, sharing expertise in areas such as the training of corrections officers.

Launching the Mérida Initiative

The Mérida Initiative will provide our Mexican partners with crucial tools to address common threats. Similar Mérida Initiative programs will be implemented in other countries in the region. Tools in Mexico will include:

- Inspection equipment that will prevent the smuggling of drugs, arms, bulk cash, persons, and precursor chemicals used in methamphetamine production;
- Aircraft that will allow the Mexican armed forces to patrol and identify narcotics shipments and the Mexican police to apprehend narco-traffickers;
- Enhanced data management and forensic equipment that will improve Mexican law enforcement's ability to target narco-trafficking and cross-border crimes;

- Enhanced information systems in Mexico that will strengthen interconnectivity across law enforcement agencies and improve information sharing with U.S. counterparts;
- Expanded anti-corruption efforts, including training for ethics and anti-corruption under a police professionalization program, support for citizen complaint offices, and training and equipping of inspector general offices to confront corruption throughout the federal bureaucracy; and,
- Judicial reform programs to improve crime prevention and to strengthen institution building and rule of law, including police reforms that will enhance police ability to investigate, to convict, to sentence, and to securely detain those who commit crimes.

To date, concrete implementation has begun. Initial projects include the following:

- A bilateral workshop on arms trafficking held in April, 2009 in Mexico, attended by DHS Secretary Napolitano and Attorney General Holder;
- The opening of three immigration control sites along the Mexico-Guatemala border in May, 2009 to issue biometric credentials to frequent Guatemalan border crossers;
- The implementation, also in May, 2009, of an anti-trafficking-in-persons system for the Mexican Attorney General's Office; and,
- A train-the-trainer program for Mexican Federal Corrections officers that will graduate 1,000 officers by the end of this year.

The Mexican Customs Service has also activated a pilot project at one crossing point to inspect every vehicle crossing the border. For the first time, Mexican Customs will require all southbound passengers at the border checkpoint to stop and go through an automated inspection process. The system weighs each vehicle, scans the license plate, and runs the collected data through various databases and risk analysis tools. The inspection process, completed within eight seconds, enhances the ability to prevent firearms, ammunition, and bulk cash smuggling.

Finally, to coordinate these efforts, Mexican and U.S. officials have convened interagency, bi-national implementation meetings in Mexico City, and have established nine working groups for the various Mérida Initiative projects. As planning and implementation progress, we will see the development of day-to-day working relationships that did not exist in the past, and, accordingly, more effective law enforcement operations.

Shared Responsibility

Mexico and the United States have a shared responsibility to ensure the security of the common border. In an interconnected world, problems defy national boundaries. Nowhere is this more evident than along the U.S.-Mexican frontier. Fortunately, both our governments have demonstrated a solid commitment to meeting their responsibilities.

The continued support of the U.S. Congress, the American people, and our state and local governments is vital to the success of the ongoing efforts. The Mérida Initiative alone will not solve all our problems, but it is a vital component of a multi-faceted solution. By providing the Mexican government with the capacity-building tools it needs, we are helping to fight a threat to our own nation's domestic security.

Mexico's Strategy

By Iñigo Guevara Moyano

Iñigo Guevara was head of statistical analysis at a Mexican State law enforcement agency from 2004 to 2008. He is currently a CONACYT fellow at Georgetown University's Security Studies Program.

The State of Public Security

Upon assuming the presidency in December 2006, Felipe Calderón engaged in an all-out war against organized crime. His strategy is to use the military as the centerpiece of national security policy.

In 2006, Mexico's public security forces comprised some 340,000 personnel, divided into over 1,600 Federal, State and Municipal law enforcement agencies. Federal forces accounted for approximately 5% of this force and were organized into two relatively new agencies: the Federal Preventive Police (PFP) which reported to the Public Security Ministry (SSP) and the Federal Investigations Agency (AFI), attached to the General Attorney's Office (PGR). These two agencies were considerably undermanned and underequipped, as well as penetrated and compromised, making it difficult for them to take the lead on the President's anti-crime strategy.

The country's State and local public security institutions were plagued with corruption and lack of professional standards, from recruitment and training to day-to-day operations. According to an independent poll (SIMO-CASEDE 2008), Mexican police departments had the lowest levels of public trust, next to unions and congressmen.

An attempt to homogenize standards in the Federal, State and Municipal public security forces, which varied considerably in size and quality, through the National Public Security System (SNSP), had been met with indifference from most of the State and Municipal agencies, as their chain of command did not include the Federal government. As mentioned, the difference in dimension is impressive, with manpower levels ranging from 11 to 80,000, but there was also a lack of a security culture. The concept of "security clearance" was non-existent in most state and municipal law enforcement agencies; sensitive information was shared without control mechanisms and very little supervision.

Mexico's most capable intelligence agency, the National Security Intelligence Center (CISEN), had gone through a painful reform during the previous Fox administration (2000-2006) that devastated its budget and stripped it of its already limited operational capabilities.

With this national security infrastructure in place, using the military to implement an urgent security policy was not the last option—it was the only one.

Mexico's Military Structure, Roles, and Missions

The Mexican military had been relegated to a “backstage” political role since the 1930's, which arguably helped to consolidate civilian power and strengthen the institutional nature of the armed forces. Mexico was one of the few countries in Latin America not to have a military coup in the second half of the 20th century. Without an external enemy and the random needs of conducting counter-insurgency operations, the military concentrated on providing civil assistance after natural disasters and emergencies. The Mexican military is one of the most popular and trusted institutions in Mexico, ranking third after the Catholic Church and schools.

In 1941, the armed forces were divided into two separate ministries: the National Defense Secretariat (SEDENA), which controls the army and the air force, and the Navy Secretariat (SEMAR), which comprises the fleet, naval air service, and a marine infantry corps. These ministries are headed by a senior active duty General and Admiral, which makes Mexico the only country in the hemisphere with two full defense ministers.

Each of these institutions has its own doctrine, deployment, training, communications, logistic, and procurement systems. Only after 2008 did they begin a process to establish a common logistics infrastructure.

SEDENA is the largest ministry, with over 200,000 personnel (99% of whom are military). Of these, only some 120,000 are actual combat forces, with the rest performing bureaucratic and general support functions. Its main roles are based on three directives:

- DN-I: national defense of the state from external (foreign) aggression, including foreign conventional threats, terrorism, and other non-state transnational threats.
- DN-II: national security of the institutions from internal threats, including internal terrorism, insurgencies, and, recently, drug cartels.
- DN-III: defense of the population in emergencies, usually natural emergencies such as earthquakes, forest fires, floods, hurricanes, etc.

The army has created a new brigade structure over the past 10 years, with three independent infantry brigades as the main rapid reaction force, backed by three light infantry, three Special Forces, one paratrooper, engineer, military police, and three armored brigades. However, the main operational unit continues to be the infantry battalion or (battalion sized) armored, cavalry,

or artillery regiment, which reports directly to a geographic Military Zone. There are 46 Military Zones grouped into 12 regions.

SEMAR has close to 60,000 personnel. This also includes a significant bureaucratic element. It can best be explained by the fact that the Navy's main HQ, located in Mexico City along with a "naval" airbase and four marine infantry battalions, is 240 miles from the nearest port. SEMAR's roles are similar to SEDENA's, in that they include external defense, coast guard, SAR responsibilities, and a similar DN-III civil emergency plan (PLAN MARINA).

Cooperation between SEMAR and SEDENA has increased since 2007, with the Chiefs of Staff of both services holding regular periodic meetings, but the establishment of a Joint Command structure is still far off.

When called upon, the Mexican military hierarchy was ready to take a center stage role in the government's security strategy.

Adapting to the Anti-Narcotic Role

The Mexican military began anti-narcotic operations as far back as the 1960's. They were usually limited to field eradication duties; a natural evolution led to interdiction activities with military units setting up roadblocks on major highways.

The anti-narcotic mission has evolved into a concept designated "high impact operations," which includes an eradication, interdiction, and anti-organized crime combination, with heavy emphasis on increasing detection, surveillance, mobility, intelligence, and counter-intelligence capabilities. The current situation called for an enlarged presence in urban areas, bringing their operations closer to the civilian population.

Both ministries have initiated structural reforms and force transformations in order to adapt better to the evolving anti-narcotic mission. SEMAR is considerably expanding its marine infantry corps, moving from two depleted amphibious brigades to 32 marine infantry battalions (BIM) tasked with performing maritime police, transportation, and port security, as well as their traditional amphibious assault mission.

Acknowledging its increased contact with Mexican society, SEDENA created the Human Rights General Directorate under the command of a full General. Its human rights record continues to be perceived as poor and is highly criticized by the media.

At the operational level, SEDENA designed a special 10,000-man force dubbed the Federal Support Corps (CFFA), which would be especially equipped and trained for low intensity, urban warfare operations. This elite unit would be directly subordinated to the President. This became a major controversy, and funds were not allocated by Congress for its implementation.

A clear sign of the army's changing operational needs is a 2009 order for 2,238 4X4 pick-up trucks, instead of an original requirement for 1,000 HMMWV's. Speed and maneuverability in urban environments were the deciding factors.

In both ministries, the use of innovative technologies such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV's), surveillance aerostats, and non-intrusive detection systems has begun, although at a pace that can best be described as "cautious."

Expanded Missions and New Strategies

The missions entrusted to the military are expanding as counter-intelligence operations launched by multiple federal agencies have exposed just how deeply organized crime and corruption had penetrated most of Mexico's institutions.

With uncontrolled violence rampaging in ungoverned or ill-governed spaces, the government devised a surge strategy dubbed "Joint Operations," overwhelmingly pouring in troops and federal agents to stabilize selected hot spots. Medium sized cities such as Chihuahua, Morelia, Ciudad Juarez, and Tijuana saw large-scale military deployments. To date (July 2009), Ciudad Juarez has a presence of some 12,000 troops. The initial effect was positive, but the problems of living in a militarized state soon became evident. Active duty officers were assigned to command local law enforcement agencies directly, as police chiefs resigned, fled, or were executed by organized crime.

In 2006 the air force took over the air eradication mission, performed by a fleet of some 50 helicopters and 8 aircraft operated by the PGR. These were transferred along with spares and ten forward operating bases. Their amalgamation was not problem free, and the air force found itself with 30% of its helicopter assets exclusively dedicated to the eradication mission.

In an effort to increase detection of illegal fields, SEMAR implemented a satellite imaging system based on the SPOT constellation of satellites in March 2009. Detection of illegal fields has increased to such a degree that SEDENA is finding it hard to obtain the proper number of personnel for the field eradication work. In the summer of 2009, two new programs have been put into place: the deployment of over 5,000 cadets from all the branches of the military education system to the Golden Triangle (the violent tripartite border of the northern Chihuahua, Durango and Sinaloa states) and a pilot program that saw 300 conscripts deploy on a month-long eradication tour to Michoacán starting June 26. This is a complete revolution in Mexican military service, as conscription had been limited to Saturday-only exercise and civil action tasks for decades.

During June 2009, maritime transportation and port security became completely entrusted to SEMAR, which will now deploy forces to Mexico's 107 ports. At roughly the same time SEDENA has taken responsibility for providing security at customs and border posts. Army troops will be responsible for inspecting vehicles and cargo going into Mexico; the U.S.-Mexico

border is especially targeted for the anti-weapons smuggling mission. This plethora of new missions brings us to the next major issue: funding.

Not a Wartime Budget

Mexican defense funding has increased to a modest 20% since 2006, but at about 0.6-0.8% of GDP, it is still considerably low, even by Latin American standards. It continues to be dominated by an inadequate salary structure, and procurement is done in a reactive and priority-driven way. It is especially hard to exercise good accountability and transparency under these circumstances. Long-term procurement planning for modern and efficient armed forces cannot be achieved with the current structure.

Mexico's Congress has discarded efforts from SEDENA and SEMAR to fund the more conventional and basic defense needs, such as fighter jets, amphibious ships, howitzers, and air defense batteries, arguing that they are not a priority in the national security scenario. Acquisition of the proper force multipliers, including much-needed helicopters, transport, and surveillance aircraft for air-mobile and air-interdiction missions has been considerably slow, and to a large degree dependent on foreign assistance.

Natural Allies

Although this is a complicated relationship in almost every dimension, Mexico's natural ally is the United States. One thing to keep in mind is that the asymmetries between the U.S. and Mexican armed forces go well beyond the former's technological superiority, as their roles and missions differ considerably. While the Mexican force's roles are mainly centered on internal security and civil protection operations, the *Posse Comitatus* Act restricts the U.S. armed forces from operating in a similar role. Although the Mexican military's main operational counterparts lie in the U.S. Homeland Security community rather than at DOD, a military-to-military relationship also needs to develop.

The absence of external threats and a non-military interventionist policy has meant that the Mexican military stands alone, with no formal allied structure. Its last combat expedition took place during the latter part of WWII, with the deployment of a single fighter bomber squadron to fight alongside Allied forces in the Pacific.

More recently, Mexican forces have performed several international deployments on humanitarian relief missions. Some of the most significant include the deployment of 184 army troops and 45 vehicles to Texas as well as a Newport-class LST and helicopters to Biloxi, Mississippi to aid victims of Hurricane Katrina in September 2005. Earlier that same year, SEMAR sent 487 personnel, a Newport-class LST, a multi-purpose vessel, and three helicopters to Indonesia in the aftermath of the Tsunami.

Strategic Recommendations

A series of 2008-2009 independent polls (SIMO-CASEDE) provided (or reinforced) a picture of what Mexicans want to see their armed forces doing. There was little surprise: 85% approve the use of the military in the war on drugs, 75% approve of its use against armed groups, and 69% want to see them directing law enforcement efforts. 51% of the polled population supported participation in UN peacekeeping operations and 43% favored participating in bi-national or tri-national operations with the United States and Canada. With this in mind legislators need to become more involved and the country needs to develop a defense policy. It is only through increased engagement by Congress and organized civil society that real public policy can be drafted. This is essential to obtain true democratic control of the armed forces. Reaching consensus may well be Mexico's biggest challenge.

- In order to relieve the burden of a bureaucratized military, a civilian-staffed defense ministry needs to be established. This cannot be improvised; a generation of civil servants needs to be trained in defense administration, strategy, planning, and intelligence and civil-military relations. Experience from countries where this has enabled a more professional and capable military, such as Colombia, Chile, and Spain should prove invaluable.
- New civilian security agencies need to be created soon to eventually take over a number of internal security functions that have recently been militarized. Institution building is a long process which has to start as soon as possible.
- The armed forces' operational capabilities need to be enhanced in order for them to fulfill their current priorities as well as the more traditional roles of a military force. This should see a continuance on airmobile development, intelligence and counter-intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) assets, infrastructure protection, command and control, and situational awareness, among others. The pace of integrating new technologies that become force multipliers and enablers, such as unmanned vehicles, biometric devices, non-intrusive detection systems, area denial systems, and all weather sensors should be increased.
- Inter-agency studies into the development of next generation requirements, ranging from space operations and cyber-defense to underwater sovereignty, need to be addressed.
- U.S. policymakers need to understand that even the slightest perception of exercising direct oversight or conditional mechanisms over Mexican forces is a political killer for any Mexican administration. The U.S. should rather direct its efforts at helping the Mexican government create an efficient and democratic oversight capability. Healthy examples of this are the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the Congressional Research Service (CRS).
- Backing from the U.S. Government is seldom mentioned in this paper for a very simple reason: it is unquestionable that full cooperation between our two great nations is needed in order to attain a secure future. The U.S. Government should continue to back the

Mexican government through the Mérida Initiative as well as the increasing military-to-military relationship.

Mexico's Polity and Economy: Security vs. Progress and Our Failed Integration

By José Luis Valdés-Ugalde

Director of the Center for Research on North America (CISAN) at the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM), jvaldes@servidor.unam.mx, www.cisan.unam.mx.

Despite a hopeful beginning, Mexico seems to be going backward in its move toward democracy and economic progress. Its economic model stems directly from the inability to allow the profound transformation of the polity that would make it possible to carry out reforms to make the Mexican economy viable. The enormous commitments the current government has made in its struggle against crime has had a negative impact on regional integration.

2001: The Beginning of the Return to the Debacle

Not long ago, Mexico foresaw a complicated but promising transition to democracy. Pluralism in the legislature, despite the continued existence of a closed political regime, was an encouraging sign of Mexico's liberalization. The main political parties seemed to understand that after 1988, when the PRI candidate, Carlos Salinas, was elected president, the best way forward was to seek consensus for building robust institutions capable of supporting and leading to the new Mexican democracy. In fact, a positive joining of forces was achieved that led to the consolidation of the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE), then headed brilliantly by Jose Woldenberg. However, something very serious took place in recent years that says a great deal about the shapeless nature of our political and social structure. The political parties, which in theory should have pushed gently for the great changes that Mexican society was demanding, consolidated their monolithic power by taking advantage of the huge economic privileges given to them by electoral norms in what is one of the Americas' most expensive electoral systems. Thus, plutocratic, authoritarian temptations were imposed, dominating the PRI, as well as the PAN, the PRD, and the bonsai parties. As a result, the legislature has run riot over the institutions of political transition, and has been subjected to the tyranny of the parties.

The Cost of Democracy

The maintenance and conservation of Mexico's democratic system is expensive. Despite enormous outlays of public resources, Mexico's democracy is profoundly ineffective at implementing the national political agenda, which includes matters vitally important for the country's future. Many of our political actors operate factionally, according to their own agendas—when they're not secret—and their own priorities that are set by personal interests. To

a great extent, this system is similar to the old PRI tradition. Our democratic transition has not yet produced the services it needs to function. The public's perception is that legislators' actions, far from naturally reflecting the popular mandate, are completely divorced from the will and sentiments of the citizenry. Along the way, they have hijacked priority issues of the national agenda such as energy conservation and energy alternatives, structural reforms of the economy, organized crime, employment, deficient public and private services, and sustainable growth.

Mexico's legislators are also paid out of proportion to their effective administration of government. The salaries paid to Mexico's legislators on a commensurate currency basis are higher than payments made to legislators of NAFTA partners, Canada, the European Parliament, the German Bundestag, and all of the Latin American countries.

Is Mexico Still PRIísta?

Although far from its glory days, recent evidence points to the restoration of the PRI party that was hegemonic for 70 years. This is no minor matter for Mexican democracy. On the one hand, it reflects the scant imagination and effectiveness shown during the years of democratic alternation, both by the previous and the current administration. On the other hand, it shows that the absence of both a modern left and a modern right capable of fostering a strategic, inclusive, forward-looking modernization project allows the most noxious traditions and practices of the past to remain in place.

A comprehensive political-institutional structure among the political actors and the branches of government has not been formed to deal with the enormous complexity of Mexico's democratic transition and the huge need for economic change that would advance the benefits that modernity offers. There has been practically no significant progress in any field that would justify the idea that "getting the PRI out of Los Pinos" had made a profound difference beyond its simple ouster. This is explained by the lack of a clear strategy for political change, as well as the lack of political will and integrity on the part of all the actors involved. The result is political, social, and economic stasis.

In short, Mexico's political and social climate has failed to change. A broad majority, beyond ideological dogmas, has not been forged to articulate a coherent plan to dismantle the institutions and forms and traditions of state authoritarianism dominant in Mexico for more than 70 years. Customs and usage from the old regime are preserved and cultivated daily, permeating the bad political dealings over the last eight years. Politicians, party and electoral bureaucracies, and the citizenry itself have not been able to free themselves from that old ambiance that has so unfortunately characterized Mexican political, social, and institutional life.

This situation has put its stamp on Mexican society. In addition to systemic and social deterioration, stagnation has seriously injured the already battered national civic culture. The terms of representative democracy have been misunderstood; the forms of the democratic institutions have deteriorated; corporatist alliances have been reproduced in the fashion of the old

political traditions of the last century; demagogic, irresponsible leaderships have been reproduced; and corruption has increased. In the end, alternation in office, instead of eliminating stumbling blocks, has produced and preserved more than the Mexican system can tolerate. Moreover, the governing class's lack of societal skill, the threat of organized crime, the profound economic crisis stemming from the U.S. economic crisis, and the failed economic model and its handling by the government have dramatically hemmed in the state and society and has made the restoration of authoritarianism more likely.

Mexico may well be submerged in the deepest social crisis of the last three decades. Mexican society's most vital interests have been adrift in a no-man's-land or sequestered amidst the authorities' overwhelming ineffectiveness. Police corruption and criminal activity are out of control. Every day brings news of executions and kidnappings all over the country. The drug-trafficking gangs are getting stronger. Their attacks are increasingly ferocious, reinforcing the official hypothesis that kidnapping has now become a business. Social and political degradation is monumental. In the face of this decadent spectacle, where the security of each one of our fellow citizens is at stake and individual freedoms are checked, we can see in the distance a diminished political class that understands very little of the whole panorama and can come to no consensus among its own members.

The hypothesis is beginning to gain credence that politicians, in their incompetence, have produced enormous vacuums of power at different levels of decision-making that have been filled by organized crime. According to different sources, the implementation of federal security policies costs more than US\$120 billion a year (15 percent of Mexico's GDP), with more than 90 percent of crimes going unsolved and allowing a crime to be committed every 22 seconds. The security figure surpasses the combined annual production costs of the agricultural, mining, construction, and gas and electricity sectors, which represent 12 percent of GDP. Is this imbalance acceptable? If this scenario does not change, we are sentencing ourselves to run in place forever, like Alice in Wonderland.

NAFTA, Truncated Integration?

Given this political scenario, the setbacks to the economy are no surprise. Moreover, the integration process does not have the impetus that it could have had, due to the lack of strategic structural reforms.

In this context, Mexico seems to be the big loser in the hemispheric dynamic. Given the current state of relations of the countries in the hemisphere, the perception is that Mexico lags behind most Latin American countries with regard to priorities, exchanges, and real dialogue, and is also politically and economically removed from the United States. The distance between Mexico and the United States has increased for two main reasons. The first is an almost absolute lack of reciprocity and sensitivity on the part of the United States regarding mutually important issues like immigration and security. The second is a deep-rooted confusion about the definition of the relationship between Mexico and the United States, a confusion involving the relationship's lack

of definition and formality. The result is an imperfect friendship that is destructive to Mexican society.

Mexico has insisted on forging a relationship with the United States based either on a personal identification between the two countries' leaders or on a supposed special relationship between the countries. In so doing, it has neglected relations with the South and missed the opportunities its exceptional geographical position offers as the neighbor and intermediary with the United States, a bridge between North and South (Central America, the Caribbean and South America), and a focal point for migration.

Seemingly, geography acts to Mexico's detriment because its proximity to the United States limits its foreign policy opportunities, rather than broadening them. It moved from authoritarianism, in which foreign policy was not a result of consensus, to an incipient democracy, in which foreign policy was improvised with national interests left undefined and forged under the failed Washington Consensus. Mexico's distance from Latin America has been deepened by a series of events and omissions that have torn away its place as a regional leader. This has caused resentment in the rest of the hemisphere because of the lack of effective policy and undefined interests and priorities. Examples of poor policy include deliberately putting migration at the top of its foreign policy agenda, focusing exclusively on Mexican migration northward and ignoring its role as a receiving and transit country for migrants from the south; Mexican diplomacy's low profile during the clashes with Cuba and Venezuela; its waffling in implementing the Puebla-Panama Plan; the frail alliance with MERCOSUR; and its paralysis in the face of the break-up of the G-3, among other things.

Conclusion: Is NAFTA an Integration Model at a Standstill?

Originally proposed as the hemispheric integration model *par excellence*, 15 years after coming into force, NAFTA is sunk in a political and operational crisis. The operational crisis can be seen in the loss of its share of international trade, which has dropped from 19 percent to 14 percent between 2000 and 2006. Each member country has also lost international trade shares: the United States dropped from 12.1 percent to 8.6 percent; Canada, from 4.3 percent to 3.2 percent; and Mexico, from 2.6 percent to 2.1 percent. By contrast, China increased its share of world trade by 4.7 percent, displacing Mexico in the U.S. market, to represent 15.84 percent of U.S. imports, while Mexico only represents 10.81 percent. The fact that the integration economies NAFTA was expected to generate failed to materialize is one of the reasons for this apparent stagnation. The integration strategy did not move forward in infrastructure, logistics, and technological innovation, and at the same time, the treaty itself was not designed with a focus on complementing production.

These criticisms show a weakening of the Mexican model for integration. Nevertheless, speculating about possible hemispheric integration based on NAFTA demands that we analyze the lessons that the Mexican experience offers. Despite NAFTA's apparent deterioration as a model for integration and growth, it is undeniably the bloc with the greatest economic power and

largest portion of world trade. The difference among the sub-regional blocs in terms of trade volume is abysmal: MERCOSUR represents only 11 percent of NAFTA's exports and only 4.9 of its imports. With regard to inter- and intra-regional trade, NAFTA countries do 55.85 percent of their trade with its other members and only 5.8 percent with the rest of the non-NAFTA countries of the hemisphere. Meanwhile, Central and South American trade with North America represents 33.4 percent of their total, and more than intra-regional trade (24.3 percent). Undoubtedly, the biggest attraction the United States can offer in terms of trade is entry into its market, which does not automatically translate into development, economic growth or, in the last analysis, active integration for its trade partners.

Evaluating the treaty's results by looking at Mexico's indicators gives us an idea of the effects of hemispheric integration on the framework of an amplified NAFTA. Between 1994 and 2006, Mexico's imports as a proportion of its GDP grew 15.1 percent and came to 28 percent of its total trade. The trade surplus *vis-à-vis* the United States has come to more than US\$70 billion. While in 1995 Mexico had 51.2 percent inflation, by 2007 it was down to 3.76 percent.

Other implications are not as positive. Mexico lost competitiveness worldwide, going from 35th place in 2000 to 58th place in 2006, according to the 2007-2008 Global Competitiveness Report. No matter how important the growth of exports, the export model has shown little capacity to pull the national economy forward given that its real growth rates have remained very low. The much praised trade surplus with the United States contrasts with the overall trade deficit with the rest of the world and the urgency of diversifying trade: from January to December 2007, Mexico's trade balance accumulated a preliminary deficit of US\$11.183 billion. On the job front, according to the U.S. Department of Commerce, from 1993 to 2007, 26 million new jobs were created in the United States. On the other hand, a shadow is cast over the five million jobs created in Mexico by the 1.3 million jobs lost in agriculture, the deficit in the agricultural trade balance, and the very patchy liberalization in that sector.

On the whole, no matter how much better it is than the rest of the regional blocs in the hemisphere, NAFTA's participation in world trade has dropped from 19 percent to 14 percent and China has filled in the vacuums of trade leadership, going from 3.8 percent to 8.3 percent of world trade. In fact, annual trade growth figures are not very encouraging either. While MERCOSUR grew 28 percent in 2004 and 23 percent in 2005, with Venezuela achieving its most dynamic growth at 43 percent, NAFTA grew 22 percent in 2004 and dropped 13 percent the following year. In both periods, Mexico grew 14 percent and the United States 14 percent and 12 percent respectively, which were lower rates than those of Brazil, Chile and Venezuela.

Given NAFTA's relative decline as a model for integration and growth, how attractive can it be for the South American economies, which, at least in the MERCOSUR, have grown 28 percent in 2004 and 21 percent in 2005, while NAFTA has sustained a 9-percent drop from 2004 to 2005 with a trade growth of 13 percent? Within NAFTA, northward migration has not lessened because the development gap among the member countries has not shrunk. On the contrary, remittances (US\$24.354 billion, last year) have become an instrument for pseudo-development.

From the south, proposals for hemispheric integration are not completely inclusive and increasingly tend toward sub-regionalization.

Integration projects have been proposed in which strategic vision is limited due to the asymmetries among the proposed participants and the absence of a political will for reciprocity. Therefore, the question continues to be relevant as to how to integrate asymmetrical economies without incurring stagnation and dependency among the less developed countries in a continent in which economic, political, and social differences are huge. Given the current state of the South American region, the impetus for integration cannot come solely from the North, but must also come from the South. It is debatable whether, given U.S. national security priorities, there is any possibility of reviving a comprehensive integration project. And, if there were any intention by South America to foster integration, it is by no means clear whether Mexico would be included and in what capacity. In any case, Mexico is facing domestic political crises of governance and modernization that are of similar scope to its notable loss of competitiveness in the region and the world.

American Foreign Policy Toward Pakistan

By Frank Schell, Richard E. Friedman, and Lauren Bean

Frank Schell is a member of the editorial board of the National Strategy Forum. A business consultant and former international banking executive, he serves on the Dean's International Council of the Harris School of Public Policy Studies at the University of Chicago and is a guest lecturer on South Asia affairs. He worked in the U.S. Peace Corps in India and speaks Hindi-Urdu.

Richard E. Friedman is the President of the National Strategy Forum and Publisher of the National Strategy Review.

Lauren Bean is the Managing Editor of the National Strategy Review.

Introduction

Pakistan, which means the “land of the pure” in Urdu, was once envisioned to be a secular country. It was founded at the partition of India in 1947 by Mohammed Ali Jinnah. Pakistan and India have fought three major wars over Kashmir and Bangladesh since partition, and there was an undeclared conflict in the Kargil area of Kashmir in 1999. This history serves to make South Asia especially tense, and there is potential for failed states and disintegration.

In view of its proximity to Russia, a shared frontier with China, and its borders with India and former Soviet republics that are principally Muslim, Pakistan is strategically important to the United States. Despite possessing a military ranking in the world’s top seven, the Islamic

Republic of Pakistan is currently challenged by an ideologically driven Taliban, which has laid claim to much of the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) and Baluchistan—two of the country’s four provinces—and to the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), located northeast of Baluchistan on the border with Afghanistan.

The locus of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda continues to be in neighboring Afghanistan and Pakistan, sometimes known as “Af-Pak,” where a porous border through remote and rugged terrain permits easy hit and run operations by Taliban and Al-Qaeda insurgents. For some observers, Pakistan’s security is challenged by the Taliban, a deadly enemy of the United States. However, these observers believe there is no immediate threat to the government and they think that the Taliban, while it cannot be eradicated, can be diminished and controlled. For others, the Islamic republic’s life is in danger and time is running out.

During the months of May and June, 2009, the National Strategy Forum conducted a series of seventeen telephone interviews and two meetings in person with Pakistani leaders, past and present, in the fields of security, military and intelligence, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the political establishment, civic and religious leaders, medicine, law, business, and financial services – all without attribution. The purpose of this special report is to:

- Gauge Pakistan’s importance to the U.S. and review the historical relationship.
- Define the strategic objectives of the U.S. and Pakistan, and Pakistan’s perceptions of the U.S.
- Examine Pakistan’s unmet social and economic needs and the message of the Taliban.
- Discuss geopolitical issues pertaining to Afghanistan and the Kashmir territory.
- Review the U.S. role in meeting these challenges to Pakistan’s security.
- Recommend policy actions for the U.S.

History of the U.S. - Pakistan Relationship

For decades, the United States has treated Pakistan without sufficient regard to the long term. There has been no comprehensive strategy, and U.S. efforts have largely been reactive to events and directed at the particular regime in power, as opposed to the country or region as a whole.

Pakistan’s membership in the Central Treaty Organization, established in 1955, alongside border countries such as Turkey, Iran, and others, made it a key partner in containment of the Soviet Union during the Cold War. For example, Peshawar, the capital of the NWFP, was the site of a major U.S. airbase for U-2 flights over the Soviet Union. Also, the Pakistani President, General Yahya Khan, facilitated President Richard Nixon’s 1972 visit to Beijing.

In the 1970s, General Zia-ul-Haq introduced Islamic Sharia law, encouraged the development of madrassa schools with religious teachings, and Islamicized the Pakistan army and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), the intelligence apparatus. When the armies of the Soviet Union crossed the ancient Oxus River, now known as the Amu Darya, to invade Afghanistan in 1979, Pakistan became a sanctuary for the U.S. equipped mujahedin – ultimately helping to force Russia's withdrawal from Afghanistan. No longer useful and soon abandoned by the United States, many of those well-armed and religiously inspired mujahedin evolved into the Islamist jihadists of today, with Taliban and Al-Qaeda associations.

After Pakistan tested its nuclear weapons in 1998, U.S. support declined and Pakistan was subjected to sanctions. At the same time, rogue Pakistani nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan was spreading nuclear technology to North Korea, Libya, and Iran. He is still regarded as a national hero. The full extent of cooperation within Pakistan has not been fully disclosed, further straining relations between the U.S. and Pakistan.

As a partner in the global war on terror, Pakistan has been criticized by the U.S. for a lack of resolve in engaging the Taliban, despite having received more foreign aid from the U.S. than most countries. For example, the U.S. has provided \$12 billion in aid since 9/11, most of it in military assistance. There is now a proposal in Congress, the Kerry-Lugar Bill, to provide \$1.5 billion in non-military assistance per year for five years, with another \$7.5 billion for the following five years. In addition, military assistance will be \$3 billion per year for the next five years. From the early 1950s until last year, Pakistan has received \$73 billion in aid from all sources. Since the Mumbai attacks in 2009, Pakistan has received aid or commitments of \$23 billion, including a \$7.6 billion IMF loan (source: *Japan Times*, April 25, 2009). Recently, the International Monetary Fund approved Pakistan's request for an additional \$4 billion in aid funds.

U.S. and Pakistan: Strategic Objectives

Combating the Taliban and Al-Qaeda is a shared U.S.-Pakistan objective, one that has been more prominent on the U.S. agenda since 9/11 and has been elevated by Pakistan in recent months due to increasing violence there. The Af-Pak region may be seen as a whole in view of the dysfunctional border, which has never been recognized by the local Pashtun (Pathan) since 1893, when the Durand Line was established by British cartographers. In recent years, U.S. strategy in Af-Pak has been protean and confusing, initially directed at the hunt for Osama bin Laden. It then evolved into support for democracy, drug interdiction, maintaining the dictatorial Musharraf and Karzai governments, winning over warlords, averting disintegration, and now fighting a rejuvenated Taliban insurgency to prevent the takeover of a nuclear armed nation while protecting the Afghan countryside. U.S. objectives toward Af-Pak tend to be seen principally through a military prism, or as some might say, through the target acquisition sensors of a Predator drone.

The Pakistani objective has been, in large part, to secure foreign aid and to assure regime survival – with enough engagement with the Taliban to placate the U.S., but not enough to provoke a domestic crisis or *coup d'état* by Taliban members or sympathizers within the army and ISI. Further, Pakistan has used the strategic threat of India to justify the high profile and voracious appetite of its professional army, the most respected and capable of its institutions, and to rally public opinion behind various military and civilian governments.

U.S. Intentions – Pakistan's Perceptions

There is a widespread perception in Pakistan that the U.S. is interested only in its own selfish objectives, such as counterterrorism, military engagement with the Taliban, and the security of Pakistani nuclear weapons, rather than in the underlying social causes of unrest in Pakistan. Some Pakistanis attribute U.S. interest in Pakistan to shared borders with China and Iran, and its proximity to Russia and the Caspian oil region.

The presence of the U.S. coalition in Afghanistan is identified as a cause of instability in FATA and NWFP, in view of the conflict being pushed into Pakistan. Some Pakistanis believe that prior to 9/11, the situation in those areas was relatively manageable.

There is also a view that the lack of hands-on monitoring of U.S. aid, administered over decades, has contributed to a culture of corruption of major proportions, with very little support getting through to the intended recipients. Furthermore, some observers maintain that the U.S. will abandon Pakistan as soon as U.S. objectives are substantially met—above all, suppression of the Taliban and its influence. In the meantime, the U.S. is perceived as supporting an unstable and corrupt Pakistani government, all the while professing its commitment to democracy. The street in Pakistan reportedly harbors anger toward its own government and toward the United States, which it considers a facilitator of corruption. The Predator drone strikes, with their collateral civilian casualties, have incensed rural populations. The intelligentsia is generally less anti-American than the street, although it continues to be cynical about the U.S. and its intentions.

Pakistan's Unmet Needs and the Message of the Taliban

The economy of Pakistan has weakened to the point that a \$7.6 billion emergency IMF loan was announced in November of 2008. Added to that is a rate of inflation that reached 25 percent late last year, although it is now receding somewhat.

There are other negative statistics (source - *CIA World Factbook*). Much of the 176 million population is separated from the mainstream and either conducts subsistence agriculture or lives in urban squalor. Nearly 40 percent of the people are under the age of fifteen, with a median age of about 21. Many in urban and rural areas have no prospects for any meaningful employment or life ahead of them. Per capita GDP (Purchasing Power Parity) is \$2,600. Also, low literacy rates inhibit broad-based communications: male literacy is 63 percent and female literacy is 36 percent. The information vacuum created by the absence of radios and televisions in remote

areas creates fertile ground for conspiracy theories. Information is often passed by word of mouth, and is frequently anti-U.S.

Although education, public health, infrastructure, and human services are among the top priorities of the Government of Pakistan, it has failed to deliver them to the interior and to parts of the cities. There is a deep cynicism expressed as to how the elites of the country have failed the rest of the population by living cloistered lives, amassing great wealth, participating in systemic corruption, siphoning off aid monies, and maintaining their own wealth in offshore havens. NGOs are also met with some skepticism because some are reportedly owned by powerful Pakistani political elements.

The Taliban is now comprised of many segments: foreign parties, displaced refugees, Sharia law fanatics, criminal elements, warlords and mercenaries who associate for circumstantial reasons, the followers of the toppled Mullah Omar now in hiding, the other tribal insurgents from NWFP to FATA to the southeast province of Baluchistan, and unemployed Pakistani youth who see the Taliban as a source of income. While ethnically Pashtun in major part, it is by no means the same Pashtun Taliban that abetted Al-Qaeda prior to 9/11. It is now a Taliban with less religiosity and more revolutionary fervor – increasingly a peasant revolt. The Taliban message of jobs, food and nutrition, clean water, tractors, shelter, clothing, medicine, and the dispensation of justice for children and adults alike resonates with the disenfranchised, who own only the clothes on their backs. In view of these unmet social needs, the Taliban are viewed in some quarters as saviors who protect the people from the vested interests and the aloof government in Islamabad. The Taliban, which is funded by its narco-operations in Afghanistan and from offshore sources, is using poverty to gain strength. For example, they are reportedly paying rural people \$300-\$400 per month to enlist, a significant sum, with promises of Jeeps and AK-47s. Although the Pakistan army has made recent progress in suppressing the Taliban in the Swat Valley, we are already seeing retaliation in regions such as Waziristan (FATA) and through bombings in urban areas. The price of this military progress has been an estimate of approximately three million displaced persons, constituting enormous collateral damage. This population is sure to harbor resentment against the army and the government. With its treasury dependent in part upon opium as a cash crop, the Taliban provides compensation to the families of suicide bombers, a relatively new phenomenon in Pakistan.

In Pakistan's two largest cities, Karachi and Lahore, with respective populations of 12 million and 6 million, there is some fear that the Taliban ideology will potentially be adopted by the unemployed and perhaps by some in the working classes. A major cleavage in Karachi is between local Sindhis and immigrants from the north and those with earlier Indian antecedents, also known as muhajirs. There is a significant Pashtun ethnic minority in Karachi, which generally holds the lower paying jobs, but has reportedly not yet shown affinity for the Taliban. Lahore is a more homogeneous and affluent Punjabi city and is seen as less vulnerable. The general public in Pakistan does not support the Taliban and its methods. The major cities are places of moderate and secular liberal values. Public displays of Taliban brutality, often

broadcast via cell phone video images, have swayed public opinion against such methods, constituting a backlash.

The Pakistani armed forces need substantial retooling to fight the Taliban and their Al-Qaeda cohorts in a counterinsurgency (CI) and human intelligence (HUMINT) environment. The army is long on the modern hardware needed to fight a land war against India, but short on equipment, training, and techniques for urban warfare to combat extremists who resemble the local population. Uncertain of the political backing and will power of Islamabad, the army has until recently been hesitant to engage the Taliban with force and resolve. This situation is further complicated by Taliban loyalties – and perhaps even members – within the army and ISI, who partnered with the Taliban to eject the Soviet army from its nine year occupation of Afghanistan. The Taliban and allied extremists are seen as a useful, asymmetric, and provocative offset to India in the region of Kashmir. Given the cadre of Taliban sympathizers within the ISI and Pakistani military, there is the question of the degree of control within the Pakistan army. Failure to defeat the Taliban in NWFP and FATA will be read by the people of Pakistan as a failure by their government and armed forces, setting the stage for more instability.

The role of the judiciary has been controversial. While the Supreme Court and High Court are respected, they hear relatively few cases. The lower courts and the network of magistrates are seen as politicized and corrupt. There are few criteria for judicial appointments and many officials serve despite weak credentials. Further, there is a fundamental lack of access to the legal system for the lower classes. Adding to this deficient legal apparatus is the fact that Pakistani law enforcement personnel are underfunded, underequipped, and undertrained. Many crimes are not reported, and crime data is said to be often manipulated. These conditions combine to create an opportunity for the Taliban to mete out its version of justice.

Many of those interviewed see countering the Taliban threat as a matter of survival for Pakistan. However, the countervailing view among other observers is that the Taliban is a serious but manageable threat. Despite these divergent views, there is consensus about the need for enhanced political will and leadership on the part of the Pakistani government. Without political leadership, even the most effective counterterrorism strategy will fail.

Geopolitical Issues

Pakistan does not wish to see Afghanistan become a hostile country on its frontiers, as it would then be caught in a pincer with India to the east. The increasing Indian consular presence in Afghan cities is seen as a threat, along with the perceived efforts of the Indian intelligence apparatus, known as RAW, to destabilize the southwest Pakistani province of Baluchistan.

While the Kashmir region (part of the state of Jammu and Kashmir, with population 10 million) is of little economic value to either India or Pakistan, it is of strategic value to both, as it adjoins China and commands the high ground of the Karakoram mountain range. It is also of emotional importance, a place evoking images of rose gardens, thick forests of deodars, and filigree

pavilions. The Urdu couplets of the Kashmiri poets of yore also figure symbolically in the sentimental attachment of both countries to this magnificent land.

Moreover, the cost of Kashmir to Pakistan has been huge, with wars fought over its possession in 1947 and 1965, and undeclared but serious hostilities in Kargil in 1999, as noted. (The other major war with India started in 1971 over Bangladesh, formerly East Pakistan, which opted to secede from Pakistan.)

The Pakistani public believes that India should be more flexible over Kashmir, a subject that repeatedly arises in discussions regarding Pakistan's foreign policy. Kashmir is an historical anomaly – a Hindu maharaja of Kashmir was forced to accede to the Indian union in 1947 as the price of military support from New Delhi against Pashtun invaders. While the United Nations adopted a resolution for a plebiscite, India has shown very little interest in pursuing this course and has also alleged Pakistani infractions as an inhibiting reason. Kashmir continues to be a haven for various Pakistani separatist movements and terrorist organizations, including the potent Lashkar-e-Taiba, which India believes is aided by Pakistan and the source of major terrorist activity within India. It is also believed to be behind the recent terrorist attacks in Mumbai.

The U.S. Role in Pakistan

The United States, while often viewed with suspicion, is the only global power with the economic resources, reach, and access to the highest echelons in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and India. The U.S. is valued by the Pakistanis for its aid money and military hardware, and not really much else – certainly not for moral authority. Some informed people in Pakistan accept the U.S. presence in Afghanistan as a necessity for regional security, while others see a pullout from Afghanistan by the NATO coalition as a means to subdue tensions.

The reliance of the Karzai government in Afghanistan on the U.S. for its existence and the new partnership with India (particularly the U.S. India nuclear deal authorized by Congress in October 2008) give the U.S. historically unprecedented influence with all three countries. China and Russia are not seen as constructive influences and there is limited affinity for those two states in either Pakistan or India.

Recommendations

First, it must be recognized that there is no quick fix; it may take a decade or more to stabilize this part of South Asia. The unrest in NWFP, FATA, and Afghanistan dates back many centuries: the Greeks, Mughals with ethno-linguistic affinity, British, and Soviets all paid a high price for their forays into this region. There is no reason to assume that this generation of U.S. political leaders will have the world view, technology, and ability to assure a positive outcome.

Second, the focus of the Pakistan government, as well as that of the U.S. and other countries that seek a stable Pakistan, should be on offering a message of hope to the people of Af-Pak as a counter to the Taliban and other extremists' recruitment and appeal. This is a battle of ideas for the minds of young people who have no alternative prospects in life. With a renewed effort at effective public diplomacy, leveraging global telecommunications, the U.S. may be able to sway public opinion in its favor and strike a blow to the Taliban stronghold.

Third, the long-term solution is the provision of social services to the Pakistani people. The immediate challenge is to assist the three million displaced persons of the Swat Valley who need basic services. There should be a major branding effort to identify the U.S. as the source of these services, including a robust media campaign. It must also be understood that the underlying social conditions in Pakistan and the 'haves versus have-nots' conflict are the root cause of unrest in Pakistan. Poverty will continue to burden Pakistan in the absence of a comprehensive national strategy led by their government. Thus, U.S. aid should be directed at education, public health, food, and basic social service needs and at rural reconstruction projects to provide opportunities for employment.

Fourth, a new humanitarian aid distribution and oversight mechanism must be developed and should involve official U.S., foreign NGOs, or neutral party advisors as monitors. Without a robust and hands-on process for controlling and accounting for the distribution, receipt, and expenditure of aid monies, the U.S. will simply perpetuate the pervasive culture of corruption.

Fifth, the U.S. should emphasize and accelerate the training of the Pakistan army in CI, HUMINT, and psychological operations. Continued military aid should be subjected to the same control and scrutiny as humanitarian aid, so that there is confidence that U.S. funding is directed at equipping the Pakistan army for a new type of warfare, and not for more armor, artillery, and aircraft to be deployed against India.

Sixth, the U.S. should engage religious leaders constructively. Many are moderates who believe that the Taliban is distorting Islam to further its objectives. The power and communications network of the approximately 20,000 madrassas should be used, rather than feared.

Seventh, India needs to offer a positive and public signal to Pakistan. It must recognize that if Pakistan disintegrates, it will have a failed nuclear armed territory on its frontiers with a likely hostile and unpredictable orientation. While India's efforts to ease tensions over Kashmir will have minimal effect on the motivation for the Taliban insurgency in Af-Pak, they would allow Pakistan to redeploy some of its army, and they would be seen to affirm that Pakistan is a respected sovereign power, not a little brother to be patronized. India's influence is unavoidable, and it can also be a very positive force. The words India uses matter. Even more helpful would be an initial and modest Indian pullback initiated by India from the Line of Control in Kashmir, then reciprocated by Pakistan. These actions would be largely symbolic, but symbolism matters.

Eighth, Pakistan should be encouraged to reciprocate Most Favored Nation (MFN) status to India as envisioned by GATT, which was superseded by the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995. Pakistan's role in world trade, and more broadly in free markets, needs further study and attention. It has not prospered the way the Indian middle class has since the Indian economy was liberalized 1991. Advice from India on economic reforms and lessons learned, if offered without looking patronizing, would be useful.

Ninth, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India must be brought to the table together to formulate a long-term strategy formulated to share intelligence, to use the network of madrassas, and to leverage the strengths of each country for the benefit of the others. Thus far, the public dialogue has been mostly accusatory, with too much scolding and finger pointing about who is responsible for bad relations.

Tenth, fear of the Taliban is evident in Tehran, even if the Iranians are now convulsed by their own internal struggles. This could offer both the U.S. and Iran some common ground for constructive engagement. As moderates, youth, women, intellectuals, the middle class, and other voices of reform rise to be heard in Iran, the desire to sever ties to clerics and theocracy will be stronger. By extension, the brand of extremism offered by the Taliban and their Al-Qaeda cohorts will have less appeal in a modernizing Iran.

These recommendations will not be easy to implement—if so, good minds and good people in all countries would have done so already. But the status quo is unacceptable and getting worse. These recommendations are put forward in the hope that sensible policies, sustained over time, can improve the situation in the region – not only for the United States, but for the people of Pakistan.

National Strategy Forum
Chicago, Illinois
August 2009

War in Afghanistan: Achieving a Successful Civilian Surge

By Catherine Dale

Catherine Dale, Specialist in International Security at the Congressional Research Service (CRS), is currently making an extended visit to Afghanistan. Her comments here do not reflect the views of CRS, the Library of Congress, or the U.S. Congress.

On March 27, 2009, President Obama announced a new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, aimed at defeating al Qaeda and preventing the future use of either country as a safe haven. One key element of the strategy for Afghanistan was “a dramatic increase in our civilian effort.” The premise was that for the Afghan people in their daily lives, true “security” means more than the

absence of insurgents shooting at them – it also includes responsible and responsive governance, grounded in the rule of law and able to meet the needs of its citizens, giving them the sense of confidence and assurance they need to raise their children, pursue their professions, and invest in the future. More civilians are needed to help directly in meeting those goals.

The call for a civilian surge in Afghanistan reflects in part lessons learned from the war in Iraq. Many Iraq “old hands” argue that U.S. civilian contributions in Iraq were both late in coming, and never sufficient to meet demand. In Iraq, the United States went to war not only with limited numbers of military forces, but also with a fraction of the civilian expertise that proved to be needed as soon as major combat operations drew to a close. Some veterans of those efforts go so far as to argue that a more effective application of all elements of U.S. national power early on might have tempered the rise of the insurgency that later threatened to consume Iraq in irremediable civil war. Later in the course of that war, security conditions in Iraq improved due to a combination of factors including the surge of U.S. and Iraqi forces, and the “awakening” and switching sides of many Sunni Arabs. As that window of opportunity opened, U.S. military commanders on the ground in Iraq pleaded again for more civilian expertise – “Where’s the State Department?” “Where’s the civilian surge?” Some more U.S. Government experts did join the fight, yet by 2008, U.S. Embassy Baghdad had initiated a strategic drawdown plan for U.S. Government civilian-led Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs).

The push for a civilian plus-up in Afghanistan is not quite new. As early as the final months of 2008, U.S. Embassy Kabul proposed a significant boost in U.S. Government civilian expertise, to come primarily from the Department of State, the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID), and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). The additional experts would serve primarily in field positions – outside Kabul – working on PRTs, establishing new district-level teams, or providing advisory support to U.S. military task forces. It was further proposed to provide them with some additional, flexible “ready funds” to support their work. By spring 2009, following the announcement of the Administration’s new strategy, the civilian surge plans called for filling 56 priority positions by June 2009, and over 400 total positions by spring 2010. Officials now suggest that the timeline will be even faster, and the total number of new civilian positions could be significantly higher.

The empirical need in Afghanistan is real – and may be far pronounced than it was in Iraq. Thirty years of civil war ruptured the country’s economy, damaged or destroyed existing infrastructure, sundered the rule of law, and rent the fabric of human capital. The fundamental premise of a significant increase in civilian expertise is not to step in and fill the void left by those disruptions, but rather, through training and mentoring, to help Afghans further develop their own capacity and capabilities to govern.

A number of observers have suggested that it may not be easy to find quickly hundreds of volunteers for the new posts. U.S. civilian and military practitioners on the ground in Afghanistan stress an additional nuance – that the challenge is not merely to find recruits, but also to find the right people with the right skills, to serve in the right positions. In a war effort

that has been under-resourced for years, there is simply no slack in terms of personnel, time, attention, or infrastructure on the ground, they argue, to babysit “warm bodies.” Remarkably – or perhaps just gratifyingly – U.S. government officials report that there has been no shortage of eager applicants, many times the numbers required to fill the new billets, including many seasoned practitioners with critical experience in complex contingencies. For the first round of hires, at the very least, the “A Team” appears to be stepping up and volunteering.

Looking ahead, the real challenges to the success of the civilian increase may be different ones.

The first challenge is the imperative need to integrate the civilian surge with ongoing U.S. military efforts on the ground. Currently, U.S. military forces in Afghanistan provide substantial support to the non-security lines of operation – governance and development, together with the rule of law. To date, in the absence of a robust U.S. Government civilian presence, U.S. military forces have frequently played *de facto* leading roles in these areas, particularly at the provincial, district, and local levels. All but one of the U.S.-led PRTs in Afghanistan are headed by military officers, who report up a military chain of command. On average, only about three members of each PRT – out of 80 to 100 total personnel – are U.S. Government civilians. Further, U.S. military forces have made substantial use of the Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP) to support reconstruction initiatives, in particular road-building, in addition to the kinds of short-term needs-alleviation projects for which CERP was originally designed. One U.S. commander recently called CERP “a surrogate for the government’s failure to provide.” More broadly, U.S. forces, with their far greater numbers and broader footprint, enjoy a frequency of interaction with Afghan officials at the provincial and district levels that their U.S. civilian counterparts cannot yet match.

It would make sense for a more extensive U.S. Government civilian presence to leverage and build on the groundwork laid by U.S. military forces, as military forces shift from a lead to a supporting role in non-security fields. It would also make sense for U.S. military forces to continue to be prepared, realistically, to make up the difference until civilians are ready to assume those responsibilities. A new, integrated U.S. Government civil-military campaign plan for Afghanistan, currently under development, should help provide a foundation for such integration. Equally necessary are effective, ongoing coordination mechanisms, perhaps building on the current U.S. Government civil-military Executive Working Group (EWG), and its working-level secretariat, the infelicitously named Integrated Civil-Military Action Group (ICMAG). To date, the EWG and ICMAG structure seems like a mere skeleton of the far more robust coordination mechanisms that developed over time between U.S. Embassy Baghdad and the Multi-National Force-Iraq headquarters, but they are a great start.

The second challenge is the need to ensure Afghan participation in the civilian increase, which is, after all, designed to boost Afghan capacity. U.S. Government plans have called for including some 600 Afghan counterparts, working with the new U.S. civilians in Kabul and in field locations. But U.S. Government officials already report a competition among members of the international community for talented Afghan counterparts and staff. At the provincial and district

levels, U.S. officials report low levels of literacy as well as relevant professional experience. Overcoming that entrenched human capital deficit – perhaps through steps such as strengthening Afghanistan’s Civil Service Commission, boosting support for secondary education and training, and providing competitive salaries for government service – may be key to the success of further capacity-building initiatives.

The third challenge involves wrestling with the question, “How much help is enough?” In Iraq, by 2008, U.S. Government civilian and military officials were engaging in a very healthy debate about the extent to which the U.S. Government should continue to support their Iraqi military and civilian counterparts. U.S. officials posed the questions: “When is it time to take off the training wheels?” “To what extent should we ‘let them fail’?” Too little assistance could conceivably lead to catastrophic failures, while too much assistance could sap initiative, send the wrong signals, and remove the incentive for host nation officials to shoulder full responsibility.

The question is designed to help guard against a more typical U.S. Government – and especially, U.S. military – gut reaction in favor of marching out and simply solving the problem, in favor of a more difficult and indirect approach: ensuring that host nation officials have the technical and management skills they need to manage and lead on their own. This set of concerns might call for a more concerted use of mentors – not just technical experts, but senior leaders (including former senior government officials), able to mentor Afghan officials in the running of complex organizations. For its part, the Government of Afghanistan has clearly indicated that it wants a vote about the kinds of international civilian expertise provided, and where and how those officials serve.

The war in Afghanistan is first and foremost about Afghanistan itself – its people and its future. At the same time, the war may also serve as a test case for the U.S. Government – for its ability to execute a balanced, integrated application of all elements of U.S. national power. Moreover, 2009 is likely to be a critical juncture in that “test,” with the introduction of a new U.S. Government strategy, new U.S. civilian and military leadership teams in Kabul, and far more concerted national – and international – attention to the effort. It is a stellar opportunity to “get it right” and to boost prospects not only for Afghanistan’s success but also for our own ability to execute complex operations in the future.

Trying Terrorists

By Richard E. Friedman

Richard E. Friedman is the President of the National Strategy Forum and Publisher of the National Strategy Review.

Closing the Guantanamo Bay Detention Center raises issues of strategy and tactics, failure to anticipate consequences, domestic politics, and international imagery. The saga begins with the

trial and convictions of the World Trade Center bombing of 1993, wherein the defendants were tried and convicted of murder and conspiracy in federal district court in New York. These persons are serving life sentences in a supermax prison in Colorado.

Several months before the invasion of Afghanistan and, subsequently, Iraq, legal scholars and national security law practitioners presented the Bush II Administration with memos outlining options for battlefield detention, the need for preservations of the chains of evidence, and due process considerations such as probable cause for detention, right to counsel, habeas corpus concerns. They also discussed the appropriate forum for trial—military commissions, court-martial proceedings, and federal district court criminal or terrorist trials. This sound advice was either ignored or rejected.

Eight years later, the same issues are pending. Failure to identify these issues has resulted in incalculable damage to U.S. international leadership. Subsequent issues have arisen: the Abu Ghraib Afghan prison scandal, the discussion regarding torture and interrogation techniques, and candidate, now President, Obama's decision to close Guantanamo.

Shortly after 9/11, Congress passed the "Authorization to Use Military Force Act" (AUMF) which granted the President authority "to use all necessary and appropriate force against those... [who] planned, committed, or aided terrorists attacks" against the U.S. This is the legal foundation for the Global War on Terror. On January 22, 2009, President Obama issued an executive order requiring Guantanamo Bay Detention Center to be closed as soon as possible and no later than one year from the date of the Executive Order.

In May 2009, Congress expressed its opposition to any convicted terrorists being incarcerated in U.S. prisons. However, in June of this year, Congress partially reversed its position by prohibiting the Administration from freeing and transferring Guantanamo detainees onto U.S. soil until September 30, 2009. However, the compromise allowed the Administration to transfer to the U.S. any detainee it intends to try.

Although the Obama Administration declared its intention to close Guantanamo, it did not plan for the consequences: Where would the released Guantanamo detainees go—those who are tried or convicted by military commissions, court-marshal proceedings, or federal courts? The obvious choice for a caring and apologetic America would be to find safe havens for the released detainees in the U.S. However, American culture includes NIMBY (Not In My Backyard) when it comes to halfway houses, paroled criminals, drug addicts, and homes for developmentally disabled young adults.

Four Chinese Muslim Uighurs have been accepted by Bermuda. One opined that his life in the Guantanamo prison was far better than his condition in China. The Pacific Island of Palau has agreed to take 17 Uighurs in return for \$200 million in U.S. development aid. (Palau will receive \$11.6 million per Uighur, while Bermuda will receive from the U.S. only \$25,000 per Uighur.)

Approximately 232 detainees remain at Guantanamo, some of whom are awaiting trial. The Europeans have been most vocal in their support of humanitarian rights for Guantanamo detainees and praise for President Obama's declaration to close the Guantanamo prison. However, there is a decided lack of enthusiasm in the European Union to accept detainees. A fundamental reason why political reality trumps humanitarian pronouncements is that a detainee accepted by one EU member country would be able to move freely among the others.

In addition to the problem of finding havens for detainees to be released from Guantanamo, there is another array of constitutional issues. The scope of constitutional protection afforded to detainees within the U.S. is different from the protection owed to persons held at Guantanamo or elsewhere. Also, the transfer of Guantanamo detainees has immigration consequences, such as asylum and other protections.

A Guantanamo detainee transferred to the U.S. for trial would be deemed to be either a criminal or a terrorist. Constitutional issues include the right to an early trial and limitations on the use of hearsay and secret evidence. Federal courts are flexible and can develop ad hoc procedures, but there will be a steep learning curve when the trials of Guantanamo detainees begin.

A retrospective review of the strategy and tactics of how two U.S. administrations have addressed the issue of battlefield detainees is not comforting. There was no strategy and there were no tactics. The application of common sense would have yielded the following considerations to be applied to an effective strategy:

- Battlefield detainees of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq should not be characterized as traditional prisoners of war.
- Catch and release of battlefield detainees is not appropriate.
- A record of detention and preservation of the chain of evidence is required.
- Civil rights of detainees must be protected.
- Rapid acquisition of intelligence from battlefield detainees is critical.

Questions that should have been considered include:

- What interrogation techniques could be used that would not be considered forms of torture?
- Where is the appropriate place of incarceration for battlefield detainees? Is the U.S. military well-trained and prepared to act as prison guards? The Abu Ghraib scandal is instructive in this regard.
- What is the appropriate judicial forum: military commissions, court martial proceedings, or federal court criminal or terrorist trials?
- What is the appropriate trial procedure?
- What would be the effect on international public opinion of incarcerating detainees at Guantanamo?

- What is the appropriate sequence of events regarding the release of detainees at Guantanamo? First, finding havens for released detainees; second, a determination of the mode of trial; and third, release.
- How should the U.S. present its detainee policy to the American and global audience?
- What would an effective U.S. diplomacy strategy entail? Advanced discussion and consultation with other states that might become havens for released detainees?

Most of these considerations and questions could have been anticipated and resolved by application of common sense. In fact, this was done, in part, by legal scholars and national security law practitioners. Yet, neither the Bush nor the Obama Administration made use of these recommendations.

The Iranian and North Korean Nuclear Programs and International Law

By John Allen Williams

John Allen Williams is Professor of Political Science, Loyola University Chicago and Chair and President of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society. He is also Editor of the National Strategy Forum Review.

No issue other than terrorism animates public security discussions more than the strong likelihood of deliverable nuclear weapons being in the hands of North Korea and Iran relatively soon. Negotiations increasingly seem fruitless, earlier opportunities perhaps being missed, and Israeli forces are practicing for preemptive strikes on Iran as these words are written.

While the military dimension of nuclear proliferation is important, so also is international law. Even though it is often cited as the justification for actions a state wishes to take for other reasons (the Iraq War comes to mind), international law is more than that. If the goal is to create a more orderly and stable international environment, the obligations of international law need to be understood and taken seriously – even when important national interests are affected.

The situations of North Korea and Iran differ with respect to international law, because North Korea is currently not a party to the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT), along with India, Pakistan, and Israel. This treaty obligates signatories to allow inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), an organization within the United Nations family, to inspect its nuclear facilities. States must also respond to IAEA requests for information on nuclear related activities.

Iranian cooperation with the IAEA has been spotty, to be charitable. In particular, Iran has not been forthcoming about the extent of its nuclear facilities and the enrichment of uranium to weapons-grade quality. Iranian leaders claim that their program is purely civilian, designed to generate electricity, yet also boast about the increasing number of centrifuges they have and

refuse to allow IAEA inspectors to monitor their production of highly enriched uranium. Such enrichment is allowed under the NPT, but UN Security Council requirements that this activity be reported and monitored have not been observed.

A series of Security Council resolutions have directed Iran to comply fully with its obligations under the NPT and imposed specific obligations on other states in their dealings with Iran not to assist them in their nuclear activities. The key document is the 2006 Resolution 1737, which noted with concern the reports of the IAEA that Iran was out of compliance with the NPT and directed Iran to suspend “all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development, to be verified by the IAEA” and also “work on all heavy water related projects, including construction of a research reactor moderated by heavy water, also to be verified by the IAEA.” Further resolutions in 2007 and 2008 expressed concern that Iran was not following Security Council and IAEA directives. Iran is therefore out of compliance with a treaty to which it is a signatory and with resolutions of the UN Security Council.

North Korea is also out of compliance with the UN, but not because of obligations under the NPT. North Korea became a signatory to the NPT in 1983, but withdrew from the treaty in 2003 when the United States accused it of enriching uranium – accurately, as it turned out. The UN Security Council responded to the October, 2006 testing of a nuclear device by North Korea with Resolution 1718, which condemned the test and demanded that North Korea “not conduct any further nuclear test or launch of a ballistic missile,” suspend any ballistic missile development program (reinforcing the earlier Resolution 1695), and return to the NPT and IAEA safeguards. This was based on a reaffirmation that “the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace and security.”

The North Korean response to these demands was flagrant noncompliance, including further nuclear weapons and ballistic missile tests and declaring invalid the 1953 armistice which ended the Korean War. The UN response shows its limited ability to coerce states to obey its resolutions. Security Council Resolution 1874, in June, 2009, reiterated earlier condemnation and demands and greatly expanded the categories of goods and assistance that member states of the UN can provide to North Korea.

Resolution 1874 also calls for inspection of North Korean vessels to ensure they are not carrying prohibited material, now including light weapons. States are allowed to intercept such vessels for inspection, with the huge exception that the consent of the flag state is required. If it will not give consent for a search on the high seas, the flag state is mandated to direct its ship to port for inspection. It is difficult to imagine North Korea cooperating in any way with these demands, and there is no provision for the use of force to compel compliance. North Korea responded that any such interception would be interpreted as an act of war – although technically they are already in a state of war, having renounced the 1953 armistice.

Both the Iranian and the North Korean cases show the limits of international law to compel state compliance with international obligations, either those specifically agreed to (Iran) or imposed upon them by the United Nations (North Korea). Political realists have long pointed out that it is a “self help” world in which nations do what they believe to be in their interest. If the costs of compliance are deemed greater than noncompliance, nations will not comply. The United Nations has only limited ability to raise the costs of noncompliance, except through its exhortations to member states to help enforce its decisions. In this effort, only the actions of major powers have a chance of being effective.

Strategists need to consider the possibility of greatly increased nuclear proliferation if nearby states feel threatened by a nuclear armed North Korea or Iran. Given the importance to those countries of their nuclear programs, it is hard to be hopeful that the international community will get its way without greatly increasing the pain for noncompliance. That will be both difficult and dangerous. Still more dangerous would be an Israeli decision that their survival as a state requires them to deal with the Iranian nuclear problem for themselves. This is a real possibility if the international community cannot act effectively.

Speaker Summary: Ilan Berman and *Winning The Long War*

By Eric S. Morse

Eric S. Morse is the Editorial Assistant for the National Strategy Forum Review.

When every problem looks like a nail, hammer away, or so the maxim goes. The current U.S. counterinsurgency strategy often views the issue primarily as a military problem, and therefore asserts predominantly military solutions. Accordingly, the military is the tip of the spear, and all other tools at America’s disposal—civilian reconstruction units, public diplomacy, education, economic aid, etc.—are not given priority. Ilan Berman disagrees with this strategy, and argues that the U.S. military is overstretched and needs non-military reinforcements in battling a *global* insurgency.

On July 15, 2009, Ilan Berman discussed his new book, *Winning the Long War: Rethinking the Initiative Against Radical Islam*, at a luncheon cosponsored by the National Strategy Forum and the Authors Group of the Union League Club of Chicago. Mr. Berman outlined a new, multifaceted direction for U.S. counterinsurgency strategy to win the war against radical Islam. The U.S. military alone cannot win this war for four critical reasons. First, the U.S. military lacks the capacity to fight a global insurgency, and continued over-stretch only weakens America’s other strategic goals and operations around the globe. Second, the global insurgency challenge is broader in scope than the current American strategy suggests. Not all insurgencies are the same—some of these insurgencies have local consequences, some of them have global consequences. Different challenges require different approaches, not all of which are most suited to the military. Third, the insurgents that our soldiers are currently fighting in the Middle East do

not yet realize that they cannot defeat the American military. On the one hand, this suggests that the U.S. military will not be defeated in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq; on the other hand, radical Islamists are beginning to use more sophisticated, non-military methods to achieve their goals. If the U.S. fails to emphasize non-military counterinsurgency, then the ultimate battle for the hearts and minds of Muslims around the world may be lost. Finally, Mr. Berman argued that the U.S. is fighting a derivative war, one that overemphasizes the defeat of Al-Qaeda after the 9/11 attacks. There are, in fact, three major groups in the war on global insurgency: Al-Qaeda and transnational terrorists; state-sponsors of terror (such as Iran); and the 1.2 billion moderate Muslim voters scattered around the world. While moderate Muslims should not be considered adversaries, special care must be taken to gain their support.

To broaden our strategic approach in the long war, Ilan Berman suggests that America should engage on five new battle grounds: ideology, communication, economics, international law, and democratization.

The ideological battle centers on the future role of Islam in world politics and culture. The focus should be on developing a peaceful and moderate Islamic world view. For example, Mr. Berman suggested that Al Qaeda has no positive, sustaining vision for the world. If the U.S. could discredit this radical ideological point of view, recruitment and appeal for radical Islam would decrease and moderate Muslim voices would have less to fear.

The communications battle highlights the importance of effectively conveying America's intentions and values to the diverse Muslim diaspora. However, America's current communication strategy is clearly represented by, for example, President Obama's recent speech in Cairo, Egypt, in which he failed to clearly distinguish the inherent differences among Muslims. In reality, the Muslim community spans the globe. America's communication strategy must recognize the need for targeted messages, tailored to different Muslim communities.

The economic battle focuses on the alternative means by which the U.S. can use its economic power to influence state sponsors of terrorism. For example, Iran's economy is highly dependent on its oil revenue. With a barrel of oil hovering around \$64, Iran's break-even production point of roughly \$90 is unmet, causing the government to run a budgetary deficit. If the U.S. chose to influence the market price of a barrel of oil by decreasing American demand (through alternative sources of energy and increased efficiency), the economic effects would be disastrous for the regime in Tehran.

The international legal battle focuses on the challenges of creating laws that apply to transnational, stateless terrorists as well as state-sponsors of terrorism. Currently, the U.S. is muddling through a plan to close Guantanamo Bay. In a separate example, international law must face the challenges of motivating states to comply with legal agreements. North Korea and Iran are currently flouting UN sanctions. These legal problems need practical and potent solutions, neither of which will be easy to come by. Overcoming these obstacles would help to

solidify America's non-military tools to use against radical terrorist groups and state-sponsors of terrorism.

Finally, the democratization battle emphasizes the growth of the civic values, political and legal institutions, and the economic development needed to turn non-democratic governments into popular, secular democracies. A democratization strategy should aim for subtle, overt political and economic changes that, over time, strengthen the political capacity of a country to evolve into a functioning democracy.

For Ilan Berman, the challenge of global insurgency cannot be overcome by military methods alone. America needs a smarter, broader, and more diverse approach to the global insurgency in order to win the long war against radical Islam.

The *National Strategy Forum Review* is now available in electronic format on the National Strategy Forum website. Please submit your email address to Lillian Murphy, NSF Program Manager (312.697.1286), to ensure that you receive future notification about NSFR journal issues. If you do not have an email address, the NSF will notify you via regular mail about the online availability of future issues.

Thank you for your continued support.