



NATIONAL STRATEGY FORUM REVIEW

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US-MEXICAN RELATIONS: NEW ERA, SAME OLD PROBLEMS

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BOOK REVIEW:

Samuel P. Huntington's *Who Are We? -
The Challenges to America's National Identity*

Reviewed by Arthur I. Cyr

STRATEGY WATCH

RESEARCH REPORTS:

Surviving Fidel ~ A Global Shift in the Making ~ Containing Iraq ~ Counterterrorism After Al
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- The advancement and preservation of democracy is essential to promote human rights, inspire principled cultural achievement, and maximize economic development.
- Informed public opinion and an enduring non-partisan consensus are fundamental parts of national security in a democratic society.

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NATIONAL STRATEGY FORUM UPCOMING SPEAKERS:

September 14, 2004—**Nicholas Rostow**, General Counsel and Senior Policy Advisor to the US Permanent Representative, United Nations, will discuss the role of the United Nations in counterterrorism.

October 12, 2004—**Enders Wimbush**, head of strategic studies for the Hudson Institute, will discuss the strategic challenges posed by a "New Asia."

November 12, 2004—**Stewart Baker**, General Counsel for the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, will discuss intelligence gathering.

January 2005—**Jorge I. Dominguez**, Director of the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs at Harvard University, will discuss the role of Cuba in Latin America.

Please contact the NSF for more information—312.697.1286.

LETTER FROM THE PUBLISHER

The US has a 185-year history with Latin America, beginning with the Monroe Doctrine, which announced to European states that the Western Hemisphere is America's backyard. The US assisted Latin American countries to emerge from Spanish rule and begin the process of democratization. This auspicious beginning was followed by a period of divergence. The US is indifferent to Latin America; Latin America mistrusts the US.

The US strategic objectives for Latin America should be (1) stable, democratic, accountable regimes, (2) prosperity and economic growth, and (3) cooperation.

These objectives are interrelated. Stable democracies mean fewer crises for the US. Prosperity and economic reform strengthens democracy. Cooperation enhances trade, reduces drug trafficking, and prevents militant Islamists from gaining a foothold in Latin America. Another strategic concern is oil. The US imports 13 percent of its oil from Venezuela and another 15 percent of its oil from Mexico.

The Western Hemisphere should be a high US priority, since there is significant risk in ignoring Latin America. The US has paid lip service to Latin America through various diplomatic initiatives that prompted high expectations, but were not sustained by the US, including the Good Neighbor Policy of the 1930s and the Alliance for Progress of the 1960s.

The Transatlantic Alliance has cooled in recent years and may become less important to the US. The US-Asian-China relationship is dynamic and it is likely that it will become more important to US interests. Latin America is most accessible to the US and can become one of the most important relationships in the coming decades.

If Latin America is important to the US, what can be done to enhance the relationship? How can the US strengthen its economic and trade relations with Latin America to induce steady growth? How can the US support economic and political reforms?

Efforts to improve the US-Latin America relationship are a two-way street: Latin Amer-

ica needs to reform itself. The US must understand that democracy in Latin America is fragile. Widespread corruption coupled with weak economies threaten democracy. The US initiated a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with five Central American states, and the Dominican Republic and Panama are to be added at a future date. The FTA will be debated in the US Senate in 2005. There may be stiff opposition from organized American labor. Another unresolved issue is immigration. There is a legitimate concern that an imprecise and unenforceable immigration policy will result in the US becoming “Mexico North.” Should the rights, benefits, and responsibilities of US citizenship be given to hardworking Mexicans who seek to earn a decent wage to support their families and return to Mexico, but who do not intend to become American citizens? What are the trade-offs for guest workers? What are the social service costs incurred by state and local governments and how do these impact economic benefits to the US economy?

The US Hispanic population has become the largest minority group in the US. The integration of Hispanics into US society will provide insights regarding how the US can strengthen its relationship with Latin America. The Hispanic ethos is based on “cortesia” – roughly translated a system of courtesies, tra-

ditions, and values that bind Latin American society. If “cortesia” is incorporated into US foreign policy, this may be an important step in addressing the question of how to improve the US-Latin America relationship, and could be a good foundation for US policies elsewhere.

We have asked National Strategy Forum friends and scholars to examine the following issues:

- The differing perspectives regarding the importance of the US-Latin America relationship.
- The political, economic, and social trends in Latin America and the effects of these trends on the US-Latin America relationship.
- The major security threats posed by the region and the strategic implications for the US.
- The future of the US-Mexico relationship.

LATIN AMERICA 101

Brian Selmeski

Most Americans perceive Latin America¹ through a set of outdated but deeply ingrained stereotypes that cast the region as a fairly uniform group of banana republics ruled by strongmen and mired in debt. While problems persist, those days are gone (if they ever existed) and the region is actually quite diverse. It boasts six official languages and 41 countries – from giant Brazil to tiny St.-Kitts & Nevis – spanning sub-Arctic to tropical climates. Nevertheless, this brief article will only be able to identify a handful of key issues that transcend national boundaries and have serious implications for the region and US but are too often misunderstood or ignored.

Skeptics are likely wondering whether Latin America really matters to the US anymore, considering the urgency of current events in the Middle East and Central Asia. It does; Latin America is literally and figuratively “America’s backyard” and what happens there has profound economic, political, and social consequences for the US. Others argue that since every country in the region

save one, Cuba, has embraced free elections, the US’ work there is nearly done. Far from it; the region’s problems have rarely been more complex or the implications for the US as significant as now.

Latin America’s statistics speak volumes as to the region’s strategic importance: It has a population of over a half billion and a land mass nearly equal to Canada and the United States combined. According to the Department of Commerce, in 2003 the US exported \$149 billion in goods to and imported \$216 billion from Latin America, accounting for approximately 20% of foreign trade. Similarly, the Department of Energy reports that imports from the US’ eight largest crude oil providers in Latin America during 2002 accounted for nearly 3.2 million barrels a day or 35% of the total.

While impressive, these numbers only tell half the story. A closer look at the countries that provide this oil sheds additional light on the region’s nature and challenges for the US. In descending order, they are:

¹Latin America is a cultural construct more than a geographic area, but is used in this article as shorthand to refer to the Western Hemisphere south of the US, including Mexico, the Caribbean, Central and South America.

1. Mexico: only recently abandoned *de facto* one-party rule, has a 10-year old opposition to NAFTA, and a 2,000-mile border with the US permitting vast trafficking of people, drugs, and goods.
2. Venezuela: where firebrand President Chávez recently won a referendum to stay in power, antagonizing Washington by urging voters to support him and thereby “defy US imperialism”.
3. Colombia: epicenter of the “War on Drugs”, home to the hemisphere’s longest running civil war, and until recently the third largest recipient of US foreign aid after Israel and Egypt.
4. Ecuador: changed presidents seven times from 1996-2000 and then elected the colonel who led a failed indigenous-military uprising, adopted the US dollar, and is one of the world’s most corrupt countries.
5. Argentina: once the most European and affluent country in the region until an economic crisis in 2001 plunged over half the population into poverty and made a relatively obscure politician president.
6. Brazil: the sub-regional power and likely spoiler to any regional free trade agreement, where a former leftist union organizer, Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, was elected as president in 2002.
7. Guatemala: where illegal armed bands operate with near impunity despite an end to the 35-year civil war between American-supported troops and leftist guerrillas and a recent free trade pact with the US.
8. Peru: whose President, Alejandro Toledo, is so unpopular – despite an economic rebound – that some now openly support the return of the indicted former president from exile in Japan.

Although each of these eight countries’ circumstances are unique, there are also numerous similarities amongst them and with other non-oil producing states in the region, topics to which this article now turns.

Fragile democracy and distrust

The long elusive dream of electoral democracy has finally taken root in Latin America. Countries with strong democratic traditions like Chile have returned to elections after periods of dictatorship; the political spectrum has expanded in places like Mexico; governments that came to power through force of arms such as Nicaragua’s Sandinistas have been replaced by popular vote. Even insular Paraguay has rid itself of iconic dictator General Alfredo Stroessner after 34 years. Yet as broad as democracy’s roots have spread, in too many cases they have not sufficiently deepened.

While elections are prevalent, democracy in Latin America remains fragile and uneven.

Especially pressing for Latin America today is the crisis of representation. Many in the region have lost faith in political parties and are desperate for alternatives, even unproven ones. Former dictators, failed coup-makers, business magnates, dark horse regional politicians, union leaders, men of the cloth, and individuals who have never before held public office have all been elected as national leaders over the past few years due to widespread distrust and resentment of traditional politicians. Frustration with broken promises and worsening conditions has also meant that popular protests remain a key part of the region's democratic process.

Protest, new actors, and lost faith

Three democratically elected leaders have been forced from office since 2000. In part this is due to previously marginalized sectors' – Indians, landless peoples, urban poor, and others – increasing organization, outspokenness, and power. Inconsistent and shortsighted rhetoric and policy towards this phenomenon has damaged the US' reputation in the region. For instance, Washington condemned indigenous protesters who pressured the presidents of Bolivia and Ecuador to resign voluntarily, but alone with Spain's Aznar administration recognized the short-lived unelected government that replaced President Chávez after a 2002 coup attempt. Most Latin Americans

decry this as a double standard.

More fundamentally, the situation has led much of the population to abandon faith that democracy will improve their lives, a situation further exacerbated by increasing literacy rates, media saturation, and pervasive corruption. A 2004 United Nations Development Program (UNDP) report entitled "Democracy in Latin America" disturbingly concluded that nearly 55% of the region's inhabitants would prefer an authoritarian government to a democratic one if it could better their economic circumstances.

Economic instability, growth, and inequality

Ironically, despite modest growth, Latin American economies have not kept pace with the expanding population resulting in declining per capita GDP. According to the UN's Economic Commission on Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), inflation and devaluation have also decreased purchasing power, so reduced discretionary income offsets growth of the middle class. There have been good years as well; however, with few exceptions the regional economy is unstable, prone to boom and bust cycles that wreak havoc on both investors and citizens.

Latin America's primary exports to the US, its largest single trading partner, continue to heavily favor capital-intensive sectors such as nonrenewable natural resources, agricultural

products, and textiles. This has contributed to the increasing concentration of wealth. In 2003, 65-75% of households in the region earned less than the national average income and nearly half the population lived in poverty. Access to clean water, adequate food, and health care continue to elude too many Latin Americans. The hope of the majority rests precariously on the social welfare systems of nearly bankrupt states that will likely be reduced in coming years due to neo-liberal policies and declining oil prices.

Foreign debt, while not the economic boogeyman it was for Latin America in the 1980s, has not disappeared either. Ecuador and Argentina defaulted on international loan payments in 1999 and 2001, in part due to flawed IMF and US policies, the latter raising the specter of a domino effect for the Southern Cone countries. While this thankfully did not materialize, it did bring back bad memories of Latin America's slide from debt crisis into the "forgotten decade" of the 1980s and again revealed the volatility of regional economies.

Globalization and free trade

The increasing pace of globalization further exacerbates this tenuous economic situation. Not so long ago it was common to speak of "capitalism, socialism, and the (nebulous) third way." Now there is only one option for

Latin America, free trade, and those who oppose US terms and pressure risk being left behind or worse. Yet unbridled free trade is a shortsighted option, presenting numerous long-term challenges to American regional interests and security. Remember, one of the most articulate advocates of this free trade model was drug kingpin Pablo Escobar; surely the US can expound a more democratic and sustainable model.

Low wages, environmental destruction, unsafe working conditions, political corruption and the like in Latin America may benefit US consumers and stock holders in the short-term but they simultaneously limit investment, trade, and consumption. They also imperil sustainability, human wellbeing, and democracy. An already weakened Latin America may not bear up under the social and economic devastation casually labeled "adjustment" and the US' long-term costs to fix this situation likely outweigh the immediate benefits. This is not to say that collective trade agreements should be abandoned. Chile and El Salvador are generally happy with new arrangements that suit their particular socio-economic conditions well.

Urbanization, social services, and immigration

Still, the consequences of the freer movement of people, products, and capital in the

hemisphere can be quite jarring for both Latin America and the US. For example, this shift, together with the region's economic rollercoaster, has fueled migration and immigration on an unprecedented scale. Internally, Latin American citizens are abandoning the countryside in alarming numbers. The ECLAC reports that from 1980 until 2000 the percentage of urban population increased from 65% to 75%. This trend is expected to continue, approaching 80% by 2015. The effects are manifold, but perhaps most disturbingly, while urban populations swell, employment opportunities still lag. This generates a rise in unemployment and concomitant pressures on public education, health care, welfare, and other social services already strained by demands and budget cuts.

Viewed from North America this trend is troubling but overshadowed by the unprecedented scope of both legal and undocumented immigration to the US. While Samuel Huntington's recent *Foreign Policy* article "The Hispanic Challenge" was considered alarmist and insensitive in many circles, the resultant controversy together with the 2000 Census data make clear the profound demographic, social, and economic consequences the US faces. Whether these changes are on balance positive or negative and what should be done require a frank and open debate – nationally and internationally. Balancing the circulation

of people with goods, ideas, and security concerns presents an enormous challenge that cannot be ignored.

(In)security and the terrorism debate

Without security, economic development, political stability, human rights, and trade cannot flourish. However, security is a deceptively simple term and national, regional, citizen, and human security are often conflated in Latin America. Consequently, the dramatic reduction in inter-state wars does not mean the region is, or perceives itself to be, secure nor does the discourse of terrorism signal a rise in actual threats. Petty and transnational crime, on the other hand, is a growth industry in Latin America.

The police, often out-gunned, poorly trained, and under-funded, cannot compete and suffer from a generally deserved bad reputation with the citizenry. Reforms to slow, antiquated, and corrupt judicial systems also lag appallingly. Elected officials with few options too often seek to fill this vacuum by ordering the military into the streets. While this is every country's right and generally enshrined in Latin American constitutions, it threatens to undo years of gradual progress on professionalization and respect for civil authority. The hemispheric security architecture has also failed to adapt to the changing security environment, retaining a Cold War logic that falls

far short of contemporary demands. Bi-lateral and multi-lateral relationships have been implemented but are essentially stopgap measures that fail to provide a comprehensive and coherent mechanism to move ahead.

Terrorism is a relatively minor concern for Latin America, yet regional leaders are keen to ensure their words are in tune with Washington's. In the weeks after the September 11th attacks, Colombian officials began re-casting their concerns as terrorism-related to gain American support for counter-insurgency as well as counter-drug operations. The two are undeniably connected and terrorist tactics are routinely employed in Colombia, but such nuance is lost when the language of terrorism is invoked. Consequently, important public debates with enormous implications are being sidestepped at home and abroad while fear grows unnecessarily. Illegal drugs produce a similar vortex.

Illegal drugs

It is commonly accepted that the "War on Drugs" cannot be won with supply-side approaches, but this does not stop the US from spending billions of dollars trying. Colombia presents a particularly troubling dilemma, as dissecting the insurgency, drugs, paramilitaries, and criminals is a veritable Gordian knot. Removing artificial barriers between the related phenomena may sound like a positive

shift; in fact it only further militarizes problems that decades of strong-arm approaches have failed to resolve. Nor does it provide an exit strategy or sufficient congressional oversight to increasing US involvement.

There has been significant progress in some areas, from negotiated demobilizations of small numbers of combatants to the military's improved operational effectiveness, distancing from paramilitaries, and improving human rights record. Still, as in most contemporary conflicts, the lion's share of the dead, injured, disappeared, kidnapped, and dispossessed are civilians, further destabilizing the country. Likewise, massive aerial herbicide sprayings, economic stagnation, and significantly less US support for reforms in justice, health, and education do little to prepare for post-conflict reconstruction or convince citizens that Washington believes in the principles it espouses.

Colombia is not the only country where a disproportionately military approach to the problem has created more complications than it has resolved. Serious problems persist in Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, and other countries where the US has favored short-term action and rationalizations over long-term solutions and ideals. Unlike the Colombian case, *gringo* oversight has not always inculcated respect for human rights elsewhere. It has, however, produced tensions, resentment, and dependence but without tangible reductions to production or

availability. Nor does the drug problem stop at the border; in fact, most Latin Americans would say it has its origins in the US though both are affected by its violence, corruption, and expense.

What can be done?

The preceding discussion paints a dark picture of Latin America, but the situation is neither hopeless nor likely to explode in the near future. Latin Americans are gifted at enduring – bank crashes, devaluation, natural disasters, hyperinflation, dictatorship, political turmoil – but turning the situation around will require more than fortitude. US leadership, commitment, and understanding are also essential to stabilize the region and achieve American objectives. Clearly, there are more questions than answers in Latin America, and those who propose facile solutions should be suspect. There are options, though. Below are some general recommendations:

- View Latin America as filled with opportunities, not threats, and learn more about the region's issues and culture. Ignorance will only ensure decreased US legitimacy and credibility.
- Embrace Latin American-style democracy publicly to convince citizens that America respects their elections and legal forms of expression – even protest and unsavory leaders.
- Take elected Latin American officials, their national priorities, and limitations seriously. Democracy is a messy business, but grounded in principles and practices that should engender common ground.
- Support the Millennial Development Goals (MDGs) established by the UN to address poverty, education, healthcare, HIV prevention, and the environment. Reaching these ambitious targets cannot be an afterthought, will not be accomplished without US leadership, and are ignored at America's own risk as democracy without development will not produce stability.
- Accept that unbridled free trade is neither desirable nor possible. Instead promote freer trade with greater sensitivity and safeguards for countries in less stable circumstances, demonstrating the model's benefits to Latin American politicians, businesses, and citizens rather than pressuring them.
- Promote increased professionalization and modernization of regional militaries and police with aid tied to independently verified indicators addressing human rights, subordination, and transparency.
- Revise and strengthen the Inter-American Defense Board lest a good potential forum to establish and advance cooperative approaches to transnational security concerns be lost.

- Tone down the rhetoric of terrorism and war, as it breeds unwarranted fear at home and abroad, as well as suspicion of US-imposed military solutions to regional problems.
- Employ military force only after all other avenues have been exhausted and do so only in concert with allies – even for justifiable cases like Haiti. Anti-Americanism is on the rise in Latin America and should be managed through coalitions and consultation as it is elsewhere.
- Articulate a clearer vision for US regional policy, increase inter-departmental coordination, and use a less heavy handed approach. Neither leaders nor citizens want to feel ignored, confused, or bullied.
- Give Latin America greater attention in policy circles to win back the majority who have been disappointed in the Bush administration’s lack of follow-through on campaign promises.
- Focus on the future of Latin America, shaking off obsolete Cold War attitudes and policies. Cuba, for example, receives disproportionate attention from Washington as an exceptional case, yet apart from the absence of elections and above average education and healthcare systems, the island nation faces most of the same problems as others in the region. An effective,

comprehensive US policy toward Latin America must address the broader issues that burden the entire region and not focus unduly on relations with Cuba.

Latin America remains geopolitically important, economically advantageous, and socially pressing for the US. There is much to be done and many rewards to be reaped. However, to move forward more Americans must first overcome their lack of knowledge about the region and unwarranted pessimism about its future.

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US-MEXICAN RELATIONS: NEW ERA, SAME OLD PROBLEMS

Cynthia Watson, PhD

Few presidential elections abroad receive the attention that Vicente Fox Quesada's did in 2000. The idea that a Mexican president would speak English, wear jeans and cowboy boots, had been a major executive with Coca Cola, and seek to oust an authoritarian party, which had governed undefeated for seventy years, was a dream come true. The Guanajuato Governor's stunning defeat of the *Partido Revolucionario Institucional* (PRI) to assume the presidency led to U.S. anticipation in the United States that Fox Quesada would achieve significant political reform.

U.S. relations with Mexico have traditionally been strained because the two states share a long border with marked economic inequality on either side. The desire of many Mexicans to get better paying jobs in the United States has not always been greeted warmly, particularly in the southwestern states. The additional concerns that many transnational issues such as people and drug trafficking, environmental spillover, water and other resource scarcities, would bleed from one side of the border (often Mexico into the United

States) has been an increasing source of tension as the populations in each country grew. The turn of the century, however, appeared different.

Any president of the United States who had been governor of a state along the common border with Mexico was bound to have a keen understanding of the mutual concerns characterizing the relationship: environment, trade, illegal migration, drug trafficking, and water as a short list. President George W. Bush, with his ability to speak Spanish and his keen sense of personal politics, was an excellent example of such a new president. During the campaign, the Governor proudly acknowledged that he might not know much about other places overseas, but he knew a lot about Mexico and its importance to the southwest United States.

Analysts in Washington were also keenly aware that presidential candidate George W. Bush had already developed a rapport with the Mexican Governor; hence, Bush's possible presidential election led to tantalizing hopes for dramatically improved relations across the

Rio Grande, a long-term goal of many on both sides of the border. George Bush's first international meeting was with the Mexican president in 2001 to symbolize the importance of the relationship.

Fox Quesada's and Bush's elections came six years after the North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA) dramatically opened market access for Mexico, the United States, and Canada. While various studies concluded different things about which state benefited most from the accord, few analysts challenged the notion that NAFTA greatly increased trade for its members. Supporters in Mexico and the United States, with the two new free trade advocates newly inaugurated, believed the mutual benefits could only increase. It appeared to citizens on both sides of the Rio Grande that the relationship was bound to improve dramatically and rapidly.

Immigration has long been the major point of disagreement between the states; Mexico advocated increasing the numbers of legal workers while elements in the United States advocated keeping out Mexicans because of ethnic discrimination, pressure on low-paying jobs, and fears of environmental destruction. The week prior to the September 11th catastrophe, Vicente Fox Quesada toured Washington, gaining a commitment from President Bush to

address the most important issue of tension between the states: immigration reform. The U.S. Congress welcomed him and his anticipated revolution for Mexico kept him in the U.S. spotlight until the twin towers fell in New York.

Dashed Expectations

Instead, four years later, U.S. relations with its southern neighbor are as bad as they have been since the 1930s when Mexico nationalized U.S. petroleum holdings. Fox Quesada's desire for immigration reform ended abruptly as U.S. sentiment spiked against foreigners. The divisions between the Mexican and U.S. presidents grew much faster than their agreements.

As soon as the 2001 attack occurred, the fundamental, enduring differences between the United States and Mexico were apparent. Some in Mexico expressed the view that Washington's arrogance, evidenced by President George W. Bush's initial eight months in office, had brought the disaster on the *gringos*. While this was not the official view from Mexico City, the terrorist attack triggered a long-repressed Mexican sense of frustration over long-experienced power imbalance with its northern neighbor. In 2002, Mexico announced its withdrawal from the treaty which

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anchors the Inter-American security system, the Rio Pact of 1947, which stunned Washington as a direct rebuttal of the drive to invoke all possible alliances in the global war on terrorism.

Most importantly, the discussions of immigration reform, which for Mexico means normalizing or expanding the options available for its citizens to move north where wages are markedly better, came to a grinding halt. President Bush proposed an interim step to allow illegal Mexicans to gain a temporary normal status but this proposal faced strong opposition within the United States and was not a long-term solution to the problem of growing proportions. At a time when Mexicans were increasingly desperate to come across the border, taking risky and often fatal options to do so, the immigration issue simply did not get the attention from Washington that Mexicans believed it required.

Today, Mexico's political system is in a state of semi-paralysis. Fox Quesada has failed to alter his nation's political system, unable to overcome the PRI's enduring power. Most fundamentally, he has failed to achieve his *Partido de Acción Nacional* (PAN)'s goal of privatizing much of Mexico's economy and ambitious attempts to alter the law enforcement and judicial systems have not been suc-

cessful. His coattails, while looking substantial in 2000, did not provide much support to local and state level politicians seeking to oust PRI office-holders.

Iraq

The differences between Fox Quesada and Bush over Iraq have been a major source of tension between the two states. Few states in the world have as an absolute commitment to the principle of sovereignty and non-intervention as does Mexico. Mexican sensitivity on the topic relates directly to U.S. interventions in the Republic at various points in the nineteenth century as well as during the Mexican Revolution (1910-1928). The prospect of President Bush's moves to oust Saddam Hussein evoked too many memories and suspicions for Mexicans to support the broader issue of ending a weapons of mass destruction program in Baghdad. In fact, the Iraq case illustrated the clash between two historic Mexican causes: protection of state sovereignty versus non-proliferation, since Mexico City was one of the original advocates for the 1970 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

President Bush was disappointed in Mexico's calls for sustaining the international inspections and, as a state with a seat on the Se-

curity Council, its refusal to support the United States on the votes leading to the March 2003 actions. Tensions increased further when Fox Quesada strongly criticized the war once it began. Relations between the two men went into a hiatus, mended only superficially with an invitation to the Mexican President to visit the Crawford ranch in 2004.

Mexico Reaches a Further Field

Another source of misunderstanding between the two countries emanated from Mexico's expanding trade with several other states around the world. While many in the United States apparently only expected to see Mexico's interest in greater trade increasing to the north, Mexico over the past four years has greatly opened its ties with South American states, such as Brazil with its historical bent against U.S. leadership in the western hemisphere. Within South America, many politicians and economists advocate free trade in the region only as far north as Mexico because of growing frustration over Washington's insincerity regarding its 1994 Miami Summit commitment to create a free trade zone of the Americas by 2005. Some in Mexico have locked onto this argument as a method of balancing U.S. power as well as helping Mexico's

economic position.

Similarly, Mexico City has shown more substantial interaction with a number of states in Asia. As a mark of this attention to the Pacific, Mexico chaired and hosted the Asia Pacific Economic Community (APEC) in 2003, a decade after joining the body. Mexico has enhanced its economic connections with China and Japan while showing greater interest in the smaller economies of the region, all of which add a balance to the U.S. predominance in the Mexican sphere of international affairs.

2004 and Beyond?

President Bush hosted President Fox Quesada in early 2004 at Crawford, illustrating his intention to repair the relationship to some degree. Part of the motivation might have been the political reality that Mexican-Americans and Hispanic voters in general are increasingly more important to the U.S. political system. The Republican Party has indicated that Hispanic voters, with their strong anti-abortion, Catholic, family-centered politics, were obvious candidates to move from their traditional affiliation with the Democratic Party to the Republicans. Eliminating the public tensions with the Mexican government was bound to improve the chances of luring these voters.

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The long-term sources of conflict between Washington and Mexico City are highly unlikely to ameliorate in the foreseeable future. Drug trafficking remains a tremendous problem for the US and Mexico, both as a transit and production state. The Mexican judiciary system still requires reform to eliminate both the public sense of its bias towards the wealthy in the country and the concerns about pervasive corruption. The environmental requirements of a rapidly growing population will cause tension as water resources become scarcer, hence, more valuable on both sides of the border. The challenges of expanding and solidifying free trade will cause difficulties for both governments. The perpetual and enduring disagreement over migration limits—with Mexico hoping to increase what the United States seeks to limit—will only continue as the population ages in the United States while Mexico's grows younger.

Finally, Mexico's discomfort with Washington's role as global cop will remain an underlying source of tension between the countries. While the United States believes its motives are well founded, Mexico remembers U.S. seizure of large amounts of Mexico and decades of bullying. These are enduring differences in vision with no reconciliation apparent.

Dr. Cynthia Watson is Professor of Strategy at the National War College. These views are personal and do not necessarily represent those of the National War College or any agency of the U.S. Government. The author can be reached at watsonc@ndu.edu.

LATIN AMERICA INSECURITIES

Margaret Daly Hayes, PhD

Security is the number one concern of a growing number of citizens, especially the poor, in Latin America and around the world. Latin America's security concerns are not the security concerns of yesterday – military or ideological threats against the State or world order. The region's security concerns today are focused on “insecurities” -- job insecurity, fear for personal safety in one's own city and neighborhood because of either random violence or organized crime, corruption and doubts about the integrity of public officials, frustration with the failure of politicians and governments to provide services. The pervasive sense of insecurity in Latin America focuses on a wide variety of sources. A colleague, Argentine Navy Captain Alvaro Martinez, recently surveyed the speeches and presentations of Defense and Foreign ministers, presidents and Ambassadors to the Organization of Latin American States (OAS) for the mention of security concerns by regional leaders. Insecurities range from traditional threats to the State and guerrilla insurgency, to concerns with recurring natural disasters. But the most worrisome insecurities stem from deeply rooted political and economic structural prob-

lems of poverty, corruption, political and economic instability, social unrest, unemployment and underemployment, epidemics (HIV/AIDS) on the one hand, to the security consequences of widespread transnational criminal activities throughout the region. A few of the insecurities are unique to a specific region – the Caribbean Island States are concerned especially with the possibility of maritime accidents involving nuclear or toxic waste in their waters and with the pernicious impact of returning criminal deportees from the U.S. on disorder and instability in their countries.

The Delegates of the OAS Special Conference on Security in the Americas reflected these preoccupations with insecurity in a more formal way in their document entitled “Declaration on Security in the Americas” in Mexico City in October, 2003. They declared that the Western Hemisphere's concept of security is “multidimensional in scope, includes traditional and new threats, concerns, and other challenges to the security of the states of the Hemisphere, incorporates the priorities of each state...” and furthermore, that “the basis and purpose of security is the **protection of human beings.**” They argued that “security is

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strengthened when we deepen its human dimension. Conditions for human security are improved through full respect for people's dignity, human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as the promotion of social and economic development, social inclusion, and education and the fight against poverty, disease and hunger." They enumerated the new threats, concerns and challenges to the region: terrorism, transnational organized crime, the global drug problem, corruption, asset laundering, illicit trafficking in weapons, extreme poverty and social exclusion, natural and man-made disasters, HIV/AIDS and other diseases, other health risks, environmental degradation, trafficking in persons, attacks on cybersecurity, hazardous materials transport including petroleum, radioactive materials and toxic waste, the possibility that terrorists might gain access to and deliver weapons of mass destruction. The OAS diplomats could not comment on specific countries, but throughout the region, there is concern that Venezuela's unforgiving populism, or intransigent indigenous groups like Quispe's pan-Aymara movement in Bolivia or a reinvigorated Sendero Luminoso might emerge to further exacerbate insecurity.

It is useful to view Latin American and Caribbean security concerns from four different perspectives – international, national, internal and local – that suggest the sources of inse-

curity.

International Insecurities

Globalization drives many of Latin America's concerns at the international level. Although most countries have undertaken profound policy adjustments to align themselves better with the global economy, many of the reforms have fallen short and left countries in a poor competitive position in the global marketplace. The structural reforms of the 1980s and 1990s resulted in a smaller state, but not in greater competitiveness. Market opening and privatizations, some of which were not well conceived or executed, were accompanied by layoffs. Unemployment, job instability and low wages (often associated with absence of insurance) is much higher in Latin America than in similar middle-ranking developing regions, and throughout the region fear about jobs is the major concern, even topping concern over violence in Colombia. New investment, anticipated to come with privatization, has come slowly and has not created new jobs. The region was battered by the international financial crises of the late 1990s, and foreign direct investment has not returned to 1998 levels. In recent studies of the impact of remittances on economies around the world, Latin America was found to be more dependent on remittances from workers abroad than any other region. Even Mexico, which enjoyed a

growth boom with the beginning of NAFTA, has seen its competitive position eroded by competition from China. In the interim Mexico failed to make the investment in education of its workforce that might have permitted Mexican workers to compete on other than lowest wage levels. In 2003 the respected Latinobarómetro opinion poll found that on average 54% of respondents across the region were “worried” or “very worried” about losing their jobs. Figures range from 60-66% of respondents in Guatemala, Brazil and El Salvador and bottomed out at 40% in Chile and Uruguay. Joblessness is closely related to violence, corruption and criminality. Attitudes toward globalization vary, but it is easy to blame local economic insecurities on “them” - particularly New York and London-based capitalists, who reside outside the country and over whom one has no control. At the same time, according to Latinbarómetro, 63% of those polled blamed their own government’s policies for their country’s economic problems. The next most named category received only 23% of responses. Government incapacity is a theme that we will return to frequently.

National and Regional Insecurity

Cooperative political, economic and military activities are the norm in the region, and traditional military threats from an aggressive neighbor are no longer an important concern

for most nations. Indeed, the Latinobarómetro authors concluded in their 2003 report that the threat of authoritarian coups has nearly vanished. Brazil and Argentina have declared officially that they no longer entertain “hypotheses of conflict” with each other. Central American countries meet regularly in presidential summits and meetings of military chiefs. The armed forces conduct regular multinational, cooperative exercises in various combinations with their neighbors. Annual joint staff talks are held between Chile and Peru and between Argentina and Chile. Student exchanges among war colleges are common throughout the region. Brazil is collaborating with countries on its northern borders, sharing radar-tracking intelligence to track down drug traffickers. Brazil’s SIVAM network detected more than 2000 clandestine flights across its borders with Andean countries in 2003. Brazil is leading, and its southern cone neighbors are participating in, the multinational stabilization force in Haiti.

This picture of Nation-State security is broken only by cross-border incursions of the Colombian insurgency into Venezuelan territory and by Bolivia’s dispute with Chile over its claim to an outlet to the Pacific Ocean. In each case, parties are encouraged by a watchful hemispheric community to pursue a peaceful resolution of their disputes.

With traditional military threats absent,

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cross border security concerns are focused much more on transnational criminal activities such as drug-trafficking, illegal arms trafficking, money laundering and illegal migrations caused by the continuing slow economic growth and persistent inequality. These regional security concerns are addressed by national police, immigration and customs agencies, and a host of other institutions with little tradition of collaboration, either within governments or between governments. Moreover, the scope and scale of transnational criminal activities are far beyond the current capabilities of most local authorities which are underfunded, under equipped and often not well trained. The military often provides logistics and intelligence support, and in some cases the local authorities have been found to be so corrupt and poorly trained that the armed forces have been asked to assume their responsibilities. There is significant cooperation among authorities to control transnational criminal activities, but much is left to be done. Corruption is a pervasive problem and ranks right after unemployment as a concern. Thirty-six percent of Latinobarómetro respondents were or had a relative who was victim of a crime. The number would be much higher if polling were concentrated in poorer cities and regions.

Internal Insecurity

Domestic security concerns range from

terrorism, internal insurgencies like the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the Peru's Sendero Luminoso to organized domestic and transnational criminal activities and, increasingly, urban gangs. Indigenous movements in Ecuador, Guatemala and Bolivia have become much more organized and active. Most, though not all, have used peaceful demonstration to press their rights.

Perceptions of internal insecurity are exacerbated by the weakness and incapacity of the regional and national political institutions to put in place programs for controlling violence or to foster greater social mobility and income equality. Concern with political institutional fragility is widespread and reflected in the low opinions that most Latin Americans express for their governments and politicians in general. While the better off economies are less worried about their futures, Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru, Paraguay, Argentina, Guatemala, Dominican Republic, Guyana and Suriname, in the Caribbean Basin region, have all fallen short of achieving stable governance. Poor performance by Venezuela's traditional political parties led to the overwhelming popular election of anti-establishment Hugo Chavez in Venezuela in 1998. The surprised establishment has been trying to recover initiative ever since and it finally succeeded in a recall referendum in August 2004. It was to no avail, however, Chavez roundly defeated the recall

by a vote of 58% to 42%, earning the right to complete the remaining two years of his office term.

Consistent with the polls that blame economic woes on the government's own economic policies, some Latin American political leaders have a hard time sustaining enough popular support to govern effectively. Peru's Alejandro Toledo has only single digit support and has two years remaining in his term. Lucio Gutierrez in neighboring Ecuador is a little better. Argentina's Nestor Kirchner has maintained high approval ratings by thumbing his nose at the international financial community and focusing on policies that benefit "Argentineans." Even President Luis Ignacio da Silva (Lula) in Brazil, who has sustained an impressive consensus with the external economic community and who remains popular, has lost internal support because of a perceived failure to deliver the reforms that might address Brazil's chronic income inequality. Alvaro Uribe has gained approval for his continuing campaign against insurgent violence in Colombia.

Personal Insecurity

Personal security is the region's real concern. One of the dominant characteristics of the security landscape throughout Latin America and the Caribbean is a high level of urban

street and gang violence that is profound, widespread and growing. Personal security concerns rank with job concerns throughout the region, and especially in Colombia, El Salvador, Brazil, Guyana, Jamaica and several other Caribbean islands.

A series of studies entitled "Asalto al Desarrollo: Violencia en América Latina" conducted for the Inter-American Development Bank in the late 1990s noted "levels of criminal violence in Latin America are astonishing. Violent and property crimes are at least six times as prevalent in Latin American as they are in the rest of the world...Violence against property and people represents the destruction or transfer of resources equal to nearly 14.2 percent of the Latin American gross domestic product. Human capital losses are equivalent to all expenditures on primary education, while capital losses total more than half of all private investment in the region. The transfer of resources from victims to thieves is greater than the sum total distributive effect of all public finance policies."

Vandalism, organized crime, kidnappings, youth mobs, high levels of unemployment (especially among young, poor, and poorly educated youths) and inadequate police response (whether from incompetence or incapacity to deal with the criminals) all contribute to the region's high level of personal insecurity. El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala

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are each experiencing growing levels of gang violence that appear to be returning elements of groups that emerged in Los Angeles during the Central American conflicts of the 1980s. The Mara Salvatrucha (MS) gang is metastasizing to other cities in Central America as well as to other cities in the United States. Gangs are often related both to petty and entrenched drug trafficking organizations and other mafia that prey on communities. Violence feeds violence. As the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) authors noted "when citizens do not have confidence in the police or in the judicial system, they are more likely to take justice into their own hands." A recent inspection by international organizations and development agencies of security sector reform focusing principally on police reform and on the criminal justice system is beginning to pay off. Several cities -- Bogotá, Colombia, for one -- have adopted community-policing programs with good results.

The theme of government institutional fragility and poor security sector capacity permeates the discussion of the insecurities in Latin America and the Caribbean. A recent report published by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) entitled "Democracy in Latin America: Toward a Citizens' Democracy" focuses on the troublesome dissatisfaction in democratic governments across the region fueled by the sense of lack of economic

opportunity, disillusion with political parties and politicians, and the abject failure of governments to solve problems of health, education, jobs, violence in the streets, corruption and other themes. While recognizing that support for democracy is increasing in the region, Latinobarómetro reports that dissatisfaction with the way democracy works in individual countries is also growing. Politicians and political parties take the brunt of blame for poorly functioning institutions. Of Latinobarómetro 2003 respondents, only 11% across the region expressed confidence in political parties, and even among Uruguayans, who expressed the strongest support for political parties, only 18% expressed confidence. The UN democracy report, led by former Argentine foreign Minister Dante Caputo, challenges the region to develop a democracy that is focused on citizens and that produces results.

Over the past several years, it has finally become acceptable to talk about "security" again in Latin America. After the return to democracy in the 1980s, Latin Americans preferred not to talk about security in an effort to turn their backs on years of authoritarian governments in which the subject was manifestly the domain of the military and some ruling faction. Moreover, as Senator Rafael Pardo of Colombia has commented, security in the Latin American region has historically been the purview of the military. Civilians were not

believed competent to participate in the assessment of the subject. The “national security doctrine” frame of reference that developed in the Cold War was rejected by the new political leaders, but they had no vision with which to replace it. Gradually both Latin American militaries and their civilian leaders have learned to dialogue on this subject. More and more countries are developing White Papers on defense to redefine political relations and roles and missions. However, while the defense focus continues to stress military roles in security, there is a much greater concern with human security, and the disparate insecurities of the human condition among the people. The long list of “threats, concerns and challenges” mentioned in the OAS Hemispheric security document underscores the depth and range of insecurity that challenges the Latin American region today. The specific threats and concerns are broadened when one also factors in the political turbulence in Venezuela, the fragile support for leaders in Peru and Ecuador, or Bolivia, where indigenous populations are increasingly insistent on participating in the political and economic life of their countries. Good governments, according to Latinbarometro’s respondents, are those that “listen to everyone, including the poor.”

The Road Ahead

After nearly five years of dismal results, reports for 2004 are upbeat for Latin America. The UN’s Economic Commission for Latin America projects a region-wide average growth of over 4% in 2004 and a sharp improvement over 1.5% in 2003. Latino-barómetro polls of democratic attitudes show stronger support for democracy as a form of government, in spite of the continued frustration with government performance. There is a vibrant dialogue about all of these issues at national, regional and subregional levels. There is greater emphasis on police professionalism throughout the region and selected cases (the city of Bogotá is one) that show real improvement. In Colombia, the Alvaro Uribe government is negotiating with illegal groups on both the right (the AUC) and the left (ELN), and its program of demobilization of insurgent elements has shown real promise, though on a small scale. Still, the youth gangs and drug mobs continue to grow in cities across the region, and many governments have a very long way to go to be able to provide solutions.

The US has tended to put the lion’s share of its policy focus on the promise of free trade agreements for Latin American democracy and development. This focus needs to be more nuanced. Free trade is promised as the pana-

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cea to a vast number of the region's problems. But, as a number of studies of NAFTA after ten years demonstrated, the free trade promise has a mixed return. In particular, it does not necessarily nor immediately solve the unemployment problem which is closely associated with violence, corruption, crime and political and economic insecurity. Much greater attention needs to be addressed to problems of governance across the security sector, including police, justice, trading places, such as ports where contraband and illegal goods are rife, financial institutions that launder resources, and to legislative and audit control and oversight of budgets and policy execution. Military-to-Military relations need to focus on realistic future roles and missions, including international operations. Much greater attention still needs to be given to developing civilian competency across a broad spectrum of policy formulation and implementation. The UNDP report on Democracy calls for a new legitimacy for the State, but a State that works *on behalf of* its citizenry. It recognizes the need for stronger public administration – it needs to be more effective, more efficient, more transparent and more responsible. Better governance – more effective, efficient institutions focused on concrete results, even when small – would go a long way to beginning to address the region's insecurities.

Dr. Margaret Daly Hayes is Principal of EBR Associates, Inc. She was the founding director of the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies and is an Adjunct Professor at Georgetown University.

WHO ARE WE? THE CHALLENGES TO AMERICA'S NATIONAL IDENTITY

Samuel P. Huntington

New York, London, Toronto, Sydney: Simon & Schuster, 2004

Reviewed by Arthur I. Cyr

The question in the title of this latest book by Professor Samuel P. Huntington of Harvard University is fundamentally rhetorical. The basic message is that American political culture, democratic in mission and purpose, European and especially British in heritage, is under attack from the ongoing enormous immigration from Latin America. In contrast to earlier migrations across our shores, this one takes advantage of the extensive land border between Mexico and the United States. A largely unregulated boundary has effectively ceased to exist in the face of this population movement.

Whether you view Huntington as prosecutor or defense counsel, he develops a very powerful case. The myriad qualities which make this immigration different from others in our history include that porous border, intense geographic concentrations of the Hispanic im-

migrants, their general unwillingness to learn the English language, and maintenance of close ties to countries of origin. The nations of origin are in many cases relatively small, accentuating the importance of links by immigrants who have departed their old residences but not really left home.

The result, viewed with alarm by the author, is that the American public consensus, which has supported our Constitution and institutions through the life of the Republic, is being undermined. Not surprisingly, U.S. affirmative action programs are blamed for abetting this trend. On this point and many others, Huntington's case reflects the themes and concerns of current American political conservatism, though he is distinctive in laying part of the blame for such programs on the corporate business community. It is no coincidence that Ronald Reagan's national political career was launched in California in the mid-1960s, just as popular resentment of affirmative action in

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education and other areas of life was growing strong.

Huntington, one of the most prolific as well as influential of contemporary political scientists, brings a number of characteristic strengths to bear in this book. He has tremendous grasp of the details as well as the sweep of history, especially in the United States. He combines this with considerable conceptual skill, aptly and persuasively summing up evidence marshaled under insightful headings and labels. A fine committed teacher, he begins the book by thanking his students.

Given his stature and substantial total body of work, this book is perhaps best viewed in the context of others he has produced over the years. Particularly noteworthy is Political Order in Changing Societies (1968). Magisterial in outlook, comprehensive in ambition, the volume attempts nothing less than analysis of trends in political development in modern governments worldwide. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (1997) posits that the contemporary world is in fact defined by a variety of increasingly intense conflicts between fundamentally different cultures. Even the growth in acceptance of English as principal mode of communication internationally is cited as evidence that strong cultural barriers exist (pp. 59-62). The terrorist

attacks on the United States of September 11, 2001, the consequent war on Islamic-based terrorism, and the Bush administration's invasion of Iraq all seem to lend credibility to this thesis, and currency to a book which had already become a major best-seller.

Huntington began his career with a more explicit emphasis on American politics. The Soldier and the State (1957) is a brilliant, valuable examination of how the military culture and profession has evolved in the United States. His dichotomy between civilian and martial styles, personified respectively for example by Eisenhower and MacArthur, is an excellent key for unlocking understanding of civil-military relations throughout our history. Political Power USA/USSR (1964), coauthored with Zbigniew Brzezinski during the height of the Cold War, addresses speculation that the two very different political systems might begin to converge over time. The two analysts rejected that hypothesis with a combination of conceptual rigor and a wealth of specific examples and arguments.

Perhaps the most directly useful of Huntington's previous works is American Politics – The Promise of Disharmony (1981). In this book, he develops a powerful defense of the American commitment to liberty and equality, and a persuasive analysis of the durability of

these values, even as policies and institutions change. At times, the argument is explicitly directed at an alienated political left which, to many, seemed growing in strength and influence in the 1960s and 1970s. The “burr under the saddle,” in Robert Penn Warren’s phrase, is quoted approvingly to sum up the continuing American struggle to bring practice more in line with ideals (p. 221).

Which returns us to Who Are We? The citizens described in American Politics might well argue that the current tolerance of the massive Hispanic tide simply reflects an important contemporary wrinkle on the never ending American effort to accept and, indeed, promote tolerance and diversity. Huntington may or may not minimize the degree to which earlier migrant populations, especially those concentrated in the industrial slums of the big Northeastern cities, preserved a distinctive “un-American” ethnic culture. Undeniable is the fact that contemporary politicians who attempt to exploit opposition to current immigration so far have uniformly failed at the national level.

Likewise, this new migration has occurred in the context of a nation remarkably more tolerant than in the past, at least domestically. This applies not just to civil rights for African-Americans and more open professional doors

for women; the decline of anti-Semitism since World War II has been profound. One factor has been the opening of formal education to far more Americans, sparked initially by the GI Bill to provide college opportunities to service members returning from that war.

To me, Huntington’s latest study is – as always – informative, but in this case ultimately not persuasive. You should read the book and make up your own mind.

Arthur I. Cyr is Clausen Distinguished Professor at Carthage College and author of After the Cold War – American Foreign Policy, Europe and Asia (NYU Press and Palgrave/Macmillan, 2000).

STRATEGY WATCH

A summary of recent events

June 2004–August 2004


Middle East

In mid May the **Arab League** declares that it will embrace political reform and promote women's rights. In **Lebanon**, the militant Islamist Shia party wins more seats in the local elections than any other party. **Pakistan** is readmitted to the Commonwealth (formerly British) after four years of exclusion. In early June terrorists linked to Al Qaeda attack a **Saudi** oil company located in Khobar – 22 people are killed. In **Iraq** a 36-person cabinet is tasked to run the country until the general elections in January. In mid June the UN unanimously passes an American-drafted resolution endorsing the appointment of an interim Iraqi government. On June 30, 2004, the interim government assumes power in Iraq. In late July the interim government arrests 500 people to demonstrate its staunch commitment to clamping down on violent crime. **Israel** fails to pass a revised plan for disengagement from the Gaza strip and the removal of all Jewish settlements. In late July Israel declares that it will continue to build its security barrier despite an advisory issued by the International Criminal Court that it is illegal. Weeks later the UN General As-

sembly passes a resolution advising Israel to take down its barrier – Israel has no intention of heeding the UN warning. According to a report issued by the International Atomic Energy Agency, **Iran** claims that traces of weapons-grade uranium uncovered by inspectors were imported into the country in centrifuge equipment. In late August Iran tests an improved version of a ballistic missile with a range that could hit

Iran tests an improved version of a ballistic missile with a range that could hit Israel.

Israel. In **Turkey** the trial of 69 suspects connected with the suicide attacks that killed 60 people in Istanbul last November is postponed because the Turkish court declares itself incompetent due to impending judicial reforms. Police in **Saudi Arabia** kill four terrorists suspected of involvement in the kidnapping and beheading of an American engineer. A **Yemen** court charges six Yemenis with planning the attack on the USS Cole in October 2000 that killed 17 sailors. **Afghanistan** sets its election for October 9, 2004. In early August the arrest of Al Qaeda suspects in **Pakistan** prompts a



In **Haiti** a Brazilian-led force of mainly Latin American UN peacekeeping troops assumes the role led by the multinational force headed by France and America.

Thousands of people are evacuated from five beaches in **Spain** after a terrorist threat made by Basque separatists

Libya agrees to pay \$35 million compensation to the victims of a 1986 bombing of a Berlin nightclub.

In **Najaf, Iraq**, heavy fighting ensues as American and Iraqi troops try to stop a revolt led by Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr.

STRATEGY WATCH

raised terror alert in the US. In **Najaf, Iraq**, heavy fighting ensues as American and Iraqi troops try to stop a revolt led by Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr. In late August, al-Sadr calls for a cease-fire by the Mehdi Army except for cases of self defense. An Iraqi judge issues an arrest warrant for Ahmed Chalabi on counter-feit charges.

Africa

In **Sudan** the government signs a peace agreement with the rebel

Sudan People's Liberation Army in hopes of ending a decade-long civil war. In the western region of **Darfur**, the violent raids by

Arab militias on the villagers continue. In early August the UN Security Council demands that the Sudanese government stop the militia from slaughtering villagers and stop preventing aid workers from providing food to the villagers. A UN envoy reports that the Sudanese government is trying to restore security. **Libya** admits that it received advanced centrifuge designs for uranium enrichment on a computer hard drive and compact disks facilitating easy

dissemination.

Weeks later Libya agrees to pay \$35 million compensation to the victims of a 1986 bombing of a Berlin night-

club. In mid June rebels in eastern **Congo** withdraw from Bukavu permitting UN peacekeepers to assume control. In early July the **African Union** criticizes the human rights violations perpetrated by Zimbabwe and Sudan. The European Union declares that it will halt aid to **Kenya** until the EU is assured that the aid is used appropriately.

Caucasus

In early June **Georgia** sends more troops to the border of the province of South Ossetia in an effort to avert smuggling. Amid talks with Russia on the status of Georgia, violence erupts at the border.

Asia

In mid May **India's** new Congress-led coalition government takes office. Weeks later **India** and **Pakistan's** foreign ministers meet to renew a ban on nuclear weapons testing. Senior mili-

North and South Korea agree to open transport links through the military zone that divides the two countries.

Violent raids by Arab militias in the Western Darfur region of Sudan leave over 10,000 dead and over 1 million displaced.

tary officials from **North Korea** and **South Korea** assemble in hopes of reducing tension along the border.

North Korea agrees to consider proposals to improve military communications. In mid June North and South Korea agree to open

transport links through the military zone that divides the two countries. South Korea promises to provide food aid to its neighbor. In late June a 33-year-old **South Korean** hostage is beheaded by terrorists demanding the withdrawal of South Korean troops from Iraq. Gloria Arroyo is re-elected president of the **Philippines**. In late July the Philippines withdraw 50 troops from Iraq in response to the kidnapping of one of its citizens. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono fails to win 50 percent of the vote in **Indonesia's** elections making a run-off in September necessary.

Europe

Horts Kohler, former IMF boss, is elected the next president of **Germany**. **Russian** president Vladimir Putin vows to double Russia's GDP by 2010 and revitalize promises to ratify

Cuba rejects the US offer of \$50,000 post-hurricane Charley aid.

the Kyoto protocol on climate change. Several men are arrested in connection with the March **Madrid** train bombings. In mid August thousands of people are evacuated from five beaches in **Spain** after a terrorist threat made by Basque separatists. The **European Union** agrees on a new EU constitution, but not on a new president.

North America

In mid May **John Ashcroft** announces that there is credible intelligence that Al Qaeda is planning a terrorist attack in the US this summer. **George Tenet** resigns as the director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA); **Porter Goss**, current chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, is appointed as the next head. In mid June the US declares that it plans to withdraw 12,500 of its 37,000 troops from **South Korea by 2006**. **Ronald Reagan**, the 40th president of the United States, dies. America is forced to withdraw a Security Council resolution intended to exempt American UN peacekeeping forces from prosecution by the International Criminal Court on account

Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez defeats a recall referendum.

of opposition resulting from the **Abu Ghraib scandals**. In early August military hearings begin in Fort Bragg, North Carolina for the prisoner abuse cases at Abu Ghraib.

Latin America

Bolivia endorses an increased role for the natural gas sector. In **Haiti** a Brazilian-led force of mainly Latin American UN peace-keeping troops takes over leadership from the multinational force headed by France and America. The European Union expressed hopes of reaching a trade agreement with **Mercosur**, South America's common market. In **Venezuela** President Hugo Chavez defeats a referendum to remove him from office two years before the end of his term. **Colombia's** second largest leftist guerrilla group, the National Liberation Army (ELN), agrees to begin peace talks with the government. In **Mexico** Vicente Fox's conservative National Action Party performs poorly in three state elections, while Mexico's former ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party achieves widespread support. In late July **Chile** launches an investigation into allegations of corruption and embezzlement against its former dictator Augusto Pinochet. In **Paraguay** a fire in a supermarket complex claims the lives of 500 people.

RESEARCH REPORTS

Summaries of recent articles presenting new ideas on strategic issues

Surviving Fidel

By William Ratliff

Hoover Digest Research and Opinion on Public Policy, 2004, No. 1

Pgs. 113-121

William Ratliff is a research fellow at the Hoover Institution. He was in Cuba during the arrests, trials, and executions of March-April 2003. He writes that the US embargo against Cuba is a failure and that the US must realize that its objectives are unrealistic and its policies are ineffective. He concedes that unless the US wants to remove Fidel Castro with force, the US and the Cuban people “will have to endure Castro until he dies”. In the meantime, the US can help reduce conflict and tension and “improve the prospects of a more peaceful transition in the post-Castro period”.

According to the author, the US must acknowledge three factors (1) Castro may be up to no good. It would be most beneficial if there is a greater US presence in Cuba. (2) The US must develop a consistent, effective policy. (3) The embargo has done more harm than good for the Cuban people. The US policy “has been largely a vote-getting, feel-good stunt rather than a serious international policy”.

Ratliff writes that although Cuba does not pose an economic or military threat to the US, US policy toward Cuba encourages conflict and instability and “makes demands on the current and future governments of Cuba that are imperialistic, logically inconsistent, and counterproductive”. The international community deems such policies as US “soft power,” a “dangerous style”. Thus, lifting the embargo would ease hostility toward the US and improve the US image in Latin America and abroad.

Ratliff writes that the embargo has become a “scapegoat” for Castro, his self-propagated image as “the scourge of American imperialism”, and for Cuba’s repression and its economic failures. Lifting the embargo would deliver a message to Castro that he is irrelevant to US interests, and the Cuban people would be better off without him. The embargo has done little, if anything, to improve human rights in Cuba.

Ratliff writes that the US can “show the ultimate respect” of doing what the Cuban people are asking for and “open the doors wider to Americans...or better yet, lift the embargo altogether”.

RESEARCH REPORTS

A Global Shift in the Making: Is the United States Ready?

By James F. Hoge, Jr.

Foreign Affairs, July/August 2004

Pgs. 2-8

James F. Hoge, Jr. is Editor of *Foreign Affairs*. He examines whether the US is prepared for a shift of power to Asia. He writes that major power shifts between countries occur infrequently and warns that the impact on global stability can be disastrous if the transition fails. He refers to the last great power shift that occurred in the early twentieth century involving Germany and Japan - "a conflict that devastated large parts of the globe".

Asia is growing – economically and militarily – and China is leading the pack, with India and the Southeast Asian states following closely behind. Despite successes, each state faces its own challenges. Most importantly, China needs to manage the effects of its transition to a market economy. If China's economy crashes because of combined factors such as inflation, unemployment, and bank debt, the entire region would suffer the consequences.

Hoge writes, "Asia's rise is just beginning, and if the big regional powers can remain stable while improving their policies, rapid growth could continue for decades". However, Asia's success is threatened by "stresses" including the challenge posed by the imminent

and unprecedented coexistence of China and Japan, the unresolved dispute between China and India, the territorial conflicts over Taiwan and Kashmir, and the North Korea situation, any of which could erupt at any moment.

What can the US do to prepare for the global power shift? Hoge offers several suggestions:

- Improve US public diplomacy efforts. The US must "replenish its diminished public diplomacy resources to recruit more language experts, reopen foreign libraries and cultural centers, and sponsor exchange programs".
- Forge regional security arrangements to expand cooperation in the US counterterrorist efforts.
- Support open economies.
- Avoid creating a self-fulfilling prophecy of strategic rivalry with China.
- Give more representation in key institutions such as the UN to Asia's rising powers.

Counterterrorism after Al Qaeda

By Paul R. Pillar

The Washington Quarterly, Summer 2004

Pgs. 101-113

Paul R. Pillar is a former deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency's Counterter-

rorist Center and author of *Terrorism and US Foreign Policy*. He writes that the metamorphosis of the terrorist threat from various centralized organizations such as Al Qaeda to a decentralized, complex global network of radical Islamists, many of whom are “fragments” of Al Qaeda, poses a menacing challenge to the US and the international community. Evidence suggests that these “nameless” terrorists’ cells are multiplying, thus making it more difficult for the US to identify links and prevent future terrorist attacks.

Pillar asserts that within every terrorist network there are linkages to expose. This requires that the US intelligence community improve its capabilities and exercise more effectively its intelligence-gathering operations. Pillar notes that there are limitations on what the intelligence community can achieve. Techniques such as data mining are hindered by practical difficulties and controversies over privacy and civil liberties.

Pillar writes that part of the responsibility lies with the American public. The US population “will have to lower their expectations of just how much of the burden of stopping terrorists that intelligence can carry...” and accept that “other policy instruments” will have to share some of the burden. One of these instruments is the international community. Ac-

ording to the author, international cooperation in the war on terror has increased since the terrorist attacks of September 11. However, Pillar suggests that international support may decline because foreign governments may not be motivated to “tackle Islamic groups that may represent an emerging terrorist threat but have not yet resorted to terrorism, such as the Central Asian-based Hizb al-Tahrir”. Many members of various terrorist groups participate in their respective governments which provides them with a sense of legitimacy (for example, the Lebanese Hizballah holds seats in Parliament) and effectively diminishes the appearance of a threat and this, in turn, dissuades international cooperation for US counterterrorist efforts.

The US must be sensitive to the Muslim population worldwide. It must demonstrate that the “war on terror” is not a war on Islam – “such perceptions among Muslims will strengthen the roots of the very Islamist terrorism that already poses the principal threat to US interests”.

Pillar writes that the “greatest future challenge to the US counterterrorist efforts that may emerge with a more decentralized terrorist threat is the ability to sustain the country’s own determination to fight it.” If US support for counterterrorism diminishes, the reverbera-

tions will be detrimental to US efforts.

Containing Iraq: Sanctions Worked

By George A. Lopez and David Cortright

Foreign Affairs, July/August 2004

Pgs. 90-103

George A. Lopez is Director of Policy Studies at the Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame. David Cortright is President of the Fourth Freedom Forum and Research Fellow at the Kroc Institute. They argue that little attention is being paid to the fact that the UN-enforced sanctions regime was effective in containing Saddam Hussein. The authors ask, “what went right with US policy toward Iraq between 1990 and 2003?” What was the impact of the sanctions and inspections on Iraq’s military capabilities?

They assert that the sanctions in Iraq were not a failure. They compelled Iraq to accept inspections and monitoring, yielded political concessions from Baghdad on political issues, reduced the available revenue to Saddam, prevented the rebuilding of Iraqi military defense following the Persian Gulf War, and blocked the import of materials that could be used to develop weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Lopez and Cortright write that “the political assessments of these accomplishments were muted” and that the “interdiction of prohibited

items was often seen as a sign of their failure”.

The UN-enforced sanctions regime has been deemed “weak and ineffective...and has been reviled...for the humanitarian costs.” The authors concede that the thirteen year history of the UN sanctions in Iraq is “long and tortuous” starting with a severe humanitarian crisis in the early 1990s.

In 2001 the US implemented sanctions reforms and revitalized international support for an embargo on weapons and materials. The new “smart sanctions” removed the humanitarian factor and “the pieces were in place for a long-term military containment system” of Iraq. Yet as the invasion of Iraq approached, the success of the sanctions regime was increasingly downplayed.

The authors write that the US failed to demonstrate how and why the sanctions and inspections worked in Iraq. The US runs the risk of repeating its mistakes in other conflicts – Libya, Iran, Syria, and North Korea. The US must examine why “so much readily available evidence” of what was right about existing policies was not publicized more effectively.

Europe and Islam: Crescent Waxing, Cultures Clashing

By Timothy M. Savage

The Washington Quarterly, Summer 2004

Pgs. 25-47

Timothy M. Savage is a career US Foreign Service Officer, currently serving as a division chief in the Office of European Analysis at the US Department of State. He recently served as US Consul General in Leipzig, Germany. The views and opinions in this article are those of the author alone and do not necessarily represent those of the State Department.

He argues that the growing Muslim population in Europe is altering the landscape of European domestic and foreign policy. If Europe does not address “the Islamic challenge”, the current status quo of the 23 million Muslims living in Europe will likely deteriorate.

Europe’s Muslim population is exhibiting several demographic trends that will have a significant impact on European countries, including a steady influx of Muslim immigrants and asylum seekers (mainly from the Middle East and Africa), a growing, ghettoized Muslim minority, and a disenfranchised Muslim youth population. Conversely, Europe’s population is declining due to a slowed birth rate and an aging population. The Muslim population is projected to double by 2015, and by

2050, it is expected that Muslims will comprise 20 percent of Europe’s total population.

What are the strategic implications for Europe? According to the author, an estimated “1-2 percent of the continent’s Muslims—between 250,000 and 500,000 individuals—are involved in some type of extremist activity”, not to be interpreted as terrorist activity. However, Savage writes that the statistical data regarding the hijackers that perpetrated the September 11 attacks suggests that “there may be something about the European political environment that contributes to certain Muslims embracing terrorism...the cells tend to be amalgams of disaffected, European-educated, single males...and...working-class drop-outs who share a common, marginal culture.” These observations coupled with a dramatic rise in anti-Semitic acts perpetrated by Arab Muslims in Europe are fueling Europe’s radical right-wing parties and resulting in dramatic actions such as the ban of the headscarf in public schools in France and Germany. Furthermore, the “Muslim factor” is creating confusion for the EU and its efforts to move forward.

According to Savage, the impact of the “Muslim factor” will be most evident in the domestic sphere. However, he notes that it will affect European foreign policy because

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Muslim populations are very involved in international affairs that affect the Muslim community-at-large, such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and Europe is next-door to several Muslim countries that share its concerns concerning terrorism, WMD, and the energy issue.

To avoid a looming crisis, Europe and its Muslim communities must become more tolerant of one another's cultural backgrounds. Europe must learn to respect the Muslim identity and attempt to integrate its Muslim populations. If Europe continues to ignore the elephant in the room, it will experience increased demographic, economic, and political decline.

Sand in Our Eyes

By Martin Sieff

The National Interest, Summer 2004

Pgs. 93-101

Martin Sieff is a news analyst for United Press International. He writes that prior to the terrorist attacks of September 11, US-Saudi relations were stable, but cracks were emerging. Soon after 9/11, when evidence surfaced regarding Saudi terrorist funding, the US swiftly changed its position toward Saudi Arabia exacerbating the already strained relationship. In order to mend relations, Sieff suggests that the US devise a foreign policy that falls somewhere between passivity toward Saudi misbehaviors and eagerness to bridle

and democratize the Saudi kingdom.

Sieff writes that historically "realpolitik considerations" have been the foundation of the US-Saudi relationship - from British hegemony during the FDR era to the threat of Soviet expansion after WWII and the containment of the Soviet Union during the Reagan years. During the 90's the relationship suffered setbacks. However, the Saudis assumed that when George W. Bush took office in 2001 the administration "would end the strains in the relationship that had developed during the eight-year tenure of the Democratic president". However, the US became "more openly critical" of the Saudi policies. This confirmed Saudi apprehensions that US policymaking would become unpredictable in the post-9/11 aftermath. Over the past two years, the US-Saudi relationship has become "ever more a dialogue of the blind and the deaf".

Sieff asserts that the US can repair the longstanding relationship with Saudis based on mutual interest. He writes that the US should:

- Renew strategic dialogue among high-level US/Saudi figures.
- Support Saudi initiatives to transform its relationship with the Wahhabi religious sect.
- Stop focusing on what is not achievable, including full democracy or regime

change.

Sieff writes that “US policymakers are handling an unexploded bomb”, and that “pushing too much change too soon on the Desert Kingdom would be dynamiting the flood gates that protect us all from being swept away in an Islamist deluge”. This does not mean that the US should turn a blind eye toward any suspicious operations. In fact, “the Saudis need to be warned that the light of the US intelligence henceforth will be shining continually on operations and fund-raising activities by Bin Laden, Al Qaeda, and similar groups”.

Europe’s Quiet Leap Forward

By Kenneth Rogoff

Foreign Policy, July/August 2004

Pgs. 74-75

Kenneth Rogoff, *Foreign Policy’s* economics columnist, is professor of economics and Thomas D. Cabot professor of public policy at Harvard University. He refutes the widespread projections concerning Europe’s sinking economy. He writes that the same projections were made about the US economy over a decade ago. “Times change,” he writes, and despite the consensus among economists, Europe may be the next “economic juggernaut”.

According to the author, Europe is not out of the game and many of the trends cited by economic analysts are based on incorrect in-

formation. For example, Europe’s output per capita is steadily declining. Economists blame this on a decline in productivity among European workers. Rogoff argues that this is not the case at all – Europeans work fewer hours than Americans, as they always have. Moreover, they take longer vacations and retire earlier. The more leisure time Europeans “consume”, the more the economy will grow.

Other variables that will contribute to Europe’s continued economic growth are a well-trained, versatile work force (despite rigid labor laws), its strong political and legal institutions, and geography. With regard to the latter, Rogoff writes that “Europe is still situated in a relatively disease-free and temperate locale that offers far better working conditions than large parts of Africa, India, or Latin America”.

According to Rogoff, Europe can succeed in overcoming the obstacles to economic growth. It must tackle its structural challenges head-on through various reform programs. It can begin by relaxing its labor laws and developing trade relations with Asia.

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