

**NATIONAL
STRATEGY
FORUM
REVIEW**

**GLOBAL VIEWS OF
US FOREIGN POLICY**

UKRAINE'S ORANGE OUTLOOK

Jaroslawa Zelinsky Johnson

**CENTRAL ASIA: IMPERATIVES FOR THE
POSITIVE SUM GAME**

Jamshed Safarov

**THE ROLE OF THE US IN MOLDOVA'S
TRANSNISTRIAN CONFLICT**

Andrei Strah

**LEBANESE—AMERICAN STRATEGIC
OBJECTIVES**

Imad Harb, Ph.D.

**STRENGTHENING US-INDONESIAN
STRATEGIC RELATIONS**

John Dempsey

**US POLICY AND THE ARAB WORLD:
STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES IN COLLISION
OR COLLUSION?**

Dr. Jafar A. Hassan

BOOK REVIEW:

Michael Klare's *Blood and Oil: The Dangers
and Consequences of America's Growing
Dependency on Imported Petroleum*

RECENT SPEAKERS:

Jorge I. Dominguez and Stewart Baker

STRATEGY WATCH

The *National Strategy Forum Review*
is a quarterly publication of
NATIONAL STRATEGY FORUM

Richard E. Friedman
President/Chair

Board of Directors

Richard A. Behrenhausen

Lester Crown

James R. Donnelley

Michael P. Galvin

James N. Pritzker

William Wolf

Morris I. Leibman
(1911–1992)
Founding Chair

National Strategy Forum Review

Publisher

Richard E. Friedman

Editor

Lauren Bean

Editorial Board

Marilyn Diamond

Rachel E. Golden

John Allen Williams

Endy Zemenides



The National Strategy Forum is a not-for-profit, non-partisan organization committed to the following principles:

- The goal of United States national strategy is a genuine and just peace, sought in common cause with the community of free and independent nations.
- The advancement and preservation of democracy is essential to promote human rights, inspire principled cultural achievement, and maximize economic development.
- Informed public opinion and an enduring non-partisan consensus are fundamental parts of national security in a democratic society.

• • •

The National Strategy Forum has no membership fee, but it depends upon the support of its members. The Forum is a publicly supported charitable institution under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. As a non-profit organization, the Forum is funded solely by contributions from individuals, foundations, and corporations. All contributions to the Forum are tax deductible.

• • •

The opinions expressed in the National Strategy Forum Review do not necessarily reflect those of the National Strategy Forum or its members.

• • •

© 2005 National Strategy Forum, Inc.

National Strategy Forum
53 W. Jackson, Suite 516, Chicago, IL 60604

NATIONAL STRATEGY FORUM REVIEW

Volume 14, Issue 2

Spring 2005

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LETTER FROM THE PUBLISHER	4
UKRAINE'S ORANGE OUTLOOK Jaroslawa Zelinsky Johnson	6
THE ROLE OF THE US IN MOLDOVA'S TRANSNISTRIAN CONFLICT Andrei Strah	10
STRENGTHENING US-INDONESIAN STRATEGIC RELATIONS John Dempsey	12
CENTRAL ASIA: IMPERATIVES FOR THE POSITIVE SUM GAME Jamshed Safarov	15
LEBANESE—AMERICAN STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES: PRINCIPLES FOR UNDERSTANDING Imad Harb, Ph.D.	17
US POLICY AND THE ARAB WORLD: STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES IN COLLISION OR COLLUSION? Dr. Jafar A. Hassan	20
BOOK REVIEW: <i>Blood and Oil: The Dangers and Consequences of America's Growing Dependency on Imported Petroleum</i>, Michael T. Klare Reviewed by Roger Hamburg	23
RECENT SPEAKERS	25
STRATEGY WATCH	28
NSF REVIEW	3
	SPRING 2005

LETTER FROM THE PUBLISHER

United States primacy provides wide scope for its national security interests, far more than other states which have self-interest objectives. Other states, of necessity, must construct their foreign policy in the shadow of what the US does and what US says it will do. Their foreign policy must be flexible and adaptive to a wide range of variables.

The US is less constrained by the variables that limit other states because the US frequently creates variables that have world-wide implications. To some extent, the US controls and is insulated from the consequences of variables. Size does matter.

Although US primacy is desirable, it is not without risk. A criticism of the US is that there is a tendency towards absolutism in our foreign policy – the power to act without fear of negative consequences. Absolutism perceives opposition as a minor irritant, although opposition may be rational and beneficial to the US. On the world stage, US primacy and perceived absolutism create the climate for opposition and anti-Americanism. Style and how US foreign policy is marketed is important.

The US need not base its national strategy or foreign policy on what is in the best interest of other states. The US need not enter into a suicide pact to become well-liked; however, much can be gained by listening to other states. The likely result is that many of the strategic objectives of the US and foreign states are similar. If there is significant conflict among competing objectives, at least the US will have gained im-

portant information that could lead to reduced tension. More important, the US can adapt its subordinate, less important goals to address the objectives of other states.

Listening to a consumer is the foundation for marketing and the sale of domestic products. On the world stage, this is called “public diplomacy.”

The growth of telecommunications technology and the accessibility of media have had a major effect on the expansion and reach of American culture and how America is viewed from abroad. In many states where anti-Americanism is strong, citizens of those states differentiate between US foreign policy and the American people. America’s culture and values are widely admired; many critics of the US want to come to the US and share in the American way of life. Cultural diplomacy is a national resource and is unspent, accumulated political capital.

Our goal is to listen and to become better informed as we consider national security and future US foreign policy. We have asked friends and scholars, and political observers from an array of countries to share their views with us and examine an various issues including:

- The important strategic role of lesser-recognized countries who are neighbors to major US allies and adversaries.
- The need for consideration of regional conflicts or points of tensions that hinder the democratic development of other nations or regions.

- The Bush administration's democracy goal rhetoric may be degraded by realpolitik considerations. For example, trading away the Ukraine for more leverage with Russia.
- US engagement with foreign states can be accomplished "on the cheap" – state exchange visits and cultural exchanges. Failure to engage, even minimally, can turn potential friends into adversaries – needlessly.
- US strategic relationships should extend beyond the broader, major issues including cooperation in the war of terrorism, and address specific, regional issues and concerns which would help the US promote its interests in particular regions.
- Bridging the gap between the US and foreign publics is imperative for a successful and effective US national strategy. □

**UPCOMING NATIONAL STRATEGY
FORUM EVENTS**

In **May**, the National Strategy Forum will host **Georgie Anne Geyer**, an award-winning journalist and nationally syndicated columnist. She will address National Strategy Forum members on the subject of her latest book, *Tunisia: A Journey Through a Country That Works*.

The summer 2005 issue of the *National Strategy Forum Review* will examine the US vision of democracy.

Please visit the NSF website for details regarding upcoming events and the *National Strategy Forum Review*:

<http://www.nationalstrategy.com>

UKRAINE'S ORANGE OUTLOOK

Jaroslawa Zelinsky Johnson

Last fall's Orange Revolution on the streets of Kiev and other Ukrainian cities was a thunderous appeal for political change. That massive but peaceful rebellion against decades of kleptocratic-oligarchic rule expressed populist momentum for the country's democratic evolution. Surviving assassination attempts and a plot to steal his election, Ukrainian President Viktor A. Yushchenko now faces his greatest challenge: fulfilling his promise and popular mandate to unite a divided, poor country and lead it into Europe's democratic mainstream with aggressive administrative, economic and legal reforms.

Ukraine's Objectives and Obstacles

The Yushchenko government's strategic objectives, endorsed by both the EU and the US, are well known: to transform a corrupt and totalitarian post-soviet state into a law-based European democracy with a genuine market economy and media freedom. Expectations are high, perhaps too high, given the obstacles: the deposed ruling elite leaves in its wake powerful oligarchs and businessmen (who amassed extraordinary wealth through rigged privatizations of state properties) in control of the economy and a significant block of votes in parliament expected to resist change.

But Yushchenko's most difficult obstacle may be the ticking clock. Ukraine will become a

parliamentary-presidential republic by the end of Yushchenko's first year in office. Thereafter, Yushchenko's powers as a strong president will be limited to control over the military, internal security and foreign policy, and much executive power will be transferred to parliament. At that point, Ukraine's oligarch-controlled parliament will vote to either retain the cabinet appointed by reformist Yushchenko or replace it with one more to its liking.

The Race to Reform

Yushchenko first needs to bridge the political divide created by campaign disinformation, and reassure supporters of his opponent Viktor Yanukovich that he intends to advance the well-being of all Ukrainians regardless of language, creed or region of residence. His promise to recognize political opposition by honoring its right to be heard and assemble with free access to print and electronic media (rights denied Yushchenko's own opposition movement) will strengthen Ukraine's shared vision of its political and economic future.

Second, Yushchenko must act quickly while still holding strong presidential power and enthusiastic Western support to take swift control of his country's most urgently needed reforms. Given his nine to twelve month window of opportunity, Yushchenko's new government, with solicited assistance from Poland and Georgia,

the EU and a UN-drafted action plan, must prioritize its reform agenda and focus immediately on three interrelated areas of structural change -- administrative reform, disassembling the shadow economy and legal reform to get Ukraine's house in order, all of which are conditions precedent to WTO, EU and NATO memberships.

Contours of US-Ukraine Relations

Yushchenko's election is regarded as a foreign policy victory by a number of governments, including Washington, but it is difficult to see how the US could take much credit for it. Although former Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma and Russian President Vladimir Putin (and the unlikely pairing of Katrina vanden Heuvel and Pat Buchanan) complained about US "meddling" in Ukraine's electoral process -- that the Orange Revolution was "Made in America" -- the facts are a lot less conspiratorial. While Washington spent about \$58 million over the last 14 years supporting various NGOs to provide training for pro-democracy citizen groups, journalists, judges and election monitors, US policy toward Ukraine changed dramatically during the first four years of George W. Bush's administration. When Bush was locating a soul in Vladimir Putin's eyes, the US was backing away from continuing the Clinton administration's strategic interests in Ukraine -- fostering democracy, media freedom, market economy and Ukraine's integration with Europe.

The Clinton administration, coming to office shortly after the USSR's dissolution, focused on the "geopolitical pluralism" of Ukraine and other Newly Independent States (NIS). Building on the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Act of 1991, the Clinton administration per-

sued Ukraine to give up its nuclear warheads and took other concrete steps to promote Ukraine's Western integration and embrace of democratic and economic reforms. Clinton pursued direct engagement with the Ukrainian leadership, hosting Ukraine's first two presidents during state visits to Washington, making three visits to Ukraine during his presidency, and establishing the Kuchma-Gore Commission, which regularly addressed bilateral matters of concern. By 1996, US-Ukrainian relations were formally upgraded to "strategic partnership," and Ukraine became the third-largest recipient of US foreign aid (surpassed only by Israel and Egypt); substantial USAID funds were targeted for developing NGOs to organize pro-democracy training programs, and US funding for VOA/ Radio Liberty and Muskie Fellowships (bringing Ukrainians to the US for post-graduate study) were at high levels, ending almost eight decades of isolation for thousands of Ukrainians. Taken together, the Clinton administration's policies and programs advanced Ukraine's engagement with the West and encouraged its internal development of a civil society.

US-Ukraine Policy Shifts

By contrast, the current Bush administration's first term took an alternative approach to Ukraine. After Bush's initial meeting with Russian President Putin, Washington pursued a Russia-centered policy which implicitly acknowledged Ukraine's location in a Russian sphere of influence. This shift in the US strategic viewpoint coincided with Kuchma's second term as Ukrainian president, a period during which Kuchma's corrupt arrogance of power exploded publicly in several scandals including the discov-

UKRAINE'S ORANGE OUTLOOK

ery of the beheaded corpse of an opposition journalist, with surreptitious tape-recordings subsequently documenting Kuchma's involvement in the journalist's assassination plot as well as pervasive official corruption – an event that drove tens of thousands of Ukrainians to Kiev streets, demanding Kuchma's ouster. Kuchma survived months of angry protests but then another scandal alleged Kuchma's involvement in the sale of Kolchuga radar systems to Saddam Hussein's Iraq, provoking *persona non grata* rebuke in the larger international community and providing Washington with additional reasons to steer clear of Ukraine.

At about this time, as Washington focused on the aftermath of 9-11 and wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Bush administration took its eyes off Ukraine. Washington's distancing itself from Ukraine came at an ultimate cost: it emboldened an already isolated Kuchma to clamp down on the nation's mass media, shutting off opposing voices and disenfranchising the opposition by issuing *temnyky* (instructions) to radio and TV stations which identified suitable and banned topics, yanking the broadcasting license of an independent TV station, and forcing Radio Liberty, BBC and Deutsche Welle off the air. During this time, Kuchma expedited rigged privatizations of the jewels of Ukraine's industry to pals and relatives, and he gave away by decree large parcels of land to loyal political cronies.

Facing international opprobrium, Kuchma bought moral and political sanctuary from Washington's condemnation and sanctions by sending about 1,800 Ukrainian troops to Iraq; as expected, Bush celebrated Ukraine's partnership in his "coalition of the willing," shelving an ongoing US-UK investigation of Ukraine's illegal arms trade with Iraq and Macedonia. Concur-

rently, Kuchma shored up Moscow's political support by redirecting much of Ukraine's foreign trade toward Russia, accelerating Russian investment in Ukraine and culminating in Kuchma's decision to reverse the Odessa-Brody pipeline west to east. Kuchma was rewarded with Putin's personal support in Ukraine's presidential election campaign last fall, although Moscow's endorsement of Kuchma's hand-picked successor failed to prevent Yushchenko's election - or the Orange Revolution.

Washington's Future Role in Ukraine's International Integration

Now that the Bush administration's second term has placed *spreading democracy* at the rhetorical center of American foreign policy, Ukraine is a good place to convert words into action. Ukraine already has a democracy movement which has considerable European approval. Ukraine may be a better test than Iraq for Washington's "forward strategy of freedom." With Yushchenko's election, Washington must decide how to encourage Ukraine's political, economic and legal reforms and its march toward international integration.

Ukraine is pursuing simultaneously three pathways to international integration: WTO membership, EU membership and NATO membership, the principal obstacles to which are Ukraine's own failures to get its civil society in order. But continued isolation from the West is not an option for Ukraine, and it is now time for the US to join with the EU in engaging more broadly and directly with all levels of the Ukrainian government. In doing so, the West must recognize Ukraine's interest in maintaining its "permanent strategic partnership" with Rus-

sia, which provides much of Ukraine's foreign trade and all of its oil and gas (and much of Europe's, through Ukrainian pipelines). But, as Yushchenko told Putin at the start of his presidency, Ukraine's new foreign policies toward its NIS neighbors will be arm's-length, guided primarily by two principles: they must serve Ukraine's national interests and they must not impede or block Ukraine's access to other markets.

Washington can facilitate Ukraine's global integration by formally recognizing its "market economy," which will expedite its admission to WTO, pending since 1993. WTO membership will enhance Ukraine's global trade opportunities and attract foreign direct investment. Ukraine's Orange Revolution significantly enhanced Ukraine's acceptance as a trading partner, as evidenced by the quick introduction of legislation to remove Ukraine from Jackson-Vanik trade restrictions with the US -- an important opening move by Washington.

Washington could also enthusiastically promote Ukraine's much desired EU membership. The Orange Revolution proved Ukraine's commitment to democratic elections, but EU entrance requirements also include a strong track record of honoring democratic freedoms and civil rights. Washington should increase USAID funding for media freedom and civil society projects undertaken by NGOs. In particular, Ukraine needs assistance harmonizing its laws and policies with EU norms and conventions regarding intellectual property, duties and tariffs, VAT, bankruptcy law, pipeline and port management, demilitarization of science and research, border control of illegal migrants and human trafficking and withdrawal of state interference

in pricing.

Finally, Ukraine's security cooperation with NATO, previously promoted by the US, continues to be more advanced than other institutional integrations, although Ukraine's full NATO membership also awaits more progress in political and economic reforms and internal restructuring of its military. For now, Ukraine's Partnership for Peace status with NATO permits collaboration in combating terrorism, countering proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and other threats to regional stability and security. Washington should continue its cooperative training missions with Ukrainian troops, and assist the Ukrainian military in developing upgraded systems of military communication.

Ukraine's ultimate international integration will depend mainly upon the Ukrainian government's political will to translate the country's reform objectives into reality. But Ukraine's successful transformation to a law-based European democracy is in the strategic interest of both Europe and the United States, and the success of that transformation will depend on their continuing support and encouragement. □

Jaroslawa Zelinsky Johnson, an international corporate attorney, is managing partner of Chadbourne & Parke LLP's Kiev, Ukraine office. Since 1992, she has represented many Western multinational corporations conducting business in Ukraine, and has witnessed first-hand Ukraine's slow transition from command to market economy.

THE ROLE OF THE US IN MOLDOVA'S TRANSNISTRIAN CONFLICT

Andrei Strah

The majority of conflicts that have erupted since the collapse of the Soviet Union have ensued in the Black Sea-South Caucasus-Caspian region. One of these conflicts is the Transnistrian problem. Transnistria is the separatist enclave in Eastern Moldova ruled by an unrecognized authoritarian regime. The Transnistria conflict is a destabilizing force in Moldova - politically, economically, and regionally in terms of security. It has weakened Moldova's economic reform programs and its efforts toward democratization and nation building. Because of this unstable political and security climate, Moldova cannot solve its destabilizing problems: massive unemployment, semi-closed borders, a crippled economy, increased crime and corruption, and human trafficking. Most important, the high degree of accessibility of armament inherited from the Soviet Union by Al Qaeda poses a serious threat to US efforts to block terrorists' channels of money and weaponry. All these dimensions affect and should concern the international community, including the US. In the light of the War on Terror, the US - as the leader and initiator of this War - should re-assess the Transnistrian conflict.

The US has declared that it has strategic interests in two main areas of Moldova: (1) the consolidation of a democracy, oriented on the market economy and the creation of mutual

beneficial relations in political, economic and security fields; and (2) the withdrawal of Russian armed forces and the liquidation of the Transnistrian conflict as well as keeping Moldova independent without destabilizing the situation in the region. However, the US has not actively pursued a solution to any of these issues.

Historically, Moldova was a country on the confluence of the Turkish, Austro-Hungarian and Russian empires. When Moldova gained its independence in early 1991, the Moldavian authorities recognized, one by one, that the most important strategic objective of the country was to regain sovereignty over the Transnistrian region. Following Romania's acceptance into NATO in 2004, Moldova found itself at the frontier of the Euro-Atlantic Alliance, sharing 450 kilometers of its Eastern borderline with Romania. Thus, the unresolved Transnistrian conflict and presence of Russian troops and armaments on its territory not only poses a threat to the independence and territorial integrity of Moldova, but to the region of Southeast Europe as a whole.

An Associated Press correspondent stressed that the "AP investigation involving interviews with a dozen officials and experts strengthened suspicions that Transnistria is a hotbed of unregulated weapons transactions" and a "repository of rocket-mounted 'dirty bombs'".

THE ROLE OF THE US IN MOLDOVA'S TRANSNISTRIAN CONFLICT

Daniel Twinning, a director of the German Marshall Fund for the US, identified Transnistria as a “leading exporter of kidnapped women to Europe, a lucrative transit territory for illicit drugs, and a key link in the arms-smuggling network that peddles the Soviet Union’s former military hardware on the international market. If Al-Qaeda has not gone shopping there yet, it is only a matter of time.”

The US approach to this conflict differs in some important aspects from the European approach. The European approach is very vague, nearly nonexistent. The American approach is concrete in terms of the abstract, but not in terms of practice. Let us try to analyze all the components of the national/strategic interest of Moldova that might be crucial for the strategy policy of the US and EU in the region.

The democratic consolidation of Moldova, assisted by the US, could result in the creation of mutually beneficial political, economic, and security relations between Moldova and the US. It is very important that the US adopt a more balanced stance towards the situation in the region by redefining its “Russia-first” approach. This inspires hope for an equitable, long-lasting solution based on the principles of independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the involved states.

The practical part of the US participation and influence in the region is more or less nonexistent. The US should concentrate on solving the Transnistrian conflict, which is vital for Moldova and for regional stability and make aims at distinguishing its strategic interests from those of Russia. Furthermore, US efforts to re-

solve the Transnistrian conflict should extend beyond its participation in the Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe (OSCE) - the product of the federalization plan disapproved of by most Moldavians. The US should not only see Moldova as an instrument to influence US-Russia relations, but as a partner as well. □

Andrei Strah has a Bachelor of International Relations and a Master of Arts in Political Science. He resides in Chisinau, Republic of Moldova.

STRENGTHENING US—INDONESIAN STRATEGIC RELATIONS

John Dempsey

In January 1998, Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz (then the Dean of Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and a former US Ambassador to Indonesia) testified before the Senate Banking and Financial Services Committee, where he asserted that “it is probably safe to say that there is no country in the world as important as Indonesia about which Americans know so little.” Since then, Indonesia has grabbed world headlines on a number of occasions: the 1998 financial crisis, the fall of Suharto, the secession of East Timor, bombings in Bali and the Jakarta Marriott and, most recently, the devastating tsunami that destroyed much of the province of Aceh. Yet despite the increased media attention, Indonesia remains misunderstood in Washington, and American policy toward the Southeast Asian nation suffers as a result.

What is it that makes Indonesia so important to the United States and the rest of the world? Four things: Islam, shipping, China and terrorism. First, Indonesia, the world’s fourth largest country with 220 million people, is by far the world’s largest Muslim nation and, more importantly, the brand of Islam practiced there is quite tolerant. Second, the Indonesian archipelago of some 13,000 islands sits astride some of the world’s most vital sea lanes, including the Straits of Malacca and Lombok, through which half of world’s shipping passes. Tankers hauling crude oil from the Middle East to the

energy-starved countries of northeast Asia, whose economic well-being is critical to global economic stability, rely on safe passage through the straits. The United States also relies on safe passage for its naval vessels through these choke points in order to respond quickly to security conflagrations arising from the Middle East to the Korean Peninsula. Third, Indonesian strength and stability is a significant counterweight to the potential emergence of China as a regional hegemon, a scenario the United States greatly hopes to avoid. Finally, and most importantly to the United States, Indonesia is a front line state in the global war on terror. Thus, the existence of a friendly, stable and moderate Indonesia that is not a breeding ground for terrorist groups is of paramount concern to the United States.

It should be noted that the United States and Indonesia share very similar strategic interests: stability in the archipelago, stamping out radical Islam and preventing the rise of Chinese influence in the region. However, the tactics Washington employs to further its interests in that country are often misguided and many of Indonesia’s main concerns—including its primary interest in maintaining its sovereign territorial integrity from Aceh in the West to Papua in the East—are overlooked when policy is made. The disproportionate weight that America puts on fighting terrorism marginalizes many of its other interests in Indonesia, which ironically has a negative impact on fighting terrorism itself.

STRENGTHENING US-INDONESIAN STRATEGIC RELATIONS

To clamp down on terror groups in the archipelago, Washington needs to have the active support of the Indonesian government and its security forces while also working to eliminate the root causes that lead Indonesians to turn to terrorist groups like Jemaah Islamiah. To do the former, the United States needs to understand Indonesia's strategic concerns and ensure that the Indonesian government recognizes that America's policies in the country will help promote both countries' interests. Providing material assistance and the resumption of training for Indonesia's police and armed forces (Tentara Nasional Indonesia -TNI) will show Jakarta that Washington cares about stability in the archipelago and that it supports the TNI, the institution that is the greatest proponent of Indonesian sovereign integrity.

Still, the United States maintains outdated restrictions on the TNI that don't reflect the change in America's priorities since September 11, 2001. Now, more than in recent memory, America needs a well-trained, well-equipped TNI to advance the main U.S. interests in Indonesia (as noted above). Supporting the TNI would stabilize the archipelago, improve relations between Washington and Jakarta and support both countries' strategic interests in the country. Restoring the TNI's access to the International Military Education and Training program (restricted since 1992) would be extremely useful to ensure Indonesia's army officers receive professional training in topics like accountability and the importance of civilian control of the military.

Also, Indonesia's police force presently receives ten times more U.S. assistance than the TNI, but not all of it is directed appropriately. The United States should fund systematic train-

ing of Indonesia's police to improve its respect for the law and due process rights and to reduce the number of illegal detentions and extrajudicial killings. When the TNI and police forces of Indonesia act professionally, the Indonesian people are more likely to respect these security forces rather than fear them, which will eliminate one factor fueling the separatist sentiments in parts of the country. Moreover, restrictions on providing non-lethal spare parts for US supplied military equipment—including C-130 transport planes—should be lifted so that the TNI is able to carry out its work safely and effectively.


Where shipping is concerned, the United States fears terror attacks on tankers in the Straits, while the main worry in Jakarta is piracy. Regardless, both nations have an interest in securing safe passage through these important waters. Washington has already provided more than \$7 million to train the Indonesian maritime police, and it should consider providing even greater assistance to Indonesia's navy to help it better patrol and secure the surrounding waters.

To be certain, providing greater military assistance to Indonesia will be met with criticism from human rights groups and others who are appalled by the TNI record on human rights (including accusations that it was behind the violence in East Timor in 1999 and in ongoing rights violations in places like Aceh). However, to sanction the TNI is more likely to alienate Jakarta—an ally in the war on terrorism and a lynchpin of America's strategy to contain Chinese expansion—and still do nothing to improve the rights situation in breakaway provinces. Providing training, expertise and certain material assistance to the TNI will more likely result in an improved human rights environment while still advancing America's main interests—as

STRENGTHENING US-INDONESIAN STRATEGIC RELATIONS

well as Indonesia's.

Finally, the United States plans to provide \$470 million in economic assistance to Indonesia over the next five years, and it would be wise to direct much of this toward stamping out corruption and reducing poverty, two of the leading factors in driving people to join terrorist groups. Economic growth and a significant spike upward in per capita income across the archipelago kept the country stable for three decades under Suharto. However, when the late 1990s financial crisis hit, the country's economy nosedived and poverty increased. Indonesians are still recovering from the sudden crash. Assisting poor Indonesians and strengthening the country's economy are critical tactics that Washington should use to promote its overall goals of stabilizing the archipelago. Overall, the US—Indonesian relationship is strong given the mutual strategic interests of the two countries—mostly the interest in stability—but more attention to Indonesia's specific concerns (e.g., the strengthening of its armed forces) would help Washington better assure that its own interests are promoted in the region. □



John Dempsey is a lawyer and specialist in Asian Affairs, currently advising Afghanistan's Ministry of Justice on legal reform.

CENTRAL ASIA: IMPERATIVES FOR THE POSITIVE SUM GAME

Jamshed Safarov

“The purpose of foreign policy is not to provide an outlet for our own sentiments of hope or indignation; it is to shape real events in the real world.”

-President John F. Kennedy, 1963

Central Asia is a region composed of a number of nation-states and inhabited by fifty million people. When policymakers or journalists pay attention to Central Asia, references to the region become a word “game” – a game for energy resources, a game for geopolitical heartland, a game of ideologies. The region is treated as a piece on the chessboard – a zone over which global powers struggle, supersede, and contain each other. Central Asia represents a rare exception in the modern world when conditions exist to conduct a positive-sum game.

Today, the region is experiencing a transformation that demands sober judgment and proper strategy. Central Asia is at a crossroads. For the first time, the people are taking steps toward secular, democratic development in the region. However, after a promising and short period of full unification and a subsequent influx of positive attention, we again seem to be in strategic limbo, the basic features of and possible solution to follow:

1. Preservation and support for moderate forces and secularism.

Central Asia is home to many great Islamic

enlighteners, a region where people have always cherished multicultural traditions and tolerance. However, Central Asia is particularly vulnerable to international extremism and terrorist organizations because of its proximity to the Middle East and its position as part of the Muslim world. Unlike in the past, these forces are the most active participants in the present regional “game” and effectively exploit the weak unity of their opponents. The US and other allies should consider these conditions when developing a strategy for the region and facilitate cooperation among moderate forces.

2. A combination of regional integration, a strong political system, and a healthy economy are the vaccine against existing destructive processes in the region.

There is a complex set of factors, many of which are inherited, that prevent regional development, including geo-economic isolation, border delimitation, distribution of water resources, rivalry for external investments, competition in the markets for identical goods, and security challenges. With regard to security, there is a firm belief that Central Asian regional security depends on the geo-economic potential and success of Afghanistan and its people, in both trans-Afghan energy/transportation projects and the economic rehabilitation of Afghanistan. Central Asian states possess unique expertise, which

CENTRAL ASIA: IMPERATIVES FOR THE POSITIVE SUM GAME

could be successfully applied to restoration programs in this country. Note the unprecedented participation of Central Asian states in the initial phases of the war in Afghanistan.

Central Asian leaders recognize the vital importance of interaction, not only between external powers, but also among the countries of the region. This is the main policy focus of the Central Asian Cooperation Organization (CACO). One of the most important objectives of CACO is the creation of a regional common market with the participation of Afghanistan. The US could contribute to this initiative and reap the benefits while advancing its strategy in the region.

3. The US should avoid “carrot and stick” diplomacy.

People of region understand that stability and prosperity are imperative for the creation of democratic institutions and a market economy. However, Central Asia, a region composed of newly born nation-states, is dealing with transitional complexities such as the formation of a new social consciousness and the realities of regional security, which slow its progression towards democracy. If the US ignores these conditions, this could lead to poor strategic decisions, which could result in distrust among the region’s leaders and citizens.

The question is – Can the US and Central Asia cooperate when the future of Afghanistan is unknown? Moreover, the coalescence of terrorist groups, drug syndicates, and organized crime movements coupled with nuclear tension in the macro-region pose significant challenges to not only regional development, but also global security. Sometimes efforts aimed at mitigating these threats are weakened by decisions based on narrow estimations and recommendations from

off-site observers.

It is important to avoid premature conclusions - that rapid democratization of the region and liberalization of the economy in Central Asia will defeat the growth of extremism and terrorism. Recall the consequences of "shocking democratization" in Tajikistan - 7 years of civil war and more than 50 thousand victims. Radical economic and structural reforms are by no means a panacea for existing social problems.

4. Utilize the proximity of Central Asia to Russia, China, South Asia, and the Middle East.

The potential for cooperation among global players is great, and Central Asia is prepared to become one of the key players in this positive sum game. The new formula for the game in the Central Asia should encapsulate three important variables: regional stability, macro-regional energy, and global cooperation. □

Jamshed Safarov is the Policy Planning and Assessment Coordinator, Uzbekistan Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

LEBANESE—AMERICAN STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES: PRINCIPLES FOR UNDERSTANDING

Imad Harb, Ph.D.

Generally, Lebanese-American relations have been cordial since the Second World War. In the 1950s and 1960s, Lebanon remained a western-oriented polity while neighboring Arab countries chose revolutionary politics. Its parliamentary democracy, though wanting, provided the only Arab representative regime and its successive governments avoided anti-American and anti-western entanglements. With the eruption and continuance of its civil war of 1975-1990, Lebanese-American relations became ambivalent. Today, these relations are seen through the prism of America's war on terrorism and the attitude toward Syria's role in the country. This essay will analyze Lebanon's strategic objectives and will attempt to find a common ground for Lebanese-American strategic cooperation.

Lebanon's strategic objectives can be summarized in a few overarching principles: sustained communal peace and democratic development, balanced relations with the Arab world and the West, a strong economy, and a special relationship with Syria. However, in keeping with the dictum that foreign policy is made in the shadow of domestic policy, these strategic objectives are governed by the fractured nature of the Lebanese polity and society. Lebanese foreign policymak-

ers and elites have to contend first with the pull and push, the give and take, of a dynamic political culture before they formulate strategies to pursue their foreign policy objectives.

Perhaps the most acute domestic consideration is the country's political re-alignment following fifteen years of civil war that destroyed its infrastructure and frayed its socio-economic environment. The Taif Agreement of 1989, hosted by Saudi Arabia and brokered by Syria and the United States, created what is today commonly known in Lebanon as the system of "the three presidencies plus one." According to this agreement, the Maronite Christians officially retained the Presidency of the Republic while the Muslim Sunnis and Shi'a strengthened their hold over the Prime Ministership and Speakership of Parliament, respectively. The Druze, a minority political community that has been at the center of Lebanese politics for centuries, maintained a powerful political position, albeit without the attendant hold on a specific institution. In effect, and in typical cooperative fashion, Taif produced a constant threat of political paralysis through mutual veto powers exercised at different intervals by sectarian elites. Thus, nothing short of a political compromise allows foreign policy decisions to be made.

LEBANESE—AMERICAN STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

Socially, Lebanon has for a long time been divided into two general cultural and nationalist camps: one espousing a clearly Arab character for the country and is made up mainly of Muslims and another advocating a western orientation and is made up generally of Christians. This specific problem of identity has forced the behavior of Lebanese foreign policy elites to fluctuate between what can be called ‘shades of alignment’ — not completely pan-Arab and yet reservedly friendly to the West. This behavior has been at the core of Lebanese politics since independence in 1943 and the current international fissures dividing so-called ‘freedom lovers’ from ‘terrorist supporters’ (read Muslims) are not helping to resolve it.

Economically, the country is reeling from the legacy of the civil war and the costly reconstruction undertaken since the early 1990s. The economy is heavily dependent on the services and trade sectors, making it hostage to both internal and external developments. The public debt, foreign and domestic, is estimated to range from \$30 to 40 billion with debt service using up any economic surplus. Unemployment is high and emigration is increasing. Corruption in the public sector is rampant. The disparities in income are staggering.

Finally, Lebanese foreign policy is heavily influenced by Syria’s since the two countries have established what can be called an ‘alliance of convenience,’ given the absence of peace with the more powerful Israel. There are an estimated 14,000 Syrian soldiers in the country (down from a high of 30,000). Lebanon has, to the chagrin of many of its capitalists, signed many bilat-

eral economic and social treaties with Syria that, in effect, link the country’s future to its neighbor’s. Representatives of Lebanon’s confessional groupings have also made it a habit to first, appeal to Syria’s policymakers for sought-after political compromises and, second, use any close relations with Damascus against their opponents. Moreover, Syria’s support of individual political organizations, most notably Hizbullah (which is at once a political party represented in Lebanon’s Parliament, a social organization providing services to the poor, and a military faction fighting Israel), gives it a de facto say in domestic Lebanese politics.

If United States foreign policy toward Lebanon is to succeed, it must understand this very dynamic environment. Framing American national interests overseas within a new paradigm emphasizing a “war on terrorism” has blinded the Bush Administration to the necessary nuances of diplomatic maneuvering, especially in the Middle East. Arab countries of the region, Lebanon included, have reservations about America’s policy that clearly states that every self-respecting country must support Washington’s interpretation of terrorism and response to it, including what most Lebanese believe to be the ill-conceived war on Iraq. According to this logic, the Lebanese must denounce and dismantle their own Hizbollah (declared a terrorist organization by the United States) and must support the American occupation of Iraq, both while Israel continues its excesses against the Palestinians and its occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Such demands are a death knell to the hopes for political and social compromise in

Lebanon and thus lead to the collapse of whatever civic peace has been reached since the end of the civil war.

Washington has now a golden opportunity to try to find a strategic confluence of interests with a large segment of the Lebanese population and elites, both Christian and Muslim. Over the last few months, a constellation of prominent political and religious organizations has begun a campaign to ‘rationalize’ relations with Syria (read ending its military presence and political influence while maintaining friendly relations with it). The campaign is also calling for strengthening democracy and the rule of law (Syria helped force Lebanese parliamentarians to amend the Lebanese constitution to extend President Emile Lahoud’s term for three more years) and for ending corruption and reviving the economy. The opposition is broad-based and includes former presidents and prime ministers, members of Parliament, heads of both leftist and rightist political parties, leaders of religious orders, and wide sectors of the economy. Given the Bush Administration’s purported interest in democracy in the Arab world, this could be the beginning of the sought-after change in the region. After all, with the war in Iraq becoming the quagmire that it was never thought to become, helping Lebanon’s democratic alternative can serve to both assure Washington of a friendly environment along the eastern Mediterranean and assist Lebanon in reaching the long civic peace it so deserves. □

Dr. Imad Harb is a Program Officer with the Iraq Education Program at the US Institute of Peace.

US POLICY AND THE ARAB WORLD: STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES IN COLLISION OR COLLUSION?

Dr. Jafar A. Hassan

Over the past few years the Middle East region has, more than ever, become one of the most significant areas of concern for US security / foreign policy, if not the top area of concern for its foreign agenda. Similarly, the nature of US strategy towards the region has become more complex as the administration focuses its attention on domestic processes and political reforms in the region.

As new leaderships assumed power in countries such as Jordan, Morocco, Bahrain, and Qatar among other newly emerging examples such as Iraq and Palestine, fundamental changes in the state building processes have taken place transforming the traditional tenets of legitimacy and approach to governance in these countries. Such transformations impose tremendous challenges on the institutional fabric of the state. The traditionally perceived inheritance of stability at the domestic level no longer implies or guarantees successful adaptability to the changes and challenges that have surfaced at the outset of the twenty-first century.

This has started a process of rethinking the state building project in many Arab countries towards strengthening the state in a manner that allows for the advancement of regional security, economic growth, political freedom and the exclusion of violence from civilian life. In this respect, state strength does not necessarily depend on or correlate with the traditional concept of

state power, but refers to the degree of its socio-political cohesion and institutional development.

This process applies clearly to Jordan where three key objectives preoccupy its leadership:

1. Sustaining domestic security and stability within the Kingdom and supporting a stable environment in neighboring states.
2. Implementing essential social and economic reforms and empowering the private sector.
3. Strengthening political processes by implementing political reforms to ensure greater grass-root participation in the national agenda.

These goals are homegrown national strategies essential for Jordan and correlate with the “new” US strategy towards the region.

US strategy after September 11, 2001 began to take the neo-realist perspective into account by focusing on the domestic level in its policy towards the Arab states. This is reflected clearly in President Bush’s recent speeches, which highlight the need to build democratic, free societies in Arab countries while implicitly criticizing the realist tenets of foreign policy towards the region that overlooked systems of government by focusing purely on traditional strategic interests with state actors.

The current Administration’s emphasis on moral values of freedom and democracy is an

important part of a new US perspective on security. The President's inaugural speech and State of the Union Address in early 2005 outlined a "freedom doctrine" that made democratization a prerequisite for combating terrorism; thus, linking security and political reform directly and advancing this perspective as a strategic objective for US policy in the Arab World.

Political reform is inextricably linked to economic reform in the region. Creating a developmental framework that could absorb more than one hundred million employment seekers in the next decade is not only a matter of improving lives but also a condition for preempting radicalism and alienation among the youngest in society.

Jordan understands the absolute need to deliver rapid and sustainable growth and development for its young population (50% under 18), which is a major focus of its socio-economic reform program. The US is a major supporter of this significant and costly program that Jordan could not embark on by its own limited resources. More than \$2 billion of US assistance between 2002 and 2005 enabled the Jordanian government to partially free up resources for its domestic reform projects.

By supporting countries that demonstrate the political will and desire to reform, the US can build examples of success in a region where success is badly needed. Such models are the best way to convince more reluctant and skeptical actors that reform is necessary for stability. It is also a common phenomenon that the countries most willing to take the big leap have the least amount of resources to complete the effort. Ensuring adequate funding for bold and far-reaching homegrown reform projects is vital to restore the public faith in the government's abil-

ity to deliver and create confidence in the genuine desire of the United States to improve the lives of Arab citizens.

Therefore, the best manner by which this administration can articulate the communality of its agenda is by supporting a coalition of reformist states that would encourage other neighbors to follow suit and come on board. A broader international context for this effort is also useful, whether this is through partnerships with the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the G8 and the European Union (EU). Such projects are already underway including the recent Initiative on Good Governance for Development in the Arab Countries initiated at a meeting in Jordan in February and organized in partnership with the OECD and United Nations Development Program (UNDP), as well as a core of six Arab countries. The Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative of the G8 Summit in Sea Island which took off in the Forum for the Future in Rabat at the end of 2004 is another example of concerted action to support the region's reform agenda.

Creating the context for private-public partnership and sustainable growth is vital alongside the political will that is needed to embark on reform. The administration has used bilateral Free Trade Agreements (FTA) as a means of pushing economic reform in the region by rewarding reformist economies with such agreements. Jordan's rapid accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) is seen as part of the momentum and incentive that the FTA and the US created among policy makers to take serious steps towards economic liberalization. Such agreements were extended to Jordan, Morocco, Bahrain and several other countries are expected to follow suit. Trade with the US allowed Jordan's

US POLICY AND THE ARAB WORLD

exports to grow from a few dozen million dollars in the late 1990s to over one billion dollars in almost five years by the end of 2004. The Middle East partnership initiative is another important component of US policy aimed at encouraging private sector and civil society empowerment in the region.

It is in the interest of the US and Jordan to encourage homegrown efforts for reform aimed at building sustainable economies and institutionalized processes that guarantee free and participatory politics. However, this process requires buy-in from the public as well leaders.

US commitment to the active pursuit of a final peace settlement on the basis of a two-state solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is also a common objective for Jordan, the United States and the region. Jordan and the United States have a strong interest in the implementation of the Road Map and achieving progress towards a final status solution.

A stable, representative and moderate government in Iraq is essential for Jordan's security. Jordan's active role in providing Iraq with the assistance it requires in this critical period is a cornerstone of the strategic relationship that ties the two countries together and an important asset for the Coalition effort in the country.

Therefore, Jordan's strategic interests and those of the United States foreign policy in the region share many common objectives at various levels that go beyond the traditional strategic military/security context. This new level of engagement by the United States in the region can serve as an important framework for building strong partnerships with states who share these common goals, but more importantly with the peoples of this region. An intensive and frank

process of strategic dialogue between the US and the Arab World that serves to highlight the communality of interests and build a transparent discourse on goals and objectives is particularly needed. Such a process would highlight shared interests and, for the first time, provide a platform that focuses on Arab interests as much as US interests.

Articulating this communality of objectives and actively building upon the common strategic denominators is essential for the success of both US and Jordan's strategic interests. While the peoples of the region and the public in the US may know more about each other, they do not understand each other better. Nothing is more reflective of this predicament than the results of many polls conducted throughout the past few years highlighting how far apart people in the Arab World and people in the United States are in understanding each other's fears and concerns. Factoring the public in the new strategic relationship is indispensable for bridging the divide between state and citizen that has come to haunt Arab and US strategic interests alike at the outset of this century. □

Dr. Jafar Hassan is the Deputy Chief of Mission at the Embassy of Jordan in Washington D.C. Prior to his appointment in DC in June 2001, he served briefly as the Director of the Israel Section at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Blood and Oil: The Dangers and Consequences of America's Growing Dependency on Imported Petroleum

Michael T. Klare

Henry Holt and Company, New York, 2004, 288 Pages

Reviewed by Roger Hamburg

Klare's latest book joins his earlier *Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict* and illustrates the global strain on natural resources: water, timber, minerals, and in the current instance oil and the dilemmas of security and energy policy that it poses for the United States. It is a clear example of "intermestic" policy - issues that are simultaneously international and domestic. It also exemplifies that in today's global economy geopolitics and geoeconomics interact in myriad and unexpected ways.

Oil, as Klare points out, is safer to use than coal (carbon dioxide byproducts) or nuclear power (radioactive wastes). Oil in the Middle East is cheap, close to the surface, and entails low production costs. This makes it both alluring and dangerous because of the unstable situation in most Middle Eastern countries. Oil both fuels and drives American industry and the economy, making the U.S. strong, while increasing dependency and potential vulnerability, making the U.S. weak. This weakness is the result of an increased need for imported oil (Klare visualizes greater dependence on Middle Eastern oil over time), an increasing rise of anti-American civil

violence and increased competition for supplies from China and India. This may well be the case whatever the outcome in Iraq, a major oil producer.

Increasing U.S. demands for oil resulted in its net importation after 1972. The U.S. had been largely self sufficient before that. President Franklin Roosevelt had made an alliance with the House of Saud in Saudi Arabia in the 1940s. Plentiful and cheap oil drove the U.S. economy in the post-World War II era. This is shown in sharp relief by the fact that it is the basis of plastics, pharmaceuticals, and textile fibers. It is so vital to American security and economic health and prosperity that Klare contends that the U.S. military has become a "global protection service" for all resources.

As an example of the latter Klare argues that the first and second Gulf Wars, the invasion of Iraq in the latter and the subsequent overthrow of Saddam Hussein's government was waged to: (1) Bring to power a stable government in Baghdad that would guarantee a free flow of oil; (2) Restore stability in Saudi Arabia (there would be no further need for a domestically destabilizing American presence there which had been containing Saddam); and (3) Put pressure on Iran to bring to power a government friendly to the

BOOK REVIEW: *BLOOD AND OIL*, MICHAEL T. KLARE

United States.

President Bush has suggested “diversification” of oil suppliers to reduce dependence on the Middle East. However, this too is fraught with danger and uncertainty. For example, Venezuela under the unpredictable Hugo Chavez is trying to involve Iran to increase oil exports to China and reduce dependence on the U.S. as a major customer. Recall again that Middle Eastern oil is relatively cheap and easy to produce. By contrast, the Atabasca tar sands in Alberta, Canada, are located in a friendly state and are likely to remain so, but the oil extracted is quite expensive to produce. The current political-economic situation in Russia is highly problematical both in terms of the supply and availability of Russian oil, the oil policies of the Putin government, and competing customers like China.

Klare’s final chapter, “Escaping the Dilemma: A Strategy for Energy Autonomy and Integrity” makes the case for a move to greater energy independence. He supports “protected” oil (although as an environmentalist he is dubious about Alaskan oil exploration) and development of alternatives like wind and solar energy, too expensive or unavailable widely in the past. We must seek not cheap energy that has to be protected by our soldiers, but a policy more in accord with American values and long-term interests.

In transportation, he argues we must place less reliance on high gas-consuming automobiles and light trucks. This among other steps he recommends would constitute a “paradigm shift” in our outlook. We should proscribe any contract based solely on a country’s energy deposits. We must agree not to defend a foreign state or entity on condition of access to oil.

He suggests improving oil efficiency, use of nonpolluting fuels like ethanol, greater use of “hybrid” (gas-electric) automobiles, development of hydrogen cell technology, and greater utilization of mass transit. He would like to see more stringent and less uneven enforcement of CAFE (Corporate Average Fuel Efficiency) standards. These regulations tend to be more acceptable as gas prices rise quickly only to become unpopular, especially with the auto industry, when people become accustomed to the higher prices over time. It was said, for example, that people bought SUVs in expectation of gas at \$1.50 a gallon and were surprised when it rose to about \$2.00 a gallon (still a global bargain) but it does not appear that SUV sales have dropped off very much and “hybrids” at present only constitute 3 % of the automobile market. The automobile companies and dealers find “gas guzzlers” more profitable. Cutting the American standard of living, even minimally, is not something that many people would accept, except under very dire circumstances.

In time, the “free market” will function. President Bush has called for more energy independence as outlined above. But the U.S. military is overextended and the supply of “cheap” global oil is becoming more problematical by the day. Klare’s clarion call and note of urgency is most appropriate and timely. □

Roger Hamburg, Professor Emeritus of political Science, Indiana University South Bend. Member of the Academic Council of NSF and Associate Councilor, Atlantic Council of the United States.

RECENT SPEAKERS

A summary of remarks made by National Strategy Forum Guest Speakers

On November 12, 2004, Stewart Baker, General Counsel for the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the US Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, addressed the National Strategy Forum members on biological terrorism.

Stewart Baker states that there is an alarming societal consensus that the threat of biological terrorism and other weapons that would have disastrous consequences is exaggerated or that the government is overreacting. According to Baker, the likelihood of a biological attack of catastrophic magnitude is not likely to occur in the next ten to twenty years – there is time to prepare for such an event. However, there is a significant risk posed by traditional biological weapons such as Anthrax (used in the attacks in Washington, D.C. in 2001, which shut down Congress and killed five people), which can be developed and used with the intended purpose of causing catastrophic damage.

According to Baker, there are two areas of biological weapons concerns. The first is the use of biological weapons by nation-states. The most notable case is the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union led the international fight to wipe out smallpox, yet they were developing an entirely new generation of biological weapons and creating tons of smallpox and anthrax designed to be resistant to existing antibiotics. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia partially abandoned its program. Several scientists employed by the Soviets at the Russian nuclear complex

defected and revealed what types of biological weapons the Soviets were developing. Baker states that the good news is that these weapons have not been used. He credits two factors: (1) US policy during the Nixon administration when the US unilaterally renounced the use of lethal or incapacitating chemical agents and weapons and unconditionally renounced all methods of biological warfare and (2) the unpredictability or uncontrollable nature of biological weapons.

The second area is the use of biological weapons by terrorists. Although we need to be worried about this threat, Baker states that many of the more sophisticated capabilities developed by the Russians or other countries - weapons that are designed to spread widely, to be undetectable until too late, to resist antibiotics - are beyond what today's terrorists are developing and using. Furthermore, there has been a lot of activity (time, money, and research) at the federal, state, and local levels aimed at improving response and recovery capabilities to potential bioterrorist attacks.

According to Baker, a real concern lies in the "revolution" that is occurring in biology today with regard to genetic design – the ability to reconstruct or modify an infectious germ, which, in turn, creates deadlier prospects. This information could be obtained by Al Qaeda or other terrorist groups. The US must find a way to address this problem.

Baker states that the biology community has not had the experience of the physics commu-

RECENT SPEAKERS

nity, which brought nuclear power into the world. Many within the physics community have spent their careers trying to control nuclear capabilities. The biology community is focused on the positive, not the negative consequences.

Over the next few decades, terrorists may execute various attacks that will be ineffective or less effective than their intended use. In time, the American public will begin to learn about the risks and to focus on the importance of preparation and recovery in a societal way. □

On January 27, 2005, Dr. Jorge I. Dominguez, Director of the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs at Harvard University, addressed the National Strategy Forum members on the future of US-Cuba relations.

Professor Dominguez states that US-Cuban relations are better today – substantively speaking – than they have been in a long time. This may be overshadowed by what he calls the “worst” war of rhetoric between the US and Cuba since the beginning of the 1960’s.

Professor Dominguez provided NSF members with a brief history of Cuba’s transition from a world power from the period of the 1960’s to the 1990’s to its weakened position after the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990’s. In the three decades before the collapse of the Soviet Union, Cuba demonstrated its strong offensive military capabilities by employing its military overseas four times to Africa – once to Morocco in the 1960’s, twice to Ethiopia in the 1970’s, and once to Angola in the 1980’s. From 1975-1980 Cuba deployed more troops abroad than the United States has ever deployed even during the peak year of the Vietnam War.

During the 1950s continuing into the early 1990’s, Cuba provided substantial support for various revolutionary movements throughout the world. Cuba was the Soviet Union’s most reliable ally and one of the America’s greatest strategic adversaries, most notably during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962.

As the Soviet Union collapsed, Cuba experienced what Dominguez calls “an adjustment to the shift in the balance of power.” Over a short period of time, from 1989-1991, the Cuban government recalled its armies from abroad, suspended its support to revolutionary movements, and dramatically redesigned its foreign policy by downsizing its armed forces, budget, and personnel, and halting the import of weaponry. The loss of Soviet subsidies caused a 55 percent decline in its gross domestic product. Once the subsidies disappeared, Cuban imports fell by two-thirds and exports fell by three-quarters. From 1990 to 1993, the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita decreased by thirty-five percent. In 2004, the GDP per capita was fifteen percent below the 1985 level. According to Dominguez, at this rate Cuba will return to the 1985 level in 2010, having lost 25 years. Cuba’s main source of foreign exchange, which sustains its weak economy, is international tourism (one of the key policy changes since the 1959-1960 and the 1990’s periods) and sex tourism. Other sources include remittances from the Cuban Diaspora, nickel exports, and the sugar industry.

Concerning US policy toward Cuba, Dominguez states that the US could have declared victory once Cuba halted all of the activities to which the US objected to in the 1990’s such as its support for revolutionary movements and its alliance with the Soviet Union. Instead, the US developed a policy that was noble in the-

ory, yet clumsy and ineffective in practice.

Dominguez states that US policy toward Cuba has remained static over the past three administrations from Bush Sr. to Clinton to the current Bush administration. Since mid-2004, US policy toward Cuba has become “more militant,” marked by a US need to hasten the end of the Castro regime. Dominguez attributes this shift to the current administration’s focus on regime change.

Professor Dominguez states that the context of US – Cuban relations can be characterized by three “baskets”:

- The first basket is the **trade embargo**, which was formalized into US law in March of 1996 by the Helms-Burton Act. The bill enforces the 40-year-old embargo against Cuba and punishes foreign companies trafficking in property confiscated by the Castro regime. The enforcement of the trade embargo has been porous. President Bush continues to suspend the provisions of the Helms-Burton Act that would allow lawsuits against firms in Cuba that are using property that Castro's government seized after coming to power and has not enforced a provision that prohibits executives of foreign firms doing business in Cuba from entering the United States.
- The second basket is **security cooperation** between the US and Cuban military forces near the US Naval base in Guantanamo, which Dominguez states is very professional. He states that the US-Cuba counter-drug trafficking operations have been very effective.
- The third basket is the **combination of harsh rhetoric and words**, exemplified by rigid restrictions on travel and academic and

cultural exchanges. However, due to the US-Cuba trade relationship, particularly US agricultural exports to Cuba, US-Cuban relations are better under the current administration. (Since the enactment of the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000, which allows cash sales to Cuba, Cuba has gone from the 226th largest market for U.S. agriculture exports to 21st, with total purchases of \$1 billion.)

Professor Dominguez states that lifting US sanctions on Cuba is not a “desirable” strategy. It is important to think about a US policy that would look ahead to the Cuba “that is already being built” as well as the engagement of international community – a combined strategy of carrots and sticks based on credible promises. □

STRATEGY WATCH


*A summary of recent events
December 2004–February 2005*

Africa

In late December the United Nations International Atomic Energy Agency uncovers evidence of secret nuclear experiments in **Egypt**; most were carried out in the 1980s and 1990s. It is reported that the IAEA is examining evidence that some research was conducted only a year ago. The Egyptian government declares that its nuclear program was peaceful. In early January peace in **Congo** is threatened when Jean Pierre Bemba, a leading member of the country's transitional coalition government, accuses Congolese President Joseph Kabila of failing to organize elections. In early February **Sudan** rejects a call for an International War Crimes Tribunal on Darfur stating that it is an internal matter and should be dealt with after the fighting has ceased; the fighting and bloodshed continue in Darfur as dismal humanitarian conditions continue to decline. A commission of inquiry declared in January that the crimes committed in Darfur are no less serious than genocide.

Asia

In mid-December **Japan** warns North Korea that it might impose sanctions after North Korea turns over human remains of two kidnapped Japanese women. North Korea said that sanctions would amount to a declaration of war.



In late December a **tsunami in Asia** claims the lives of more than 295,000 people.


In mid-February **North Korea** announces for the first time that it has nuclear weapons and rejects calls to restart disarmament talks. **Taiwanese** President Chen Shui-bian's Democratic Progressive Party fails to take control of parliament. Mr. Chen resigned as party leader. President Chen appoints a new prime minister in late January after the cabinet resigned in the wake of the poor election results. In late December a **tsunami in Asia** claims the lives of more than 295,000 people – Indonesia was hit the hardest with a death toll of nearly 243,000 people. Three days of fighting between the **Philippine** army and two groups of Muslim rebels on the southwestern island of Jolo leaves sixty dead.

Caucasus

Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili proposes autonomy to the breakaway region of South Ossetia, while acknowledging that Russian acquiescence would be needed for the deal; South Ossetian leaders reject it. In early February a Russian delegation led by special Foreign Ministry ambassador Igor Salvosky visits Tbilisi to negotiate with Georgia on a draft framework treaty between the two countries.

Europe

In mid-December Austrian doctors confirm that Victor Yushchenko, the opposition candidate for **Ukraine's** presidential election, had been poisoned with dioxin, which disfigured his



In mid-January the **Ukraine** Election Commission declares **Victor Yushchenko** winner of the presidential vote.

South American leaders declare the founding of a continent-wide union at a summit in **Peru**, which they hope would be similar to the **European Union**.

Israeli Prime Minister **Ariel Sharon** and **Palestinian** Authority President **Mahmoud Abbas** agree to a ceasefire at a landmark summit in **Egypt** early February.

North Korea announces for the first time that it has nuclear weapons.

STRATEGY WATCH

face. In mid-January the Ukraine Election Commission declares Victor Yushchenko winner of the presidential vote; he is inaugurated as president in late January. In early December the Basque separatist group ETA set off a string of small bombings in Madrid and other cities in **Spain**; no one is injured. In early February, an ETA car bomb attack injures forty-two people in a Madrid business park. Spain's King Juan Carlos and Queen Sofia and Mexican President Vicente Fox were due to open an art exhibition at the convention center. Spanish Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero accuses his predecessor, José María Aznar, of deleting computer records that had information regarding his government's reactions after the March 11th Madrid bombings. **Turkish** Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan objects to suggestions that the European Union should add new conditions before agreeing to open Turkish membership talks. **Romania's** presidential election run-off is won unexpectedly by the opposition candidate, Traian Basescu, who was the former mayor of Bucharest.

Latin America

Mexican President Vicente Fox fires Mexico City's police chief and the commissioner of the Federal Preventive Police over the November 2004 public lynching of three policemen. The **Colombian** government withdraws a bill that would have raised

In mid-February floods and landslides kill more than 80 people and leave at least 60,000 homeless in **Venezuela** and **Colombia**.

an extra \$700 million in revenues by increasing value-added tax and taxing pensions - a blow for Colombian President Álvaro Uribe, who Congress recently approved to seek re-election. In early January the Colombian government extradites Simón Trinidad, a leader of the FARC guerrilla movement, to the United States where he faces charges of drug trafficking and kidnapping Americans. In mid-February **Colombian** President Alvaro Uribe and his **Venezuelan** counterpart agree to meet to resolve the worst diplomatic row between the two neighbors in years. In mid-February floods and landslides kill more than 80 people and leave at least 60,000 homeless in Venezuela and Colombia. **Cuba** releases seven political dissidents from jail. A **Brazilian** court orders the government to open its files on the dictatorship-era repression of a guerrilla movement in the Araguaia region of the Amazon. The Brazilian armed forces are being called on to acknowledge more responsibility for the 1970s "dirty war". **South American** leaders declare the founding of a continent-wide union at a summit in Peru, which they hope would be similar to the European Union. UN troops invade a slum in **Haiti's** capital, Port-au-Prince, in their first big blow against gangs loyal to the former President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. In Buenos Aires, **Argentina** a fire in a dance hall kills at least 186 people. Former **Chilean** dictator Augusto Pinochet is placed under house arrest after the Chilean Supreme Court rejects defense arguments that the

In late January elections are held in **Iraq** for the first time in five decades.

he is unfit for trial due to dementia and rules that he could be tried on charges of murder and kidnapping.

Middle East

In early December a local cell of al-Qaeda claims responsibility for an attack on the American consulate in Jeddah, **Saudi Arabia**, in which five expatriates and four terrorists are killed. Hamid Karzai is sworn in as President of **Afghanistan**, making him the first democratically elected leader of the country. In mid-December **Israel** and **Egypt** sign a trade agreement. In late January elections are held in **Iraq** for the first time in five decades. In early February election results are delayed; some ballots were declared invalid because of tampering. **Israeli** Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and **Palestinian** Authority President Mahmoud Abbas agree to a ceasefire in at a landmark summit in Egypt early February. NATO defense ministers meet to discuss the role of the alliance in **Iraq** and **Afghanistan**. A bomb blast in central Beirut, **Lebanon** kills former Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri.

A bomb blast in central Beirut, **Lebanon** kills former Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri.

place the budgets and most of the assets of 15 spy agencies under a new post of National Intelligence Director (NID); John Negroponte, former US Ambassador to Iraq, is selected to be the first NID. In January, President Bush is inaugurated for his second term; Condoleezza Rice is confirmed as Secretary of State. President Bush appoints Michael Chertoff, who serves on the 3rd U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in Philadelphia, as the new Secretary of Homeland Security; replacing Tom Ridge. □

North America

In early December the US Senate approves intelligence overhaul bill proposed by the independent commission that investigated the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. The bill will

THE NATIONAL STRATEGY FORUM, INC.

53 West Jackson Blvd., Suite 516

Chicago, IL 60604

T: 312.697.1286

F: 312.697.1296

Email: nsf@nationalstrategy.com

Website: www.nationalstrategy.com