



**NATIONAL
STRATEGY
FORUM**

R E V I E W

FAILED STATES

**THE SECURITY PARADOX OF
FAILED STATES**

Ken Menkhaus

**SECURITY AND THE CHALLENGE
OF FAILED STATES**

Will Reno

**BOOK REVIEW— PAKISTAN:
EYE OF THE STORM**

**INTERVENTION IN FAILED
STATES**

Anna Simons

**RECONSTRUCTING STATES IN
THE WAKE OF CONFLICT**

Vladimir Solonari

STRATEGY WATCH

RESEARCH REPORTS: *A POST SADDAM SCENARIO ~ DEFENDING AGAINST ANARCHY ~
END OF AN AFFAIR ~ NAVIGATING THE TAIWAN STRAIT ~ WHERE ARE THE HAWKS ON
NORTH KOREA*

RECENT SPEAKERS: *GARY MILHOLLIN*

The *National Strategy Forum Review*
is a quarterly publication of the

NATIONAL STRATEGY FORUM

Richard E. Friedman
Chair/President

Board of Directors

Lester Crown

Richard A. Behrenhausen

James R. Donnelley

Michael P. Galvin

James N. Pritzker

William Wolf

Morris I. Leibman
(1911-1992)
Founding Chair



The National Strategy Forum is a not-for-profit, non-partisan organization committed to the following principles:

- The goal of United States national strategy is a genuine and just peace, sought in common cause with the community of free and independent nations.
- The advancement and preservation of democracy is essential to promote human rights, inspire principled cultural achievement, and maximize economic development.
- Informed public opinion and an enduring non-partisan consensus are fundamental parts of national security in a democratic society.

• • •

The National Strategy Forum has no membership fee, but it depends upon the support of its members. The Forum is a publicly supported charitable institution under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. As a non-profit organization, the Forum is funded solely by contributions from individuals, foundations, and corporations. All contributions to the Forum are tax deductible.

• • •

The opinions expressed in the National Strategy Forum Review do not necessarily reflect those of the National Strategy Forum or its members.

• • •

© 2003 National Strategy Forum, Inc.

National Strategy Forum
53 W. Jackson, Suite 516, Chicago, IL 60604

National Strategy Forum Review

Publisher
Richard E. Friedman

Editor
Lauren Bean

Editorial Board
Marilyn Diamond
Rachel E. Golden
John Allen Williams
Endy Zemenides

NATIONAL STRATEGY FORUM REVIEW

Volume 12, Issue 3

Spring 2003

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Letter from the Publisher	1
The Security Paradox of Failed States	2
<i>Ken Menkhaus</i>	
Security and the Challenge of Failed States	5
<i>Will Reno</i>	
Intervention in Failed States: What the Military Can and Can't Do	11
<i>Anna Simons</i>	
Reconstructing States in the Wake of Conflict	15
<i>Vladimir Solonari</i>	
Book Review: Pakistan: Eye of the Storm-by Owen Bennett Jones	18
Reviewed by <i>Endy Zemenides</i>	
Recent Speakers	21
Strategy Watch	24
Research Reports	28

LETTER FROM THE PUBLISHER

The theme of this issue of the *National Strategy Forum Review* is Failed States. We are grateful for the insights of the scholars who participated in a recent conference at Northwestern University underwritten by The Searle Foundation entitled “Nasty Little Wars,” organized by professors Will Reno and Ken Abbott.

What is the relationship between failed states and US national security and US national strategy? One, a humanitarian impulse to help people who are in need. Two, progress towards a more stable world. Implicit in the latter objective is a reduction in the number of safe harbors for international terrorism. Tyranny and chaos left unattended are real threats to the US and its allies.

There is an historical parallel between contemporary US (and western allies’) objectives and old European imperialism. The mission of the old imperialism was to civilize “primitive” people: to teach them self discipline and give them the skills needed for stable political governance. The incentive given to indigenous people was an imprecise promise of eventual self-rule at some time in the indefinite future. The world has seen the collapse of many failed post-colonial states, re-

sulting in massacre and chaos. Frequently, the goal of new leaders was self-aggrandizement rather than state building.

The contemporary vision of how to assist failed states may be to spend as little as possible, get a quick result, and get out.

There is a risk that liberated states will become victims of tyranny and that the cycle of liberation and tyranny will be repeated. The gamble is whether a new regime installed by liberators can build a legitimate political state without massive, long-range continuing assistance from the US and its allies. The caution is that the Roman Empire fell because of imperial overreach.

The array of articles that follow will examine some fundamental issues that will assist our strategic thinking.

- What constitutes a failed state?
- Why and when should the US and other states intervene and provide assistance?
- Is there a clear US policy for failed states? If not, what should the criteria be?
- Should failed states be addressed on a regional basis?
- What are the criteria for prioritization and selection of states that will receive assistance?
- Reconstruction: How to put the pieces together (Iraq is an example)?

THE SECURITY PARADOX OF FAILED STATES

Ken Menkhaus

Failed states – extreme political crises in which institutions of central government collapse, often amidst protracted civil violence, lawlessness, ethnic conflict, and displacement – have become a depressingly familiar part of the contemporary political landscape. A recent “State Failure Task Force” commissioned by the CIA to examine the causes of state collapse counted 127 instances of state failure between 1957 to 1996, with the highest rates of state collapse occurring since 1990. Today, roughly 20 countries of the world’s 191 sovereign states meet the Task Force’s definition of a failed state.

Before the 9/11 terrorist attacks, failed states were treated principally as a humanitarian concern, as the source of a new and problematic type of crisis -- the “complex emergency.” These crises (Somalia, Afghanistan, Sudan, Rwanda, Haiti, Congo, and Liberia, to name a few) triggered humanitarian interventions ranging from emergency relief operations to full-scale peace enforcement missions; but US policy response to these failed states was almost always a humanitarian preoccupation, often driven by the political imperative to be seen as “doing something” in response to media coverage of war and famine. This had important implications for policy. To the extent that the stakes were political, not strategic, pol-

icy decisions tended to be driven by political rather than strategic choices. The result was US policies which focused more on addressing symptoms rather than cause; a preoccupation with quick-fixes, exit strategies, and risk-aversion; and a tendency for the US government to cut bait as soon as the media turned its attention elsewhere or when events in the crisis took a negative turn.

Throughout this period, some analysts and government figures argued that failed states were a security as well as humanitarian concern. Failed states, they claimed, posed a variety of threats to US and global security – as petri dishes for virulent diseases, safe havens for transnational criminal rings and terrorists, conduits of drug and gun-smuggling, sites of environmental disasters, and sources of regional destabilization and “spillover” anarchy. This attempt to frame the crisis of failed states within a much broader definition of national security was at best a partial success. The fact that most of these crises were occurring in Sub-Saharan Africa, the least strategically and economically important region of the world, worked against this logic. But the real weakness of this argument was less its logic than its unpalatable policy implications. Lurking in the shadows of every discussion of durable solutions to failed states was the dreaded term “nation-building.” Advocating nation-building

Ken Menkhaus is a Associate Professor of Political Science at Davidson College.

was a career-ending move in the aftermath of the 1993 Somalia fiasco.

That, however, has changed since the al Qaeda attacks of September, 2001 and the subsequent war on terrorism. Now, failed states are viewed as potential security threats of a high order. "America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones," signals the most recent White House National Security Strategy document.

Nation-building, or "post-conflict reconstruction" (as clever aid agencies prefer to call it) has consequently been, or is in the process of becoming, "securitized." That is, it is now justified not as a worthy humanitarian or development objective but rather as a tool with which to promote a broader national security goal. That objective is to combat terrorism by "draining the swamp" to deprive terrorist networks of safe operating bases. Failed states are part of the swamp.

Thanks to the securitization of nation-building in the aftermath of September 11, a much larger portion of the national security establishment now supports the premise that failed states are a security problem which must be addressed. At least for the moment, nation-building is earning a grudging place in the portfolio of realist thinking on national security. Traditional objections about nation-building, quagmires, and missions creep, which not long ago enjoyed an air of hard-nosed realism, now seem timid. A recent *Foreign Policy* cover proclaiming "Nation-Building Is Not for Sissies" almost reads like a taunt. Privately, skeptics may continue to harbor deep reservations about the viability of nation-building, but are hard-pressed to present an alternative as part of the long-term strategy in the war on terrorism.

The securitization of nation-building insures more sustained American and Western attention to failed states as a matter of national interest. But sustained attention is no guarantee of success if nation-building strategies are based on a misdiagnosis of the relationship between failed states and terrorism. And we are in danger of making just such a mistake.

Conventional wisdom holds that collapsed states constitute a safe haven for international terrorists. The logic behind this proposition is, on the surface, entirely reasonable. Zones of state collapse appear to offer a sanctuary beyond the rule of law, where terrorists can establish bases or staging grounds with little risk of detection. Terrorists will, therefore, naturally prefer the impunity of anarchy to the risks of operating within the reach of a national security and police force.

In reality, up to now transnational criminals and terrorists have found zones of complete state collapse to be relatively inhospitable territory out of which to operate. They are too dangerous, too unpredictable. They offer too little cover, as non-native visitors are easy to spot where so few foreigners dare to live. And they provide a paucity of Western targets for a terrorist attack. Instead, terrorist networks have found safety in weak, corrupted, quasi-states—Pakistan, Yemen, Kenya, the Philippines, Guinea, Indonesia. Terrorist networks, like mafias, appear to flourish where states are governed badly rather than not at all.

Herein lies the security paradox of failed states and nation-building. First, current nation-building practices—from Kosovo to Rwanda to East Timor—are haphazard, short-term, and flawed. They are a product of half-way measures, diplomatic compromise, inadequate and delayed funding, organizational ri-

THE SECURITY PARADOX OF FAILED STATES

valries, and the chaos produced by the “projectization” of post-conflict reconstruction, involving hundreds of UN agencies, non-governmental organizations, and private contractors. The current system almost appears designed to yield exactly the kind of states – weak, ineffectual “quasi-states” – within which terrorist networks thrive, producing the very sanctuaries for terrorism which the US and its allies are seeking to eliminate.

But even if current nation-building practices can be improved, initiatives to address failed states face a transitional security problem. The task of rebuilding the capacity of a collapsed state to govern and police effectively is enormous, and even in the best of situations can require a decade or two of sustained assistance. The long stretch of time which passes between state collapse and effectively rebuilt government constitutes a dangerous transitional stage, a period when the government on the receiving end of nation-building efforts is weak, vulnerable, but sovereign – in other words, a quasi-state.

At the heart of the security dilemma of failed states lies two propositions, both of which are disquietingly realistic. The first proposition correctly identifies failed states as a major security threat. The second proposition correctly argues that nation-building as currently conceived is a fool’s errand. How to respond to this apparent impasse?

One option is to quietly abandon the nation-building enterprise and accept that the war on terrorism will be reactive, not preventive, executed as a protracted military and counter-terrorist operation. A recent comment by Senator Joseph Biden hints at this possibility. “Some of these guys don’t go for nation-building,” he observed. “They think it’s

cheaper to just go back in and empty the swamp again if you have to.”

It is also plausible that nation-building practices will continue with only incremental reforms, despite the fact that they are clearly failing. Large US and UN agencies are notoriously resistant to change in policies, and will prefer standard operating procedures regardless of their effectiveness. This option also has the political attraction of demonstrating that we are “doing something” while blame for failure can continue to be conveniently placed on locals and third parties.

A third option is to fix the broken system of nation-building. Overhauling post-conflict reconstruction so that it stands a much better chance of success would be neither easy nor politically popular. Indeed, some of these reforms would push the US and its allies into an uncomfortable policy discussion about trusteeship.

Trusteeship-type solutions to failed states are not popular either at home (where the cost of trusteeship would be viewed as too high and the commitment too long) or abroad (where they are viewed as a pretext for neocolonialism). For these reasons, trusteeship has been a virtually taboo subject to date. But the topic may soon be unavoidable, especially if a show-down with Iraq results in a messy regime change that requires direct and prolonged external intervention. For as undesirable as trusteeship is, there may be no other way to effectively monitor and combat terrorism during the long transition from collapsed state to functional government. Trusteeship as a looming policy option thus demands urgent and serious public debate.

SECURITY AND THE CHALLENGE OF FAILED STATES

Will Reno

Instability marks significant portions of the post Cold War world. Throughout the last decade, perennial conflict has wracked clusters of states in the Horn of Africa, Central Africa, and West Africa. The Caucasus region and parts of Central Asia show signs of extensive state recession as some successor states of the former Soviet Union fail to construct effective administrations. All of these places feature extremely weak state institutions, they fall further behind the rest of the world economically, and conflict takes on a sense of permanence.

State failure and collapse is not new. History is littered with failed principalities that were absorbed into contemporary European states. Latin America's 19th century *caudillos* divided fractious realms in which the writ of central governments barely extended beyond capitals. The Central American Federation and Simon Bolivar's empire fragmented into successor states that survive today.

The present is different. Failure of governments no longer means that their states cease to exist. Even though Somalia has had no central government since January 1991, it survives as a member of the UN, a client of the World Bank,

and even has diplomats to represent its interests (in principle, at least). More important, Somalia's continued legal existence bars recognition of a successor or neighbors from partitioning or annexing its territory. The United Nation's 1960 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (Resolution 1514) entrenched this principle of sovereignty divorced from any test of capability to perform. It proclaimed that every colony had a right to self-determination and that "inadequacy of political, economic, social or educational preparedness should never serve as a pretext for delaying independence." Even tiny islands in the Caribbean were entitled to a separate independent statehood. The absence of a capital city—or any city—in Mauritania was no obstacle to its independence in 1960. The extreme paternalistic Belgian rule in Congo left that country almost devoid of an indigenous class with administrative skills, but did not delay its independence in 1960.

Some rulers fared better than others. None faced the penalty of the extinction of their state. This protection did not extend to regimes, however. Leaders in sub-Saharan Africa between 1960 and 2000 could anticipate a 60 percent

Will Reno is Associate Professor of Political Science at Northwestern University. He is the author of *Corruption and State Politics in Sierra Leone (Cambridge, 1995)* and *Warlord Politics and African States (Lynne Rienner, 1998)*. He is a specialist on irregular warfare and politics of violence in the context of state collapse.

probability of sudden departure from office (other than death by natural causes), with about two-thirds killed or exiled in the process, with the threat coming primarily from their own armies.

Domestic coups, coupled with the absence of external threat to the state's existence, caused rulers to rely upon divide-and-rule strategies to keep themselves in power. Palace guards and private militias under the commands of trusted associates protected rulers, since an army organized on professional lines could easily challenge the ruler's tenure. Multiple armed groups, usually under the command of family members or others with personal ties to the ruler, were more reliable, or at least more easily watched. In more extreme cases rulers extended this suspiciousness to state bureaucracies, even weakening existing ones, fearing rivals might use the constituencies of successful state agencies to launch their own bids for power. In their place, rulers depended upon these personal networks of followers, ethnic kinsmen, family members and those from the old establishment who they could co-opt to maintain their hold on power.

This strategy of rule undermined effective functioning of state agencies and sabotaged the capacity of the state to help local people in their everyday struggles to survive. Once states were unable to provide even basic services—by 1992, Congo-Zaire's last published budget allocated no expenditures for social services—further effort to do so became an encumbrance and diverted scarce resources that rulers needed

to sustain their role as patrons to associates.

As state agencies weakened, rulers maintained their hold on power through controlling markets. As formal markets declined in tandem with state agencies, the capacity of rulers and their associates to extract wealth from informal and clandestine markets gained importance. Thus heads of states, militia commanders, and regime favorites often became the largest smugglers and used their political control to manipulate markets and chase out independent operators.

Substantial foreign aid has not reversed this situation. Especially during the Cold War it may have enhanced it. Rulers found that allegiance to a Cold War patron's ideological perspective could attract economic and military support. Without significant external dangers to the state, these resources could be devoted to protecting the regime through feeding personal networks. Some scholars such as Nicolas van de Walle in his *African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis, 1979-1999* (Cambridge, 2001), argue that post Cold War aid sustains patronage-based regimes. Far from suffering from an absence of foreign aid, he calculates that African states receive substantial aid, equal to 12.3 percent of GDPs in 1996, much more than Marshall Plan aid to European states in the late 1940s that equaled about 2.5 percent of recipient GDPs.

WHY ARE FAILED STATES A THREAT?

In addition to the crushing burdens they impose

on their citizens, the broader global threat from failed state regimes lies in their use of commerce, especially clandestine, to control people and get resources for patronage. This is not the anarchical struggle depicted in Robert Kaplan's celebrated article, "The Coming Anarchy" in the April, 1994 *Atlantic Monthly* magazine. Instead, rulers systematically loot available resources, usually by violent means as they become more divorced from the interests of local citizens. This culminated in Sierra Leone in the 1990s in the competitive looting of the country's diamonds as the national army and rebels vied with each other to control the country's diamond mines for personal gain. These regimes also tend to become more reliant on outside businessmen as their own economies crumble. International norms that protect state sovereignty leave even the most desperate ruler with a façade of sovereignty that can be used to shelter business arrangements. A ruler of even the weakest state can equip business partners with diplomatic passports and bank stationery useful for concealing illicit transactions. Even this researcher has been offered passports for purchase in the offices of official immigration agencies.

Criminals are best equipped to do business in the violent and risky environment. Liberia's president Charles Taylor and his partners, for example, are alleged to have sold diamonds on their personal account in exchange for arms in deals involving associates of the al-Qaeda network. UN experts have documented how the armies of Uganda and Rwanda engage in commercial operations in rebel-held areas of

Congo. The deployment of Zimbabwe's army in Congo opens the door for major private business ventures for Zimbabwe's top politicians and army officers in the company of Congo's leadership as Zimbabwe's formal economy collapses. Where these collaborations involve warfare, they almost always include arms traffickers and private military advisors who often pursue other local business interests of their own.

A new generation of rivals to personalist dictators uses the same commercial networks to finance their challenges. Once installed in State House, the onetime-rebel invigorates the commercial network that he rode to victory. These networks draw upon partnerships with neighboring rebels. The current conflict in Cote d'Ivoire, raging since September 2002, shows signs of Liberian involvement, even to the extent that the names of two Ivorian rebel factions are derived from a Liberian political organization from the 1980s and a 1990s rebel group. The UN and several foreign governments have accused Liberia's President Taylor of aiding rebels in Sierra Leone before that country's war ended in 2002. Civil violence in Guinea is traceable to Liberian influence, while some in Guinea's government support an anti-Taylor Liberian insurgency. This pattern of cross-border interference is repeated across the continent, and is a major factor in the expansion of conflicts. As conflicts are resolved in one state, they move next door, often to return.

Combatants and leaders of these groups also show a greater level of collaboration. Individuals who received training in Libya's Benghazi camp in the 1980s, ostensibly to overthrow

“reactionary” African governments, now regularly appear in diverse rebel forces, and occupy state houses in at least two African states. These connections ease the spread of commercial networks as an instrument of patronage-based rule and weaken existing state institutions.

US CONCERNS IN THE WAKE OF 9-11

The United States government now considers the possibility that these commercial networks may aid or harbor terrorists. The *National Security Strategy* of September, 2002 declares a fundamental US interest in “denying further sponsorship, support, and sanctuary to terrorists by convincing or compelling states to accept their *sovereign responsibilities* [emphasis mine].” This is a fundamental change in the outside world’s, or at least the US’s approach to the sovereignty of failing states. Positive state capability is also inimical to the way that failing states are run. But those interested in denying sanctuary to terrorists and the clandestine commercial networks they depend upon for resources, have to rely upon conventional governments that are at least strong enough to monitor and control territory and regulate transactions across their borders. Some rulers may cast their lot with reformers and hope that US or European support will keep them in power. Unfortunately, compliance is nearly impossible in the more extreme cases of state failure, since it is precisely these networks that rulers depend upon to survive.

Casting off these networks will create new rebel movements as expelled associates launch their own bid to control the state, or they will join existing rebels.

Yet even as US strategic interests add conditions for outside acceptance of failing state regimes, it leaves no room for new states. Even though factional violence continues in southern Somalia and US officials voice concern that Islamist groups may find refuge there, people in the north have created the Republic of Somaliland and the Province of Puntland. No state recognizes the sovereignty of either entity, even though both maintain levels of internal order greater than in many African states. Both, especially the former, provide services to their citizens. Authorities in both show interest in ensuring that terrorists stay far from their realms. Were US and other state officials to recognize new states where old ones failed and collapsed, they would be acknowledging the resumption of a historical process that has led to strong states. But they fear disorder if such measures were to embolden secessionists or irredentists elsewhere.

POST 9-11 US POLICY

Indirect rule, preferably as a UN protectorate is one option for managing failed states that collapsed into factional warfare. This is expensive. The UN effort in Sierra Leone, with only \$10 million in internal revenues in 2001 and a GDP of about \$650 million, cost almost a billion dollars to maintain a 17,500 person peace-

keeping force and run reconstruction programs. Kosovo costs NATO about \$2.5 billion annually, and Bosnia, \$4 billion. Afghanistan struggles along on \$12 billion annually, even though critics of the US and its allies complain that they are not doing enough to rebuild the country. Adding to this list of countries, especially after the conquest of Iraq and if regimes in other states are unwilling to yield, rapidly increases the financial burden to unacceptable levels.

A less expensive option taps commercial interests of incumbent regimes of weak states and US investors. In countries like Angola, rulers manipulate commercial networks, often through clandestine and violent means, as in the failed states described above. But since Angola also possesses considerable oil reserves, partnership with foreign oil companies gives the country's president new wealth to distribute according to his personal discretion. He prefers oil royalties to clandestine networks since he can more easily control that income by virtue of his status as uncontested sovereign ruler. Starting in the mid-1990s, Angola's president did punish subordinates who engaged in clandestine commerce in diamonds and other resources. Oil royalties enabled him to equip a more powerful army, and to hire foreign private military trainers to put in key command positions. This eased his fears about the reliability of his own army and led to the defeat of rebels in 2002.

US officials can use such relationships to encourage incumbent rulers to re-centralize

coercion in the hands of a single agency, a key to stability and control over territory and borders. This does not eliminate the patronage politics of failing states, nor does it necessarily result in better services for citizens. As a World Bank researcher observed, it may be better to support a strong kleptocrat who can at least control his state's territory, than to deal with multiple factions, a tradeoff that may be sufficient to satisfy US strategic concerns. With the exception of official investment promotion subsidies, "aid" is generated through private commerce, not the US treasury.

Government promotion of foreign investment, especially in the energy sector through the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, or the World Bank's Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency are tools that help promote private investment amidst risks characteristic of failing states. A major World Bank-sponsored oil pipeline in Chad, for example, equips that country's government to battle rebels. Soon after his receipt of the first signing bonus, the president promptly purchased arms.

This strategy is fraught with problems. As it strengthens regimes' hold on power, as in the Middle East, citizens may perceive that the US supports local tyrants. Though President Bush postponed his planned 2003 tour of Africa; local commentary in Nigeria took negative note of a US oilman-turned-president greeting corrupt Nigerian politicians who are widely condemned for stealing the country's considerable oil royalties. Newspapers in African capitals increasingly denounce the appearance of a US

preference for stability in Africa at any cost. This strategy trumps most concerns with promoting democracy, though advocates argue that the restoration of government control and creation of order are necessary preconditions for democracy.

Of course this strategy also requires natural endowments of the right kinds of resources. It also tends to benefit regimes that always had to rely upon foreign help to extract these resources. New investment may limit the shift of patronage politics into the networks that are of greater concern to the US.

A more expensive, but less risky and more widely applicable strategy includes direct government-to-government assistance in carrying out essential tasks and bolstering key agencies. One can observe the plethora of mid-level US government officials on flights to capitals such as Georgia's Tbilisi or Kyrgyzstan's Bishkek or Ghana's Accra to get a sense of the extent to which foreign advisors have bolstered key agencies in failing states, especially military and police. This extends to US customs and financial regulation experts. US officials help write and organize enforcement of regulations hostile to Middle Eastern religious and educational foundations that US officials regard as threatening to US interests. At the same time, local rulers remove a disruptive external source of patronage that was undermining informal control over associates. Unfortunately, US officials are left to appear in public eyes as bolstering corrupt rulers, and complicit in their crimes.

Rulers most dependent upon violent exploi-

tation of resources, cross-border networks, and clandestine uses of state prerogatives for business purposes, like Liberia's President Taylor, find it much more difficult to accept conditions attached to these kinds of assistance. They also represent the largest threat in terms of collaborating with global criminal networks and spreading conflicts to neighboring states. Such states would be bad candidates for international protectorate rule, since such rulers would have to be driven out first.

All options come with high costs, either financially or in terms of generating anger toward US support of tyrants. Strong states will always interfere in the affairs of the weak, especially when it is seen to be in the strategic interest of the strong. Negative effects can be mitigated, however, through multilateral cooperation. It is more difficult for recipients of aid to exploit the strategic interests of the strong partner if assistance requires adherence to recognized global norms, and perhaps involvement of international agencies. Citizens of failing states tend to regard these agencies as among the few arenas in which their interests may have weight. Thus aid, even if to its own corrupt governments, will carry greater legitimacy in local eyes. Ultimately, this may create the basis for those officials, or their successors, to risk cultivating legitimacy from among citizens in return for helping people in their everyday struggles to survive. This virtue has far greater long-term value to US strategic interests than does a hated government in league with the US.

INTERVENTION IN FAILED STATES : WHAT THE MILITARY CAN AND CAN'T DO

Anna Simons

One paradox associated with U.S. military intervention in failed (or failing) states is that our army, navy, air force, and marine corps may be the only entities in the world capable of actually affecting a worthwhile rescue. No other organizations possess their logistical or organizational wherewithal. Nor are there any other organizations that approach problems as holistically. In addition to combat soldiers, we have doctors, nurses, engineers, lawyers, water treatment experts, even veterinarians in uniform. If anyone has what it takes to put a state back together again, it is our military. However, our military is also constitutionally averse to intervening in another country's domestic mess, and this – actually, is for good reason, though the argument I am about to make is not the one usually offered.

First, we must recognize that many states routinely fail their citizens. They do so whenever they can't afford them the basics in terms of either physical or social welfare security. In such cases, citizens find themselves with little choice but to turn to those they know they can count on: members of their extended family, tribe, religious community, etc. In a perverse

sense, so long as these alternative sources of social welfare and subsistence don't become too overtaxed, governments can manage to muddle along, sometimes for decades. Usually it is only when members of the elite (and the middle class – when this exists), in other words, those who ostensibly control government, suddenly find themselves no longer able to make government work for *them*, that we know a state is finally sliding from dysfunction to cataclysmic failure. Then, all sorts of scrambles to re-exert control occur. However, not even this is always sufficient to render a country a failed state in the eyes of the international community. For that to occur, law and order must collapse in the capital, civil war must threaten to destabilize a region, and refugees have to pour across the borders... Then, we suddenly point to all of the warning signs we should have noticed, and start seeking blame in specific, precipitating events. However, in every failed state the building blocks of dissolution are actually societal in nature and have long been in place. What do I mean by this? That basically, where states fail nationalism is lacking. Citizens not only feel no attachment

Anna Simons is an Associate Professor of Defense Analysis at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California.

INTERVENTION IN FAILED STATES

or loyalty to their government, but they feel no attachment or loyalty to each other beyond the bounds of whatever ethnic, regional, or religious group they belong to. Another way to put this is that if a sense of nation exists, it does not include all citizens. For instance, in the former Yugoslavia, when push came to shove, most Serbs self-identified as members of a Serb, not a Yugoslav nation.

Here is where we Americans have a difficult time understanding how unlike us most people are. People in many places are branded with a group – not individual – identity at birth. Everyone is recognized to be a member of this or that lineage, clan, tribe, or religious community first *and always*; their status as individuals doesn't count. One consequence of this is that if Saddam Hussein, for instance, preferentially relies on and rewards fellow Tikritis, then being from Tikrit is of paramount significance in Iraq. Similarly, being from Siad Barre's clan in Somalia, just as being a Tutsi in Rwanda, or a Serb in Croatian Krajina could automatically privilege one in the eyes of fellow-members, and damn one in the eyes of non-members. Ethnic politics of this nature preclude nationalism from ever being able to take root.

Typically, nationalism is achieved when or as *a people* shares experiences, and everyone sharing those experiences recognizes they have more in common with one another than with people who haven't gone through these things. What is shared may be linguistic, religious, or

cultural. Without question, there is a strong connection between nationalism and war. Indeed, where we often see the strongest sense of nationalism is where people have either fought one another and then overcome their differences or fought in a war of 'national' survival together against a common enemy. Nor do such wars necessarily have to be won to instill or enhance a sense of nationalism. People just have to come through or gain from them the sense that they still are *a people*. In other words, nationalism can be forged through a shared sense of victimization – the Serbs, Israelis, and Palestinians come to mind. This then means that outsiders can inadvertently help unite a people – something we may have achieved in Somalia if only we had stayed there longer and incited more Somali opposition to our presence. But nothing programmatic outsiders do to “nation-build” will nation-build. External actors cannot make the people of another country feel more attached *to one another* (unless, again, they threaten their identity or survival as an extant people).

Because the Marshall Plan gets cited so often, let me briefly remind readers of its antecedent, which was World War II. We should be mindful that though the Marshall Plan worked wonders, where it worked them was in countries and among peoples who: a) had experienced a long grinding war, b) been conquered, and c) were devastated both literally and figuratively, from the ground-up as well as from the

top-down. In all cases, actually, where the U.S. and our military has effectively helped to rebuild a country – whether in Europe and Japan post-World War II, South Korea after the Korean War, or even our own South after our Civil War – the pre-existing social structure has either been substantively rearranged by the victors (namely, us) and/or the majority of the population was anxious to start over. Contrast these examples with those where we haven't successfully rebuilt governments, let alone governments that could outlast our presence – in Vietnam, Panama, Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, and (now potentially) Afghanistan. In none of these places did we fight to take (or retake) the country. In none of these places did we run the place ourselves. That is one difference worth pondering. The second is the kind of infrastructure we build and then leave behind. Is it tied together? Does it tie people *together*? There may be a lesson in this, too.

Indeed, here is where candidate George W. Bush was absolutely correct when he recognized that we should not *nation-build*: we shouldn't because we can't. The most we, as outsiders, can do is help build certain kinds of infrastructure that, in turn, can help strengthen the sinews of a state. Indeed, the most benign, yet significant and durable effect we can have is to help build roads, railroads, bridges, anything that serves to better knit all parts of a country together, that employs locals, leaves behind tangible results, and lines as few pock-

ets as possible. Any other type of aid – foreign aid that is not transformed on site, under donor supervision, into something that can't be stolen, misappropriated, or abused – is always part of the problem and never part of the solution. It directly contributes to the corruption of anyone who can get their hands on it, while usually those who get their hands on it do so for the good of their family and/or cronies. What we regard as nepotism and corruption, we must remember, is a moral imperative in most communities, where people belong to extended families and feel duty-bound to look after their own first. Here, again, is how dysfunction works: whenever high-ranking officials routinely distribute any moneys or goods that flow through their hands to relatives, clan members, clients, etc. this bankrupts whatever social welfare system the government may have set up. With no social welfare net, people have little choice but to then do as government ministers and others do: look after their own first. No amount of pressure placed on governments to be more accountable or transparent is likely to break this vicious cycle, no matter how great the financial incentives dangled by the World Bank or the IMF, because from top to bottom people will continue to think in terms of the good of their own particular group first (no matter how this is defined), and not in terms of the good of the nation. The only way to destroy or substantively rearrange people's loyalties is to smash the social system, and scramble

INTERVENTION IN FAILED STATES

these groups. Clearly this is not something we are prone to do, though if we were – and here’s another irony – no one could do this better than our military since it and it alone could bring the requisite force to bear.

However, there are at least two other military roles worth considering. Militaries in general are the most nationalist institutions countries have. They take individuals and, at a minimum, give them a new group of people to be loyal to – namely, their fellow soldiers – and, when they work at it, can help secure individuals’ loyalty to the nation as well. Our military can help in setting up other countries’ national armies, as we are currently doing in Afghanistan. In fact, whenever we intervene in a failed state this is what we *should* do, along with help to establish a credible local police force. Both are critical for restoring security, law and order, and people’s confidence in investing in their own futures. Having said this, though, there is also an invaluable demonstration effect to be gained in having our military help with such efforts, even if too few of us Americans engage in national service ourselves: our military showcases what is to be gained when the most lethal structure of state is also the most integrated, meritocratic, and selfless in terms of who and how it serves.

This is made manifest every time the U.S. military is deployed to a failed state to assist in stabilization efforts. Locals see young Americans in uniform slogging their hearts out for

utter strangers. But the hard question we should ask is: are they giving their all in vain? What is left when they leave? In case after case recently, no matter the impression they’ve made, as soon as they are withdrawn there is a loud sucking sound. There go the resources they represented – as well as the resourcefulness. We may turn over some rebuilt clinics, schools, comfortable facilities, and a heap of equipment to the locals. But we won’t have yanked the rug out from under their social structure. Short of this, we won’t have solved the problems that led to the state failing in the first place: namely, a lack of nationalism and a surfeit of other allegiances.

We also, though, won’t have done what had to be done in this country to break down regionalism, develop the hinterlands, and tie everyone together. This is only likely to be achieved elsewhere the same way it was accomplished in the U.S. – by improving transportation, electrifying villages, damming rivers, etc. Here is where our military blazed the trail and still has tremendous experience. And even though physical infrastructure of this sort may be well be neglected by future governments, even the worst roads in a country like Somalia remain roads.

To conclude, then, when it comes to what our military can and can’t do in failed states, we can’t ‘nation-build’. But we can build, and from this – maybe – will flow change.

RECONSTRUCTING STATES IN THE WAKE OF CONFLICT

Vladimir Solonari

Failed states are a recent phenomenon. Prolonged existence of what is deemed to be a failed state would be inconceivable in the era that preceded liberal democracy and market economy. Eighteenth-century Poland, when it was perceived as a failed state, was liquidated by its powerful neighbors, Austria, Prussia and Russia. It might well have been liquidated even earlier had there been no dispute among those powers as to precisely how its territory should be divided. The right of empires to dismember a weak state would not have been questioned. When territorial changes were the order of the day and the idea of popular sovereignty was alien to both the rulers and the ruled, a failed state was an oxymoron, an anomaly that should and would be liquidated by its neighbors. The vacuum of power would be filled sooner rather than later

In today's world, territorial changes must be based on the agreement of the parties. The parties are expected to agree over the restoration and/or reconstruction of the state. Annexations are forbidden and the use of force

highly circumscribed. Governments are expected to enjoy at least a minimum amount of support from their own populations and to be broadly representative of the majority of their citizens. Genocide and forced exchanges of the population are categorically proscribed. It follows that all states are presumed to be legitimate. They exercise sovereignty over the territory they claim; and the composition of their population will remain more or less fixed.

Still, some states succeed while others manifestly fail. The great majority of those that fail are located in Africa, Asia, and South and East Europe, i.e. in those regions which for centuries were ruled by multinational (or supranational) empires and/or were subjected to colonial rule of European powers. What those states share is their lack of independent statehood, heterogeneous ethnic populations with vivid memories of mutual hatreds, weakness of public institutions, shortage of trained and experienced administrative and political cadres, and lack of societal consensus over basic public principles. What is sur-

Vladimir Solonari served in the Moldovan Parliament for eleven years, having been twice reelected. He currently is a Rosenzweig Fellow, Center for Advanced Holocaust Studies, U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum, Washington, DC and Senior Research Scholar, Center for Political Sociology, Moldovan State University. He is an author of many articles on Moldovan history and politics.

prising is not the failure of many of the states in those regions but that some of them have succeeded and may survive.

Lack of development is both a consequence and a reason of the failure of a state. It is difficult to imagine what would induce potential investors to risk their money in these countries. It is more difficult to think of policies that might successfully address obstacles to development such as chronic poverty and severe budgetary constraints. Consolidation of public institutions necessitates major government spending. The possibility of obtaining capital investment is negligible. Thus, the conditions for the degradation of a state are present.

However, if the state fails, its failure will not necessarily attract attention of the outside world. Failure of many states is likely to be ignored. For more than the last ten years, no state has existed in Somalia. It was the focus of world attention for a short while in 1992 because of the ill-fated US humanitarian intervention. Since then it has been forgotten. Afghanistan was in the forefront of international news in the eighties during the days of Soviet intervention; it fell into oblivion after the Soviet withdrawal and returned to public attention after September 11 and the American war on terror. In contrast, the partition of Cyprus has not prevented economic development. Failed states become a problem for the international community when their territo-

ries become hotbeds for international drugs dealers, arms smugglers, and organized networks of international criminals.

There are other reasons for international intervention. In former Yugoslavia, it was the imminent danger of the spread of war and humanitarian catastrophe in the Balkans. In Afghanistan, it was Al-Qaeda. In Iraq, if the US intervenes, it will be the threat of weapons of mass destruction in the hands of a ruthless and unpredictable dictator. While the immediate aims vary, it is the issue of reconstruction that must be addressed by the interveners.

The immediate problem that the international community faces in the aftermath of regime change and cessation of internal strife is restoration and consolidation of central authority. This is to be accomplished by mediated negotiations of internal political players whose aim is the creation of the interim representative government. This phase, if it is successful, is followed by the creation of a constitutional framework and election of a representative assembly intended to lend legitimacy to the new order and to the new constitutional government.

Although achieving these immediate aims is difficult, it is not impossible, as the recent experience of Bosnia and Afghanistan demonstrates. However, what follows is usually a much more difficult series of issues.

Only consolidation of public institutions, creation of a homogeneous modern political culture, and economic and social development can prevent recurrence of the failed state in future. In the majority of cases these tasks are bound to be very difficult, if not outright impossible.

The biggest obstacle is the lack of long-term commitment of the international community to the development of a failed state. It is axiomatic that in less developed states, the deeper the divisions and animosities among its ethnic populations, the poorer the natural resources of the country; the further away the country is located from the international trade routes the bigger are the resources that are required to prevent the recurrence of the failed state phenomenon in future. The commitment on the part of the international community is usually much less than what is minimally necessary.

These considerations suggest that western states limit their intervention and mediate only when self-interest requires them to do so. The use of force must be justified in the eyes of the public. It means that it has to be couched in humanitarian and democratic terms by reference to the needs of the suffering local populations. In doing so, intervening governments often enter into commitments that might exceed their possibilities. If

interventions run into difficulties and the cost of the reconstruction proves to be higher than was initially anticipated, the political cost of long-term assistance might prove to be prohibitive.

Prudence may dictate to limit outside intervention to mediation between the parties without entering into concrete obligations. There are good reasons for this restraint. However, where and when western states decide to intervene, not only short- but also medium- and long-term consequences of such activism and the costs of ensuing responsibilities must be taken into consideration.

PAKISTAN: EYE OF THE STORM

by *Owen Bennett James*

Yale University Press, 2002, 328 Pages. \$29.95

By *Endy Zemenides*

As Pakistan celebrated its 55th year of existence this past summer, the country's turbulent history continued. Pakistan has been ruled by its military for over half of its existence, and in 2002 a referendum installed military dictator Pervez Musharraf as president for the next five years. Musharraf subsequently amended Pakistan's constitution to give the president the power to dismiss the legislature and to institutionalize the military's role in Pakistani politics through the creation of the National Security Council. Tensions between Pakistan and India continue, but these tensions now have global significance, due to the nuclear power status both countries attained in 1998. Finally, as al Qaeda operatives – and perhaps Osama bin Laden – hide out in Pakistan, the country remains at the center of global concerns about terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism.

Yale University Press, which recently published *Taliban* by Ahmed Rashid, has now brought an inside look at this key South Asian nation from former BBC correspondent Owen Bennett Jones. A key to managing Pakistan's role in the battle against terrorism, Islamic fundamentalism and nuclear proliferation will be an understanding of how Pakistan got to where it is today. Jones provides an insightful, concise history of Pakistan since 1947. The genius of Jones' analysis lies in his organization. Jones does not cover Pakistan's history chronologically, but by analyzing key historic events and trends that have made Pakistan "the eye of the storm" in the post-September 11 world.

On October 12, 1999, General Pervez Musharraf came to power in Pakistan through a coup overthrowing the government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. This usurpation of power by Pakistan's military was just the latest of several coups in the country's

Endy Zemenides is a member of the National Strategy Forum Editorial Board and a partner in the law firm of Acosta, Kruse, Raines & Zemenides, LLC.

history. Like the military rulers before him, Musharraf promised to restore order, root out corruption, and promote social justice. The international community, however, remains unimpressed by the General's promises. Musharraf was pressured for two years to set a timetable for the return of democracy. Pakistan's support for the Taliban regime in neighboring Afghanistan had made the country a pariah in the international community. Finally, international economic sanctions that followed Pakistan's 1998 nuclear test remained in place and further weakened the country's economy.

Less than two years later, on the morning of September 12, 2001, the US deputy secretary of state, Richard Armitage, informed Pakistan's ambassador to the United States and the director general of Pakistan's main intelligence agency, Inter Service Intelligence, that Pakistan had to choose between the United States and the Taliban. General Musharraf provided the response Armitage wanted, and transformed Pakistan from an international pariah to a key ally in the war against terrorism overnight. Pakistan's transformation made Musharraf friends in the West – friends that helped Pakistan secure \$3 billion worth of external assistance – but did not result in a transformation within Pakistan itself. If true change is to happen within Pakistan, it can only come at the expense of the continued domination of the military. Jones' analysis of the military's role in Paki-

stani history reads much like an indictment. Not only have Pakistan's military rulers mismanaged the country's economy, exacerbated ethnic and sectarian tensions and skewed the country's priorities – especially by sustaining hostilities toward India – they have also supported, and in some cases created, groups that are now the direct target of the war on terrorism. For example, in attempt to bolster the legitimacy of his regime (from 1977 to 1988), General Mohammed Zia-ul-Haq, actively courted religious zealots. Zia encouraged the formation of madrasas and directed the bulk of American aid dollars to Islamist Afghan mujahideen. Thus, Pakistan's military rulers created the conditions under which the Taliban, and to a lesser extent, al Qaeda, were born.

Jones' account of the Pakistani military's history inevitably lead to the conclusion that the military is in large part responsible for its disastrous defeats by India, the loss of East Pakistan (Bangladesh), continued nationalist aspirations in Pakistan's various provinces, Islamic fundamentalism, and the siphoning off of important economic resources. In the chapter he devotes to the Army, Jones concludes that “[i]f Pakistan is, as many Pakistanis believe, a failed state, then the army must take its fair share of the blame.”

While Jones' critique of the Pakistani military is consistent, this history of Pakistan differs from other commentary in that it focus to a large extent on the events that led to the

assumption of power and rule of Musharraf. These events include the Kargil campaign, the 1999 coup, September 11, and the development of the nuclear bomb. Jones' analysis makes it clear that the United States and the West have a direct interest in the ability of the Musharraf regime to bring stability and some degree of prosperity to Pakistan.

Jones depicts Musharraf as the antithesis of Zia. He notes that Musharraf is the first Pakistani leader (civilian or military) in thirty years to confront the country's Islamic extremists. These efforts have been welcomed by many Pakistanis. Musharraf has aggressively pursued modernist policies such as eliminating bonded labor, rooting out corruption, and broadening the syllabi of madrasas to include English and science.

Three years after taking power, however, no significant progress has been made on any of those fronts nor have tensions with India over Kashmir subsided. Nationalist movements still thrive in Pakistan's provinces, where various ethnic groups resent Punjab domination and desire greater autonomy within Pakistan (in the form of a confederation) or even their own state similar to Bangladesh. While siding with the United States in the war on terrorism may have given Pakistan greater access to foreign aid and loans, the country's social indicators – 25% of children are born with low birth weight, 55% of adults are illiterate, and 20% of the population is not expected to survive to age forty –

are foreboding.

For Jones, Musharraf's most serious shortcoming is that he, like the military rulers before him, insists that the military is the only solution to Pakistan's problems and not one of the main causes. Despite a stated commitment to the return of democracy, Musharraf also has a history of disregarding democratic institutions and civilian leaders. Jones illustrates this disregard through a brilliant account of the Kargil conflict which brought Pakistan and India into conflict for the first time since they both became nuclear powers. Musharraf, as army chief of staff, planned and executed the Kargil conflict while keeping the elected government completely in the dark. Not only did Prime Minister Sharif not authorize the Kargil campaign, but he and the Prime Minister Vajpayee of India had appointed high-level envoys to begin negotiating a peaceful resolution to the Kashmir problem.

Jones argues that most Pakistanis want to live in a free and tolerant state, not a theocracy. Jones is not confident that Pakistanis will realize their wishes, especially as long as Musharraf remains committed to military rule. Continuing the status quo in Pakistan could lead to a failed state – an option that cannot be left on the table given the specter of al Qaeda operatives and nuclear weapons in the country.

RECENT SPEAKERS:

Gary Milhollin

On January 14, 2002, Professor Gary Milhollin, director of the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, addressed the National Strategy Forum on the options available to the US to stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

Following is a summary of his remarks.

There are options available to the US to stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). For example, the US could educate technology companies about the types of computers used in the development of WMD and the purchasers of those computers that could endanger US national security. Also, the US could make it politically costly for countries such as Russia (which sold a nuclear reactor to Iran) to continue selling nuclear capable materials. However, each country that possesses a nuclear bomb or is in the process of developing a nuclear bomb is motivated by various factors: money, respect, security, or regional dominance. Professor Milhollin examines three countries that pose the greatest nuclear threat to US national

security: North Korea, Iraq, and Iran.

North Korea signed the non-proliferation treaty, reaped the benefits, reached nuclear capabilities, and withdrew from the treaty. Unfortunately, there is no effective sanction mechanism. Thus, North Korean leaders know that they can use the threat of WMD to blackmail the US.

The US has three options: destroy North Korea's nuclear weapon capabilities, defy, or pay North Korea. The first option is feasible—there is one plutonium processing plant in North Korea that if bombed would freeze production at the current level. However, an attack could ignite a war and cause regional instability. The second option provides no assurance of the level of effectiveness. North Korea has enough plutonium and spent reactor fuel to make about five nuclear bombs in a matter of six months. If antagonized, North Korea could sell its nuclear weapons program to the highest bidder. Therefore, the best option for the US is to convince North Korea to stop their program long enough for negotiations. Ideally, the US could assist North Korea by giving them money and diplomatic status in exchange for abandoning their nu-

RECENT SPEAKERS

clear and missile programs. However, North Korea may fear that if it disarms, the US will gain political and military advantage and funding will cease. This poses high risk and potentially high cost for the US.

In Iraq, the evidence of WMD is undetermined. Consequently, the UN inspectors are involved in a game of “hide and seek”, cheat and deceit with Iraqi officials as the US prepares for war. Milhollin asks “Why is it that war with Iraq seems to be on the horizon?” The Bush administration has decided that Iraq must be disarmed. This requires inspecting Iraq for machinery, materials, and know-how involved in developing chemical, biological, and nuclear weaponry. Milhollin notes that the US, Germany, and Switzerland have supplied Iraq with machines, materials, and technical knowledge to develop their WMD programs. For example, US companies supplied machine tools and computers to the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission.

Milhollin states that inspections are the alternative to war. However, inspections are most effective when they verify disarmament, not create it. When inspectors probe a country in which the government does not want them to find anything, discovering WMD programs is difficult. In order to improve the efficacy of inspections, the US could provide fresh intelligence to the UN inspectors.

Unlike North Korea, it is unclear as to whether or not Iraq has nuclear bombs; Saddam Hussein has the design, not the nuclear resources. If the Iraqis can smuggle enough nuclear weapons material, it would take about six months to develop one or two nuclear bombs.

Iran is buying a reactor from Russia that it does not need. Iranians are energy independent; they have oil and they can make their own electricity. By purchasing an \$800 million dollar reactor from Russia, the Russians are expected to supply “sweeteners” to Iran such as heavy water technology, graphite technology, and enrichment technology which have no utility in a civilian energy program and may be used for nuclear weapons development.

If Iran develops a nuclear bomb, it will pose the same threat as North Korea and Iraq. More troubling is Iran’s support of Hamas, Hizbollah, and other Islamic fundamentalists. If Iran’s nuclear program reaches the production stage, the US will need to decide whether or not it should intervene.

Regime change for failed dictatorships is inevitable and will be favorable to the US. Milhollin asks “How do we get to that point from where we are now without losses? More freedom and more democracy will make it more difficult for rogue nations to exist.”

Questions and Answers

Milhollin refutes Alexander Lebed's claim that a dozen portable nuclear weapons known as demolition munitions are missing from Russia's nuclear arsenal. Both the US and Russian intelligence sources agree that all of the weapons are accounted for.

When asked to comment on the Bush administrations' policy of preemption versus prevention, Milhollin states that a policy of preemption could be useful if it could be implemented; however, prevention is also an effective strategy. For example, Brazil and South Africa chose not to pursue their nuclear weapons program.

Milhollin explains that the benefits of a non-proliferation treaty for North Korea include technical assistance from the International Atomic Energy Agency, and a reputation as a "one of the international good guys".

Milhollin deems the Nunn-Lugar program as functional. Aspects of the program have not been effective, and it is difficult to implement a program that pays countries not to use weapons. However, if the program is re-worked, it could be successful.

It is possible to persuade countries to stop selling material and technology used to develop nuclear weapons. Yet each country has its own motive for obtaining nuclear weapons.

According to Milhollin, India has a "post-colonial chip on their shoulder" and they want respect. Pakistan needs a bomb because India could defeat them in a conventional war. The North Koreans are hoping that the US will pay them to contain their nuclear weapons program. Saddam Hussein believes that a bomb is essential for regional dominance. The Iranians live in a dangerous neighborhood, and they need a nuclear bomb for respect and security. These countries understand that they cannot fight the US with conventional weapons.

When asked to comment on the utility of NATO and the UN in US strategic decision-making, Milhollin asks, "Where is the help?" France and Russia are undermining the US with concessionary oil deals with Hussein, and Germany has supplied one-half of Iraq's nuclear weapons material. The US is the only country that has enough leverage with other governments to protect international security.

Milhollin states that the best method of US defense against nuclear threats is to utilize intelligence capabilities to deter factions or countries that seek either to establish or revitalize their nuclear weapons programs, and to interdict US companies from transporting nuclear capable materials to suspect buyers.

STRATEGY WATCH

Asia

In early December, **North Korea** declares that it is ending an eight-year freeze on its plutonium-producing reactors. A North Korean ship is stopped and searched in the Arabian Sea by Spanish and American warships. The ship is found to be carrying Scud missiles, warheads, and chemicals to be legally purchased by Yemen's government. In mid-December, North Korea expels the UN inspectors monitoring a nuclear reactor at Yongbyon. **Indonesia's** government and separatist rebels in Aceh province sign a peace deal which could end nearly three decades of fighting. The deal grants autonomy and free elections to Aceh in exchange for the disarmament of the rebels. Roh Moo-hyun is elected president of **South Korea**. In late January, a South Korean envoy is affronted by North Korea's President Kim Jong Il, who accused the US of utilizing the tactics of a "serpent". The United States offers to talk to **North Korea** about how it might meet its non-nuclear obligations. North Korea demands a non-aggression treaty with America before offering any assurances about its weapons programs. In late January, Maoist rebels and the government of **Nepal** agree to a ceasefire designed to lead to peace talks in an effort to end nearly seven years of fighting. For the first time, **China** allows Taiwanese airliners to use Chinese airports between January 26th and February 10th, a holiday associated with the Chinese new year. The **Japanese** destroyer Kirishima is deployed to cruise the Indian Ocean as protection for vessels refueling American and other ally ships in support of the war on terrorism. In **South Korea**, 120 people are killed in an explosion on two subway trains when a man lights a carton filled with an unidentified material. In mid-February, **North Korea** threatens to disengage from the armistice agreement

that ended the Korean war in 1953. In late February, **North Korea** reactivates its Yongbyon nuclear reactor, not the processing plant at the site.

Middle East

In late November, **Iraq** accepts the UN Security Council resolution on disarmament. Hans Blix, the UN's chief weapons inspector, and Mohamed El Baradei, chief of the International Atomic Energy Agency, arrive in **Iraq** to begin searching for WMD. **Turkey's** Justice and Development Party of Recep Tayyip Erdogan is victorious, securing an absolute majority in Parliament. In mid-December, the European Union leaders formally approve a December 2004 review date for Turkey's candidacy. In **India**, the BJP, the ruling Hindu-nationalist party, wins in the western state of Gujarat raising fears of further violence in the state against Muslims. In late January, three missionaries are murdered at Jibla hospital in **Yemen** by an Islamic militant. In **Afghanistan**, 18 members of a fundamentalist militia are killed in a battle with American and Afghan forces—the largest military action in the country since last spring's Operation Anaconda. **Iraq** and **Kuwait** hold their first talks in four years about Kuwaitis missing since Iraq's invasion and the Gulf war. In early February, Ariel Sharon's Likud party garners 38 seats in the Knesset, **Israel's** parliament. The Labour party and the Shinui party, the second and third place victors, refuse to join a unity government. In mid-February, **India** develops a supersonic cruise missile capable of hitting major cities in Pakistan. In **Saudi Arabia**, fourteen pilgrims are trampled in the midst of a shoving crowd during a ritual of the annual Muslim pilgrimage, the Hajj. Ayatollah Hussein-Ali Montazeri, **Iran's** leading liberal cleric, is released from house arrest where he has been confined

THE NSF REVIEW STRATEGY WATCH
December 1, 2003-March 5, 2003

In **Venezuela**, opponents of President Hugo Chavez call off a two-month strike that crippled world oil exports.

Libya is chosen to chair the United Nations Human Rights Commission this year.

France, Germany, and Belgium veto a NATO proposal to develop a “contingency plan” to protect Turkey if the US invades Iraq.

North Korea declares that it is ending an eight-year freeze on its plutonium-producing reactors.

since 1997 for criticizing Ayatollah Ali Khomeini. In mid-February, NATO approves the deployment of radar planes, Patriot missile systems, and biochemical units to defend **Turkey** in the event of a war against Iraq. In late February, **Turkey's** government seeks the approval of parliament to allow America to station over 60,000 troops in the country to fight in a war against Saddam. Turkey is also negotiating a \$15 billion package of grants and loans from America to hasten an agreement. In **Iraq**, a military transport plane crashes in southeastern Iran killing all 302 people aboard. In late February, Hans Blix, the chief weapons inspector, demands the destruction of Iraq's **missiles** which fly beyond an agreed limit. In early March, Iraq destroys sixteen Al Samoud 2 missiles. In **Pakistan**, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, the man believed to be the key planner of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, is arrested in a CIA-led operation in a house outside Islamabad.

Europe

Italy's legislature passes a controversial bill that enables defendants to have trials moved to a different court if they can claim "legitimate suspicion" of the original judges. In late January, Italy's Supreme Court rejects Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi's plea to move his trial from Milan where he says the judges presiding over the trial are biased against him to another district's jurisdiction. Berlusconi is accused of bribing judges in a business merger. The **Danish** government rejects Russia's demand for the extradition of Akmad Zakaev, a Chechen leader, due to insufficient evidence. At a meeting in **Prague**, NATO invites seven former communist countries including the Baltic nations of Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania, and Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.

Austria's dominant conservative party, The People's Party, wins first place in a general election for the first time in 36 years with 42% of the votes cast. In Grozny, **Chechnya**, rebel Chechen suicide bombers blow up the headquarters of the pro-Russian government building killing 46 people and wounding 76 others. In early January, anti-terrorist police in **London** find traces of ricin, a deadly poison, when they arrested six North Africans. Jacques Chirac, president of **France**, and **German** Chancellor Gerhard Schröder agree on a joint proposal to the convention drawing up a draft constitution for the EU. In late January, **Britain** begins sending a large force to join the American military build-up in the Gulf region. The leaders of **Britain, Spain, Italy, Portugal, Denmark, Hungary, Poland** and the **Czech Republic** sign a letter to the media urging solidarity with America. Germany, France, and Belgium remain in opposition. In mid-February, the nineteen members of NATO gather in **Brussels** to vote on US-backed "contingency plans" to defend Turkey if America invades Iraq. France, Germany, and Belgium veto the proposal. Turkey invokes Article IV of the NATO treaty which requires member states to meet if one member believes its security is threatened. The Yugoslav parliament adopts the Constitutional Charter of the State Union of **Serbia and Montenegro**, marking the beginning of a new reformed state, replacing the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Police arrest a man at **London's** Gatwick Airport after finding a live grenade in his luggage. Police arrest six more terror suspects during a major security operation around Britain. In Hamburg, **Germany**, a German court jails Mounir Motassadeq for 15 years after convicting him of aiding the September 11 suicide hijackers in the first trial anywhere of a suspected attack conspirator. Tasos Papadopoulos is elected president of **Cyprus**.

Africa

In Kaduna, **Nigeria**, riots erupt after the Nigerian newspaper *This Day* allegedly insults the Prophet Muhammad by suggesting that had he been alive, he might have married one of the beauty queens of the Miss World pageant. Two-hundred and twenty people die and eleven thousand lose their homes. The World Food Program estimates that eighteen million people are at risk of starving in **Ethiopia**, **Eritrea**, and **Sudan**. In late November, the government of **Burundi** and the main rebel group, the Hutu group, sign a ceasefire. By mid-January, fighting intensifies in Burundi as the government's forces and the rebels try to capture as much land as possible before peace talks resume in Pretoria. In late January, president Pierre Buyoya and the Hutu leader call for the swift deployment of the peacekeeping troops that South Africa, Mozambique, and Ethiopia promised to contribute. In mid-December, **Congo's** government, rebels, and opposition parties sign a peace agreement to end four years of civil war and set up a transitional government to hold its first elections since independence in 1960. **Kenya's** opposition movement led by Mwai Kibaki wins a presidential and parliamentary election for the first time since independence in 1963. **Togo's** parliament amends the constitution to allow Gnassingbé Eyadéma, ruler since 1967, and Africa's longest-serving head of state, continue his term. A boat carrying **Somalis** to Yemen catches fire and capsizes in the **Gulf of Aden** killing 80 people. **Libya**, a regime with a record of human rights abuses, is chosen to chair the United Nations Human Rights Commission this year. In **Congo**, villagers stone and beat four teachers to death after being accused of casting an evil spell to cause an outbreak of the Ebola disease that has killed nearly 70 people.

North America

President George **Bush** authorizes the release of

\$92 million in military assistance to six Iraqi opposition groups. Jorge Castañeda, **Mexico's** foreign minister, offers to resign because of slow progress in talks on migration with America and domestic criticism of his policies on Cuba. In early January, **Nancy Pelosi** is sworn in as House minority leader, making her the highest-ranking woman in congressional history. President **Bush** uses his state-of-the-union address to make his case for a war against Iraq. In early February, Secretary of State, **Colin Powell**, presents evidence to the UN Security Council of **Iraq's** concealment of weapons of mass destruction from the UN weapons inspectors. The International Atomic Energy Agency declares that **North Korea** possesses an untested ballistic missile capable of reaching the US.

South America

In early December, the United Self-Defense Forces of **Colombia**, the country's main paramilitary group, announce a ceasefire to avert government legal proceedings. **Nicaragua's** former president, Arnaldo Aleman, is under house arrest for embezzlement and money laundering. Lucio Gutierrez, a retired army colonel who led a failed coup in 2000, becomes **Ecuador's** new president. The **US** and **Chile** conclude a bilateral free-trade deal after two years of talks. In **Brazil**, leftist Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, a former trade unionist from the Workers' Party, is sworn in as president. In **Venezuela**, the opponents of President Hugo Chavez call off a two-month strike that was detrimental to the economy and crippled oil exports. In **Bolivia**, thousands of protesters take to the streets demanding the resignation of President Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada. In late February, **Colombia's** left-wing FARC rebels announce that they have three American hostages who were working for a Pentagon contractor.

RESEARCH REPORTS

Summaries of recent articles presenting new ideas on international affairs

A Post-Saddam Scenario

Robert D. Kaplan

The Atlantic Online, November 2002

Robert D. Kaplan writes that a US invasion of Iraq could improve America's strategic bearing in the Middle East. The Middle East is "on the brink of an epochal passage". Any US invasion must be calculated with great consideration for Iraq's neighbors, in particular, Iran. According to Kaplan, Iran is the Middle East's "universal joint". With its convoluted yet functional political system, Iran will change only when forced to do so. An altered Iranian foreign policy would open the floodgates of reform amongst other nations in the Middle East providing the US with a favorable strategic posturing to execute an invasion of Iraq. The burden of Middle Eastern reconstruction will not be borne solely by the US. However, the scale of US involvement in Iraq will parallel that of Germany during WWII.

Despite the repressive and secularist climate in Iraq, Saddam Hussein has maintained a stronghold for over thirty years. A regime change instrumented by the US could destabilize the entire country. Kaplan writes that Iraq "is the most logical place to relocate Middle Eastern US bases in the twenty-first century." He argues that if the US does relocate its bases to Iraq, the transition would signify acceptance of "dynamic change" as opposed to what many

might deem as an attempt at extending Western dominance. Therefore, the US must abandon any goals it may have for a democratic regime in Iraq and construct a more realistic political system. Kaplan suggests a "transitional secular dictatorship that unites the merchant classes across sectarian lines and may in time lead to a democratic alternative." The US must negotiate an ambiguous agreement between the new Iraqi regime and the Kurds prior to an invasion so that the Kurds can claim some form of autonomy and the central government can claim some form of control.

Iran must also be considered prior to a US invasion of Iraq. The Iranian population is "the most pro-American" in the Middle Eastern region. Kaplan notes to "keep in mind that the Middle East is a laboratory of pure power politics...Our dismantling of the Iraqi regime would concentrate the minds of Iran's leader's as little else could". Although Iran is far more advanced politically than Iraq, the country lacks a single leading political figure. Policy-making is the result of bargaining amongst three leaders: Ayatollah Sayyed Ali Khamenei, President Mohommad Khatami, and the former President Ali Akbar Hashemi. Achieving a change in leadership to serve US interests would require a disruption of the balance of power and an incentive for yielding to US force such as general amnesty for Iranian officials guilty of human right's abuses.

The reforms that could result from a modified Iranian foreign policy would eradicate inter-regional differences enabling a seamless transition for the US. For example, the Iranian backed Hizbollah movement in Lebanon would be dismantled which would in turn remove the missile threat from Israel. Iran, Israel, Turkey, and Eritrea could form an “informal, non-Arab alliance of the Near Eastern periphery” improving Israel's strategic position in the Middle East. Israel could withdraw from the West Bank and Gaza. “When no Israeli soldiers are to be seen in their (Palestine's) towns, the seething frustration, particularly among youths, will turn inward toward the Palestinians' own Westernized and Christianized elites”.

The Iraqi people have no recollection of a modern state. A regime transition will require the participation of Iraq's neighbors to enable the formation of an alien political system. The Middle East is a region “characterized by many weak regimes that will totter until the next cataclysm”. Thus, the US should establish itself throughout the entire region to secure territory for long-term, “imperialistic involvement”.

Navigating the Taiwan Strait: Deterrence, Dominance, and US-China Relations

Robert S. Ross

International Security, Vol. 27, No. 2

Fall 2002, pp. 48-85

Robert Ross asserts that in the absence of a declaration of independence from Taiwan, the US can be assured that China will not declare

war on Taiwan. However, the Bush administration may be enacting policies that will instigate a conflict by threatening China's interests in Taiwan. In order to prevent an escalation of the conflict between China and Taiwan, the US must uphold the deterrence policy of both the George H.W. Bush and Clinton administrations: maintain the security of Taiwan while expanding relations with China.

The US has “reputational interests” in Taiwan. Chinese leaders understand Washington's commitment to Taiwan; they understand that an attack on Taiwan would be an attack on the US. When the US responded to Chinese military exercises near Taiwan in March of 1996, it signified the extent of US commitment. Chinese leaders “respect not only US military leaders but also US resolve, and thus believe that American retaliatory threats to protect their interests are credible”. US conventional capabilities and information warfare capabilities are far superior to China's. US high-technology, high-accuracy conventional weaponry is “as effective as nuclear weaponry in achieving military objectives”, and US information warfare is capable of destroying an adversary's information systems “thus immobilizing its war-fighting capabilities”. If conventional and informational deterrence fails, US military action “on the battlefield” would ensure victory.

China's deterrence capability is minimal. China does have nuclear weapons; however, these weapons could only be used as deterrents against the US. A strike on the US would be too risky, not only because of US capabilities,

but because Chinese leaders “have minimal confidence that China’s strategic forces have a second-strike or even first strike capability”. The time it takes to assemble, for example, one intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM), is more than two and a half hours. China would be too vulnerable to US retaliation. According to Ross, the level of early-response preparation is insufficient.

Yet China fears more than US military superiority; it fears the destruction of its economy. A war with the US would cost China participation in international markets, thus depriving them of capital gain. An economic crisis would defer China’s rise to super power status until it was able to stabilize its economy. Ross writes that the most detrimental cost incurred by a war with the US would be the collapse of the nationalist legacy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

Ross asserts that the Bush administration must be confident in its deterrence strategies and create policies that reflect US efforts toward security and development. Yet the Bush administration may be implementing policies that are imperiling the protection of Taiwan and irritating the leaders of China. For example, the Bush administration increased arms sales to Taiwan, and according to Ross, the arms sales in 2001 were the largest since 1992. The US is considering participation in the development of a missile defense program for Taiwan. Also, the relationship between US officers and the Taiwanese military have expanded to “working-level and high-level exchanges” of military training advice and discus-

sions of wartime coordination efforts.

Increasing Taiwan’s arsenal and improving the diplomatic treatment of its officials provides more ammunition for the PRC by demonstrating support for the independence of Taiwan and contesting the interests of China. “Chinese leaders will resist US strategic presence in Taiwan, causing heightened bilateral tension and reduced Chinese cooperation on a range of issues, including proliferation and stability in Central Asia...the Middle East...and on the Korean Peninsula.” Furthermore, if Beijing fails to retaliate against a declaration of Taiwan’s independence, secessionist movements throughout China could mobilize an uprising against Chinese rule.

Over the past decade, the US has made remarkable advances in its military and technology capabilities; it has established a strong relationship with Taiwan, and secured close ties with China. Rather than disrupt this delicate balance by challenging Chinese interests, the US should continue the policies of the preceding administrations.

Defending against Anarchy: From War to Peacekeeping in Afghanistan

Kimberly Zisk Marten

The Washington Quarterly, Winter 2002/2003, pp. 35-51

Kimberly Zisk Marten explains that the US must improve its peacekeeping strategies in Afghanistan. Bush administration officials argue that “training Afghan forces is an alterna-

tive to large-scale peacekeeping”. Anarchy is rooted in Afghanistan; the current situation demands the coordination of military efforts combined with a multilateral peacekeeping operation. By 2004, the new security institutions in Afghanistan will be established, and the central government will be able to administrate efficiently so that US troops can be extricated. In order to protect US long-term security interests and reinforce its mission to the American people, the US should make certain that terrorists do not find a home in Afghanistan.

Despite the intervention of US and coalition forces, chaos persists in Afghanistan. For example, battles between rival warlords are being waged throughout the country, and humanitarian aid convoys are restricted from traveling between cities. Zisk writes that “there may be no real war in Afghanistan at present, but there is no peace either”. Also, Afghanistan is in an economic maelstrom; the markets cannot function safely thus preventing any form of recovery. Police and border guards are involved in corrupt networks. Under their supervision, hoards of arms enter the country and government officials are assassinated.

Zisk writes that in order to stabilize the situation, the US must “command a military presence—a reminder that the international community is monitoring developments throughout Afghanistan and has the political will to take action”. This would require “tens of thousands” of troops including “well-defended garrisons” and armed foot soldiers to monitor the daily activities of the major cities. The US

troops would perform certain duties such as “airlifting troops and supplies, providing secure communication capabilities, and civil affairs work that helps secure the support of local populations”. “Most important”, Zisk writes, “the United States should send troops that demonstrate the resolve to stay as long as necessary... Stability in Afghanistan is too important to US national security interests to allow casualty avoidance to trump mission goals”.

The US command of such a mission should be authorized by the UN Security Council for two reasons: first, according to the UN protocol, the US can choose other countries to contribute their efforts. Zisk explains that the US would need to engage its allies from NATO and the Islamic countries; second, the US could maintain control over the design of the mission even though it would be required to report back to the UN secretary general and the Security Council about the progress of the operations. Furthermore, a multinational mission would lessen the burden of the US and help ensure homeland security in the future.

The Bush administration made a commitment to protect America from terrorists. If the US wants to fulfill its commitment and win the war against terrorism, it must be willing to sustain peacekeeping operations and to engage the efforts of its allies abroad. A successful multinational peacekeeping operation in Afghanistan would set a precedent and establish a template for how the US could potentially deal with Iraq post-conflict.

End of an Affair? Immigration, Security and the US-Mexican Relationship

Robert S. Leiken

National Interest, Winter 2002/2003,
pp. 87-97

Prior to September 11th, President Bush and Mexican president Vicente Fox spoke of compromise, cooperation, and loyalty. For Fox, Bush provided the hope for an immigration accord. For Bush, Fox provided the promise of Latino votes. A bilateral migration agreement would have provided a covenant upon which the two leaders could forge their alliance. However, after the terrorist attacks of September 11th, the security of America overshadowed the amnesty of illegal aliens. The focus of US policy shifted from foreign to domestic; as a result, Mexico was frustrated and the US became disengaged. Since September 11th, Bush and Fox have been involved in a tug-of-war over all of the merits they spoke of in the beginning of their terms. Robert Leiken writes that “now it is time to pick up the pieces and see what can be salvaged.”

Robert Leiken explains that the intimate relationship between President Bush and Vicente Fox “always transcended personal chemistry and reflected the structural convergence between the two countries stemming from economics to demographics.” Mexico is the leading trading partner to the US, and Latinos make up nine percent of the US population.

At the beginning of their terms, the two leaders were prepared to undertake the issue of Mexican migration. In February, 2001, Bush visited Fox in Mexico where he proposed a bi-

lateral migration commission. The promise of the immigration accord appealed to both the US and Mexican constituencies. The US-Mexican relationship was progressing at full speed.

However, US vulnerability that loomed after September 11th and the critical examination of national security that ensued eclipsed any US foreign policy efforts to “regularize” millions of illegal aliens. The Bush administration lobbied the Congress to reinstate section 245(i) of the immigration code. This section would apply to 200,000 of the nine million illegal immigrants residing in the US when their visas (or “green cards”) become available. Each immigrant would undergo a background check by the INS and be required to pay \$1,000 fine in order to “adjust their status”. Congress strongly opposed reinstating 245(i) which “led it (the Bush Administration) to realize how deeply 9/11 had interred the US-Mexican immigration agenda.”

In Mexico, Fox found himself in a predicament: bad relations with Congress, internal conflicts within his Cabinet, and a degenerating economy. With his domestic political agenda in disarray, Fox focused his efforts toward foreign policy and “bucking the US on political issues”. Mexico led a number of opposition movements against US intervention in Guatemala and the Dominican Republic. The Mexican Senate denied Fox a trip to visit the US to meet with Bush. Leiken writes that “Mexican foreign policy had returned to its old basis—an adjunct to domestic politics with an anti-American logo”.

The final blow to the US-Mexican relationship came in October 2002 when Bush traveled to Mexico for an APEC meeting in Cabo San Lucas. Fox wanted to discuss immigration and the US wanted to discuss the war against Iraq. Mexico refused to back the US against Iraq, and the US made no concession on the migration agreement. Bush also rejected Fox's invitation to return to Mexico in early 2003.

Leiken writes that despite the frustration that resonates between the US and Mexico, the relationship is not doomed. "The task for the two administrations is to establish a mode of cooperation based on convergent national not personal or political interests." For example, the US-Mexican border must be strictly controlled. Leiken explains that the migrants from Mexico may not be a security risk, but the routes by which they travel could easily be used by terrorists. Also, the US should take responsibility for the illegal aliens who are employed by various sectors within the states by enforcing sanctions on employers and "regularizing" migrants. Beyond border control and blanket amnesty, the US and Mexico should cooperate to improve opportunities in Mexico in the areas from which the inhabitants are "prone to migrate". For example, the US and Mexico have established a program called "Partnership for Prosperity" which was developed to "encourage infrastructure and education investments in those zones".

Leiken writes that the relationship between President Bush and Vicente Fox cannot be based upon "partisan politics" or "personal affections". Vicente Fox should understand the

institutional incapacity of the US post 9/11 to implement the bilateral migration agreement at this time. President Bush should be compassionate to Mexico's aspiration for economic integration. Together, the two leaders should agree on what they are able to provide one another while at the same time protecting the national interests of their countries.

Where are the Hawks on North Korea?

Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay
The American Prospect, February,
2003

Why is the US practicing passivity with North Korea? Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay argue that the current "do-nothing" policy toward North Korea is evidence of a lack of preparedness on the part of the Bush administration to address a recurring threat. Daalder and Lindsay explain that North Korea serves the same threat as it did eight years ago with both its nuclear and conventional military capabilities. The US must assert the same strict diplomacy with North Korea as it has and continues to do with Iraq.

The Bush administration claims that the US showdown with North Korea is diplomatic, not military, and that the conflict with Iraq does not parallel the crisis in North Korea. North Korea has nuclear weapons and war is not an option. Furthermore, the conventional military capabilities of North Korea are intimidating to the US.

Daalder and Lindsay write that the US grounds for diplomacy are based upon flimsy

RESEARCH REPORTS

assertions. It is debatable whether or not North Korea possesses any nuclear weapons. The evidence was based upon the assumption that if Pyongyang could produce the materials, it could produce the bomb. In 1994, North Korea was alleged to have extracted enough plutonium to develop one or two nuclear weapons. In 2000, it was determined that North Korea operated an illegal uranium-enrichment program. The authors note that these programs “involve a different and more complicated technology” and if implemented today, would require a minimum of three years to construct a nuclear bomb. The White House agrees that “Pyongyang currently possesses no more than one or two nuclear bombs”.

North Korea’s conventional military capabilities are no fiercer than those of the US. And the US has the financial capabilities to sustain the country if war ensued. Since 1994, North Korea has lost as much as ten percent of its population to famine, and its GDP “totals less than four percent of the US defense budget”. Daalder and Lindsay write that the US would win in any conflict with North Korea “quickly and decisively”.

Daalder and Lindsay write that the US should be enforcing preventive measures. US complacency will lead to disastrous outcomes. North Korea will produce more nuclear bombs (in addition to the alleged one or two) increasing its chances at success in an attack. Furthermore, if North Korea, a “starving, bankrupt country” becomes a leader in WMD, rogue fac-

tions such as Al Qaeda will go to great financial lengths to acquire one of their bombs.

Daalder and Lindsay argue that restoring the 1994 Agreed Framework is not enough because North Korea violated and then withdrew from the agreement. The authors write that Pyongyang “must account for all its fissile material and spent fuel, and ship both of them out of the country.” It must shut down its facilities and allow inspectors to perform their job without restrictions. If North Korea agrees to these demands, the US and its allies should provide incentives for each stage of disarmament such as a peace treaty (including new security guarantees), full diplomatic relations, and significant economic assistance. If North Korea fails to adhere to the agreed conditions, the US should make it clear that it will eliminate its nuclear facilities.

The hawks of the Clinton administration believed that confrontation was the only method of diplomacy for dealing with North Korea. Today, the US-North Korea situation is at a critical brink and the hawks are advocating peace instead of force. According to Daalder and Lindsay, now is not the time for peacekeeping, now is the time for action.

THE NATIONAL STRATEGY FORUM, INC.
53 West Jackson, Suite 516
Chicago, IL 60604

(312) 697-1286

(312) 697-1296 Fax

nsf@nationalstrategy.com

www.nationalstrategy.com