



# NATIONAL STRATEGY FORUM REVIEW

## **US FOREIGN POLICY: A SEARCH FOR COMMON PURPOSE**

**THE AMERICAN PUBLIC AND  
US FOREIGN POLICY:  
A SEARCH FOR COMMON PURPOSE**

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- The advancement and preservation of democracy is essential to promote human rights, inspire principled cultural achievement, and maximize economic development.
- Informed public opinion and an enduring non-partisan consensus are fundamental parts of national security in a democratic society.

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# THE AMERICAN PUBLIC AND US FOREIGN POLICY: A SEARCH FOR COMMON PURPOSE

*Richard E. Friedman*

**T**he events of September 11 have produced an environment that is not quite war and not quite peace. There is a belated recognition of the extent of US vulnerability to international terrorism and of the dangers of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Yet ambivalence remains regarding homeland security, how US primacy is expressed, the prioritization of military and social service spending, and the allocation of finite resources. The thesis of this article is that US foreign policy will be far more effective if there is unity of purpose among the American people and if they do not let disagreements about domestic policies color their judgment about security issues.

Prior to World War II, US foreign policy was the domain of the elite. The American public generally focused on economic matters and remained passive as events unfolded during the late 1930's that led to war with Germany and Japan in 1941.

Immediately after WWII there was a brief period deemed the golden age of bipartisan foreign policy. Many US successes in the international arena (the Marshall Plan, the Berlin Airlift, and others) were the result of bipartisan support.

In this perilous time, a sense of common purpose is needed to enhance national security. The American public could be an important resource for the formulation of a coherent US national

security policy and foreign policy. Common purpose is somewhat different from common sense. It is based on an understanding of one's own conceptual framework and that of others.

The assumption that people's worldviews are necessarily based on rationality may be incorrect. A cognitive subconscious may produce a "knee-jerk" reaction to issues and events. This reaction may not have an analytical or logical basis. Rather, it stems from personal values — what is believed to make us a good person and what is morally right. By extension, those whose beliefs are different from ours may be morally bad and wrong. The moral worldview is a subjective, ethical judgment about what constitutes a good person and a good nation.

Discussion, civil disagreement, and compromise are fundamental to American democracy — a sometimes messy business. Informed debate should tap into the vast intellectual resource of the American public, whatever their political orientations may be.

The barrier to achieving a common purpose in foreign policy may be strongly held partisan differences regarding domestic social policy issues (right to life, capital punishment, gay rights, etc.), unrelated to national security issues such as international terrorism and the proliferation of WMD. Extending domestic social policy beliefs to threat-based issues may be misdirected, because states and non-state actors who seek to harm the US have a vastly different set of values

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and objectives than the American public.

Liberals (the left, progressives, etc.) and conservatives (the right, hegemons, etc.) have distinctive world views, but it is necessary to disentangle domestic from foreign and security policy considerations. Unfortunately, it is sometimes difficult for one group to perceive accurately the worldview of the other. It is human nature to speak to those with similar views, resulting in mutual reinforcement of one's own perspective.

Foreign policy decisions are perceived to be either right or wrong, when viewed through different domestic social policy lenses and filters. Self-identified liberals and conservatives often select different topics for discussion and use different shorthand metaphors to express their beliefs. For example, the Patriot Act is perceived to be either a law designed to prevent acts of terrorism or a law that tramples civil liberties. In fact, it could be some of both, and reasonable people should be able to work out a broad area of understanding based on widely shared values.

The issue is how to discuss alternative moral systems. Can people honestly present how they choose their beliefs, the depth and accuracy of information they utilize, their categories of beliefs, their reasoning process, and their choice of words and metaphors to express their beliefs? The shorthand answer is, "probably not." However, creating a bit of intellectual discomfort may be valuable. A degree of self-doubt may modulate unwarranted certainty, reduce vitriol, and diminish gratuitous proselytizing.

Traditionally, domestic economic and social issues have been more important to the American public than international affairs. September 11 and subsequent events involving homeland security and the invasion of Iraq changed these priorities to some degree. For example, the beginning phase of the invasion of Iraq was framed as a "war" or "peace" issue and the more complex underlying issues of regime change, humanitarian concerns, oil supply and regional sta-

bility were ignored. This involvement in foreign policy, while laudable, can be counterproductive unless there is a framework for rational, informed discussion. A frame of reference is useful because it is quick and readily accessible.

Great care is needed when discussing US foreign policy. The framework used as a compass for thought and expression of beliefs can be oriented incorrectly. The expression of beliefs in the hurried and harried American society is through metaphors that are an effortless way to justify a conclusion. A person may be identified as "cheap" or "frugal" depending upon whether the intention is positive or pejorative. In the foreign policy arena US primacy can mean either world leadership or world bully. The term "multilateralism" may be used to condemn unilateralism and overlook the underlying need to take action when multilateral engagement and agreement is difficult or impossible to reach.

One tangible and attainable goal is to reduce the level of enmity and hatred expressed in contemporary partisan discussion of foreign policy issues. Primitive tribes fear and loathe the tribe that resides over the adjacent mountain ridge or jungle clearing. Because of a lack of communication, many encounters tend to be violent. CNN and access to mass communication provides an opportunity for exposure to different group perspectives, yet we tend to misperceive, misunderstand, and fear the worldview of the "other". Most Americans profess their love of country, but good people sometimes hate their government and their president—a subject that requires more research. It is clear that American self-hate does not diminish the prevalent hatred of the US expressed by foreign states and people.

Ideologically defined groups are not necessarily monolithic. There is a wide range of systemic variation. Because categories are complex, they contain many variations and permuta-

tions that stray from central principles. Members of the groups are not always ideologically pure. Thus, it is not helpful in public discourse to preface one's beliefs by stating, "as a conservative (or liberal) my view is ...."

The categories that underlie a group's orientation have an embedded demonic prototype applied to those who have opposing views. When one of the demons or demonic hot-button principles is expressed by an opposing group, it violates all that is deemed good and right. This raises the issue of the existence of absolute values and who is competent to decide which absolute value is correct. A dilemma arises when an opposing group with demonic principles successfully meets its basic responsibilities of national security and economic prosperity. Consternation among the opposing political group becomes rampant: why cannot success be deferred until after the next election?

The issue is whether we are willing to compromise one or more principles if it serves one's self-interest or the national interest to do so. Of course, compromise is subject to criticism by idealistic group adherents who will accuse their pragmatic colleagues of a callous betrayal of principles and ideology. Less rabid critics would use the word "waffling." People can have multiple models in different domains. For example, a martinet in business or a Mafia hit man may be a nurturing parent at home. It is possible to be "liberal" on domestic social policy issues and "conservative" on particular foreign policy and national security issues.

Members of groups need not resign their group membership or forego rigorous discussion of social policy issues to reach accord on national security issues. The term "middle" or "centrist" is misleading because it is not neutral. It is a statistical norm based on a wide array of discrete issues. Also, the term "moderate" may be misleading, because it suggests a reluctance to make a forceful examination of difficult issues. If political cover is needed, the better char-

acterization of one's position may be "multi-dimensional".

In time of peril when the US is in harm's way, it is a major function of government to protect the nation and its people. In time of tranquility the major function of government is to nurture its people by achieving prosperity and providing aid to those who, without fault, need social services.

What is needed is to recognize that:

- There are many similarities that define the principles and differences among ideologically defined Groups.
- There are wide variations within each group.
- Domestic social concepts and categories that are transferred to the foreign policy arena may be inappropriate and unhelpful.
- There is a massive amount of national security and international issues information available to people who seek to educate themselves on these issues.
- A reduction of rhetorical vitriol may provide a bridge toward enlightened discussion with people who have a different worldview.
- Pragmatic variation should not brand a pragmatist as a group traitor.

Compromise is the essence of democracy, and issues of national strategy are too important to be confined within ideological straitjackets. There is an underlying, broad zone of agreement that enables people of goodwill to address these vexing issues. The subsequent articles will examine an array of national security issues and address how broad zones of agreement can be achieved.□

## SEEKING AGREEMENT ON US PRIMACY

*John Allen Williams*

**H**ow the US should exercise its vast power is a subject of spirited debate as the problems of postwar Iraq mount and as political candidates develop selective amnesia about previous positions. The debate bears a superficial resemblance to the discussions during and after the Vietnam War about the “limits to power” and the wisdom of this country attempting to exert influence in far-away places. But this time around there is a difference: there is little mainstream sentiment that the US can or should abandon its position of primacy. The issues of when, where, and how to exercise US power remain contentious, but that the US is – for better or worse – the global hegemon is not in dispute.

At least five areas of consensus are visible behind the rhetoric. First, the US cannot hide behind the oceans for protection. While being physically separated from those who would do us harm is an advantage, September 11 showed that this is not a good solution. It became apparent that day to all sentient beings that there are things “out there” that can hurt us, and we had better figure out what they are and how to deal with them.

Second, with its vast physical and human resources, the US is uniquely positioned to affect the world for good or ill. Still, and this is the third area of agreement, there are limits to what even a country as powerful as the US can

do. The aftermath of the Iraq War shows some of these limitations. We therefore need to work with others, either in the context of longstanding agreements or by *ad hoc* “coalitions of the willing,” to achieve our goals abroad. Despite misgivings on the effectiveness of the United Nations as a forum for deciding vital security issues, there is a growing consensus that ignoring the UN, or appearing to do so, carries unacceptable costs and should not be done lightly. The UN can also be helpful in brokering solutions, as it is attempting to do with respect to the timing of elections in Iraq, and in providing diplomatic cover for actions the US wants to take.

Fourth, we must make our choices based on US values and – yes – interests. Robert Wood remarked when he was at the Naval War College that great nations have only two choices: they can shape the world so it is supportive of their values and interests, or they can wait for some other great nation to do so. We have come a long way from the “Vietnam syndrome,” which caused us to shy away reflexively from any foreign involvement, especially military involvement in the Third World (now called the Global South).

Similarly, the “Mogadishu syndrome” after the October 1993 raid (recounted in *Black Hawk Down*) in which 18 American soldiers were lost, made the Clinton administration very

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## SEEKING AGREEMENT ON US PRIMACY

wary of any actions that might involve US casualties. The Iraq war is increasingly controversial because of the difficulties of postwar reconstruction (which should have been better prepared for) and disagreements about whether the war itself was in the US interest. Had weapons of mass destruction been found, this would have provided the needed rationale for most Americans.

Fifth, we need to understand that primacy includes more than military power. The US has multiple resources of power, including economic, political, and cultural assets. The role of military power may simply be to hold the power of an adversary in check while waiting for the other elements of power to have an effect. This is arguably what happened in the half century confrontation between the US and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. We engaged one another militarily only by proxies, such as in Korea and Vietnam, yet the ability of the US to project robust military power kept Soviet military force from being used.

Debates today center on these areas of consensus, but do not pose a challenge to them. The wisdom of particular manifestations of US primacy or how the US interacts with other states and international institutions may be hotly disputed, but there is no serious alternative to a principled and judicious use of US power in areas of our vital interest. □

# RESETTING THE NATIONAL CONSENSUS ON SECURITY STRATEGY

*Larry Seaquist*

**C**an Americans fashion a new strategy for national security that gathers us all to a common purpose? We can. Indeed, an overhaul of our international stance is overdue. We live in such radically changed circumstances that the old ground rules may be getting us into trouble. But to move such an enterprise from idea to implementation, we must recall just what those now-antique precepts are and how strongly they still grip our strategy thinking.

America is not a young nation. Our political culture harbors several old myths about foreign policy. We commonly assume, for example, that the domestic and the international agendas must be treated separately. Notice how our politics force the two apart. Famously, President Bush 41, a successful war president, is said to have lost his bid for reelection because he didn't care enough about life here at home. Enroute to becoming No. 42, candidate Clinton "focused like a laser" on the home front, then carried that disdain for the foreign into his first years in office. Reversing the template but reinforcing the pattern, President Bush 43 now parades himself as a "war president" whose international responsibilities trump more homely concerns.

The roots of another DNA-level intuition run back to our nation's origins in the era of sailing ships: *America is isolated and Americans are isolationists*. Insulated by broad reaches of salt water, more lately castled behind our parapets of

military power, Americans are said to care little and know less about foreign affairs. With this indictment in mind, campaign gurus hold it good to squirt a whiff of international policy into politics from time to time, but insist that elections ultimately turn on voters' primal concerns here at home.

Another pleasant myth has it that politics stop at the water's edge. Patently untrue, as a glance at the history of any of America's wars will show, it nonetheless remains a mantra, often deployed against one's partisan and therefore unpatriotic opponents.

Never mind that these myths don't quite add up. As a set they supply a threat-think perspective that has been with us a long time. In this strategic outlook we Americans need to glance up from our comfortable lives only if high danger looms from overseas. No subtle, long-term menace will do. Our adrenaline stirs only for gargantuan, ocean-crossing malevolence. Between emergencies, we can leave matters to the specialists in Washington, the diplomats and warriors hired to deal with the routine hazards of life around the globe.

There is one more precept wound into our strategic intuition: engage *overseas*. Right from our beginnings, when Thomas Jefferson sailed almost all of his tiny navy against the Barbary pirates then raiding American merchantmen in the far off Mediterranean, America has dealt

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## RESETTING THE NATIONAL CONSENSUS ON SECURITY STRATEGY

with the occasional Big Threat by engaging it with as much military force as possible as far away as possible.

Furnished with this simplifying outlook, Americans have had no need for the nuances of high strategy. A simple yardstick did the job. How big is the threat? What size military do we need to go over there and deal with it?

Time-tested as it may be, overseas threat-think has become obsolete. Terrorists are not the only forces that now reach deep inside our homeland without necessarily exposing anything vital that can be attacked by our military, no matter how far reaching their firepower. As every American worker can tell you, America is no longer separable from the rest of the world. National security is now job security, energy security, food security, even dollar security and environment security. All are cross-connected; all are tied intimately to complex dynamics swirling around the whole globe. Our old standby, military vigor, is only one of the contributors to the common wellbeing – and a lesser one at that.

How might we go about creating a new American consensus around this larger understanding of security? One thing we don't need to do is tell Americans the facts. They already know about jobs going overseas, TVs coming from China, and the cost of living tied to the price of oil in the Middle East. What our citizen-voters need is an opportunity to weigh in on how all the threads of national security are to be brought together.

What can National Strategy Forum members do? Here are three concrete steps, two for immediate use in this election season, one to deploy on November 3rd, the day after the election when the winning candidate begins (re)organizing to deliver four years of good governance:

1 – Insist that our politicians cross-connect the domestic to the *international*. Accept no more

speeches in obsolete compartments. If they are elected, our candidates will have to juggle energy policy, Middle East politics, and counter-terrorism programs all at the same time. Ask them how they plan to do that and get a win-win outcome.

2 – Refuse to accept the size of the Defense budget as a proxy for *security*. Yes, we want our young men and women to have the very best training and equipment. But whether coming out of Republican or Democrat mouths, pro-military slogans are no substitute for sober discussions with the electorate of how we can multiply the Pentagon's leverage by correcting our public diplomacy failures and acting to prevent conflicts before we have to send in the Marines.

3 – (For use after the election) Push for a major update of our top-level *strategy-making procedures in Washington*. Washington's institutional problem is not whether our intelligence community is serving up good all-source "dots." The failure is that no one is chartered to weave all-factor plans out of the disparate threads of "security." Not finding WMD in Iraq was a minor problem compared to the shock of discovering the day after the military victory that no one knew what to do next and that the Pentagon was leading a muddled, hugely expensive country-building project interconnected both to American domestic policies and the fortunes of many other countries. We can do better.

Throughout, we must insist on foresight. Very rarely can the complicated problems that undermine the security of an American citizen be fixed by emergency military intervention. As we fashion a new collection of strategic precepts let's make this the first one: *an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of (military) cure*. What do you have on your list?□

# THE DOCTRINE OF PREEMPTION: PRECEDENTS AND PROBLEMS

*Endy Zemenides*

**I**n the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, the Bush administration released a new national security strategy. No aspect of that strategy, or of the Bush administration's practice of foreign policy, has been more widely criticized as the concept of preemptive war declared in the strategy. This concept has been called "unprecedented," "illegal" and "dangerous" by critics at home and abroad. The critiques grew sharper in the wake of the war in Iraq, which many have identified as the first exercise of the Bush administration's doctrine of preemptive war. Unfortunately, the controversy surrounding the war in Iraq and the Bush administration's foreign policy have not resulted in a substantive debate over how to reconcile the historic practice of preemptive war/self-defense and the threat of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and terrorists.

## US DIPLOMATIC HISTORY AND PREEMPTION

U.S. foreign policy has long contemplated the legality of preemptive self-defense. On December 29, 1837, British troops crossed the Niagara River to the U.S. side and attacked the *Caroline*, a ship owned by U.S. nationals that was allegedly providing assistance to anti-British rebels in Canada. Despite the British claim of self-defense, heated diplomatic exchanges – which ultimately led to a British apology – ensued. Communications between British diplo-

rats and Secretary of State Daniel Webster recognized a right to preemptive self-defense. Webster, however, argued that the *Caroline* incident was not a case of permissible self-defense because of the absence of key criteria.

In a letter to Lord Ashburton, special British representative to Washington, Webster argued that a state properly exercising a right to preemptive self-defense would first have to demonstrate that the "necessity of that self-defense is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment of deliberation." After establishing such necessity, the state acting preemptively could only respond in a manner proportionate to the threat. Thus, the leading nations in the coalition that went to war with Iraq in 2003 – the United States and the United Kingdom – established the criteria of necessity and proportionality as the standard for permissible preemptive action.

## PREEMPTION AND THE UN CHARTER

The experience of two World Wars led the international community to establish an order for the use of force. This order took form in the UN Charter, which prohibited states from the threat or use of force. The UN Charter allowed two exceptions to this prohibition: force authorized by the Security Council under Article 42 of the Charter or the exercise of "the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United

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## THE DOCTRINE OF PREEMPTION: PRECEDENTS AND PROBLEMS

Nations” under Article 51 of the Charter. No provision of the Charter permits, or even acknowledges, the right to preemptive self-defense. The UN Charter, however, did not bring about the end of preemptive war in international relations, nor did it necessarily result in the censure of state’s that conducted such action.

The U.S. faced the issue of the legality of preemptive action during Security Council debate over the Cuban missile crisis in 1962. A military preemption action to prevent the Soviet Union from introducing nuclear-capable, intermediate-range ballistic missiles into Cuba was considered by the Kennedy administration. President Kennedy ultimately order a military “quarantine” of Cuba, and a diplomatic solution was reached.

Although war was ultimately averted, the Cuban missile crisis serves as an important precedent for the right to preemptive self-defense. Not only did the Security Council fail to repudiate a right to preemptive self-defense, the debate in the Security Council included consideration of the necessity criteria established in the *Caroline* case.

Five years after the Cuban missile crisis, Israel launched a preemptive military action against Egypt, Syria, and Jordan. This action, which resulted in a decisive Israeli victory and is known as the Six-Day War, is a classic example of preemptive self-defense. On June 5, 1967, after several weeks of frantic diplomacy while hostile troops were massing in the Sinai, the Golan Heights, and the West Bank, Israel launched its operation. The Security Council took the crisis under advisement, but refused (as did the General Assembly) to condemn the Israeli military action.

The value of the Six-Day War as a precedent for preemptive self-defense is based on the nature of the threat faced by Israel. Hostile nations were undertaking a massive mobilization on Israel’s border, threatening the very existence of

the state of Israel, and diplomatic recourse had been all but exhausted. The imminence of the threat was undeniable, and Israel’s only other choice of means was to withstand an attack.

### SELF-DEFENSE AND POST 9-11 WORLD

Despite the restrictions of the UN Charter, there is no explicit prohibition of preemptive self-defense in international law, and customary international law appears to recognize a right to such self-defense when certain criteria are met. The UN Charter and customary international law were formed in a world where states were the main actors to be regulated by law. Moreover, the most dangerous weapons in the world today are WMD, which can be mobilized and undetected, unlike the Egyptian tanks, planes and troops that massed on Israel’s borders in 1967.

In such a world, is it reasonable to require states to engage in preemptive self-defense only when an overwhelming threat is *imminent*? Given the difficulty of detecting either mobilized WMD or terrorists, do not states essentially forego a right to effective self-defense if preemptive self-defense is not an option? On the other hand, if states follow the lead of the Bush Administration and do not require a threat to be imminent before acting against it, would preemptive actions remain defensive in nature? If the *Caroline* criteria are relaxed too far, what is to prevent India from acting against Pakistan, Russia acting against former Soviet Republics, and Israel acting against Iran, all in the name of preempting attacks by terrorists or WMD attacks?

Preemptive self-defense has always had, and will always have, a place in the foreign policy toolbox of U.S. Presidents. The challenge for the international community is to reconsider the established customary international law criteria for preemptive self-defense. The new dimension is the threat of terrorism and WMD. □

# US INTERESTS AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

*Richard S. Williamson*

**W**ith the collapse of the Soviet empire and the implosion of the Russian empire, the United States became the world's sole superpower. With Soviet tanks no longer threatening them, Europe decreased their level of defense spending and fell further behind US military might. And China, while an emerging power, still lags far behind. The post Cold War "unipolar moment" has become the "unipolar era."

The United States is unchallenged in military might, cultural reach and economic power. The United States has the capacity to act alone to protect its vital interests when it must. But it is better to work with others when possible to spread the burden and, in some cases, to increase the likelihood of success.

Throughout the 20<sup>th</sup> century and into the new millennium, our foreign policy has been informed by a belief in American exceptionalism. As Ronald Reagan said at Westminster Hall, "Freedom is not the sole prerogative of a lucky few but the inalienable and universal right of all human beings." We recognize that human rights are universal, our values are just, and America fights when required not to build an empire but to make the world safer, more secure and more free.

However, the United States cannot afford to be reckless nor careless in advancing our values

or protecting our vital interests. No country, not even the world's sole superpower, can afford to unnecessarily irritate or offend others. While America may have the capacity to go it alone, to always do so would be neither prudent nor wise. As in the case of Operation Iraqi Freedom, a coalition of the willing can be formed with like-minded states to advance important security interests. However, enduring international organizations also are valuable vehicles in which and through which to take action. As permanent institutions they offer structured gathering places, a venue to exchange views, predictable ways and means to reach consensus when possible, mechanism to implement decisions, and the "indicia of legitimacy" to give those decisions broader acceptability.

The United Nations (UN), with all its contradictions and disappointments, has been important in establishing international norms on human rights and against global terrorism. Its universal membership and acceptance in far flung corners of the globe give UN action a reach and bona fide that is valuable to us in advancing freedom and fighting evil fanatics who, to advance their twisted political cause, would target innocent civilians for harm.

The works of the UN system to provide humanitarian relief in war-torn countries or places devastated by natural catastrophes is valuable

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## US INTERESTS AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

and important. UN peacekeeping missions in Africa, Afghanistan and East Timor have advanced peace, reconciliation and justice. In these areas, it is in the US interest to support and contribute to UN efforts.

And the UN helped sanction an international coalition in the first Gulf War which, in turn, helped other countries join with America to repel Saddam Hussein's illegal occupation.

But the UN Security Council's anachronistic structure and procedures make it susceptible to abuse. America must be prepared to act without UN Security Council sanction when required as President Clinton did in Kosovo and President Bush in Iraq. US sovereignty cannot be sacrificed.

Some global challenges are better suited to multilateral response such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The UN, the International Atomic Energy Agency, the London Suppliers Group and other international institutions have helped deal with the dangers of WMD proliferation. Similarly the World Trade Organization has been an extremely useful vehicle to lower trade barriers, which, in turn, benefits the United States and the entire global economy. The World Health Organization helps contain contagious disease such as SARs. And the United Nations Environmental Program helps address pollution issues that know no borders.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has been a valuable linchpin of the US/European relationship for over 50 years, helping address grave security issues and usefully providing a foothold for America in Europe. NATO made a vital contribution to containing the Soviet Union during the long Cold War. Today NATO is playing an important role in helping central and Eastern Europe move from the dark past of Soviet domination to enduring freedom

and security.

While the United States is the world's sole superpower and consequently has the capacity to act alone if it must, America benefits from international organizations. America, founders of the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and other international institutions, has benefited from them and will continue to do so. Ultimately the mission must define the coalition (or the international organization) and not the other way around. But often the mission can and should be advanced within and through an international organization. □

# SHAKING UP THE INTELLIGENCE PARADIGM: ARE WE SEEKING CONSENSUS WITHOUT ASKING ALL THE RIGHT QUESTIONS?

*Ronald D. Lee*

**E**fforts to achieve a working consensus about the roles and capabilities of the United States' intelligence community ("IC") form an integral part of broader efforts to reach domestic agreement on the direction of U.S. foreign policy. The IC includes the intelligence organizations and functions of numerous federal government departments, agencies, and services, including the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, Central Intelligence Agency, Coast Guard, Defense Intelligence Agency, Department of Energy, Department of Homeland Security, Department of State, Department of the Treasury, Federal Bureau of Investigation, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), and National Security Agency (NSA).

First, the conduct of foreign relations and the pursuit of foreign intelligence both aim to sustain and increase national security and the United States' capabilities to help preserve international stability. Second, the activities and foreign relationships of the IC are themselves part of the practice of statecraft. Finally, the IC directly supports U.S. government officials as they conduct foreign policy. There is no shortage of reports, studies, and commentators proposing that one vision or another of the IC is the vision that

should unify the nation. Instead of adding to those gigabytes of insights, this essay summarizes two of the principal lines of discussion and then touches upon two additional challenges for those who study and make decisions about the future authorities and activities of the IC.

## **FAILURES AND ABUSES, OR SUCCESSES AND FIDELITY TO THE RULE OF LAW?**

Much discussion about the perceived woes and proposed reforms of the intelligence community ("IC") proceeds along one of two lines; at times, the discussion moves along both tracks simultaneously.

The first theme is summarized in the two words "Intelligence Failures." This line of discussion posits that the IC has lost its superiority and is no longer able consistently to deliver a decisive information advantage to the nation's policymakers and warfighters. The resulting debate centers on what external and internal factors diminished the IC's capabilities, the potential consequences for United States hegemony, and the measures, cost, and time required to rebuild, re-capitalize, and reinvigorate the nation's spies. A series of commissions and studies over the past few years, including the National Commission on

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Terrorism: Countering the Changing Threat of International Terrorism (2000), have proposed measures to revitalize, reorganize, and reform the intelligence community. The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, an independent commission created by legislation in late 2002, is charged with preparing an all-inclusive account of the circumstances surrounding the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and with recommending corrective actions to thwart future terrorist attacks. Most recently, the President of the United States established the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities in the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) in February 2004 to examine and make recommendations about the capabilities and challenges of the IC to provide intelligence relating to WMD and related threats.

While the first debate inquires whether the IC is understaffed and incompetent, the second debate asks whether the IC is overzealous and malevolent. This second theme is summarized in the words "Intelligence Abuses" and begins from the premise that the IC has strayed from the path of full respect for the constitutional rights and liberties of United States persons before and may stray again. More than a quarter of a century ago, the Church Committee and the Pike Committee of the United States Congress investigated domestic intelligence activities of the IC and proposed reforms, including enhanced legislative and executive oversight, and a statutory framework involving federal judges to regulate the conduct of certain electronic surveillance activities. More recently, the debate has focused on whether the enhanced legal authorities that the IC has received in the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 to collect and share intelligence information should be continued, renewed, or repealed. A full or even a partial discussion and documentation of these enhanced authorities is well beyond the scope of this essay; widely discussed topics include (a) the involvement of

criminal investigative purposes and personnel in decisions to commence, alter, or discontinue electronic surveillance and physical search authorized under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA); (b) the use in criminal proceedings of information obtained pursuant to activities authorized under FISA; and (c) the Federal Bureau of Investigation's investigative powers, when authorized by designated courts, to require any person to produce business records relevant to an investigation concerning international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities.

Both of these discussions are healthy and necessary, and complementary to each other rather than contradictory. If the IC is not capable enough, it may face temptations to come closer to invading the privacy and civil liberties rights of US persons in order to meet crucial intelligence requirements. On the other hand, arguably the greater the capabilities of the IC to intrude upon the rights of US persons, the greater the need to strengthen scrutiny of the IC's activities. None of this is to cast aspersions on the integrity, intentions, or commitment to the rule of law of the IC and its officials; the IC demonstrates a strong and enduring commitment to the Constitution and the rule of law and has numerous internal and external oversight mechanisms. Rather, these points illustrate the complex dynamic between capabilities and compliance with the legal requirements that protect the rights of US persons.

### TWO STRIKING DEVELOPMENTS

Much of both the heat and the light produced by these discussions of capabilities and individual rights have failed to take into account two cardinal challenges to the mission performance and current organization of the IC in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. This commentary describes those challenges, while leaving for another day proposed solutions or responses to those challenges.

The Size and Shape of the IC. The conduct of foreign intelligence and the receipt and use of its products has always been an inherently federal function. The federal government, of course, is solely responsible for conducting the foreign affairs and national defense of the United States, and intelligence activities derive their primary reason for being from the support of these two activities. The agencies that collect, process, analyze, and disseminate foreign intelligence are federal in charter and international in scope and activities; the agencies and officials that receive and rely upon foreign intelligence are federal and their areas of responsibility are worldwide.

The emerging challenge is occasioned by transnational terrorism targeting U.S. persons and U.S. interests in the United States as well as abroad. As recently as 1997, terrorism and weapons of mass destruction were, according to a statement by President Clinton released by the White House, a priority of the third order, behind supporting military operations and providing political, economic, and military intelligence on countries hostile to the United States. It is reasonable to surmise that the IC now has no higher priority than intelligence to prevent and disrupt terrorist attacks upon the United States, its persons, and its interests. Unlike military operations and intelligence about other nations, intelligence to detect and disrupt international terrorism is not exclusively a federal concern. In recent testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, the Director of Central Intelligence George J. Tenet stated, “[F]or the growing number of jihadists interested in attacking the United States, a spectacular attack on the US Homeland is the ‘brass ring’ that many strive for.” The leads, investigative information, and plain old hunches that are needed to formulate specific requirements for terrorism-related intelligence and to inform its collection, analysis, dissemination, and use could well come from state, county, and local law enforcement officers, emergency re-

sponse personnel, and public health officials as well as from traditional federal generators and recipients of foreign intelligence.

Moreover, because non-federal officials typically have primary responsibility for public safety in almost all areas of the United States, save for areas of federal and tribal jurisdiction, these state, county, and local officials in many cases may have demonstrable needs to receive foreign intelligence reporting. Their involvement and the paramount importance of terrorism-related intelligence reporting, could over time fundamentally change the size, shape, and the operating procedures of what has traditionally been thought of as the IC. Of course some state, county, and city officials already receive some information from the IC and work as informal parts of the IC through ad hoc arrangements and through Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs).

Both of the debates that permeate discussion about the IC – whether it is doing well or is on the verge of failure and whether it is protecting US person rights or is on the brink of abusing them – could take on substantially different directions in view of the challenges of incorporating non-federal officials into the IC’s processes.

The Ambiguity of Identity. A second challenge is the growing ambiguity of identity. It is easiest to discuss this challenge with an analogy to the conduct of law enforcement activities. When local police conduct a physical surveillance or stakeout outside a known criminal hangout, they are watching for the comings and goings of, say, known suspects Person A and Person B. They may also note the presence of Person C and Person D, and will correlate this information with other investigative facts to determine if C and D should be regarded as suspects, victims, or bystanders. In other words, they are putting together facts and attempting to form a coherent picture and investigative story out of those facts; they will in turn use that assessment to direct

## SHAKING UP THE INTELLIGENCE PARADIGM

their further work. The linchpin of this stakeout and assessment, of course, is knowing the individuals' identities; the officers must be able to recognize a specific person as Person A every time they observe that person. Face, hair, body, gait, mannerisms, conduct, and clothes all assist in that recognition of individual identity and individual identity is the anchor around which the investigators build up their analytic picture of the suspects' activities. If Person A could appear to be a different person each time he entered and exited the stakeout location, the analytic picture the police are able to put together would be incomplete and distorted. Conversely, if every person entering and exiting the stakeout location appeared to be the same Person A, the police officers' efforts would also be frustrated.

Now translate this confusion of identities – the target's ability either to change apparent identities constantly, or the ability of several potential targets to take on and use the same identity – to the digital realm. The target may be able to adopt, discard, vary, and multiply electronic identities at dizzying speeds. Moreover, and equally frustrating to an investigator, several different targets, or conceivably thousands or millions of possible targets, could share the same apparent identity. Police officials conducting a lawfully authorized physical or electronic surveillance would confront a fog of confusion and misleading activity not unlike that which a defensive team in football sees when the quarterback executes a double-reverse play and the ball changes hands several times.

As is the case with non-federal involvement in the IC, the myriad possibilities for IC targets to exploit the same ambiguity of identity in the digital age also pose fundamental new issues for the effectiveness of the IC. The ambiguity of identity may also change the terms of debate about the appropriate measures the IC should be able to take, under lawful authority, to conduct its mission while protecting the rights of U.S. persons. One partial response has been the enactment by

Congress, as part of the USA PATRIOT Act, of a statute that permits that permits authorized agencies, in seeking judicial approval to conduct electronic surveillance pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, to apply for an order that does not limit the permitted surveillance to enumerated communications facilities in circumstances where the court finds that the actions of the target of the surveillance may thwart the identification of that person.

## CONCLUSION

Perhaps not since the Church and Pike investigations into the domestic activities of the U.S. intelligence community in the early 1970's has public concern about the appropriate tradeoffs between the authorities of intelligence agencies and the privacy and civil liberties rights of U.S. persons been so spirited. Likewise, the debate about the perceived lack of capabilities of the IC to protect the nation has perhaps never before reached such a high level of intensity because of the stakes. These debates and the search for a working middle ground are healthy and necessary activities for a democracy, and prerequisites for a non-partisan consensus on foreign policy.

As these debates proceed, they should proceed and be informed by careful attention to two relatively recent developments: the need somehow to involve state and local officials as appropriate in the intelligence requirements, generation, and consumption cycle; and the need to deal with the ambiguities of digital identity. These developments may require rethinking key foundational assumptions on which the IC has operated for the past half-century or more. After this careful reexamination, which may help to determine the success of the community in protecting the nation against global threats, the search for consensus on the appropriate level of the IC's capabilities and legal authorities can and should resume with renewed vigor and insight. □

# PETROLEUM AND NATIONAL INSECURITY

*Vito Stagliano*

**T**he United States is the world's largest consumer of petroleum, a fact of life that is likely to remain unchanged well into the future. Americans consume 20 million barrels of petroleum each day, 10 million of which are imported in varying volumes from virtually every oil-producing nation in the world, except Iran, whose oil the U.S. continues to embargo. According to the Energy Information Administration's (EIA) "Petroleum Supply Annual 2003" and OPEC's "International Energy Outlook 2003," the imports that worry American policy makers, however, are the approximately 2 million barrels per day that come from the Persian Gulf, and the nearly 5 million barrels per day that are under OPEC control. OPEC, it should be recalled, is one of the world's last remaining cartels, a union of governments that collude for the sole purpose of extracting - from consumers in every nation - rents that would not otherwise be available in a competitive market. Oil prices in an OPEC-free international oil market would probably settle in the range of \$10-\$12 per barrel, as they did in 1985/1986 when OPEC lost control of its members' output, versus the current, OPEC-manipulated \$30 per barrel. The swing producer of the OPEC cartel is Saudi Arabia, whose proven oil reserves are equal to, and may be greater than the combined reserves of the entire Western world.


Security concerns about petroleum supplies can be traced to the U.S. Navy's conversion of its ships' boilers from coal to oil use in 1904. The Axis and Allied powers rushed to seize Middle-Eastern oil fields to secure their supplies during WWII. But energy security concerns did not rise to public pre-eminence until 1973 when Saudi Arabia and Kuwait orchestrated an oil embargo against the United States, in retaliation for America re-armament of Israel during the Yom Kippur war. According to the document published by Resources for the Future (RFF) entitled "The Ghost of OPEC in Energy Security Policy," the embargo precipitated the first energy crisis of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, described by then-president Richard Nixon as a "blow to American pride and prosperity," and "a turning point in our history." The energy crisis mentality gripped U.S. domestic and foreign policy for most of the following decade. President Gerald Ford declared in 1975 that "Americans are no longer in full control of their national destiny, when that destiny depends on uncertain foreign fuels at high prices fixed by others." 1979 was the concluding year of the energy crises decade, when the Administration of Jimmy Carter confronted the Iranian revolution, whose consequences were labeled by Carter as the "moral equivalent of war."

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## PETROLEUM AND NATIONAL INSECURITY

**Critical Petroleum-Related Events and U.S. Crude Petroleum Prices  
1970 - 2000 (EIA)**



Can hydrocarbons really shape the fate of nations? Can the United States be held hostage to a few million barrels of oil imports from the chronically unstable Middle East? What is incontrovertible, as the chart of critical oil sector events illustrates, is that the structure of the international oil market, dominated at the margin by the Persian Gulf's producers, can impose political and economic penalties on the U.S. and the world, which are far in excess of the role that oil dependence plays in the broader economy. Each of the oil price spikes that were induced by the 1973 embargo, the 1979 Iranian revolution, and the 1991 Iraqi war, contributed directly to the recessions that ensued. The recession of 1974-77 was especially severe, and the economic

downturn of 1979-80, driven by oil prices at close to \$50 per barrel, arguably cost Jimmy Carter his presidency.


U.S. oil use seems pervasive, but is actually concentrated in sectors for which substitutes are either infeasible or too costly. The transportation sector accounts for two thirds of American use. Except for about one million barrels per day consumed for heating and power generation in New England and Florida, the remaining U.S. oil consumption is an industrial sector feedstock for the manufacturing of essential products, notably plastics. Geo-politics notwithstanding, and setting aside historically ineffective U.S. policies to curb OPEC influence, to the extent that oil consumption can be curbed, the focus must neces-

sarily be the transportation sector.

The historic evidence is clear that mandatory improvements in the fuel efficiency of cars and trucks have been the only effective instrument of policy to produce measurable decreases in U.S. oil consumption. This achievement was made possible by the Corporate Average Fuel Efficiency (CAFÉ) law, which was enacted by Congress in 1978, when the average American car was capable of traveling barely 12 miles on a gallon of gasoline. According to the EIA report entitled "Petroleum Chronology of Events 1970-2000" (May 2002), the CAFÉ law, which authorized the U.S. Department of Transportation to set fuel efficiency standards for automobiles and light trucks, raised the average fuel economy of the U.S. fleet by a stunning 81% -- from 15.8 to 28.6 miles/gallon in just over a decade to 1988. Since 1988, the average fuel economy of vehicles has dropped by more than 2%, indicating the large-scale insertion into the national fleet of highly inefficient vehicles. CAFÉ standards have been frozen since the Reagan Administration. Neither Republicans nor Democrats have sought to increase CAFÉ standards because U.S. auto manufacturers have successfully argued to Congress, though not persuasively to analysts, that higher standards could be obtained only by sacrificing auto safety, and that, in any case, consumer preferences rather than regulation, should drive consumer choice of vehicle.

The present structure of oil demand is a given, as is the inevitable decline in U.S. domestic oil production. As a consequence, and as illustrated by the forecast shown in the accompanying chart published by the EIA, "Annual Energy Outlook 2002," U.S. dependence on petroleum imports, including imports from the Persian Gulf, will rise inexorably. They will rise more sharply, if world oil prices are lower, because lower cost imported oil will displace

higher cost domestic oil. Perversely, imports will be lower if OPEC succeeds in keeping prices above \$30 per barrel.



The inexorable rise in projected oil imports does not necessarily translate into increased U.S. policy vulnerability. Oil supply interruptions can be managed physically by the judicious use of strategic stocks that are held by the United States and a very few other nations, as was done during the 1991 Iraqi war. The economic consequences of oil price shocks can also be managed by the judicious use of monetary policy.

Geo-politically, the issue remains fundamentally one of conflict management. It is an open question whether the oil-consuming Western, and oil-rich Arab worlds can find a *modus vivendi*. What is clear is that the riches of Middle Eastern oil could be used to enhance human life rather than to destroy it, especially if a political solution could be found to the long-standing Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Peace could very well be the means to mitigate, if not, indeed, eliminate, the world's and America's century-old obsession with reliance on oil supplies from the politically unstable, socially volatile nations of the Persian Gulf. □

# REBUILDING PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

*Walter R. Roberts and Barry Fulton*

**A**s public support for American foreign policy abroad has deteriorated, the conduct of public diplomacy has been sharply criticized by a host of reports, editorials, and practitioners themselves. Prominent among them are the government-chartered report of the Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World entitled "Changing Minds and Winning Peace: A New Strategic Direction for U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Arab and Muslim World," a year-long study by the Council on Foreign Relations entitled "Finding America's Voice: A Strategy for Reinvigorating Public Diplomacy," and a report by the Government Accounting Office entitled "U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department Expands Efforts but Faces Significant Challenges." They agree that the conduct of public diplomacy does not meet today's challenges. Public diplomacy is broken and must be repaired.

A 20-country survey conducted last year by the Pew Research Center for People and the Press entitled "Views of a Changing World 2003: War With Iraq Further Divides Global Politics" shows that the "the bottom has fallen out of support for America in most of the Muslim world." These results are corroborated by other respected surveys and rich anecdotal evidence that anti-Americanism has increased substantially all over the world.

Can this negative image be improved by public diplomacy? Does it serve the national interest to devote scarce resources to public diplomacy?

What is the proper balance between the exercise of hard power and soft power?

The term *public diplomacy* came into widespread use in the aftermath of 9/11 as the American public awoke to the new threats to our security. At an earlier time, similar government efforts were known as international information and cultural programs. In wartime they were called psychological operations. Indeed, the Voice of America and, subsequently, the cultural and educational exchange programs initiated by Senator J. William Fulbright grew out of World War II. Public diplomacy has come to embrace not only international broadcasting and exchanges, but also the critical work of information and cultural officers at American embassies overseas.

Over the past several decades, diplomacy has become increasingly more public as a consequence of the new media and the more sophisticated publics. Public opinion is ever more important to the United States, because in the information age foreign publics have a profound influence on their governments, even in autocratic countries. Nonetheless, American public diplomacy has been shortchanged since the end of the Cold War.

Public diplomacy cannot be undertaken on the cheap. And that is what America has been doing for years. With sufficient resources, public diplomacy can make a difference. After World War II, for instance, when Germany and Austria were occupied countries, the U.S. Army, adequately fund, instituted far-ranging information and cul-

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tural programs that were well received. They included radio and press operations as well as American information and cultural centers in every major German and Austrian city. When these programs were transferred to the State Department in 1950, they were immediately reduced for budgetary reasons. But the groundwork had been laid, and public opinion in these two countries about America, if not its current foreign policy, has been remarkably favorable.

Another example is Radio Free Europe (RFE). Created by the Central Intelligence Agency in 1950 during the Cold War, RFE enjoyed resources commensurate with the challenge. While the Voice of America, as part of the State Department and later of the U.S. Information Agency, had a yearly struggle for funding, RFE's budget was always adequate. The demise of the Soviet empire was certainly accelerated by the round-the-clock broadcasts in every Eastern European language. Indeed, Czech president Václav Havel and Poland's Lech Walesa have each given credit to RFE for inspiring the people in their countries to liberate themselves from Soviet domination.

The United States spends 400 billion dollars on defense, some 40 billion dollars on information gathering through its intelligence activities, and 28 billion dollars on international affairs -- of which little more than one billion dollars is directed to public diplomacy. It is impossible to say what it would cost to build trust within the international Islamic community. However, to compare the task with past successes, consider that expenditures for public diplomacy in Germany and Austria were approximately one dollar per person after World War II. Applying that formula to a billion people and adjusting for inflation would require a budget of seven billion dollars for public diplomacy in the Islamic world alone. By spending only a fraction of that today, America's voice has been reduced to a whisper.

While present funding is clearly inadequate, additional resources won't necessarily address the problem. America's strategic interests require a

combination of diplomatic, developmental, military, and intelligence activities. People who are denied an adequate diet and basic human rights will not be influenced by public diplomacy unless complementary programs hold some hope.

Public diplomacy's proper role within this strategic mix must begin with a careful assessment of our nation's public diplomatic readiness. This is true not only in the Islamic world, but also in other parts of the globe where our vital interests are at risk. Just as defense readiness is routinely evaluated, a proper assessment of diplomatic readiness must consider such indicators as the optimal resource level, the quality of personnel, the adequacy of infrastructure, and the degree of training. With rare exceptions, the U.S. Government fails to meet even minimal standards in most countries today.

We are now in a new war, a war that's religious and cultural dimensions have created a gulf of mutual misunderstanding and even hatred. New programs will have to be initiated and adequately funded. *Radio Sawa* was a first step in this direction. Likewise, America's new Arabic-language Satellite Television Service, *Alhurra*, was initiated in recognition of America's declining support in the Middle East. On the other hand, VOA Arabic broadcasts were discontinued, new visa policies have resulted in a decline of Middle Eastern students attending American universities, and calls for expansion of exchange programs have gone unheeded. Recent hearings chaired by Senator Richard Lugar, Congressman Frank Wolf, and Congressman Christopher Shays suggest that Congress understands the severity of the problem.

With better coordination with the White House, other government agencies, and the private sector -- buttressed by a substantial increase in resources -- public diplomacy could regain its place as an effective instrument of U.S. foreign policy. Absent adequate resources and coordination, however, it will be no surprise if international public opinion remains hostile to American policies. □

# GLOBALIZATION: ENHANCER AND DISRUPTOR

*Rachel Golden*

Since 9/11, terrorism has replaced globalization as the most widely discussed topic. However, globalization, because of its impact on global security and stability remains of prominent concern, especially the issue of how to reduce its most harmful consequences without losing its benefits.

Globalization affects international security and stability because it is a system disturber, a tradition buster. It restructures how we live, work, play, and relate to one another. As science and technology drive down costs and break barriers, as the commercial model becomes the iron law, and as competition, locally and globally, intensifies, the rules of the game and power – have begun to shift. In this shifting, institutions, values, traditions, culture, attitudes, and how we think about ourselves are transforming. On the outside governments, business, universities, hospitals, jobs look the same -- but inside, they have changed.

Globalization is not confined to Big Issues, like terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, global warming, the drug trade, and HIV/AIDS. For many more millions, it changes “personal”, everyday life -- sexuality, family, and marriage. Traditional family systems are transformed, particularly as women stake claim to greater equality and empowerment. Other traditions, such as those connected with religion, are also experiencing major de-

stabilizing transformations. Fundamentalism originates from this world of crumbling traditions.

While the vast majority of the world is happy, or at least content, with what globalization has brought or promises to bring, a small minority is not. Small groups, like al Qaeda, are enraged and bitter at what they see. Women’s empowerment, affirmative action, coeducation, opposition to female circumcision, fashions that titillate, films that arouse, other ethnic/religious groups gaining money and power at their expense. Their world, truths, power, lifestyle, communities are not only crumbling but being debased. What hubris. What a humiliating disgrace to honor. Is it surprising that they seek out others who share their disillusion? To talk and commiserate about how the world is not right and how it can be righted? To use the latest technologies to organize themselves, secretly and openly, locally and globally, to act defensively and offensively to protect and promote their interests? Isn’t that what democracy is about? But what about the fact that they are willing to destroy not only those who do agree with them but innocent bystanders? That must be stopped.

Most countries in the world are democracies. And so it is not an impossible feat for this disaffected, enraged faction to find space to build and finance the organizational structure to

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disrupt the forces they perceive are “attacking” them. In this age of globalization, being a disruptor does not imply poverty or lack of education. Rather, it refers to persons with severe cases of order discontent, determined to replace the status quo by whatever means necessary. Because they operate in small, tightly knit groups, they are able to act swiftly and stealthily, which is what makes them so lethal.

So what is the remedy, especially for disruptors, like the terrorists or dictators who would use WMD against our allies or us? How do we remove the cancers in globalization?

There is a traditional two-pronged approach, or strategy, which is generally accepted in this American democracy. The first, described elsewhere in this issue, are rules, or systems, to stop the proliferation of WMD, terrorists, money laundering, etc. The other calls for policies that promote processes and values to enable the transition to progress and modernization to be more civic, civil, and civilized. Basically, it calls for larger doses of democracy, free trade, and assistance to reach the Millennium Development Goals and eradicate HIV/AIDS. In combination, this cocktail is expected to produce opportunity, prosperity, inclusion, and security -- economic growth, poverty alleviation, and greater equality within and across borders. And as it works, it expands a middle class that becomes increasingly rights-conscious and acts through the political process to protect and expand its rights.

But reality, at least as it affects real people, doesn't work as fast as this traditional approach predicts. What often happens is that a few people get obscenely rich, many people get downsized, and the right approach is not always best for all.

And so, then what happens? Unintended consequences. At the extreme, political instability, religious fanaticism, ethnic separatism, political corruption, military takeovers, and regional conflict. But also substance abuse, trafficking of women and labor, arms smuggling. So another ingredient added to the democracy-free trade cocktail is pro-poor development. More rights based, gender sensitive, unintended consequences. The sum of all this is destabilization. (But remember, for most people, the cocktail is working just fine; they want more democracy, prosperity, and development, not less.)

What is the alternative? Scuttle democracy? Bring in protectionism? Forego development? Do we want the world to be a big North Korea or Myanmar? Certainly not. And remember, most of the world is satisfied with the way its life is progressing. Sure, they would like more money and leisure but basically they feel that life is improving, and have no desire to regress. Ask the Russians or the East Germans whether they want to revert to pre-1991 or 1989.

So how to disrupt the disruptors? The more that is done to expand democracy and freedom or opportunity, prosperity, and inclusion, the more it enrages, and the more enraged, the more engaged we become promoting democracy and freedom. Will the disruptors strategy work or will capitalism, democracy and freedom transform the disruptors? Based upon the past, we know what was, is no longer and what is, is not likely to last. But we also know that with the future come new problems. □

# BURDEN SHARING

*Richard E. Friedman*

**I**n Mark Twain's American classic, "Huckleberry Finn," Huck persuaded his friends with style and guile to paint his white picket fence, while he sipped lemonade and watched them work. The white picket fence—a classic incident of buck-passing (shifting responsibility to another person)—could be the metaphor for an important aspect of US international relations.

The principal strategy for maintaining the international equilibrium of power is balancing, to prevent upsetting the balance of power. The tactics are buck-passing and burden sharing. Prior to September 11, these two methodologies were well understood. The buck passer would try to maintain good relations with the aggressor state, while cooperating with and building the strength of the buck catcher. The rationale for burden sharing was that states threatened by an aggressor have a strong incentive to work together to prevent domination by the aggressor.

Conflicts among modern states over the past several centuries were, for the most part, based on boundary disputes. However, in the context of international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the dictum that "geography is destiny" no longer applies. International terrorism is amorphous. State sponsored terrorism is difficult to prove because terrorists work in the shadows and they have created international

networks that transcend boundaries.

American buck-passing in the context of international terrorism is no longer feasible. However, the converse of this premise is not true. Other states are delighted to have the US commit itself to the lion's share of the war on terrorism. Other states are guided by realpolitik that results in the US being the buck catcher rather than the buck passer.

The present political focus on the US-led invasion and occupation of Iraq is a guide to understanding the long range implication of balancing, buck-passing, and burden sharing. The code words are "unilateralism" and "multilateralism." The US decided that the Saddam Hussein regime was an imminent threat, but failed to gain broad support from the world community for regime change in Iraq. Consequently, the US acted unilaterally supported by the UK and a relatively weak coalition of the willing. Critics of this policy, realists who sought containment and idealists who were morally opposed to the use of military force, branded this as an anti-multilateral policy.

A better strategic analysis could be based on traditional notions of great powers' buck-passing and burden sharing. Assuming that American buck-passing regarding international terrorism and proliferation of WMD is not feasible - a national security strategy must be based on burden sharing.

Most states are threatened by international

terrorism and the proliferation of WMD. The US is most concerned because of the September 11 attacks, a belated recognition that the US is the prime target and that the US critical infrastructure is vulnerable. European states are far less concerned about this threat than they should be, but a significant attack on European targets could change their orientation. The recent disclosure that Pakistan's nuclear agency leaders were actively involved in the transfer of nuclear technology should give pause to all doubters.

Is there common ground for states to cooperate in counter-terrorism activities? Intelligence gathering and sharing are the predicates for effective counter-terrorism operations. Notwithstanding the recent opposition of France and Germany to US policy, motivated largely by internal political issues, the military and intelligence communities immediately below the political leadership of both countries have cooperated with the US.

Burden sharing is imperative for most states and should be relatively easy to achieve. The UN is disregarded by many in the US, but it is held in high esteem in Europe. For Europeans, any cooperative international action must have the UN imprimatur. The US needs to recognize that, notwithstanding the political barrier of the UN Security Council, the UN is an important political force in Europe and that it provides much needed humanitarian, refugee, and world health assistance.

NATO is a viable institution and would benefit from more political support from the US. Note that NATO has leadership responsibility for the peace-keeping force in Afghanistan. Non-governmental organizations (NGO's)

have taken on vastly increased responsibilities for international humanitarian and civil reconstruction projects, and it is likely that they will have a greater quasi-governmental role in the future. The US needs to increase its support for NGO's and other international organizations on a selective basis.

The US needs to learn from Huck Finn—that style and guile are needed. In this context, Huck Finn is a better role model for US policymakers than the American cowboy. □

## AN END TO EVIL: HOW TO WIN THE WAR ON TERROR

By David Frum and Richard Perle

Random House, 2003, 284 pp., \$25.95

Reviewed by **Sam Sarkesian**

**T**his book paints a sweeping panorama of the terrorist threat to the United States and the way to defeat it. It is grist for the mill for all sides of the political spectrum. The background of each author tells part of the story. David Frum was a special assistant to President George W. Bush and is a resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. Richard Perle served as Assistant Secretary of Defense under the Reagan Administration and as Chairman of the Defense Policy Board under President George W. Bush. He is a resident fellow in the American Enterprise Institute. The authors' background will give readers the opportunity to tag the authors with a particular political perspective.

The first chapter begins by quoting Thomas Paine, "These are the times that try men's souls." The last chapter begins with a quote from Thomas Jefferson reading in part, "against violence actually offered, we have taken up arms." These quotes capture the theme and framework of the book "There is no middle way for Americans: It is victory or holocaust. This book is a manual for victory."

Nonetheless, the war against terrorism—the "new war," seems to be undermining the nerve of many American political and media elite. "We

can feel the will to win ebbing in Washington; we sense the reversion to the bad old habits of complacency and denial." But all of this may simply be "fatigue." In any case, no one is spared including some members of the present administration, and needless to say the Clinton Administration is heavily criticized.

According to the authors, since the war on terror began, much pessimism and defeatism has been the usual assessment, beginning with Afghanistan and then with Iraq. Reports of the collapse of order in Iraq, American casualties, and the continuous efforts by the US military in trying to establish order are transmitted by much of the media. Yet, in many parts of Iraq, there is much progress and stability—much of it not reported to the American people.

The failure to find weapons of mass destruction have given critics a basis for condemning both President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Tony Blair for going to war on exaggerated accounts of Iraq's threat. Nonetheless, by toppling Saddam Hussein, Frum and Perle conclude that many objectives were achieved including the fact that "We eliminated the Arab world's cruellest and most tyrannical ruler."

The authors argue that militant Islam is an aggressive ideology of world domination, primarily aimed at the democratic West. Brief statements

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from the Koran are used to justify that point of view. For two centuries triumphant promises of Islam have proven false. This has been the case particularly in the 20<sup>th</sup> century. The US involvement in the Middle East during World War II and after made it the focus of militant Islam. Yet, the authors acknowledge that for many Moslems, Islam is a peaceful and non-threatening religion. At the same time, moderate Moslems feel that terrorist militant Islamic groups are contrary to the good name of Muslims and Islam. The extremists claim the opposite, “spectacular acts of terrorism *strengthen* Islam.” Militant Islam is driven by a murderous rage against the United States. The authors state that to win, America must defeat this “murderous rage” on three fronts: at home, abroad, and in the minds of men and women in the Islamic world. A number of chapters focus on the challenges and what needs to be done on all three fronts.

At home, the war on terror cannot be won, but it can be lost. To be effective against the terrorist threat, the United States needs institutional reform organized for victory. This includes reforming the CIA, FBI, the Pentagon, the US military, the Department of State and developing a more effective homeland security system. (The authors acknowledge that the US military has performed outstandingly). Many institutional errors are recounted: personnel occupying these positions seem entrenched and not about to change their ways. Reform must include having each of the agencies cooperate fully with one another and focus specifically on the job and the new war. The authors provide a list of reforms to include distinctions between policy makers and policy implementers. The reform of institutions must include a reform of the spirit. This means focusing on the need to win the war and protect American values and culture. But there is much

to do in terms of identifying and defeating terrorist support organizations in this country and in North America, in general. “The struggle for an American Islam has only just begun.”

Abroad, terrorist regimes and regimes that support terrorism must be defeated. These include North Korea—because of its nuclear and missile program and Iran, for sheltering leaders and others of al-Qaeda. But little has been done by the United States against these regimes. The entrenched American foreign policy bureaucracy and international law are the culprits. In dealing with Syria, the United States needs to reorient its policy. “Syria must open its controlled economy and its authoritarian political system.” Libya is a long time supporter of terrorism even with its agreement to pay compensation for the Lockerbie disaster. A section titled “The Dark Places” is an overview of terrorist threats in other parts of the world such as Somalia, Sierra Leone, and Columbia, Paraguay, and even Nigeria.

Part of the war abroad is on Hamas and Hezbollah. Many in the Middle East do not condemn these groups because of the benefits they bring to the region. The United States must take action against them. “Cease criticizing Israel for taking actions against Hamas and Hezbollah analogous to those the United States is taking against al-Qaeda.” The Israel-Palestinian conflict is examined stressing that need for a democratic Palestine.

The greatest criticism is aimed at Saudi Arabia. The authors conclude that the Saudi Royalty has been a long time supporter of terrorists and organizations supporting terrorism. To improve the Saudi-US connections, a number of alternatives should be implemented. “Tell the truth about Saudi Arabia” and “their Wahhabi missionary efforts in the United States and elsewhere abroad.”

In the minds of men and women in the Is-

## BOOK REVIEW: AN END TO EVIL

lamic world, religion is the key to culture. In turn, this is fundamental to ideology. The war on terrorism is also an ideological war, with all that it suggests about values, culture, and commitment. The United States has done poorly in this respect. Much of the opinion in the Middle East sees the US as an imperial power trying to impose its values and views on other states and cultures. Yet, it is also true that there are groups of younger people, particularly in Iran that want to be like Americans. The book doesn't give enough credit to Moslems throughout the world that may disagree with militant Islam and who may well see the United States as a democratic, liberty oriented power for their own religion. In following through on these issues, a number of items from previous chapters are repeated ranging from the nature of the Islamic threat to the Palestine-Israel conflict.

In the chapter "Friend and Foe" the authors criticize US allies for their lack of support in the war on terrorism and going into Iraq. France takes the brunt of this criticism. Attention is given to Europe, where US policy rankles most Europeans—but the European views are discredited. Indeed, the authors challenge the view that an integrated Europe is best for US policy. Brief assessments are made of NATO, as well as China, Russia, Pakistan, and the United Nations. The UN is assessed as being useful but also doing miserably in responding to security threats. South Asia is viewed as a base for terrorist organizations. A template to respond to friend and foe issues is presented as the basis for US policy.

The final chapter begins by quoting Thomas Jefferson and makes it clear that the war on terrorism is a war for liberty. This is a total war. But it is not the US that wants to impose its values on others, it is the terrorists "who intend to impose their values upon Muslims and non-Muslims." The US system and the American

people must understand the totality of this threat and respond accordingly. The authors conclude, "Our vocation is to support justice with power. It is a vocation that has earned us terrible enemies. It is a vocation that has made us, at our best moments, the hope of the world."

Focusing on the general reader, the authors avoid using technical and geopolitical jargon. There are few extensive endnotes, tables, quantitative assessments, or long quotes. There is no index or bibliography. There is an appendix: "Current List of Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations (as of May 23, 2003)."

The authors are coming from one side of the political spectrum, with a conservative point of view on what needs to be done to defeat terrorism. Regardless of the political view of the authors and some redundancy in the book, it is recommended to the general reader. It is recommended to those on any side of the political spectrum. The book is likely to be supported by those on one side of the political spectrum and heavily criticized by those on the other side. Whether one agrees with the authors or not, as a "manual for victory" the book will trigger heated debate about the threat of terrorism and the concept of "new war." □

## RECENT SPEAKERS

On January 9, 2004, **Steven Emerson**, Executive Director of The Investigative Project (the largest intelligence and data-gathering center in the world on militant Islamic activities) addressed the National Strategy Forum members on the nature and scope of the terrorism threat within the US and abroad.

Steven Emerson states there is a clear distinction that must be made between Islam and militant Islam. Islam is a “vibrant religion” that does not endorse violence. The majority of those who practice Islam are neither connected nor supportive of a radical militant Islamic agenda. However, “there are those in positions of leadership in the religious sector and the non-profit religious endowment community that are tethered directly to support radical Islamic fundamentalism.” Furthermore, religious-sanctioned terrorism has been perpetrated under other various religious umbrellas – Christianity, Judaism, and Hinduism; however, “today, no other religious-inspired violence matches the scope and transnational breadth of militant Islamic fundamentalism.”

Emerson states that the Al Qaeda terrorists who perpetrated the September 11 attacks were not a band of fanatics who “hijacked a religion.” Their actions were motivated and guided by the doctrinal interpretation of Islam. But America, as a liberal, pluralist society, has an inability to recognize deception and is willing to sanitize the essence of Islamic extremism by removing any religious context or motivation, and essentially exonerate the perpetrators of terrorism for fear of engendering charges of racism by Muslim leaders. For example, the Council on American-

Islamic Relations [CAIR] was given front-page coverage in the New York Times as a civil-rights group. The fact is that CAIR was founded by Hamas and a portion of its money came from the Holy Land Foundation, a conduit for Hamas, as well as from the Islamic Association of Palestine. Its officials have been connected with support of Hamas as well as other militant groups. Regardless, CAIR was regarded as legitimate.

Emerson states that militant Islamists and those directly connected to radical Islamic groups exploit the tolerance and political sensitivity of the American society by claiming that the distinction between moderate and militant Islam is racist. They use the charge of anti-Muslim racism to insulate themselves from scrutiny and mass identification as extremists, and ultimately, impose the rule of militant Islam around the world.

How does the US encourage genuine moderate Islam while protecting its citizens from the threat of Islamic extremists? Emerson states that the responsibility is not solely that of the intelligence community or law enforcement, but that it is a challenge for the US as a whole. “We need to be an active society working together to ensure that Islamic extremists are exposed and held to the same standards to which we hold ourselves.”

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On February 17, 2004, **General Joseph Ralston**, former NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe, addressed the National Strategy Forum members on the role of NATO in the new security environment.

*(continued on next page)*

## RECENT SPEAKERS

General Ralston refutes the public misperception that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is on a downward spiral. He states that the mission of NATO is to protect other NATO countries, and that decisions made by NATO are based on a consensus among the 19 members. NATO responded to September 11 by invoking Article V- an attack on one member will be regarded as an attack on all members. NATO sent Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft to patrol airspace in the US, Turkey, and the Straits of Gibraltar. Since September 11, thirteen NATO members have played a significant role in the operations in Iraq. Within the past year, NATO took over operations in Afghanistan as Commander of the International Stabilization Force. Also, NATO forces are operating in several countries including Bosnia and Kosovo.

There is another misperception that the NATO alliance is fractured. General Ralston emphasizes that NATO is the central organizing force for Trans-Atlantic cooperation. He asserts that rather than characterizing the rift between the US and France as a fracture of the alliance, it would be more accurate to say that France has a different opinion of the current global status quo than the other 18 alliance members. He emphasizes that the French military has provided steady support to the US in the past, particularly in the Balkans, and that a distinction needs to be made between the motivations of the professional military and that of the politicians.

General Ralston states that there is a role for NATO in future operations, particularly in Iraq. NATO's successful involvement in the Balkans over the past nine years has trained the organization how to cope with ethnic tensions, religious fractures, and nation-building.

General Ralston identifies three other areas of concern where NATO could play a role in pre-

venting further escalation: India/Pakistan, North Korea, and Israel/Palestine. With regard to the Israeli/Palestinian conflict, General Ralston states that the solution is similar to the Geneva Accord, the "unofficial" blueprint for the Israeli-Palestinian permanent status agreement – Palestine will have to recognize Israel as a legitimate state, Israel will have to return to its 1967 borders, and both countries will have access to Jerusalem. He states that the Israelis would be comforted by the fact the NATO forces would be commanded by the US and the Palestinians would be comforted by the fact that there would be representatives present from the other NATO members.

With regard to the US military, General Ralston states that it is a professional elite force. The military has several responsibilities – it acts as a tactical consultant to civilian political leaders and it is responsible for carrying out operations set forth by those leaders. However, despite its successes, General Ralston states that the maxim 'why change a good thing' should not be applied to the armed forces. The military must implement internal reforms in order to meet the threats of the new global security environment while maintaining its lethality. The US military needs improve its ability to predict future threats and to develop its "capability-based force" – increased mobility, flexibility, nuclear deterrence, and the capacity to fight in any high-intensity conflict.

NATO is evolving and expanding. Within the upcoming months, it will extend membership to seven countries of Central and Eastern Europe - Bulgaria, Slovakia, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, Romania, and Lithuania. Also, NATO is working to improve relations with Russia. General Ralston states that the organization must continue to adapt because it is central to the defense of the United States and the international community. □

# STRATEGY WATCH

*A summary of recent events  
December 2003–February 2004*

## Africa

In **Liberia**, the United Nations attempts to disarm militants by offering a payment in exchange for their weapons. Efforts go awry when too many individuals present their weapons to the UN and demand payment. In early January, an **Egyptian** charter flight crashes into the Red Sea killing the 148 passengers aboard the plane. **Syrian** president Bashar Assad states that he wants to cooperate with the United States and revive discussions with Israel. Mikhail Saakashvili wins **Georgia's** elections replacing Edward Shevardnadze. In late January, **South African** President Thabo Mbeki and **Zimbabwean** President Robert Mugabe agree to begin formal discussions with the opposition Movement for Democratic Change. In mid-February, **Sri Lanka's** president, Chandrika Kumaratunga, dissolves parliament, calls for early elections in early April, and fires 39 government ministers.

## Asia

In early December, **Japan** agrees to send up to 600 troops to Iraq within a year; it's largest deployment since WWII. In **Taiwan**, President Chen Shui-bian states that he will continue with his referendum plan which calls on the mainland to stop its threats. **North Korea** declares that it will halt its nuclear weapons program in exchange for concessions from the US, including fuel aid and removal from the US list of sponsors of state terrorism. Six-way talks aimed at resolving the conflict will resume on February 25<sup>th</sup>. In mid-February, the UN World Food Program announces that it faces a shortage of food for its distribution program in North Korea because of a lack of funds. In late December, **South Korea**

states that it will send 3,000 troops including combat units to Iraq. Also, three of South Korean president Roh Moo-hyun's former aides are arrested for extorting funds for his 2002 election. **China** declares that it will "crush" any attempts made by Taiwan to declare independence. In late January, the avian flu kills nearly one million birds in **Vietnam**, kills ten people in Vietnam and Thailand, and spreads to Japan, South Korea, Cambodia, Taiwan, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Laos. In mid-February, Taiwan's presidential election begins with a televised debate, the first in Chinese history.

## Europe

In **France**, President Jacques Chirac, based on a recommendation issued by the French independent commission on secularism, bans "ostentatious" religious symbols, including the Muslim headscarf, in schools and other public buildings. The ban will become a law later this year. In mid-December, members of the **European Union** fail to agree on the provisions of the EU constitution. In mid-February, the leaders of **Britain**, **Germany**, and **France** hold a three way summit in Berlin to discuss the future of the European Union and other issues. The summit angered other European leaders who alleged that the three leaders are trying to dominate the expanded EU. In **Azerbaijan**, former president Heidar Aliev dies. In mid-January, a coalition government is formed in northern **Cyprus** that will revive the reunification discussion with the Greek-Cypriot south. In early February, **Russian** presidential candidate Ivan Rybkin disappears unexpectedly and resurfaces five days later in the Ukraine capital of Kiev. He claims he was kidnapped and drugged by captors. A **Lithuanian**

# THE NSF REVIEW STRATEGY WATCH

In mid-December, US soldiers capture Saddam Hussein at a farmhouse outside of Tikrit, **Iraq**.

**North Korea** declares that it will halt its nuclear weapons program in exchange for concessions from the US, including fuel aid and removal from the US list of sponsors of state terrorism.

In mid-February, the leaders of **Britain, Germany, and France** hold a three way summit in Berlin to discuss the future of the European Union and other issues prompting allegations of domination by other European leaders.

In **Haiti**, demonstrators strike in an effort to force the resignation of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. Weeks later, the Pentagon sends 50 US marines in response to a security request from the US Ambassador to Haiti.

parliamentary panel concludes that there are adequate legal grounds for Lithuania's legislators to impeach President Rolandas Paksas. In late February, Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder publicly backs **Turkey's** EU bid and states that he believes Turkey will receive membership in December. In late February, **Russian** president, Vladimir Putin dismisses his entire government. **Macedonia's** president, Boris Trajkovski, and several of his staff are killed after their plane crashes into a mountain in southern Bosnia.

### Middle East

**Iraq's** Governing Council declares that it will establish a special war-crimes tribunal without UN or international involvement. In mid-December, US soldiers capture Saddam Hussein at a farmhouse outside of Tikrit. In late December, an earthquake in Bam, **Iran** claims the lives of at least 28,000 of its 80,000 inhabitants. In **Afghanistan**, a *loya jirga*, or grand council, opens aimed at approving a new constitution. In **Pakistan**, President Musharraf survives a third assassination attempt in two years. In **Libya**, President Muammar Qaddafi admits that his government has been secretly developing weapons of mass destruction. He declares that the government will halt its program and allow international inspectors to inspect various sites. In early January, the US re-establishes a diplomatic presence in Libya. In early January, **Indian** Prime Minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee and the president of **Pakistan**, Pervez Musharraf, meet for the first time in more than two years to discuss Kashmir and other issues. Weeks later, the delegations agree on a timetable for further discussions starting with high-level talks in May or June. In late January, **Iran's** President Muhammad Khatami and his government threaten to resign unless the Council of Guardians reverses its decision to ban nearly one-third of the reformer candidates from standing in the February general elections. In early

February, in response to the ban, over one-third of the Iranian parliament resigns. **Israel** and Hizbollah begin an exchange of 436 Arabs, mostly Palestinian prisoners, in return for a captured Israeli businessman and three Israeli soldiers presumed dead. In early February, **Israeli** prime minister Ariel Sharon announces that all Jewish settlements will be removed from the Gaza Strip in an effort to disengage from the territories occupied by Israel since the 1967 war. In mid-February, an Iranian airliner crashes near the Sharjah airport in the **United Arab Emirates** killing 43 people. A car bomb kills 50 and wounds at least 50 in Iskandariyah, Iraq. Abdul Qadeer Khan, the father of the **Pakistani** nuclear bomb, admits to providing nuclear secrets and equipment to Iran, North Korea, and Libya. In mid-February, 100 Iraqis are killed in two consecutive suicide bombings. In mid-February, over 300 people are killed and 450 injured in **Iran** when a train transporting fuel and chemicals crashes and explodes. An earthquake in northern **Morocco** kills nearly 570 people and leaves 20,000 homeless.

### North America

In early January, the Pentagon excludes firms from those countries who opposed the war, including France and Germany, from bidding on contracts worth \$18.6 billion for rebuilding Iraq. Weeks later, it announces that some of the new Iraq contracts will be open to all countries. In **Canada**, Paul Martin becomes Prime Minister. In early January, President George Bush announces plans to reform America's immigration laws including one provision which would give legal status to nearly 12 million undocumented workers. In late January, David Kay resigns as America's chief weapons inspector on claims that President Bush received faulty intelligence regarding Iraq's WMD program. In early February, President Bush announces that the US will launch

## STRATEGY WATCH

an “independent bipartisan commission” to examine the intelligence failures with regard to alleged Iraqi WMD programs. In Washington, DC, the Senate closes its administrative buildings after ricin is found in the office of Bill Frist, the Republican majority leader. In mid-February, President Bush agrees to set up a private meeting with a national commission that is investigating events leading to the September 11th attacks.

### South America

**Nicaragua's** former president, Arnaldo Aleman, is convicted of fraud, money laundering, and misuse of public funds and sentenced to twenty years in prison. In **Haiti**, demonstrators strike in an effort to force the resignation of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. In mid-February, rebels groups seize several small towns and kill 40 people. Weeks later, the Pentagon sends 50 US marines in response to a security request from the US Ambassador to Haiti. In **Peru**, President Alejandro Toledo replaces Prime Minister Beatriz Marino, a popular technocrat, with Carlos Ferrero, one of Toledo's party members. In **Guatemala**, Oscar Berger is elected president. Officials from the US and **Costa Rica** resume talks on the ratification of the proposed trade accord, the Central American Free-Trade Agreement. The court trial begins for **Peru's** former intelligence officer, Vladimiro Montesinos, who is charged with smuggling arms to Colombia's FARC guerrillas. Peru's president Alejandro Toledo denies any knowledge of this activity. In mid-February, heavy rain and flooding kill 91 people in **Brazil** and leave 117,000 homeless.







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