



NATIONAL STRATEGY FORUM REVIEW

THE FUTURE OF THE TRANSATLANTIC ALLIANCE

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- The advancement and preservation of democracy is essential to promote human rights, inspire principled cultural achievement, and maximize economic development.
- Informed public opinion and an enduring non-partisan consensus are fundamental parts of national security in a democratic society.

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LETTER FROM THE PUBLISHER

The strategic objectives of the US and European states that comprise the Transatlantic Alliance are to promote order and enhance political and financial stability. Achieving peace is an important goal, but is particularly difficult when the enemy's avowed objective is to disrupt through terrorism and violence. Among Europeans and Americans, there is antipathy and growing estrangement, despite the fundamental values we share as Western democracies. There is a need to restore a reliable partnership, share burdens equitably, and forge a common international security system.

Some commentators suggest that Europe and the US do not share a common worldview, that they agree on very few strategic issues, and that they do not understand each other. The differing US and European responses to September 11 and the US occupation of Iraq, and perceptions of international terrorism and the proliferation of WMD, are instructive. A threshold issue to consider is whether Europe is a cohesive region that shares a common view regarding international terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and the European-US relationship.

The US framed its policy as a "war" on terrorism. Many Europeans believe that the use of the term "war" is inappropriate. The European view is that combating terrorism is a police and intelligence function rather than a military operation. The rationale for the European approach

may be that they do not have adequate military resources. There may be an important semantic distinction between the US "war" on terrorism and the European counter-terrorism "fight" or "battle." Occasionally semantics are important, as was apparent with the ill-chosen use of the word "crusade" at the outset of the invasion of Iraq.

Another area of transatlantic tension is the role and importance of the UN. The Europeans hold the UN in high esteem for legal and moral legitimacy. The US regards the UN as marginal on major political and security issues, although more important on humanitarian matters.

Some US policymakers note a growing European trend towards pacifism and isolationism that is inconsistent with the nature of the threat confronting Europe and the US. This trend existed before September 11, 2001 and the split over the US occupation of Iraq. When diplomacy, economic sanctions, and international cooperation cannot restrain international terrorism, pacifism offers no credible alternative solution to the use of military force. The terrorists who perpetrated the March 2004 Madrid train bombing may have intended to alter the imminent Spanish general election; if so, they succeeded. The terrorists' message for Spain and Europe is clear: go easy on terrorism and abandon the US and its war on terrorism and cooperating states will not be attacked on their soil. In this context, pacifism is the predicate for European isolationism.

The US is sensitive to its period of wrong-headed isolationism and Europe's appeasement of Hitler in the 1930's that ended with the German invasion of Poland in 1939.

The European view is that peace is achieved by law and diplomacy rather than by force. The corollary issue is whether the US is doing the dirty work to maintain European security. There may be a growing American unwillingness to protect and support Europe. This may emerge as a major US national security policy issue: whether the US should significantly reduce or withdraw its military forces in Europe. The American rationale could be its finite resources and the proposition that Europe will have to make the hard choice of re-arming itself or risk the consequence of appeasing terrorists. If Europe provides for its own security, the US perspective may be that it will be dealing with a mature partner rather than a carping adolescent.

US absolute certainty regarding the wisdom and moral basis of its foreign policy is galling to Europeans. Many Europeans feel that US absolutism coupled with military power is destabilizing to world order. The European preference is to have the US recognize that the present threat is worldwide and complex, requiring a calibrated and nuanced approach. Transatlantic cooperation is essential and will be reached only by consultation with competent European partners.

While Europe and the US do not understand each other as well as they should, the drift that could result in ultimate separation can be corrected. The ongoing relationship is too valuable to lose. US national security interests require that the US, the *de facto* senior partner in the relationship, take the initiative by identifying the

abrasive issues and underlying reasons for the tension and conflict among friends, partners, and strategic allies.

This issue of the *National Strategy Forum Review* addresses the Transatlantic Alliance. We have asked National Strategy Forum friends and scholars to consider the following issues:

- The differing US and European perspectives regarding the threat of international terrorism, the proliferation of WMD, and the Europe-US relationship.
- The effect of European demographics on strategic issues (an aging population; a growing proportion of European Islamic citizens).
- The strategic and military relationship between the US, the European Union, and NATO.
- The possible emergence of a "New Europe" with the accession of 10 new states to the European Union and the possible effects this will have on European cohesion. □

EUROPE 101

By Vincent A. Mahler

Without question, the European Union is the most important regional organization in Europe—or, for that matter, the world. Even the most basic statistics bear this out. With its expansion from 15 to 25 members in May 2004, the absolute size of the EU's economy surpasses that of the United States as the world's largest. Its population of 450 million is as large as the combined populations of the United States, Japan, Canada and Australia. The EU is particularly important to the United States. It is, for example, America's largest source of foreign investment, its leading trade partner, its leading media and telecommunications partner—the list could go on almost indefinitely.

Given its importance, it is surprising how little known and appreciated the European Union is in the U.S. Even American policymakers and opinion leaders who focus on Europe often appear more interested in NATO than in the EU. The EU is even less well known among the U.S. public at large than among those attentive to foreign policy issues. On March 26, 2004, the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press published a public opinion survey of American attitudes toward various countries and regions of

the world (available at <http://people-press.org/reports>). Over a third of all respondents reported that they had no opinion, positive or negative, on the EU. Fully 7 percent said that they had never even heard of it.

The intention of this article is to offer a brief overview of the European Union's history and policies, focusing on the aspects of the EU that are least understood in the United States. The discussion will be divided into two parts. The first will offer a basic chronology of the EU's complex and eventful fifty-year history, a history that is no less impressive and interesting in that it has generally been covered on the business page rather than on the front page. The second part will describe what the EU does, summarizing the numerous and diverse ways in which member-states have been willing to surrender sovereignty in a variety of areas to an intergovernmental organization.

A Brief History of European Integration

After the massive destruction of World War II, there was a widespread conviction in Western Europe that competitive nationalism was a de-

Vincent A. Mahler is Professor of Political Science at Loyola University Chicago. He is the author of *Dependency Approaches to International Political Economy* (Columbia University Press) and author or co-author of articles in *International Organization*, *The American Political Science Review*, *International Studies Quarterly*, *Comparative Political Studies*, *Comparative Politics*, *Polity*, and other journals and edited collections.

structive force and that new Europe-wide institutions would have to be forged to resolve disputes among countries without resort to war. However, despite a few ambitious plans for a United States of Europe, most policymakers were aware that full political or military integration was an unrealistic goal in that it would force nations to surrender their sovereignty on the very matters that were most sensitive to them—issues of war, peace and diplomacy.

In forging European integration, these policymakers argued, it would be more productive to concentrate not on diplomatic and military issues, which tend to divide nations, but rather on economic ties, which tend to be less sensitive. Issues of international trade, transportation, currency valuation, investment flows, tourism and customs procedures were the sorts of issues that appeared especially amenable to drawing countries together, since no single such issue would be likely to be a matter of such great political salience that countries would find it impossible to compromise. Moreover, the practical benefits from cooperation—more trade, more investment, easier transportation and travel—were obvious; it was not lost on Europeans that the economies of the superpowers of the postwar period operated on a continental scale.

The first major success in achieving European integration occurred on January 1, 1952, when six European countries—France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg—formed the European Coal and Steel Community, which sought to coordinate postwar reconstruction in two leading industries of the time. In 1958, European integration was broadened to incorporate cooperation in other areas.

The most important new organization formed at this time was the European Economic Community (EEC). The EEC's first decade, the 1960s, was in most respects very successful. Its most impressive achievement was a customs union; for all practical purposes, the EU became a single entity for purposes of international trade. At this time the EU also inaugurated a common agricultural support policy—a policy that, as will be seen, was more reflective of political than economic motivations.

In the next decade, the 1970s, the EU's record of achievement was more mixed. On the positive side, the European Community (as it came to be called) expanded in 1973 to include three additional members, Britain, Ireland and Denmark. On the other hand, the 1970s were a time of "Euro-pessimism" that reflected the rapid inflation, high unemployment and economic stagnation of the time, and the EU's momentum of the previous decade seemed to grind to a halt as internal disputes over budgets and other issues dominated its agenda.

In the 1980s and 1990s, the EU's early momentum was restored. Not only was there an additional expansion of membership—Greece joined in 1981 and Spain and Portugal in 1986, resulting in a doubling of membership from the original six—but the EU undertook a series of major policy initiatives. The first was the Single European Act of 1986, which sought to make the single European market that had been envisioned from the EU's earliest days a reality. Some 300 concrete measures were implemented that together removed a wide array of non-tariff barriers to trade, government-imposed limitations on the movement of services and capital across na-

tional boundaries, and impediments to the ability of workers to seek employment in other EU member states. The momentum of the Single Market Initiative was sustained in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty on European Union, one of the most important breakthroughs in the EU's history. The Maastricht Treaty implemented a variety of institutional reforms designed to streamline the EU's operations by, for example, greatly limiting the range of policy decisions that required unanimous agreement among the member states. The Treaty also established a multi-year timetable for monetary union, although not all member-states chose to participate. Finally, in the mid-1990s the EU admitted three additional members, Austria, Finland and Sweden, increasing its membership to fifteen.

Since the end of the 1990s, two major issues have dominated the EU's agenda. The first was its decision to undertake the largest expansion in its history. In the Nice Treaty of 2001 the EU agreed to admit the former Soviet Republics of Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia, as well as Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, and two Mediterranean countries, Malta and Cyprus. (The Greek and Turkish parts of Cyprus failed to reach agreement on a political solution to the island's division, and only the Greek portion entered the EU.) These new members formally joined the EU on May 1, 2004, although there will be a multi-year phase-in period before they fully participate in all EU policies. The other major issue that is currently dominating the EU agenda is the adoption of a European Constitution. The draft currently under consideration proposes a overhaul of the EU's institutions, which had initially been designed for a six-

member organization of limited scope. Among other things, the draft Constitution enhances the power of the European Parliament, the one EU institution that (unique among intergovernmental organizations) is directly elected; clarifies the division of powers between EU-level institutions and national governments; offers a Charter of Fundamental Rights of EU citizens that codifies a wide range of civil and political rights; streamlines the budget process (the EU, incidentally, is also unique among intergovernmental organizations in that it can directly tax citizens in its member-states); extends the EU's authority in national security matters and in combating terrorism and crime; and seeks to raise the EU's profile in foreign affairs by creating a position of EU Foreign Affairs Minister. To the intense disappointment of many EU leaders, the draft Constitution did not achieve agreement at a meeting of heads of state and government in December, 2003, but it will be discussed further and some form of the current document will likely be adopted at the EU level and sent to member-states for ratification by the mid 2000s.

EU Policies

What does the European Union do? The short answer is that the EU plays some role in nearly every area in which modern government itself plays a role. There are, however, only a few areas in which the power of the EU is complete: in most policy spheres, its sovereignty is shared with the governments of its member-states. In some cases the dividing line between the EU and member-state governments is drawn far in the direction of the EU—examples include

agricultural and trade policy, competition policy and, for the Eurozone members, monetary policy. In other areas, the EU's authority is much more limited, and the authority of member-state governments correspondingly greater; this is the case for social policy, educational policy and foreign and security policy. Many policy areas, of course, fall somewhere in between, and the demarcation between the EU's authority and that of its member-states is the subject of a great deal of political and legal maneuvering within the EU.

With this general description in mind, it is useful to focus individually on several of the policy areas in which member-states have ceded the greatest degree of sovereignty to EU institutions. First, the EU is a customs union, which means that it combines a free trade area with a common external tariff toward the outside world. (It is worth pointing out to an American audience that a customs union like the EU is a far more ambitious undertaking than a free trade area like NAFTA, in which barriers to internal trade are removed but members retain independent trade policies toward the rest of the world.)

Second, the EU operates a Common Agricultural Policy that offers EU farmers a system of price supports and protection from foreign competition. The reason the EU is so dominant in this particular policy area has more to do with political than economic considerations. To put it crudely, Germany in the 1950s was willing to pay the price of subsidizing French farmers in the interest of political rehabilitation and achieving a larger market for German industrial products. Although the political dynamics have shifted, extensive EU agricultural support poli-

cies have continued to this day, as they have in other rich countries such as the U.S. and Japan. Few EU policies areas have been as contentious, both within the EU and in its relations with its trade partners.

Third, as has been indicated, the EU oversees a large body of law that has very substantially liberalized the free flow of goods, services, capital and labor across the EU's internal boundaries. This has entailed not only the removal of regulatory barriers but also a major effort to harmonize technical and other standards across member-states so that economic actors will be faced with similar business conditions wherever they operate.

Fourth, the EU oversees a competition policy that operates at the regional level rather than at the level of member-states. Domestic or foreign firms wishing to merge with or acquire EU companies are subject to the oversight of this policy, which seeks to ensure that such actions do not stifle competition.

Fifth, the EU achieved full monetary union among twelve of its then-fifteen members (all but the UK, Denmark and Sweden) in 2002; this will gradually be extended to the member-states that joined in 2004. It is not always appreciated how major a step monetary union has been. Not only have marks, francs and lire been eliminated, but member-states have ceded authority to a region-wide European Central Bank that sets interest rates for the Eurozone as a whole.

Sixth, the EU supports a regional policy that transfers a great deal of economic assistance from richer to poorer regions of the EU. This program is particularly innovative in that the basic unit is not the member-state but the region

(for example, Northern Italy is a net donor but Southern Italy is a net recipient of regional aid).

Seventh, the EU has focused to some extent on a number of other issue areas, although in these areas member-state governments play a larger role than in the foregoing policy areas. These include environmental policy, which has at times been a source of contention between richer and poorer member-states; social policy, especially gender equality and fair labor practices; policies that address cross-border issues of crime and terrorism; and support for scientific research, especially relating to Europe's standing in high tech sectors.

Finally, the EU has devoted enormous time and energy, especially since the early 1990s, to forging a Common Foreign and Security Policy, in an effort to enhance its role in the diplomatic and military spheres. To committed Europeanists, this is the logical next step for the EU, permitting it to finally move beyond low politics into the realm of high politics and diplomacy. There is a good deal of disagreement, both within and outside the EU, as to exactly what has been accomplished by this effort. Skeptics note that, while the EU has issued a great many common policy statements, this merely reflects the fact that EU member states agree on a great many issues. Certainly, on some political and military issues EU members disagree vigorously, disagreement that the Common Foreign and Security Policy mechanisms have done little to alleviate. This was dramatically illustrated in the Iraq war of 2003, in which a number of EU member-states strongly opposed the U.S.-led "coalition of the willing," while others actively participated. More concretely, the EU has begun

to venture, although very cautiously, into the military sphere: the EU recently sent a peace-keeping force to Macedonia and has agreed to establish a small permanent "rapid reaction force" to respond to European humanitarian crises. In terms of the broader military situation, though, the EU's efforts to forge a common defense are complicated by the fact that there already exists a longstanding European military alliance that has thoroughly dominated most EU members' national security policies for over half a century: the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. As it happens, not all EU members belong to NATO (exceptions include Austria, Ireland, Finland, Sweden, Cyprus and Malta), while not all European NATO members belong to the EU (notably Iceland, Norway, Turkey, Romania and Bulgaria)—complicating matters even further.

When Americans think of the EU, foreign and security policy is the area on which they tend to dwell—and in these areas the EU has been less successful in achieving integration than in the economic sphere. However, for Europeans domestic concerns and foreign economic relations tend to be more prominent in political discourse than in the U.S. If the EU's importance is to be judged by its accomplishments in the areas of diplomacy and national security, its relatively low profile among Americans is probably justified. In fact, however, the EU's most important achievements have been in the economic and social spheres. If it is judged on its accomplishments in this area, the EU's importance to the U.S. and the world as a whole is already profound and will likely continue to grow in the coming decades. □

EUROPEAN UNION DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS

By Lauren Bean, Editor

National Strategy Forum Review

The European Union (EU) is experiencing negative demographic trends that may affect its political, economic, and social stability and its relationship with the US. These trends are slow economic growth, an aging population, a decline in birthrates, a reduction in the skilled labor force, a projected decline in population, youth unemployment, and an unstable social welfare system.

In May 2004, the EU admitted 10 new member states - eight former Soviet bloc states (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia) and two Mediterranean islands (Cyprus and Malta),

enlarging the union to 25 independent states with a combined population of 454.9 million—a 20 percent increase from the EU15.

Recent expansion has prompted questions concerning the economic, political, and social implications of the enlargement. For example, the EU is concerned that citizens from the newly accessed (and poorer) eastern European countries will migrate to the wealthier western European countries in search of jobs and better social benefits.

The demographic and economic trends are shown in the matrix which follows.

European Union (25)*	Population (Million)	Population Growth Rate (%)	Net Migration Rate (migrants/1,000 population)	Gross Domestic Product (GDP) Per Inhabitant, USD	GDP Growth Rate (%)	Unemployment Rate (%)	Inflation Rate (% Annual Rate of Change)
Austria	8.1	0.22	2.2	27,900	0.0	4.3	1.9
Belgium	10.4	0.14	3.2	29,200	0.3	7.3	1.9
Cyprus (Greek Cypriot)**	0.7	0.56	.43	15,000	1.7	3.3	4.0
Czech Republic**	10.2	-0.08	.97	15,300	2.0	8.0	.6
Denmark	5.4	0.28	2.3	28,900	1.9	4.5	2.2
Estonia**	1.3	-0.49	-0.71	11,000	6.0	9.5	3.7
Germany	82.4	0.28	3.2	26,200	0.1	8.6	1.7

* Sources: Eurostat, 2002; CIA World Fact Book, 2003 11

** New EU Members as of May 2004

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EUROPEAN UNION DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS
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European Union (25)*	Population (Million)	Population Growth Rate (%)	Net Migration Rate (migrants/1,000 population)	Gross Domestic Product (GDP) Per Inhabitant, USD	GDP Growth Rate (%)	Unemployment Rate (%)	Inflation Rate (% Annual Rate of Change)
Greece	10.6	0.19	3.3	15,700	4.0	9.9	3.8
Finland	5.2	0.14	1.2	25,800	2.5	9.1	2.3
France	59.3	0.42	1.0	26,000	1.0	8.7	1.8
Hungary**	10.1	-0.29	.78	13,300	3.3	5.8	5.3
Ireland	3.9	1.03	7.8	29,300	2.9	4.4	4.4
Italy	57.3	0.11	2.9	25,100	0.2	9.0	2.3
Latvia**	2.3	-0.73	-1.19	8,900	6.1	10.5	7.6
Lithuania**	3.4	-0.23	0.14	8,400	6.7	11.7	0.8
Luxembourg	0.4	1.23	7.5	48,900	-	2.8	1.7
Malta**	0.4	0.73	2.34	17,200	1.2	8.8	2.4
Poland**	38.2	0	-0.49	9,700	1.4	19.1	1.9
Portugal	10.3	0.17	6.3	19,400	-	5.1	3.7
Slovakia**	5.4	0.14	0.53	12,400	4.4	16.6	3.3
Slovenia**	1.9	0.14	2.34	19,200	3.2	6.4	5.7
Spain	40.7	0.16	5.8	21,200	2.0	11.3	3.0
Sweden	8.9	0.01	3.2	26,000	1.6	4.9	2.6
The Netherlands	16.2	0.5	3.1	27,200	0.1	2.7	4.6
United Kingdom	60.1	0.3	2.6	25,500	1.3	5.1	1.2
Total Population:	454.9						
United States	291.4	.92	3.52	36,300	2.4	5.8	1.6

TURKEY'S EU MEMBERSHIP: PROSPECTS AND IMPLICATIONS

By Reha Keskinetepe

This article reflects the personal views of the author and not necessarily the views of the Turkish government.

The significance of the European Council – the EU Summit bringing together Heads of State and Government – to be held in December 2004 has been vastly enhanced, as it will reflect, among other things, European leaders' political choice regarding the role to be played by the Union in its adjacent regions, especially towards the East. This point is further underlined by the decision expected from the European Council on whether to start accession negotiations with Turkey, perhaps within the first half of 2005. The political, strategic, economic and, unavoidably, cultural reverberations this decision will generate will have a bearing on Europe's perception of itself and on its relations with adjacent areas and beyond, including the Transatlantic partnership.

To evaluate the significance of the decision and to consider possible developments, it will be helpful to briefly recap how Turkey-EU relations have evolved over the years and what membership means for Turkey.

The interest shown by Turkey in the European integration project dates back to the late

1950s. There is ample evidence, including memoirs by the then incumbent officials, that the decision by Turkey to seek membership in the emerging European structure had a fundamental political premise far beyond the expectation of possible economic gains. The underlying political objective was to advance the Turkish Republic's European orientation. Indeed, the ideological direction of the young Turkish Republic in the 1920s and 1930s was intentionally inclined towards Europe and the West. This was the mature decision of the Turkish elite, eventually enjoying popular support in the Republic founded by Atatürk, who aspired to develop the country politically, economically and socially to provide for the society the highest contemporary standards available then. Today in 2004, this visionary goal still holds its appeal for the Turkish people and it is exemplified by Turkey's bid for EU membership.

Turkey's interest in European integration received a positive response at an early stage and the Association Agreement between Turkey and the then European Economic Council (EEC) was signed in 1963 in Ankara. The agreement stipulated in Article 28 that Turkey would one day join the Community, as it was referred to then.

Reha Keskinetepe is Deputy Director General for Policy Planning at the Turkish Foreign Ministry.

TURKEY'S EU MEMBERSHIP

After some 20 years of incremental improvements, the relations began to develop more rapidly as forces of integration gained ascendancy and as Turkey began liberalizing its economy initially starting with the 1980s. In 1987 Turkey officially applied for full membership. In its response, the Commission basically underlined Turkey's eligibility for membership, yet deferred the in-depth analysis of Turkey's application until the emergence of a more favorable environment, putting the issue on the back burner for the time being. By the early 1990s, coinciding with the major geopolitical change taking place in Europe, the prospects of Turkish full membership had already become a constant agenda item of Turkish politics and a prioritized foreign policy issue. As the EU adapted to the changing circumstances and set out the conditions for membership, the prospects of Central and Eastern European countries' accession became increasingly credible. Turkey felt it was being left behind despite its relatively long history with the EU. During this period Turkey was preoccupied with the separatist terrorist movement of the PKK.

By 1999, it had become impossible for the EU to leave the Turkish application pending for much longer. The Helsinki European Council reconfirmed Turkey's eligibility for membership and offered the prospect for accession based on the same conditions as other candidates. The Helsinki Summit committed the EU to engage Turkey toward membership and gave Ankara the chance to prove it was serious about joining the EU. The deal was clear: as a full-fledged candidate Turkey would be invited to start accession negotiations, provided the Copenhagen political

criteria were met. With the Helsinki decision, a comprehensive reform program was launched in Turkey and was upheld by successive governments and, as expected, enjoyed popular support. The pros and cons of membership and questions regarding the sincerity of the EU towards Turkey's membership became subject of a lively public debate. There was, for example, some opposition to the lifting of the death penalty, as it would benefit Abdullah Öcalan, leader of the PKK, who had the blood of thousands of innocent people on his hands. At the end, however, the pro-EU side won the day by a large margin. Latest public opinion polls indicate that 75 percent of the Turkish population favors Turkey's EU membership. A significant part of the remaining 25 percent is not likely to oppose the project of integration with Europe *per se*, but rather distrusts Europe for its perceived double standard and prejudice towards Turkey.

As we approach the end of 2004 Turkey feels confident it has made much progress. A series of comprehensive reforms, including Constitutional amendments, were passed, bringing Turkey full circle in compliance with the Copenhagen political criteria. This is supported by declarations from the EU side that they are impressed and even surprised by the success and pace of the reforms. Yet, the Turkish Government resists complacency and is determined to preclude excuses to those in the EU who might be looking for reasons to delay a decision. At the end of the day, Turkey has proven it is serious about membership and has devoted its resources to that end. It is now up to the EU to do its share, to make an objective appraisal of the situation and to act wisely and fairly.

As the December deadline approaches, hesitations, second thoughts, but also misrepresentations and even prejudices will resurface. Turkey will have to counter them, not brush them aside.

Turkish membership presents a challenge to the EU due to Turkey's size. Turkey's relative economic weakness and large population are cited by some as disadvantages. Yet the opposite argument has more clout. Economics and demography do not lend themselves to misrepresentation if properly analyzed. The potential of Turkey's vibrant economy, its entrepreneurial strength, and the expected levels of growth are promising. The present positive trend in the economy and the economic reforms complementing the political ones are leading in the right direction. As for demographic trends, the Turkish population is expected to stabilize at approximately 85 million by 2025, which is far less than the 100 million, as some would like the European public to believe. With the expected increase in foreign investments in Turkey following the start of accession negotiations, domestic demand for labor is likely to diminish the willingness of Turks to migrate to Europe en masse in search of jobs. More importantly, given the negative demographic trends in Europe (falling birth rates and decreases in population in some cases) over the next few decades, the young population of Turkey can be viewed as an asset rather than a hypothetical liability for the EU countries.

As the flux in international relations continues, the case for Turkey's EU membership is increasingly making more geopolitical sense even for the less enthusiastic Europeans. Europe

is in search of an identity to assume a more effective role in international relations. The Transatlantic differences over Iraq revealed the urgent need to find an optimum solution: to accept the US as the major international player, positively engage it as a partner, not vassal, and at the same time act as a credible and responsible power for good in critical regions and globally. This vision found its expression in the European Security Strategy adopted by the EU leaders at the end of 2003. Turkey stands out as the sole candidate country that can significantly contribute to the realization of this vision. This is gaining increasing recognition as Turkey builds up its soft power status in addition to its military capabilities.

Turkey's location is pivotal vantage point in relation to the Middle East, eastern Mediterranean, the Caucasus, the Black Sea Region, Central Asia, and the Balkans. Admittedly, these regions constitute some of the weakest links for the international community to establish global peace and stability. The new risks and threats, including international terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, are associated with some of these regions. Some argue that by admitting Turkey, the EU will involve itself directly with these problem-ridden regions. Clearly, however, these problems lay at Europe's, and more generally the West's, front door with or without Turkey as a member. It follows that, with Turkey as a member, the EU will gain additional channels to address these problems more directly.

Turkey is already a regional power that is looked upon as a stabilizing factor in the areas it

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borders. As an advocate and initiator of regional cooperation, Turkey strives to make use of interdependence as a confidence-building dynamic, eventually forming common interests favoring peaceful relations. This approach helps regimes in the region feel more confident to interact with the changing international scene and encourages them to remain within international law. Turkey's affinity and historical ties with the regions surrounding it facilitates such a process. Consequently, Turkey can and does advocate democracy, freedom, human rights, rule of law and good governance in its area, including the larger membership of the Organization of Islamic Conference. As Turkey advances towards EU membership, the credibility and effectiveness of its voice calling for modernization and democratic reform increase.

Most recently, Turkey proved its merit as a major contributor to conflict resolution over the Cyprus issue through a problem solving approach. The point of departure for Turkey was the belief in a win-win approach. Encouraged by Turkey's support for the UN Annan Plan, the Turkish Cypriots overwhelmingly voted in favor of a "United Republic of Cyprus" to join the EU on 1 May 2004. Unfortunately, the Greek Cypriot side did not respond positively, and voted against the unification of the island—contrary to what they had promised the EU and the international community. Thus by going the extra mile, Turkey eliminated this potential excuse, unjustified as it was, that might have been used against it at the December European Council. The parties to potential, frozen or acute conflicts in regions bordering Turkey can draw the necessary

conclusions from this example and Turkey's constructive role therein.

Moreover, at a juncture in world politics when multicultural skills are increasingly becoming a necessity for states in their foreign relations, more so for those hoping to play a global role, Turkey has much to offer. It is said that Europe lacks the social and cultural "melting pot" experience associated with the US. Instead, Europe has come up with enlargement, a comprehensive and mutually socializing process to which Turkey's accession will make a major contribution.

In the same vein, Turkey's EU membership will help the Union counter arguments that it is an exclusive, and allegedly Christian, club. With religion having been accorded, albeit unjustifiably so, much significance in international relations, the EU will demonstrate that the European advocacy of universal values is more than just rhetoric by welcoming Turkey into its fold. With Turkish membership and even the process leading to it, namely accession negotiations, 10 million Muslims already living in Europe will feel more confident and welcome to integrate into their host societies. On the other hand, Turkey will prove to the Muslim world that a predominantly Muslim country can interact with the West as an equal partner and move towards deeper integration to the benefit of both sides. By the same token, Turkey would demonstrate that, with democracy in action, Islam need not be viewed merely as a channel of opposition or exploited by some as a rhetorical conduit for extremism and violence.

Turkey's position as a prospective regional

center for storage and transport of oil and natural gas further emphasizes the desirability of having Turkey within the European energy area. An EU member in the vicinity and on the transport routes, including major pipeline projects, of 70 percent of the world's proven energy sources will be an asset given the energy dependence of Europe.

In a good case scenario, Turkey can start accession negotiations in the first half of 2005 and negotiations might last for some time, perhaps 7-10 years, before its full membership. This process, including the period before membership, will render the EU more credible and efficacious in its efforts to conduct a common foreign and security policy. As a corollary, the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) will have its chance of success increased not merely by Turkey's unique geopolitical location and military power, but also by its foreign policy approaches, its advocacy of universal values and its leading role as a confidence builder and stability generator in its region.

Turkey's aspirations to join the EU are not a choice between Europe and the US, as some might believe. Turkey, by virtue of its location, historical experience and present understanding of world politics, conducts a multi-lateral, multi-layered foreign policy that refutes the static notion of mutual exclusivity reminiscent of the Cold War mentality. Europe and the US need each other even if deeply rooted differences do surface at times. The EU and the US can both contribute to world peace in their own ways and more so in cooperation. It is with this understanding that Turkey values the transatlantic alli-

ance and the need for partnership rather than rivalry.

If the above are the pros of Turkish membership for the EU, then, their absence will be the cons. Indeed, it is possible for the EU to assume a minimalist approach and be content with enlargement only up to the western borders of Turkey. In such a case, Turkey will lose. However, the opportunity cost for the EU will be significantly higher. Indeed, in the highly likely case of Turkey having fulfilled the Copenhagen political criteria and having reached the critical mass in their implementation, a position that can be justifiably argued to have been met at present, a decision in December by the EU leaders short of starting accession negotiations, however sugar-coated, will be unwise and arguably un-European. Turkey will certainly not accept further ambiguity and will outright reject anything short of full membership in due course. In such a worst-case scenario, the official, popular and intellectual disappointment in Turkey would be extremely hard to mend. Turkey would continue with her reforms, certainly remain a Western ally and pursue peace and stability in its region. However, the EU would lose a partner, in its truest sense, willing to pool its sovereignty with the Union and would be deprived of the close coordination of a pivotal country in a critical region of the world. □

WHY A STRONGER EUROPEAN UNION BENEFITS THE UNITED STATES

Ambassador Wolfgang Ischinger

While European statesmen like Robert Schuman and Konrad Adenauer were the intellectual and political architects of the integration movement that became the European Union, American presidents starting with Harry S Truman served as attentive godfathers. Successive US administrations recognized that increasing unity among Western European nations was vital to their survival as free-market democracies. They also understood the American interest in a Europe politically and economically strong enough to support its NATO obligations and to serve as a significant trading partner.

Obviously the Cold War greatly influenced Washington's perspective. Today, the Atlantic alliance faces different challenges. The European Union is newly expanded east and south, bringing together 25 nations and more than 450 million people. More expansion is anticipated over the next few years with Romania and Bulgaria waiting on the doorstep, having embarked on their own EU accession process. A decision on starting accession negotiations with Turkey has yet to be made. Chancellor Schröder recently affirmed Turkey's prospect of full membership after reforms. Further, the European Union has evolved beyond its origins as a com-

mon economic market toward a more integrated union with its own foreign and security policies. In these circumstances – spiced with tensions over the Iraq issue – it came no surprise that doubts would arise about the future of the US-EU relationship.

Let me give you my answer right away: We in Germany strongly believe that a larger and stronger European Union serves fundamental US interests. Many problems will be solved much faster with a united EU than with 25 individual states. Not only economically will it be a win-win situation, but also politically and strategically. Does that mean that a more cohesive Europe would be more agreeable to each and every American initiative? Of course not.

Arguments over specific policies will occur in any alliance of democracies. But such questions can certainly be settled more easily when the parties share basic values and important interests. Americans and Europeans obviously do have a lot of both. Our core common values include freedom, respect for human rights, democracy, tolerance, and the rule of law. Shared interests must start with our urgent need to defeat the new totalitarianism – Islamic terrorism – that is threatening us all. Additional interests are

Wolfgang Ischinger is the German Ambassador to the United States.

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related to the attacks inflicted on us by the Jihadists: such as a peaceful settlement between Israel and the Palestinians and reform in the Broader Middle East, which we all desire. Other important interests are preventing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, managing globalization, combating AIDS, and reducing poverty in the developing world.

Neither the United States, for all its wealth and power, nor Europe, for all its potential, can successfully confront these problems alone. They pose daunting challenges even for an Atlantic alliance prepared to pour intellectual and material resources into the effort. Yet today the alliance is manifestly unbalanced. The US is the only world power worthy of the label. The EU is still a “power in the making”, as acknowledged recently by my foreign minister, Joschka Fischer, and it is learning from its weaknesses.

In the 1990s those weaknesses were exposed as turmoil engulfed the Balkans. Once again it took American leadership and muscle to take the lead in dealing with the crisis. However, learning a lesson from the Kosovo war, the EU started developing a common European Security and Defence Policy and is a major contributor to peacekeeping in the former Yugoslavia, where Germany is providing the largest contingent.

Still, in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, the EU had no ready-made security strategy that would have allowed a meaningful strategic dialogue with America. Yes, individual European countries responded to the threat of global terror in constructive ways. There has been heightened US-EU cooperation on all aspects of the fight against international terrorism – increased intelligence sharing and law enforcement efforts, heightened security at vulnerable targets and

successful efforts to cut off financial networks used by terrorists. Germany, for its part, has contributed forces both to the war effort and the peacekeeping program in Afghanistan, where more than 2,000 German troops are today helping to rebuild that nation and several hundred more are participating in Operation Enduring Freedom worldwide. But in the aggregate, as a strategic partner, the EU response was halting.

Reacting to this deficit, the EU has adopted a European Security Strategy, addressing global threats such as international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The EU’s security concept is a comprehensive one, providing for a whole range of civilian, diplomatic and military measures in times of crisis.

The EU has also adopted a new strategy to fight terrorism and further strengthened its common approach in the aftermath of the terrorist bombing in Madrid. An EU anti-terrorism coordinator has been assigned. Police and law enforcement cooperation as well as cooperation in intelligence gathering and sharing have been stepped up.

The European Security Strategy outlines the role of the European Union on the world stage as follows:

“As a union of 25 states with over 450 million people producing a quarter of the world’s Gross National Product, and with a wide range of instruments at its disposal, the European Union is inevitably a global player. In the last decade European forces have been deployed abroad to places as distant as Afghanistan, East Timor and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The

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increasing convergence of European interests and the strengthening of mutual solidarity of the EU makes us a more credible and effective actor. Europe should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world.”

On the broader question of military capability – which would be a genuine concern even absent global terrorism – further integration is the key to progress. For decades, Americans shouldered much of the burden in defending Western Europe against Soviet aggression (and occasionally complained about it, with justification). The end of the Cold War obviously altered the nature of the Alliance’s security challenge, but it did not end our need for a common security strategy.

The United States began adapting relatively quickly, moving toward lighter, more agile combat units and making great strides in developing “smart” weapons. The result is that the disparity in capability – particularly the capability to project force afar – is greater than ever. A more integrated Europe, with a common defence policy and a greater investment in resources, would reduce this gap. Armament acquisition on a joint basis would enhance efficiency, producing more bang for the *euro*. Duplication of functions among the defence establishments of 25 countries could be reduced.

This is why the EU has decided to set up a European Defence Agency. This agency will work to strengthen the cooperation of the member states in the fields of defence capabilities development, research, acquisition and armaments.

In the context of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), EU members have committed themselves to create the capacity to deploy up to 60,000 troops in a crisis area within 60 days for humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping and crisis management operations, including peacemaking. Recently, Germany, France and the United Kingdom took the initiative to suggest the creation of battle groups of up to 1,500 troops that could be deployed within 15 days for international operations of 30 up to 120 days.

The EU has not only built up military means for crisis prevention and management, it is also ready to provide up to 5,000 police officers for peace missions—1,400 of which can be deployed within 30 days. In addition, the EU is prepared to make available other civilian experts for such missions. Germany, along with Sweden, was the first to set up a pool and a comprehensive training facility for civilians to serve in international missions, in Berlin in 2002.

Those newly developed capacities have already been brought into practice in several operations the EU undertook in 2003: the European Union Police Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina; Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, an “autonomous” EU military operation; and the meanwhile successfully completed Operation Concordia in Macedonia, an EU military operation drawing on NATO assets and capabilities.

By the end of this year, the EU would be ready to take over NATO’s SFOR mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina, currently having about 7,000 troops, under the name EU-FOR, should such a decision be taken by NATO at the Istanbul summit.

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None of this is intended to sap NATO's strength or reduce its relevance. The purpose of the European Security and Defence Policy is not to replace but to complement NATO. By enhancing the Union's capability to act, we also reinforce the strategic partnership between the EU and NATO. NATO is and should remain central to our security needs. But NATO's muscle is enhanced if both the American and European pillars holding up this bridge across the Atlantic are strong.

The pattern of European participation in crisis management is clear enough now. Today, Europeans supply the preponderance of peacekeeping forces in the Balkans – roughly four times the size of the US contingent. Elsewhere, in United Nations peacekeeping missions, European troops outnumber Americans by about seven to one. In terms of international development assistance, the EU and member states supply just over half the global funding.

The draft constitution which the EU is currently negotiating contains further elements that would enable the EU to become a stronger foreign policy player. It envisages, *inter alia*, creating the office of a European foreign minister and a European foreign service. It is also designed to make decision making more effective in a larger EU and thereby increasing the EU's capacity to act.

Summing up: it comes as no surprise that in terms of military power, there is a gap between the United States and the EU. But the new kind of threats we are facing today cannot be fought with military means alone. The EU, with its broad range of instruments, ranging from development cooperation, financial and trade policy,

human rights policy to the effective police, the civilian monitors and mediators and the military, is in this sense quite uniquely situated to contribute to crisis prevention and conflict management. And those instruments will now combine the capacities of 25 EU members.

Both Europe and the United States have a huge stake in promoting stability and economic opportunity in poorer regions – regions that, if ignored, may become breeding grounds for tomorrow's terrorists. Many of the EU-members have long-standing traditional relations to countries worldwide and a deep knowledge of the regions that may serve to help us get to the roots of terrorism and fanaticism.

The Middle East is right at Europe's doorstep. Europe has for the last decade been engaged in a dialogue with states and non-governmental agencies of countries across the Mediterranean Sea, the so-called "Barcelona Process".

Similarly, both sides of the Atlantic have a large and urgent interest in reviving the "road map" as the basis of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations and in making a tangible start in the effort to bring the Broader Middle East into the 21st century. This is why Minister Fischer suggested a new transatlantic initiative for the Middle East. The G 8 summit will hopefully advance this common endeavor.

Enlarging the European Union from 15 to 25 member states is a historic achievement. But an even greater challenge lies ahead: we need to ensure that the 10 new member states of Central and Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean are able to grow economically and fully share in the security and unity that the EU represents.

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Those who suggest that the purpose of a strong European Union is to be an effective counterweight to American power and influence are misguided. The fundamental interests of the United States and Europe remain the same today as they were during the decades of the Cold War. As Europe expands and deepens its integration process, it will become stronger on foreign and security policy, and this larger and more united Europe will be a stronger partner for the United States, a partner of more equal standing.

Americans and Europeans can master the challenges of the 21st century, just as we defeated the scourges of the previous one, if we act together and if we recognize the benefits of strong institutions on both sides of the Atlantic. This is as true today as it was when Schuman and Adenauer, supported by Truman, envisioned the idea of European integration a half-century ago.□

THE NEW NATO AND THE TRANSATLANTIC ALLIANCE

Sir Peter Ricketts

The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) was set up in 1949 to express the transatlantic commitment to mutual defence in the face of the threat from the Soviet Union. It has also been, over the years, the essential place where North Americans and Europeans consult each other about any other threats to their security.

NATO performed this function most effectively for 40 years. After the Soviet threat disappeared, and the Berlin Wall came down, NATO re-invented itself. It became the organiser of robust peacekeeping operations, holding the ring in difficult circumstances, first in Bosnia and then in Kosovo. In doing so, NATO created the necessary security for the rebuilding of these shattered territories to proceed. At the same time, NATO acted as a beacon for the newly liberated nations of Central and Eastern Europe. It helped them establish modern, democratically accountable armed forces. And it offered the prospect of membership to those who came up to NATO's standards as free nations. The arrival of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary in 2002, and an additional seven nations (the three Baltic States, Slovenia, Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria) in March 2004, is itself an important contribution to achieving the long-standing US goal of a Europe whole and free. The arrival of these nations has also brought a new sense of

enthusiasm and fresh perspectives to the Alliance.

The enlargement of NATO, without losing any of its effectiveness, is a historic achievement. But the transformation underway in the Alliance goes much further than that. It really began in the aftermath of the terrible September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. This was instantly seen by all NATO allies as an attack not just on the US but on the whole international community, and therefore on NATO itself. It was therefore natural that NATO immediately agreed to invoke Article 5 of its founding treaty, which declares that an armed attack on any member state is an attack on all member states.

This landmark decision – the first time that Article 5 had been invoked since it was written in 1949 – reflected a unanimous view among NATO members that the attacks on 9/11 represented a new threat to the transatlantic community. NATO again showed that it was capable of adapting in the face of this new threat. NATO Foreign Ministers declared at a meeting in 2002 that NATO would be prepared to deal with threats wherever they occurred. In doing so, they put an end to a debate which had gone on for years about whether NATO should be willing to act far beyond the boundaries of its member states.

It is one thing to set an ambitious goal. But

Sir Peter Ricketts is the NATO Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom.

it is also vital for NATO's credibility that it should be capable of living up to this ambition. That is why NATO Heads of Government at the Prague Summit in November 2002 set in hand a profound transformation of the Alliance's military arrangements. The goal was to undertake military operations when necessary in a faster and more flexible way. NATO leaders decided to create a new NATO Response Force, capable of deploying serious military capability within a few days to deal with an urgent crisis. At the same time, leaders decided to slim down NATO's Command Structure and focus it more sharply on transformation.

NATO nations were probably all surprised by the speed with which the Alliance had to translate these new goals into concrete action. Within months of the Prague Summit, NATO agreed to take over responsibility for the International Stabilisation and Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. There are now some 30 NATO and Partner Nations contributing to this force. The NATO Council is working on plans to expand its geographical scope progressively to the whole of Afghanistan. In the meantime, NATO forces work in close cooperation with the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom to spread the authority of President Karzai's government, to help with modernising Afghanistan's security sector, dealing with the problem of narcotics, and providing security for the elections in September 2004. NATO is also supporting Poland in their leadership of a sector in Iraq.

It is worth pausing for a moment to reflect what an extraordinary change these deployments represent for the countries concerned. The armed forces of many European allies were trained and equipped to defend their countries or their near neighbours against the threat coming from the Soviet Union. Now they are having to

deploy their troops to, and keep them supplied in, some of the most inhospitable terrain on the planet, thousands of miles from their home bases. All this requires investment in new equipment. And it requires the men and women in the armed forces of allies to learn new skills. There has been much in the press about NATO's difficulty in finding the forces necessary to expand the mission in Afghanistan. This is indeed a problem. But it should not obscure the fact that allies have had to rise to a series of new challenges in recent years – NATO is after all still maintaining significant forces in Bosnia and Kosovo, as well as the new requirements in Afghanistan and – for many allies – in Iraq.

NATO's new Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, has made clear that the Alliance cannot fail in Afghanistan. Allied leaders will be taking further decisions on NATO's role at their summit in Istanbul (28-29 June). They will also be considering NATO's other military operations: they will probably take the final decisions on handing over the Bosnia mission to the European Union at the end of 2004; they will be assessing the implications for the Kosovo mission of the recent upsurge in violence there; and they will no doubt be discussing the position in Iraq on the eve of the transfer of sovereignty to a new Iraqi government.

Given the evident strain on the armed forces of NATO allies in meeting all these operational commitments, Heads of Government will also be considering new initiatives to improve the usability of allied forces. This means in practice increasing the proportion of our armed forces that are capable of deploying on missions. There are no easy answers. But the prospects are that the demand for the services which NATO has shown it can provide are likely to continue to grow. So this issue needs to be given priority.

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One of the most encouraging signs of NATO's continued vitality is the interest shown by many countries in joining NATO one day or at least developing a close partnership with it. Over the last decade, NATO has developed a range of Partnership Programmes, offering advice and assistance in fields such as defence sector reform, border security and counter-terrorism. NATO has active Partnership Programmes with a broad spread of countries in the Balkans, Central Asia and the Caucasus. The Mediterranean Dialogue links NATO with our neighbours to the south of the Mediterranean. The Istanbul Summit is likely to be the occasion for a further upgrading of NATO's links with this crucially important group of countries.

This links to a major new theme for transatlantic cooperation more widely this year. That is the need to support reform and modernisation in the Arab World. This broad-gauge strategy is intended to help home-grown efforts in Arab countries to tackle the social, economic and political problems which, if not dealt with, can provide the breeding ground for alienation, extremism and in the worst case, terrorism.

Reform in the greater Middle East is likely to be a key theme at the US-chaired G8 Summit at Sea Island in June 2004. It will also figure in EU/US work. NATO's role can only be limited. But the Alliance can contribute by offering to a wider group of countries in the Middle East the same practical expertise on defence sector reform that has proved useful in Eastern Europe and with Mediterranean countries. NATO is at present hard at work on an initiative to launch at Istanbul on these lines – another example of NATO taking up a challenge well beyond the original North Atlantic area.

A final important aspect of the changing NATO has been the successful development of

much closer relations with Russia. NATO and Russia are no longer enemies. We share a wide range of interests including combating terrorism and avoiding instability. We have established a NATO-Russia Council where NATO countries and Russia sit as equals to work on issues of common interest. This has developed well. We hope that President Putin will decide to come to a NATO-Russia Summit at Istanbul to push this work further.

The sum total of all these changes is a NATO which is profoundly different and yet still the same - different in the geographical scope of its military operations, and the widening range of its outreach programmes; the same in its core values. The 1949 Washington Treaty has not changed. And this may be partly the secret of NATO's success. The Founding Fathers had the wisdom to see that, to be strong, NATO should not be an Alliance against a single threat (however important the challenge of deterring the Soviet Union) but an Alliance for a set of shared values. The last 55 years have shown that the Alliance has successfully applied those permanent values – of respect for democracy, freedom and the rule of law – to a changing world. That is why the Alliance has stayed strong, and has remained a beacon attracting countries that have emerged from occupation or authoritarian rule.

To remain strong, the Alliance also needs the continued support of publics and parliaments in all its member states. It needs an informed debate about where NATO should engage and with what objectives. It has been part of the scenery for a long time, but it should never be taken for granted.□

ON THE DRAFT TREATY ESTABLISHING A CONSTITUTION FOR EUROPE: Security and Diplomatic Implications for the United States

Alex G. Papadopoulos, Ph.D.

The autumn of 2001 was a time of turning points. As the United States launched its post “9-11” war on terrorism by invading Taliban Afghanistan, the European Council considered that Europe had reached a turning point of its own. During its meeting in Laeken, Belgium, on 14-15 December 2001, it called for the creation of the “European Convention on the Future of Europe”. The draft treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe crafted by this specially charged European constitutional convention was adopted by consensus during June and July 2003 sessions. It was submitted by Convention President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, former President of France, to the President of the European Council in Rome on 18 July 2003. The draft treaty will be presented for ratification to the twenty-five member states of the EU this year. Denmark, Ireland, and Luxemburg are constitutionally bound to hold referenda on the treaty. The United Kingdom appears now inclined to do the same. Austria, France, Italy, Portugal and Spain are considering the manner of ratification. The remaining states among the long-standing membership will present the treaty to their national parliaments for ratification.

There is little question that the inability of the European Communities, initially, and the European Union, later, to speak in one voice and act with conviction in the Gulf War, the War in Bos-

nia, and the Kosovo Crisis were evidence of lacunae in European security and foreign policy coordination. Since the 1991 Gulf War, the pro-political integration European leaders made significant efforts to increase the cooperation in security and foreign policy through the Maastricht, Amsterdam, and Nice treaties. The last proposed treaty on the EU Constitution is clearly the most ambitious among them. It would be impossible to overestimate the political and symbolic significance of this endeavor in innovative regime architecture at a time in international affairs when the acts of states—either as individual agents of international action or as members of institutionalized collectives—have profound impacts on international security and prosperity. The initial rationale for a Constitution Treaty for Europe was unrelated to the geopolitical exigencies of the post “9-11” world, and was anticipated in some form since the Treaty on European Union as part of the EU’s institutional thickening. I suggest here that given the contrarian atmosphere in Europe surrounding the “war on terrorism” after the invasion of Iraq, it is probable that elements of the proposed Common Foreign and Security Policy reflect a newly guarded position of Europe on U.S. hegemony. Understanding then the philosophical and policy bases of the draft European Union Constitution Treaty would help us form an opinion on the foreign and security policy impli-

Alex G. Papadopoulos, Ph.D. is Associate Professor of Geography at DePaul University.

cations for the United States of an ever more closely integrating and powerful Europe. With more precise treaty language on common foreign and security policies and the protocols for their implementation than ever before, politicians and scholars agree that the ratification of a European Constitution will have diplomatic and security implications for the United States. I would support the notion that the implications will be strongly positive.

The Nature of the Regime and the Proposed Constitution

The most significant challenge for observers of European integration is in understanding the character of the legal-political regime that has given rise to successive European Communities and ultimately the European Union. The inability of many to understand and appreciate the innovative structure behind the European collective governance model stems from a reluctance to accept that the member states of the European Union often act in a most “non-state” manner: They have been willing to surrender their decision-making prerogative in policy areas that are fundamental to sovereignty preservation, like monetary affairs. They entrust in the European Commission—the supranational organ of the EU executive branch—the responsibility for initiating and designing European cohesion and harmonization policies. They accept and implement often punitive judgments by the EU’s supranational European Court of Justice without any threat of legal or other violence on the part of Brussels, Luxembourg, or Strasbourg. Equally puzzling to many is the power structure of the EU itself. Those who call it an emerging “superstate”—according to some even a “bureaucratic despotic” one with roots in French “dirigisme”—should take notice that the EU executive has neither a military nor a police force of its own, and is thus unlike a sover-

eign state that holds a monopoly on force legitimated by a national consensus. Instead the EU’s institutional architecture does not appear to want to abolish the European state system as much as reform it and supplant it with a mixed system of intergovernmentalism and supranationalism. While the European Commission acts supranationally and in the collective interest, the hybridity of EU governance ensures that key aspects of the sovereignty of its member states will be under the oversight of the Council of Ministers—the intergovernmental organ of the EU executive branch.

So, if EU member states still retain control over significant aspects of sovereignty, is the EU an emerging federation? By implication, is the proposed Constitution Treaty the founding document of a federation? I would follow here Andrew Moravcsik to suggest that the answer is a qualified “yes”: The European integration regime after the 1957 Treaty of Rome created a *de facto* federal structure. Yet, the practiced federalism is transnational in nature and resistant to centralization in most policy areas. Its “states’ rights” dimensions do not address rights of so-called “regional states”, but rather the rights of still sovereign territorial states.

The EU political-legal regime is, then, something new. It is a regime form that represents a possible evolutionary path beyond traditional state territoriality for regional state systems in the age of globalization. As John Ruggie and Marc Plattner, among others, now propose, the EU regime reflects pragmatic responses to globalization-making events that occurred after WWII. Such events have since been eroding the sovereignty of the traditional, Westphalian-type territorial state. In his article entitled "Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations", Ruggie speaks about the emergence of such political post-modernity as “a new

form of configuring political space.” He continues by noting that in Europe “the process of the unbundling of [political, state-based] territoriality has gone further than anywhere else”. In that sense, then, the EU is federal-like, post-Westphalian, and “post-state” in its constitutional nature. It is certainly not an emergent centralized “superstate,” but rather a *transnational* federal entity that has enshrined in its institutional structure and treaty language deferential treatment for three levels/scales of political territoriality: Europe, national member states, and subnational “regional states.”

The nature of the EU constitution, however, is still in question. Is it similar to the U.S. Constitution which is often held up as a model federal constitution? As Jack Rakove notes in his article entitled “Europe’s Floundering Fathers” , the EU document falls somewhere between the Articles of Confederation (1776-77) and the federal constitution of 1787. Importantly, the retention of the state system—and state sovereignty in some form—has made it necessary to craft a European Constitution *as a treaty* between sovereign states; a situation unlike what the founders of the United States confronted. Rakove agrees that “a[n EU] constitutional treaty, as the new charter is sometimes called, is still more a treaty among nation-states than a constitution for a common people. In theory, it allows individual members of the EU either to block the adoption of the constitution or to truck and bargain for points they deem particularly important.” The absence of taxation powers and the limited range of empowerment in foreign and security affairs, Rakove continues, make the proposed EU constitution less authoritative than the U.S. Constitution.

Foreign and Security Dimensions: A Source of Concern for the U.S.?

In philosophical terms, the EU Constitution

Treaty represents in important ways what the German Foreign Minister, Joschka Fischer, called in his 2000 Berlin speech on the future of Europe “the political endgame” fifty years after the launching of European integration. The European Constitutional Treaty consolidates and, in some key ways, simplifies an institutional architecture that came into being in an incremental fashion in the guise of a series of treaties and acts among an ever-growing cast of European states. Whereas the massive portion of integration labor appears to be in the economic arena, political integration has been the prize from the earliest stages of envisioning a new order for post-WWII Europe. Failed attempts to construct a European Political Community in the 1950s and 1960s—the Pleven and the two Fouchet Plans respectively—did not make Europeans scuttle the objective but rather recast it in terms of a longer, more pragmatic path to progressively deeper economic interdependence.

In practical terms, the Treaty on European Union (1993) was the beginning of Joschka Fischer’s “endgame.” Its Title V replaced European Political Cooperation structures with an intergovernmental pillar in the Community structure that mandated the formulation of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Article 11 set out its five main principles: (i) to safeguard the common values and fundamental interests of the Union; (ii) to strengthen the security of the Union; (iii) to preserve peace and strengthen international security; (iv) to promote international cooperation; (v) to develop democracy and the rule of law, including human rights. The system is not entirely egalitarian. The intergovernmental character of this arrangement gives an asymmetric advantage to the largest member states—Britain, France and Germany.

More than ten years later, the political “endgame” has been rendered significantly more

ON THE DRAFT TREATY ESTABLISHING A CONSTITUTION FOR EUROPE

mature in the EU Constitution Treaty. Consolidating competences previously under the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Western European Union—both Cold War-era security cooperation structures—the proposed Constitution’s Title V “The Union’s External Action” (Articles 193-214) lays out a much more impressive array of missions and specific instruments of implementation under the jurisdiction of the President of the European Council, the intergovernmental Council of Ministers and the new office of the Union Minister of Foreign Affairs. Adopting a tone consistent with liberal multilateral organizations, its provisions are meaningfully reflective of post-Cold War, post-“9-11” and globalization exigencies. Its first provision establishes the political cultural context:

“The Union's action on the international scene shall be guided by, and designed to advance in the wider world, the principles which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, equality and solidarity, and for international law in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter (Title V, Chapter I, Article III-193).

The subsequent provisions speak about collective action in support of international security, human rights and democracy, sustainable economic and environmental stability, and promotion of multilateralism. Importantly, later the treaty declares that “[m]ember states shall work together to enhance and develop their mutual political solidarity. They shall refrain from any action which is contrary to interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive

force in international affairs (in Chapter II “Common Foreign and Security Policy” Article III-195). In this vision, the Council of Ministers is designated as the responsible executive entity. The language leaves little doubt that member states retain significant freedom in deciding whether they would comply and participate in what the Council will determine as actionable policies.

We should applaud and embrace the efforts of our European allies to build an international security capacity because their Constitution Treaty is absolutely consistent with the substantive objectives of the United States: It calls for more peace and international cooperation in resolving security crises; it calls for robust, sustainable, and competitive markets and a global economy; it aspires to build healthy democracies and economies in the less developed world; and it aspires to help construct a sustainable global environment. It conceptualizes that action-agenda as a multilateral effort, which is entirely consistent with its own innovative, postmodern, transnational federalism. Clearly, this may give pause to a strongly unilateralist U.S. Government. Yet, in no article or provision in its Constitution Treaty are there calls for mounting a common foreign and security policy that would have as its objective power parity with the United States. No U.S. Government that shares the pragmatic, if not noble, security and foreign policy fundamentals outlined in the EU Constitution Treaty should be concerned about the implications of a broader international division of security labor with a more united, more capable European Union. There will be no burden that the combined shoulders of the United States and the anticipated stronger European Union will not be able to carry.

SCHOOL SAFETY IN THE 21ST CENTURY: ADAPTING TO NEW SECURITY CHALLENGES POST-9/11

Prepared by the National Strategy Forum Staff

On October 30-31, 2003, the National Strategy Forum conducted a conference sponsored by the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation entitled **Schools: Prudent Preparation for a Catastrophic Terrorism Incident**. The conference addressed how schools can prepare for a catastrophic terrorism incident (CTI) — an event that would have a profound effect nationally, regionally, and in the community.

Conference participants included parents and parent groups, school administrators and faculty, school security and safety experts, public health officials, environmentalists, pediatricians, psychiatrists, nurses, representatives of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), US Department of Homeland Security (DHS), US Department of Education (DOE), counter-terrorism experts, operators of transportation services, and communicators. The discussion focused on the nature of the threats, infrastructure, resource needs, and the emergency preparedness process.

The major findings are:

- The need for school emergency preparedness is increasing. Every day 53,000,000 plus children — 20 percent of the total US population — attend school or day care. Many participate in after-school programs as well.
- Information regarding individual emergency preparedness is abundant, efficient, and accessible. Yet the ability of schools to respond to traditional crisis incidents (fire, campus shootings, and natural disasters) varies widely. Very few schools are prepared to respond to a CTI.
- Schools are faced with new threats, including bioterrorism. A bioterrorism incident that results in mass casualties (1,000 or more) may occur in a school or neighboring community. Consequently, schools require an “all-hazard” approach to emergency planning. School preparation for a CTI is one part of overall citizen (parents and students) preparedness for a CTI.
- Schools vary in location, size, and potential exposure to CTI incidents, and there is a hierarchical/organizational distinction between public and private schools.
- The responsibility of a school for its students in a CTI is much greater than during a traditional emergency crisis. A school is a temporary custodian of its students; a CTI may

extend the usual custodial period of a few hours to 24 hours or more. This would require shelter and feeding for an extended period of time.

- The resources normally available to assist schools in a traditional emergency situation would be greatly diminished or non-existent during the response period of a CTI.
- Individual schools have discrete problems; however, school supervisors and school support staff can reduce risks and be better prepared if given the necessary information, training, support, and resources.
- The array of complex issues may be daunting for school supervisors whose discipline is education rather than crisis management. Schools are currently under-funded for school preparedness. Creativity, collaboration, and new sources of skill, equipment, training, and funding are needed.
- Innovative, “best practice” solutions can be made available to school supervisors by providing access to a concise, yet comprehensive bibliography of available resources, many of which are low cost.
- Educational achievement and prudent preparation for emergencies and disasters are linked. Administrative and political pressures on school officials may force educational achievement testing goals to be in competition with school safety.

The post-conference report entitled “**School Safety in the 21st Century: Adapting to New Security Challenges Post-9/11,**” provides context to enable schools to adapt existing emergency plans to encompass a CTI and to develop and implement an “all-hazard” emergency plan. The full report is available in Adobe Acrobat format on the National Strategy Forum website, www.nationalstrategy.com. □

INTELLIGENCE IN WAR: KNOWLEDGE OF THE ENEMY FROM NAPOLEON TO AL QAEDA

By John Keegan

Alfred A. Knopf, 2003, 384 Pages, \$30.00

Reviewed by **Patrick L. Moore**

If war had a religion of its own, it would have to be *military intelligence*. No other martial pursuit instills such mystical devotion or such practical contempt at the same time. The devotees of Mars in a trench coat or gilly-suit claim decisive and almost unnatural powers for those with accurate foreknowledge in warfare. The doubters of this Gnostic view of intelligence only grudgingly serve the deity as a G2 (Staff Intelligence Officer), because they regard it as a deviation from the path of a true warrior and thus a hindrance to a serious officer's career.

Using his ever-keen scalpel of historical analysis, Keegan exposes the preconceptions and myths surrounding intelligence in war. His greatest feat here is to uncover, with careful brushstrokes of historical fact, the essential nature of both intelligence and war. Keegan produces case after case demonstrating that *intelligence*, the mantram in the War Against Terrorism, was simply not decisive. To paraphrase Dr. Johnson, "intelligence" gathering – or charging faults

therein - can be "the last refuge" of the guilty, negligent, or timorous as the excuse for doing the wrong thing or (perhaps worse) doing nothing. That is not to say that intelligence does not materially affect the outcome of combat. Rather, the truth is that mere advance knowledge of the enemy has never yet proved to be the sole determining factor producing victory.

Keegan uses as examples Nelson's pursuit of Napoleon leading to the Battle of the Nile; Stonewall Jackson's campaign in the Shenandoah Valley; the British sea chase of German commerce raiders in World War I; the Battle of Midway; the Battle of Crete in World War II; the 1939-43 Battle of the Atlantic against the U-Boats; the intelligence campaign to discern the threat and nature of Hitler's "V" weapons; and the 1982 Falklands campaign. All lend strong support to his case that intelligence (however ample and accurate) alone, does not win battles or wars. The lack of it may be a severe handicap, but its possession, as well as not being a panacea, may even be a misleading distraction from applying decisive force when necessary.

Patrick L. Moore is a Chicago attorney and a member of the *National Strategy Forum Review* Editorial Board.

His clearest test cases for that argument are his accounts of the Battle of Crete and the Battle of Midway. Crete shows that intelligence may often be a necessary condition for victory, but can never, by its nature, be a sufficient one. There must also be material and moral force enough to impose one's will on the enemy, and the political will to use it. Even good intelligence, without those elements of force, often becomes useless knowledge of the inevitable. In effect, intelligence is much like the proverbial price of mocha-java, "with a buck ninety-five and good intelligence you can get a cup of coffee." With good intelligence and sufficient "muscle" (both physical and the force of will), victory can be earned. The point is that Mars occasionally does favors for the weak side that strives mightily in battle, but he rarely gives gifts, however clever they may have been in ferreting out the enemy's plans, to the smaller battalions who do not suffer the fight. History shows that even a poorly informed combatant can roll over a highly knowledgeable one if the ignorant one has enough force. Keegan points out that, like a tiger eating an Einstein in the jungle, it doesn't care how brilliant he is and it almost always doesn't matter. The reverse is simply not true.

On Crete, 33,000 British (among them many crack troops) and 9,000 Greek militia were fully warned of the impending German assault. By contrast, a German force of around 22,000 paratroopers and mountain troops were wrongly briefed that they would meet only slight resistance from 12,000 defenders. The allies, however, despite their tremendous intelligence advantage stemming from the now legendary "Ultra" decrypts, still managed to lose the battle by snatching defeat on the second day from the

jaws of a decisive victory they had won on the first. Even the New Zealanders, reputed as the best troops on the island, who easily proved to be the match of the attackers when the German parachute and glider attack suffered ruinous casualties that first day, became confused and wrong-footed on the second day. As if in a bad dream presumably brought on by their recent defeat on the Greek mainland, the British defenders of the island developed a paralyzing apprehension of a possible sea-landing that never happened, instead of finishing off the clear and present danger of the surviving German airborne troops who had established a very tentative hold on the island's main airfield. In the end, the superior daring, commitment and focus of the German attackers enabled them to hang on until their transport pilots landed load after load of reinforcing German mountain troops who then carried the day.

As Keegan explains, the British were forewarned so thoroughly as to know the day and hour of the attack. The allied commander, General Freyberg (himself a New Zealander), was heard to remark "they're dead on time" as the first wave of German transports flew over. The Germans were nevertheless both more focused and more determined than their opponents. As Keegan concludes from the battle (presumably discounting the 9,000 untrained Greek militia among Freyberg's forces):

[H]owever good the intelligence available before an encounter may appear to be, the outcome, given equality of force, will still be decided by the fight and, in a fight, determination, again given equality of force, will be the paramount factor. The New Zealand-

BOOK REVIEW: INTELLIGENCE IN WAR

ers were troops of the very first quality On Crete, however, they met other soldiers who preferred collective death to defeat. The men of the [German] 7th Airborne Division and the 5th Mountain Division were in berserker mood. It was their almost mindless courage that allowed them to prevail.

The other critical example of an apparently typical ineffectiveness (or at least irrelevance) of intelligence in deciding outcomes in battle, is the Battle of Midway. The conventional view is that the victory came about because an intelligence coup permitted Adm. Nimitz to deploy his three remaining carriers in an ambush and caught the Japanese napping. Like the British reading German codes, yielding their “Ultra” intelligence, the Americans had broken the Japanese naval code and dubbed that information “Magic.” The commander on Midway was directed to falsely report by radio in plain language an urgent water distilling problem. The American signals intelligence unit in Hawaii shortly thereafter intercepted a Japanese message saying that “AF,” the code designation for Midway in their upcoming offensive, had an urgent drinking water problem. Then, as most of the history books say, the ambush was set and Nimitz sprang on the Japanese carriers when they unwittingly stumbled into it.

As Keegan convincingly argues, the decisive contribution of intelligence traditionally afforded to American signals intelligence in the Battle of Midway just didn’t happen. While Nimitz was given a fleeting advantage in deploying his carriers, the limitations of naval aviation and instrumentation in those days defied most of the heroic

efforts of the American carrier pilots. It took lots of dumb luck – good for the Americans and bad for the Japanese – to set up the American victory for the Navy to win. The American torpedo bombers did promptly find the Japanese carriers but were all shot down without hitting anything. But their gallant charge at sea level did bring the Japanese fighter cover down from their high altitude station over the Japanese task force to to deal with the Americans surface level attack. In the end, that was a lot.

Meanwhile, the American dive-bombers were left wandering (despite their best intentions) without a clue. The squadron leader of one formation happened to look down and noticed the brilliant white wake of a fast-moving warship contrasted against the blue Pacific. Putting two and two together, he realized that the ship was both Japanese and returning to the main body of the fleet. Taking a bearing on the ship, the squadron’s new course quickly led them to the carrier pilot’s dream – the enemy carriers arrayed before them, their decks strewn with rearming and refueling aircraft. Even alone, the one squadron of American planes cut a fiery swath through the Japanese carriers in their fatally vulnerable condition. Their double jeopardy had developed from their commanding Admiral Nagumo’s dithering just a little while too long (he was not an experienced carrier task force commander) over whether to launch a second strike against Midway or, depending on possibly defective reports, taking a gamble on being able to immediately strike the American carriers. In the end he did neither and lost his carriers.

As Keegan points out, no aspect of the battle after Nimitz’ first deployments had anything to do with the Honolulu intercepts. A mere sliver

of quick thinking by an American squadron leader, a large measure of heroism displayed by the American torpedo bombers, and Nagumo's taking just a few minutes too long to make a decision, were the ingredients of the victory at Midway.

Especially haunting in Keegan's historical analysis is the recently established pervading ignorance of that very subject among Americans students today. Most schools appear to be exacerbating the problem rather than solving it as they distract the leaders of tomorrow with political correctness and lack of rigor in academic pursuits. As Keegan shows time and again, those ignorant of the past are truly condemned to repeat the mistakes made by others before them, a lesson not only for high school sophomores but heedful for national leaders and heads of state as well.

Once he arrives at the present, Keegan takes little time to explain the dangerous error that treating intelligence as the elixir of victory can be. Merely knowing is not enough. As he concludes, history teaches that:

[K]nowledge cannot destroy ... an offensive initiated by an enemy unless the possession of knowledge is also allied to objective force. ... Intelligence can only work through strength.

In summary, Keegan teaches that knowing what an enemy intends and is capable of is of no advantage or relevance without the strength, wits, and will to thwart him. Absent such enabling factors, foreknowledge is merely notice of impending and inevitable doom.

This is particularly troubling in light of the signs that many in America and the West in gen-

eral seem not entirely convinced that militant Islam has declared war and that our survival is truly at stake. The repeated hearings about fixing intelligence and the improvement of intelligence products appear to come dangerously close to becoming mere photo-ops for politicians and a way station for those who would defy facts and do nothing.

What Keegan shows is that misguided reliance on "intelligence," alone or primarily, to militarily get us out of the mess of the 21st Century's first (and perhaps last) war, is to use it like a mental and moral "standoff" weapon. He concludes that there will be no substitute for fighting this vicious new enemy with remorseless determination, drawing a knife from the boot and going in close for his throat. Reverence for intelligence can quickly turn into an excuse for a misplaced and inappropriate squeamishness, expressed as a refusal to take casualties or to offend pundits' sensibilities by actually destroying our enemies who won't surrender. As John Keegan poignantly advises:

Foreknowledge is no protection against disaster. Even real-time intelligence is never real enough. Only force finally counts. As the civilised states begin to chart their way through the wasteland of a universal war on terrorism without foreseeable end, may their warriors shorten their swords. Intelligence can sharpen their gaze. The ability to strike sure will remain the best protection against the cloud of unknowing, prejudice and ignorance that threatens the laws of enlightenment. □

RECENT SPEAKERS

On April 14, 2004, **Charles Moskos**, Professor Emeritus of Sociology, Northwestern University, addressed the National Strategy Forum on the findings of his field research conducted from November 29, 2003, to December 7, 2003, in Kuwait, Qatar, and Iraq.

Professor Moskos stated that the most important finding of his research is that active-duty soldiers displayed a higher level of morale than was expected and that the reservists, both the Army and National Guard soldiers, displayed a low level of morale. Reservists complained that they are treated as “second class citizens.” They frequently serve longer terms than do the active-duty soldiers, they are less likely to know the end date of their deployment, and they receive less compensation than the civilian contractors.

Another important finding is that the mission of Operation Iraqi Freedom has not been clearly defined for the soldiers. It has elements of combat, guerilla warfare, peacekeeping, and occupation. He suggested that the ambiguity of the mission makes the role of the chaplaincy particularly important. Chaplains act as both spiritual advisors and counselors. Soldiers feel more comfortable confiding in a chaplain rather than a therapist because of the stigma attached to seeking mental healthcare.

Professor Moskos offered several recommendations concerning how to improve the operations in Iraq, Qatar, and Kuwait including:

- Develop a more salient, accurate, and thorough field manual for soldiers.
- Provide greater recognition for the duties performed by the military police.
- Consider the use of short-term active-duty enlistments to perform duties currently conducted by reservists.
- Consider requiring that incoming NCOs and junior officers participate in a short semi-intensive course on Arab culture and common Arab expressions.
- Consider recruiting assistance from local Iraqis in exchange for high pay or guaranteed pensions.□

On May 12, 2004, **Ambassador Margaret Tutwiler**, Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, US Department of State, addressed the National Strategy Forum on US public diplomacy efforts.

Ambassador Tutwiler acknowledged that the US has a “problem” with too many countries in the world – a problem that has increased through successive administrations. Solving the problem necessitates “many years of hard work” and new public diplomacy initiatives.

She stressed that US public diplomacy must extend beyond the “traditional model of government,” which includes elites and government

officials, and focus on the non-elites, particularly the youth, who are a strong force within their countries.

Tutwiler commented on the importance of the media outlets and information technology. She said that the US must use all information channels including television, radio, newspapers, and the internet, that are widely accessible by foreign audiences, to “annunciate, defend, and articulate” not only its strategic interests and policies, but also its culture and values.

Tutwiler identified several programs aimed at engaging and informing foreign audiences, particularly in the Arab and Muslim world. For example, in 2003 the State Department sponsored 30,000 academic, professional, and other exchanges worldwide and facilitated nearly 500 interviews and press conferences with senior State Department officials for foreign media outlets.

In mid-March, the Chicago Sister Cities International Program, Casablanca, Morocco sent a delegation of 82 people to Casablanca to participate in exchanges across a broad spectrum of issues including cultural, educational, medical, business development, technology, and urban planning. The success of this program is attributed to the trust, respect, and friendship between the people of Casablanca and the people of Chicago.

Tutwiler emphasized the pivotal role of the American public in the US public diplomacy campaign. She stated that every US citizen has a responsibility to inform and educate others about the American identity in a culturally sensitive way. Traveling abroad presents every American

with an opportunity to act as a diplomat and to promote a positive image of the US.

Ambassador Tutwiler stated that the US will continue to make mistakes, but she is “optimistic” that the US can achieve a more positive and accurate image abroad. □

On May 11, 2004, Dr. Mehmet Aydin, the Turkish Minister of State and a former professor of Theology, addressed the National Strategy Forum on the nexus between religion, culture, and politics.

Turkey, a secular Muslim state since its founding in 1921, has adapted to the exigencies of a rapidly changing contemporary world.

Dr. Aydin explained that the vision of Turkey’s founder, Kemal Ataturk, was a departure from Turkey’s history and tradition. He recognized the need to utilize culture to create a balanced normative religion that could be adapted to the modern world. This created the direction for incremental change resulting in modern Turkey that has a dual European and Asian perspective and orientation.

Dr. Aydin asserted that Turkey meets all of the political and economic criteria for European Union (EU) membership. He suggested that Turkey could provide guidance to some reluctant EU states regarding their orientation towards their Muslim citizens.

Dr. Aydin stated that democracy is not a monopoly of Christian states. Turkey has demonstrated that Islam is compatible with Western values and traditions. Turkey is a model. □

STRATEGY WATCH

A summary of recent events

March 2004–June 2004

Middle East

In early March suicide bombers kill nearly 170 people in a series of attacks on Shia Muslims in Karbala, **Iraq**. In mid-March the 25 members of the American-appointed Iraq Governing Council agree to a new interim constitution that gives Kurds autonomy in a federal state and makes Islam a source of legislation. In mid-May the president of the Iraqi Governing Council is killed by a car bomb near coalition headquarters in **Baghdad**. Twenty-two people are dead after one of the most violent conflicts between Serbs and Albanians in **Kosovo**. In **Syria** 25 people are killed after police come to blows with the country's ethnic minority. In late March **Israeli** forces assassinate Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, leader of the main **Palestinian** Hamas movement. One month later, they kill his predecessor, Abdel Aziz Rantisi. The international community condemns the assassinations. Mohamed El Baradei, head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, declares that **Iran** promises to uncover more about the nation's nuclear weapons program. **Pakistan** declares that it is willing to discuss nuclear disarmament with India. In late April various militant Islamic groups, demanding the withdrawal of US troops from **Iraq**, kidnap 40 foreign civilians. In **Saudi Arabia** Muslim fundamentalists kill two Americans, two British, an Australian, and a local policeman. In mid-May **Turkey** foils an Al-Qaeda plot to bomb the NATO summit to be held in Istanbul in late June. The southern **Greek** re-

gion of Cyprus rejects the UN Annan Plan in a referendum for a unified Cyprus.

North America

Thirty-six people are killed and several neighborhoods are destroyed by floods in northern **Mexico**. In early April Vice President Cheney confirms that the US does not support an independent Taiwan or any reunification brought about by force. In early May photographs and reports emerge showing the mistreatment of Iraqi detainees by American troops sparking outrage among the American public and the international community.

South America

In early March six people are killed and dozens are wounded during five days of opposition protests in **Venezuela**. Several weeks later President Hugo Chavez makes veiled threats to stop selling oil to the US, accusing the US of backing a campaign to oust him. In late April he sends a message of support to the Iraqi insurgents. **Argentina** avoids defaulting on \$3.1 billion due to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Former **Haitian** President Jean-Bertrand Aristide claims that the US ousted and abducted him. The former president finds refuge in the Central African Republic before heading to Jamaica. In the interim, Boniface Alexandre assumes the role of president

THE NSF REVIEW STRATEGY WATCH

In mid-March a series of bomb attacks on the **Madrid, Spain**, rail network kills approximately 170 people.

In **India**, Sonia Gandhi, Italian-born daughter-in-law of the late Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and the widow of former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, is elected unanimously as leader of the Congress Alliance. Following the election, she withdraws her name for consideration for next prime minister.

In late April **North Korean** president Kim Jung Il makes a secret visit to **China** to discuss its nuclear program and its deterring economy.

In early May photographs and reports emerge showing the mistreatment of Iraqi detainees by **American** troops sparking outrage among the American public and the international community.

and names his cabinet while American troops begin the disarmament process. In late March the government of **Peru** agrees to dissolve its intelligence services claiming that several agents have close ties with former President Alberto Fujimori and former chief spy Vladimiro Montesinos. Rio de Janeiro calls on the **Brazilian** government to deploy its army to quell the fighting between rival drug clans. The government decides that the police are a sufficient force. Following Spain's lead, **Honduran** President Ricardo Maduro announces that he will pull his troops out of Iraq as soon as possible. **Mexico** and **Peru** recall their ambassadors from Havana after Cuban President Fidel Castro criticizes the two countries for siding with the US in condemning human rights violations on the island. In **Bolivia** radical groups strike after President Carlos Mesa approves the export of natural gas to Argentina, forcing the leader to resign.

Africa

The **African Union** declares that its members will establish a security council with a standing army to prevent or mitigate civil war in the continent. A French police investigation blames **Rwandan** President Paul Kagame for shooting down his predecessor's plane in 1994. President Kagame denies the charges and alleges that France directly abetted the 1994 genocide that followed the death of then President Juvenal Habyarimana. The government of **Zimbabwe** arrests and charges approximately 70 suspected mercenaries with plotting to oust the president of **Equatorial Guinea**. In early April the African

National Congress of **South Africa** wins the country's third all-race elections. The parliament of **Zanzibar** outlaws homosexuality. Thousands flee **Sri Lanka** after a clash between rival factions in the Tamil Tigers. **Libya** sentences one Palestinian doctor and five Bulgarian nurses to death by firing squad for deliberately infecting some 400 children with HIV. **Sudan** wins a seat on the UN's human rights commission despite its existing policy of ethnic cleansing that has caused one million black Sudanese to flee to the western region of Darfur. In **Nigeria** Christian militiamen attack and kill five hundred to six hundred Muslims with machine guns.

Europe

In early March a terrorist group issues threats to blow up parts of a railway network in **France**. In mid-March a series of bomb attacks on the **Madrid, Spain**, rail network kills approximately 170 people. Weeks later, six Islamic terrorists suspected of executing the Madrid attacks are killed after one of them detonates a bomb as police try to enter their apartment. Following the bombings, the Socialists unexpectedly win Spain's elections. The newly elected President Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero announces that Spain will pull its troops out of Iraq. The conservative New Democracy party wins the March elections in **Greece** making Costas Karamanlis the youngest prime minister to date. British Prime Minister Tony Blair meets with **Libyan** leader Muammar Qaddafi to discuss international efforts to restore relations with Libya as a reward for forfeiting its weapons of mass destruction. The **Lithuanian**

parliament impeaches President Rolandas Paksas. The parliament of **France** backs a draft law that will delegate more power to its regions. In late April **British** Prime Minister Tony Blair declares that there will be a referendum on the EU constitution. In early May the **European Union** welcomes ten new member nations including eight former Soviet bloc states (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia) and two Mediterranean islands (Cyprus and Malta).

Asia

In early March the six-nation talks concerning **North Korea's** nuclear weapons program end in a stalemate. They will meet again in late 2004. In late April North Korean president Kim Jung Il makes a secret visit to China to discuss its nuclear program and its deteriorating economy. In **Malaysia** Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi dissolves parliament and calls for an election. **India** announces that its parliamentary elections will begin at the end of April. In mid-May Sonia Gandhi, Italian-born daughter-in-law of the late Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and the widow of former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, is elected unanimously as leader of the Congress Alliance. Shortly thereafter, Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee resigns his post ending his six years in power. Sonia Gandhi withdraws her name for consideration for next prime minister. **South Korean** opposition parties propose the first impeachment motion against a president to date. In mid-March President Roh Moo-hyun is impeached. Weeks later, the South Korean courts restore him to office. Tens of thousands of

South Koreans protest in opposition to the impeachment. President Chen Shui-ban of **Taiwan** is narrowly re-elected. Opposition candidate Lien Chan claims that irregularities spoiled the election and alleges that President Chen staged his own attack for voter sympathy and demands a recount. Chen agrees to a recount. Fighting in **Nepal** kills nearly 200 people. In mid-May **China** announces a plan to assist Pakistan in building a nuclear-power plant.

Caucasus

In **Georgia** President Mikhail Saakashvili asserts control over the Ajarian region.

RESEARCH REPORTS

Summaries of recent articles presenting new ideas on international affairs

Goodbye to Berlin?

By Walter Russell Mead

The National Interest, Spring 2004

Pages 19-28

Walter Russell Mead is the Henry A. Kissinger Senior Fellow for US Foreign Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations and author of *Power, Terror, Peace, and War: America's Grand Strategy in a World at Risk*.

Mead examines why Germany's influence on US foreign policymaking has diminished.

According to the author, "Red State" or "American Revivalist" policymakers are the chief reason for the lack of German influence in the US foreign policy agenda. The author writes that "Red State" refers to those parts of the United States where there was a strong electoral support for Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush in the 2000 election. "American Revivalists" include both the Jacksonian popular nationalists and the neoconservatives who have heavily influenced American foreign policy since September 11. They "think Germany's advice is mostly bad, and so they want to take as little of it as possible." Several factors contribute to this attitude including Germany's foreign policy track record in the post Cold War era (the author notes Germany's decision to recognize Croatia in 1991 and the impact of that decision on the Balkan conflict) and its marginal role in European institutions.

A closer look reveals that the root of the problem is much deeper – differing perspectives regarding Europe and its role in the international community underlie the rift between Germany and the US. Germany sees Europe as a rising peer competitor to the US. The US views Germany as part of Europe - a region exhibiting slow economic progress and negative demographic trends. Many US policymakers believe that Europe "wants real political control over vital American foreign policy in exchange for kind words at the UN, mostly symbolic military support and limited financial aid." The author highlights the European demand for the non-reciprocal veto over American actions abroad. He suggests that Europe should abandon its quest to alter America's primacy perception or accept "permanent frustration and unhappiness resulting from America's unshakable refusal to engage on these terms."

Another contentious issue between the US and Germany is France. Many Americans believe that Germany has demonstrated "weakness and diplomatic inadequacy." France has "consistently outmaneuvered and outclassed its German partners" on world affairs."

Mead offers three avenues to restore the historic alliance between the US and Germany. First, Germany needs to exercise more effective and forceful diplomacy with its neighbors. He writes that Germany's "historic task" is not to "abandon European integration for the sake of

France.” Second, the US and Germany must develop a common approach to the problems of the Middle East. Third, these two nations must also examine the future of the Transatlantic Alliance and the future role of Europe in global affairs and a “US-German conversation must be a central part of it.” □

International Trade

By Arvind Panagariya

Foreign Policy, November/December 2003

Pages 20-29

Arvind Panagariya is a professor of economics and co-director of the Center for International Economics at the University of Maryland, College Park. He is coauthor of *Lectures on International Trade* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998) with Jagdish Bhagwati and T.N. Srinivasan.

Panagariya refutes the debates concerning “fair trade” that have hindered the global trading system.

Openness to trade is “indispensable” for economic growth

According to the author, openness to trade forces increases competition for entrepreneurs, it affords access to the best technology, and it allows countries to specialize in “what they do best.” The author notes that macroeconomic and political stability and other policies are required as well.

Rich countries are not more protectionist than poor ones

The author suggests that not all poor countries are protectionist either; however, on average, developing countries have higher tariffs on industrial products, and textiles and clothing sectors. According to the author, “overall, the countries that stand to benefit most from greater competition and openness are those nations that display the highest protection, including most countries in South Asia and Africa.” Many developing countries produce and export labor-intensive products including textiles, clothing, leather, and footwear that attract high duties in importing countries in North America, Latin America, and Asia.

Freer trade does not increase poverty in the Third World

Panagariya writes that openness to international trade spurs rapid economic growth. He notes several countries with newly industrialized economies that have experienced growth free of poverty including Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan. He identifies three channels through which openness to trade helps the poor: (1) “the active ‘pull-up’ – sustained growth rapidly absorbs the poor into gainful employment;” (2) growth generates fiscal resources that can be used for anti-poverty campaigns, and (3) growth helps raise incomes of poor families which improves their ability to access health and educational resources.

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Agricultural protectionism in rich nations does not necessarily worsen global poverty

If developed countries were to abandon agricultural protectionism, both rich and poor nations would suffer the consequences – increased worldwide prices of agricultural products. Also, agricultural liberalization would only benefit rich countries, “which bear the bulk of the cost of the subsidies and protection, and their domestic consumers.”

Protectionism should not beget protectionism

The author states that “protectionism by rich nations merits opposition;” however, he asserts that poor countries should “dismantle their own protectionist policies in order to increase trade and stimulate economic growth” regardless of whether or not rich countries lower their trade barriers. These barriers can often times be circumvented by countries with “outward-oriented policies” and result in expanded exports.

Development will be included in the World Trade Organization Doha agenda

Trade negotiations between rich and poor countries regarding the removal of tariff-peaks from developing countries and the reduction of agricultural protection in rich nations are “far from buried.” According to the author, when the negotiations conclude, “development concerns will be central to the agreement.” However, many developing countries have objected to the inclusion of several development issues (for example, investment, and competition policy) that would require them to adopt “developed-country

practices and regulations” which would “impose asymmetric obligations” for which many developing countries lack the resources.

The World Trade Organization does not harm poor countries

Notwithstanding the dominance of developed countries and the imbalance of negotiating power, “the WTO is the best friend available to exporters in poor nations.” It offers developing countries “a rule-based forum in which to defend their trading interests and rights.”

Free trade is not bad for the environment

The author acknowledges that free trade can hurt the global environment, but it can also produce benefits. Furthermore, “when trade produces adverse environmental effects, the solution is not to ban or restrict trade,” but rather “governments should adopt environmental policies to achieve environmental objectives and allow trade policy to target economic objectives.”□

The Next Battleground in the Terror War

By Lisa D. Cook

Hoover Digest: Research and Opinion on Public Policy, No. 1, 2004

Pages 70-75

Lisa D. Cook is a fellow at the Hoover Institution and a development economist at Harvard University.

Lisa D. Cook contends that the US has made commendable progress towards mitigating the

terrorist threat posed by African failed states. However, she writes that the war on terror is far from won on the African continent. The November 2002 Al Qaeda terrorist attacks in Kenya put Africa on the US national security map and “ignited the debate within the national security community on the vulnerability of passenger airlines to surface-to-air missiles and on intelligence-sharing across countries.”

To date, the US has implemented some initiatives that address the problems of the African continent. For example, the US has provided diplomatic support to the leaders of several regional states, including Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Sudan, and Liberia, burdened by civil conflict.

According to the author, “one of Africa’s greatest problems is that it receives such fleeting attention from the United States. Occasional interest emerges when the latest vicious civil war, crippling natural disaster or large scale humanitarian crisis erupts on the continent...” Diplomatic support for democratization is not enough to minimize the terrorist threat in Africa. Cook suggests a multifaceted approach composed of four steps:

The United States should:

1. Reward leaders who are responsive to the needs of their citizens and pressure those who are not.
2. Help reduce poverty and improve sustainability by helping to extend the capacities of the African economies. One way of doing this is to accelerate existing programs aimed at improving economic conditions but exhibit slow progress, including the African Growth and Opportunity Act.
3. Improve existing HIV/AIDS programs (for

example, the authors suggests that the US should match pledges to payments made to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS) and encourage greater financial support from the international community.

4. Provide resources that will assist in enforcing and sustaining peace in the African states. □

The Outsourcing Bogeyman

By Daniel W. Drezner

Foreign Affairs, May/June 2004

Pages 22-34

Daniel W. Drezner is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago and author of *The Sanctions Paradox*.

Daniel Drezner contends that the negative claims made by alarmists about the effects of outsourcing are “exaggerated” and that the resulting provocation of lawmakers and workers could “do more harm than good.” Drezner concedes that outsourcing is a critical issue that needs to be addressed; however, he writes that hype could prompt a public demand for protectionism, which would not solve the problems of the US economy and would yield negative short-term and long-term effects.

“Outsourcing occurs when a firm subcontracts a business function to an outside supplier.” Several institutes have conducted surveys regarding the effects of outsourcing on US jobs and the projections are concurrent - over the next five to ten years, a few million jobs will migrate overseas, mainly from the financial and information technology (IT) sectors. At first glance, the numbers are disheartening. However, Drezner

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asserts that the American public must “separate fact from fiction.”

According to the author, “the predictions are of gross, not net, losses” and “that close to 90 percent of the jobs in the United States require geographic proximity,” and thus, will not be affected by the outsourcing phenomenon (for example, retail, restaurants, marketing, research, development, to name a few.) Drezner notes “it is debatable whether actual levels of outsourcing will ever match current predictions” and “even if the most dire-sounding forecasts come true, the impact on the economy will be negligible.”

The jobs that are being sent offshore are mainly from the manufacturing sector. This has little to do with trade and much to do with technological innovation. As for the service sector, “the data contradicts the popular belief that US jobs are being lost to foreign countries without anything to replace them.”

To explain this phenomenon, Drezner cites a study conducted by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York which suggests that the job loss the US is experiencing is the result of a “structural transformation: jobs are disappearing from the old sectors (such as manufacturing) and created in new ones (such as mortgage brokering)” meaning “the recent recession and current recovery are a more extreme version of the downturn and jobless recovery of the early 1990s.”

The author also notes that outsourcing has economic benefits – US firms become more profitable which in turn benefits shareholders and increases returns on investment and non-economic benefits. (Many countries in which the US has established outsourcing operations are allies in the war on terrorism including India,

Poland, and the Philippines.)

The author writes that “the problem of outsourcing is less one of economics than psychology – people feel that their jobs are threatened.” Solutions to the problem include expanding the criteria under which the Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) program applies to displaced workers and helping firms purchase targeted insurance policies to offset the transition costs to workers directly affected by offshore outsourcing.

According to the author, “outsourcing is not the bogeyman that critics say it is.” Moreover, the arguments against outsourcing need to be refuted; otherwise, the effects could be detrimental. □

A Normal Country

Andrei Shleifer and Daniel Treisman
Foreign Affairs, March/April 2004
Pages 20-38

Andrei Schleifer is the Whipple V.N. Jones Professor of Economics at Harvard University. **Daniel Treisman** is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Los Angeles.

Andrei Schleifer and Daniel Treisman argue that the Western characterization of Russia as a “disastrous failure” is erroneous and that the country’s metamorphosis is cause for commendation. Despite a very tumultuous transition from communist dictatorship to multi-party democracy, Russia has achieved “admirable” social and economic progress comparable to other “normal middle-income countries.”

According to the authors, the belief that Russia's economy shrunk in the 1990s is not entirely accurate - the drop in economic output was overstated, the estimated economic decline was significantly smaller, and the consequences of Russia's stagnation were exaggerated. They acknowledge that the 1990's were a "decade of extreme macroeconomic turbulence in Russia," but when compared to other post-communist economies of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, Russia's performance was not atypical. Several countries including Poland, Tajikistan, and the Czech Republic exhibited a similar decline in output and Russia "performed roughly as one might have expected." Today, Russia "is a marketplace of mostly private firms, producing goods and services to please consumers instead of planners."

The authors refute the claim that the privatization programs implemented in the early 1990's are to blame for Russia's economic decline and economic inequality. They argue that economic decline actually slowed and that economic inequality decreased following the implementation of the privatization programs. Nor is the small class of oligarchs to blame for Russia's poor economic growth. According to the authors, Russia's "oligarch-controlled companies have performed extremely well," and they have "followed the example of oligarchs everywhere," including in the United States.

Russia's political institutions have also come under intense criticism concerning the legitimacy of its democratic infrastructure and democratic values including political freedom and civil liberties. The authors write that Russia's political institutions are "imperfect," but that the criti-

cism is "overblown."

The authors attribute the misperceptions concerning Russia's post-communist transition to four factors: (1) Sensationalism among Western newspapers and television stations, (2) Russia's position as the poster child for globalization opponents, (3) Russia's position as a "football in American politics" during the Clinton administration," and (4) Russia did not look like the other middle-income countries with its "brilliant physicists and chess players, its space program, and its global military influence." □

The New Geopolitics of Oil

By Joe Barnes, Amy Jaffe and Edward L. Morse
The National Interest, Special Energy Supplement, Winter 2003/2004

Joe Barnes is a research fellow for the Baker Institute of Public Policy at Rice University and a former member of the State Department Policy Planning Staff. **Amy Jaffe** is the Wallace Wilson Fellow for Energy Studies at the Baker Institute and Associate Director of the Rice University Energy Program. She is project director for the Baker Institute/Council on Foreign Relations Task Force of Strategic Energy Policy chaired by Edward L. Morse. **Edward L. Morse** is Executive Advisor at Hess Energy Trading Company and was Deputy Assistance Secretary of State for International Energy Policy in 1979-1981.

There is a broad-ranging concern among the American public with regard to US oil dependence on the Middle East. According to the authors, there is a lot of talk and little action on the

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topic of how to approach this challenge. This policy inaction can be attributed to the US “political domestic inability to forge rigorous compromises to achieve energy security.” Should the US practice conservation or increase domestic production? Regardless of the rhetoric, the reality is that US oil consumption is on the rise. US oil demand is about 20 million barrels per day, of which forty percent is produced domestically.

One of the key components of the US energy strategy is building cooperative relationships with major foreign oil producers - most importantly, Saudi Arabia, which the authors note, is “the centerpiece of the status quo.” The Saudi capital of Riyadh is the world’s largest exporter of oil and possesses a quarter of the global petroleum reserves in addition to excess capacity for use in an emergency. However, there has been continual intense criticism by conservative commentators since 9/11 regarding Saudi involvement in the terrorist attacks.

How can the US reconcile security and energy? Look to other major oil producers – Russia and Iraq. Russian oil development has been on the strategic radars of both countries since 2001. Russia is the largest non-OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) oil exporter in the world and second to Saudi Arabia in total world exports. However, the authors note several obstacles to Russia’s “quest” to equal or surpass Saudi Arabia in the international oil markets:

- Inadequate rule of law protections in the business sector which might hinder Russia’s ability to attract private investments
- Technological, economic, and bureaucratic

barriers to new investment in other areas, including the Russian Far East

- Lack of excess capacity for emergency use
- Relatively expensive oil production costs
- Lack of international commercial ties with East Asia or North America

A second alternative to Russia is Iraq. It possesses eleven percent of the world’s proven oil reserves, second to Saudi Arabia. According to the authors, “under optimal circumstances, Iraq could be very attractive to foreign investors because of its low production costs and proximity to the Persian Gulf and Mediterranean Sea”; however, this optimism may be eclipsed by security concerns, the high cost of expanding Iraqi oil production, and uncertainties regarding privatization and OPEC membership.

Other oil producing regions, including Central Asia and the Caucasus, Latin America, and Africa promise little oil output to the international markets because of political, economic, and social instability. Even Canada, a “key alternative” that is not currently being pursued by the US, faces daunting environmental barriers to the production of its “promising” tar and sand resources.

According to the authors, it may be difficult for the US, Saudi Arabia, Russia, and ultimately Iraq to develop a common production policy because the interests of oil suppliers and consumers diverge. The US should examine alternative energy resources including hydrogen fuel. Still, this option faces several barriers.

The US must act pragmatically and it must be willing to compromise “its unrestrained oil addiction.” According to the authors, a hybrid policy of conservation and increased domestic

production will prove risky, expensive, and ultimately ineffective. The authors suggest that “the United States should turn back to multinational agencies and push more seriously for new ways to bring the rules of global oil trade and investment in harmony with rules governing other trade in manufactures and services” – liberalization and open access in all international energy resources. □

Japan’s English Lessons

by Bill Emmott

Foreign Policy, January/February 2004

Pages 51-56

Bill Emmott is editor of *The Economist*. He is the author of three books on Japan and of *20/21 Vision: Twentieth-Century Lessons for the Twenty-First Century* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2003).

For Japan to adapt to the post-9/11 global security environment, Bill Emmott suggests that it must deviate from its pacifist orientation and “develop a capacity for independent knowledge, thought, and action that does not cut across or undermine its close alliance with the United States.” For guidance, Japan can look to America’s strongest ally – Britain.

Emmott writes that Britain and Japan share several commonalities - for example, both island nations have historically sought to bridle neighbors seeking to advance their own interests, and since WWII, both nations have forged a close relationship with the US. These relationships, Emmott notes, represent “a defeat for old aspirations and self-images” for both countries. Over the past six decades, Britain has opted to

develop a greater sense of independence from the US with regard to its foreign policy, whereas Japan has chosen a more “servile relationship.”

Many commentators speculate that Japan’s passive posture is a cover for a hidden agenda – “a free ride on US defense spending.” However, others argue that Japan’s subservience may have happened “by default.” Following WWII, Japan relied on the US for military protection because it was prohibited under a US-imposed constitution from developing defense capabilities beyond basic self-defense. Over the past several decades, Japan has made efforts to strengthen its defense capabilities with the intention of never having to use them.

With the growing lethal threat of North Korea, Japanese leaders have suggested that Japan should be prepared to react to North Korea’s hard-line strategic posturing (for example, contemplating a preemptive strike should danger to Japan be detected). Emmott writes that the realization of the North Korean threat to Japan has “shifted the balance of Japanese politics away from pacifism, enabling a slow but steady dismantling of some of the legal obstacles preventing the country from having a normal defense stance.” For example, Japan launched a spy satellite program in March 2003 costing more than 2 billion dollars. Emmott writes that this program indicates that Japan wants to play a larger role in intelligence gathering and that Japan “is no longer sure close ties with the United States are enough and is beginning to cover itself for the possibility that Washington might be too pre-occupied elsewhere in the world to pay sufficient attention to Japan and North Korea.”

Emmott writes that Japan’s concerns are valid and that the country faces a complex chal-

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lenge. The solution? Do as the British do: “be dependent [on the US] but also more independent,” maintain a close relationship with the US, but develop the capacity to act independently of the US. This may be a daunting task for Japan. It is in a very different position than Britain – it bears the burden of its historic passivity, it does not hold a seat on the UN Security Council, and it is not a member of a regional institution like the EU. However, Japan’s Ground Self-Defense Force is “almost one and a half times the size of the British army. More hardware and software investment, as well as declared intention to establish a nuclear deterrent ... would bring Japan’s military posture more in line with Britain’s.” Still, Japanese troops are inexperienced in warfare. Their military force must be exercised through local or regional deployments. □

THE NATIONAL STRATEGY FORUM, INC.

53 West Jackson Blvd., Suite 516
Chicago, IL 60604

T: 312.697.1286

F: 312.697.1296

Email: nsf@nationalstrategy.com

Website: www.nationalstrategy.com