



NATIONAL STRATEGY FORUM REVIEW

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STRATEGY WATCH

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- The advancement and preservation of democracy is essential to promote human rights, inspire principled cultural achievement, and maximize economic development.
- Informed public opinion and an enduring non-partisan consensus are fundamental parts of national security in a democratic society.

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The National Strategy Forum has no membership fees, but it depends upon the support of its members. The Forum is a publicly supported charitable institution under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. As a non-profit organization, the Forum is funded solely by contributions from individuals, foundations, and corporations. All contributions to the Forum are tax deductible.

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NATIONAL STRATEGY FORUM REVIEW

Volume 15, Issue 3

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LETTER FROM THE PUBLISHER

American power was at its zenith during the period 1989 to 1991 when the former Soviet Union collapsed and the US emerged as the world's sole superpower. This led to an inflated sense of US primacy and power – that it could act as it pleased in world affairs.

Subsequent to 1991, an array of emerging global issues suggests the need to recalibrate the extent of US primacy and power.

- **Militant Islamic Terrorism:** the ability of relatively small groups to destabilize the US economy and threaten the personal security of US citizens
- **Asymmetric warfare:** the ability of weak states and small groups to use conventional weapons technology and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to frustrate US military force projection
- **Oil dependency:** Oil drives the US economy. Much of the world's oil resources are held by states that are politically unstable or are declared adversaries/enemies of the US.
- **Anti-American populism:** the rise of adversaries in Latin America, the United States' backyard (Venezuela, Bolivia, and possibly Peru)
- **Globalization:** Some commentators believe the consequences of globalization will threaten US prosperity in both the short- and long-term.
- **The rise of People's Republic of China (PRC):** China's long shadow over US interests in Asia
- **Foreign perceptions of the US:** pervasive anti-Americanism abroad

The spate of post-1991 US foreign policy problems and failure to identify emerging issues in a timely manner, coupled with miscalculation of US ability to influence events, suggests imperial overreach. This may be a classic case of state hubris – excessive pride and self-confidence, and arrogance.

There will be a new US administration in 2009.

It is likely that US foreign policy objectives will change. During the period preceding the 2008 US presidential election, it may be useful to re-examine the fundamentals of strategy and how they should be applied to US foreign policy.

In simple terms, strategy is the skillful use of a state's economic, diplomatic, and military forces through macro, long-range planning and implementation. There are two additional elements of strategy that are frequently ignored.

Adversaries are dynamic, not static. They have their own set of strategic objectives that, in large part, differ from and are in conflict with the objectives of an opponent. Competitive strategy is the ability to recognize an opponent's enduring strength, determine a methodology to circumvent or weaken the opponent's strength, anticipate what counter-measures the opponent may take, and be ready to counter the opponent's counter-measures. The US failure to anticipate the depth and intensity of the Iraq insurgency is an example of US miscalculation – the inability to understand its opponent's competitive strategy.

In retrospect, because of its superpower status, US foreign policy since 1991 has not been the subject of thorough public debate focusing on its strategic objectives and what goals are attainable. The result has been near-term tactical thinking rather than a strategic evaluation of where we are and where we want to be in the future.

Complementary strategy is an innovative idea to graft onto traditional strategic thinking. This begins with an examination of US strategic objectives. US policymakers must identify and understand the strategic objectives of other states. This innovative approach seeks to adapt US objectives to the objectives of other states, if it is possible to do so without substantially weakening US strategic objectives. In street terms, this means giving the other person or state a 60-40 bargain. This may be the mark of a truly great power. One immediate consequence

could be the likelihood of gaining many more and new friends for the US and repairing relationships with some old ones.

It might be time to revive the old maxim, “doing well by doing good,” and apply it to contemporary US foreign policy. Resource wars over oil and water shortages are a distinct future possibility. These challenges present an opportunity for US leadership that would be well received by the global community and a wide spectrum of American citizens – practicality coupled with altruism.

An example of US complementary strategy can be applied to the PRC, which is energy-deficient and oil-hungry; and its appetite for oil will increase in the future. The PRC’s hot economy will intensify its need for oil, drive up the world price of oil, and increase the likelihood of conflict with the US. Consider engaging the PRC in a joint quest for new technologies that would result in reducing both US and PRC dependence on fossil fuel. This could include technology-competent India and Israel, both of which are also oil dependent. A similar joint venture could address the water shortage problem (desalinization and conservation of monsoon rainwater).

Perhaps the proposed energy and water technology joint venture ideas suffer from being overly optimistic. However, it is a vision that may have resonance with American citizens, neighbors, and many other states which have a latent respect for America’s values.

We have asked friends and scholars to examine the dynamics of US friend and foe relationships. Through these discussions we hope to gain insight into possible strategies for US foreign policy in the near future. •

An article entitled “Unions and Policy” by Dan Swinney appeared in the Spring 2006 *National Strategy Forum Review*, “The Domestic Dimension of US Foreign Policy.” The website of the Center for Labor and Community Research website is www.clcr.org. It contains additional information about the Illinois High Performance Manufacturing Initiative, the Chicago Manufacturing Renaissance, and Austin Polytechnical Academy.

UNDERSTANDING THE PRIVATIZATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY

The National Strategy Forum and the American Bar Association Standing Committee on Law and National Security sponsored a recent conference on the subject of “Understanding the Privatization of National Security,” which was underwritten by the McCormick Tribune Foundation. The conference addressed the national security implications of the trend toward privatizing functions traditionally performed by government.

The following issues were discussed:

- Factors that have impelled the increased utilization of Private Security Companies (PSCs) and Private Military Companies (PMCs)
- Negative and positive factors associated with governmental reliance on PSCs and PMCs
- Red tape issues: Are there missions that only the government should do? What missions should be outsourced to PSCs and PMCs?
- Policymaking for government-PSC/PMC issues
- Legal and accountability issues; self-regulation mechanisms; and Congressional oversight and the need for new legislation
- Ethical issues regarding the government-private contractor relationship
- The use of PSCs and PMCs for domestic security including critical infrastructure protection, catastrophic terrorism incidents, natural disasters, and border security (in lieu of state national guard troops)
- Lessons learned from the military-PSC/PMC relationship that can be applied to their future use for various security missions

RENEWING TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS

The Global Euro-Atlantic Agenda

J.D. Bindenagel

After the contentious debate over the war in Iraq, it is time to renew the Euro-Atlantic agenda and the international cooperation needed for a successful security strategy. The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 was a triumph of the moral values underpinning a common European-American commitment to democracy and human rights as well as of the true strength of America to stand steadfastly with its allies. It ended an existential Soviet threat that for decades had kept the United States and Europe together. When the Berlin Wall fell on November 9, 1989, the world celebrated the end of the Cold War, and we imagined at that moment that there could be a new world based on democracy, human rights, and the rule of law.

However, in the years that followed the world descended quickly into terror, genocide and war. Bosnia, Chechnya, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Afghanistan, Darfur, and Iraq have wrecked that dream of a peaceful, democratic world. In its place we find it inescapable that today's political and strategic cooperation and competition take place in the context of competition for energy. Following the surge in Chinese and Indian demand for oil, the need for greater supplies of energy, more refining capacity, and the uncertainty in the suppliers market, including Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran, Nigeria, Venezuela, Central Asia, the Caspian and others, will sow the seeds of conflict in the 21st century.

The old realist school in America and in Europe, based on the Wilsonian commitment to universal principles embedded in international law and human rights, now faces its greatest challenge. Preventive war in Iraq and the new US National Security Strategy with the pre-emption doctrine has divided Europe and the United States. Until international agreement can be reached on who decides the legitimacy of preventive war and on what basis, the world will be more unstable.

As we face this new, more dangerous world, it is clear that it would take something extraordi-

nary, or an unusual combination of circumstances, to get Europe, Asia and the United States to agree on global collective security. To see the challenge, one needs only to look at China, which is shedding its communist dogma; Russia, which is moving between democracy and autocratic governance; Europe, which has introduced transnational, pooled sovereignty; France, which strives to be the leader of Europe; Germany, which has emerged from the disaster of the Second World War and the Holocaust with a strong commitment to human dignity; and the United States, which envisions a transformed, democratic world.

Nevertheless, a global Euro-Atlantic agenda can define a common course for the United States and its European friends by building on common interests that we share at our core. The key challenge for Euro-Atlantic nations, as Henry Kissinger reminds us often, is "to develop a new sense of common destiny in the age of jihad, the rise of Asia, and the emerging universal problems of poverty, pandemics, and energy, among many others."

President Bush's revised National Security Strategy is based on the twin pillars of promoting freedom and confronting challenges, and his aspiration is to create a transformational American Foreign Policy promoting democracy globally with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world. The United States needs its allies now in new ways, and in coming years we will succeed only in partnership. Can America and Germany as well as the transatlantic community come together to put into practice that understanding?

The transatlantic community, with Germany and the United States, has the chance to seize the agenda and shape the transformation of this uncertain world. Historically, a solid and stable relationship between the United States and Germany has been the indispensable precondition for progress in democracy and the rule of international law and provides the basis to renew the transatlantic relationship.

We know that old formulas don't work; the world is faced with threats that have caused fear. Germans and Europeans are not immune to increasing fear in the wake of a new kind of terrorism in Europe and around the world; however, fear is not a sound basis for policy. American leadership, which is vital for unity and the strength of the West, has promoted international stability despite the tumult caused by global terrorism and other threats. Can a new American strategy that is based on military pre-emption against global terrorism continue to achieve international security? Can international security and stability flow from increasing economic globalism based on shared values, commitment to democracy and human rights?

It is perhaps in the Middle East where we need most to have a global Euro-Atlantic agenda to create hope, security, and stability.

Europeans and Americans believe in freedom and wish to promote democracy and human rights, while establishing international order and managing the competition over energy resources found in the most unstable parts of the world. In order to set out on a common policy course, I offer three urgent issues for the debate over a global Euro-Atlantic agenda.

Germans and Americans must better understand the roots of the 1989 Democratic Revolution in Europe that brought down the Berlin Wall and ended communism in Europe. We triumphed because we built our policies together in NATO, the UN and other international bodies, and in treaties on the basis of our united belief in freedom, democracy, rule of law, and the inviolability of human dignity. Setting aside the differences in pursuit of war in Iraq that have divided us, we need to reaffirm that these values guide our foreign policy. The end to the policy clashes, especially over Iraq, between the United States and Germany that we have endured will come slowly as we rebuild policies that are legitimized in international law.

The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks that disrupted the UN-NATO-EU partnership ended the short-lived peaceful interregnum since the fall of the Berlin Wall. Now America and its allies struggle

to eradicate the terrorist threat while maintaining our values. Some Europeans and Americans charge that American action, such as rendition, holding prisoners without access, and violating civil liberties at home, runs counter to basic American and European values. Other Americans charge that such action is necessary to fight terrorism and also to shake up a paralyzed, sluggish Europe and a sclerotic Middle East. Whatever our differences, we need to understand better the changes to the international structures – the United Nations, NATO, European Union, and others that were wrought on November 9, 1989 and on September 11, 2001. Those changes must not erode our common moral commitments. Without a commitment to our values, especially human rights and human dignity, we will not sustain public support for our policies.

German Chancellor Angela Merkel has stated that a common global policy is the only answer to the new challenges facing the Euro-Atlantic community. Chancellor Merkel's speech at the 42nd Munich Conference on Security Policy addressed the threats from "the erosion of state structures, terrorism, and weapons of mass destruction in the hands of unreliable regimes," and endorsed NATO as the key institution for managing the transatlantic community's responses based on shared interests and values. However, if NATO is to remain the key Euro-Atlantic institution over ten or twenty years, it must become the body which constantly carries out and discusses joint threat analyses. Merkel in Munich said that NATO "must be the place where political consultations take place on new conflicts arising around the world, and it should ... be the place where political and military actions are coordinated."

Recent successful NATO policies, such as the Dayton Accords, have worked to provide stability in Europe and have allowed the Balkans to recover from the terrible conflict of the 1990s. In 1999, Germany joined the United States in authorizing NATO to bomb Kosovo to end the Milosevic campaign of ethnic cleansing. That military action shaped new international law authorizing international use of force to prevent humanitarian disasters or human rights violations. These policies are shaping a new Euro-Atlantic agenda in keeping with our principles.

It is perhaps in the Middle East where we need

most to have a global Euro-Atlantic agenda to create hope, security, and stability in Iraq and to contain Iran and reinforce nuclear non-proliferation measures of the Non Proliferation Treaty and defuse conflicts over energy resources.

There remains an urgent need to address security and stability in Iraq following the withdrawal of American forces, which offers the region as a whole the opportunity to create a new security structure. Ambassador Ischinger addressed this idea when he wrote: "An effective regional security arrangement would need to take into account the interests of Israel as well as those of Iran and the Arab countries, and it would need to be led and supported by the United States, Europe and Russia. As has recently been suggested, the U.N. Security Council might provide a framework for the elaboration of such an arrangement." In the longer term, the Iraqis will need to provide for their own security and economic well-being as well as to develop their own democracy.

Germany is committed to stability in Iraq and supports the creation of viable Iraqi democratic and economical structures. Euro-Atlantic cooperation is helping to assist the Iraqi authorities in building a justice system, in establishing a free press, in training university tutors and engineers, and especially in developing vocational training. However, those tasks will fail without security and the Euro-Atlantic community should make the establishment of a regional security structure a critical component of its strategy.

In the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the recent withdrawal of Israeli settlers from Gaza and parts of the West Bank has opened a new chapter in the region and requires a new response on our part. Germany and America have affirmed the need for security and the cessation of terrorism, recognizing that the international community must do more than merely decry the violence and loss of human life affecting both sides in the conflict. In addition, economic development, as captured in the motto "Peace through Jobs," is needed in order to provide hope for those who have suffered severe economic deprivation because of the conflict, particularly in Gaza, and is critical to any lasting security and peace between Palestinians and Israelis. Without jobs for the people of Gaza, the grinding poverty of the area

will breed more despair and violence that in turn will affect Palestinians and Israelis alike.

The most urgent threat in the region is Iran. Iran is extremely challenging, especially as the regime claims it is at most a few years away from completing its nuclear program. Iranians have created a huge obstacle to good relations by pursuing nuclear weapons and by stating officially that Iran wants to wipe Israel off the map. Germans, Americans, and others

Germany and America have affirmed the need for security and the cessation of terrorism, recognizing that the international community must do more than merely decry the violence and loss of human life affecting both sides in the conflict.

have begun the necessary international cooperation with the EU3 – Germany, France, and the UK – to bring European-American diplomatic and military power to bear on the proliferation of nuclear weapons in Iran. A policy to extinguish a neighboring country is morally as well as politically repugnant. Containing Iran's desire for those weapons is a common agenda item. The

danger is both in the Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons capability and also in the doctrine of preemption, which could lead to United States' use of force in Iran. If military force is preemptively used to intervene in Iran, instead of diplomacy, that use of force will set the stage for another transatlantic standoff. We must have more diplomatic options, and to create them the prerequisite is face-to-face negotiations between the Iranians and the Americans.

Most certainly in Iran we need the help of global partners like China to deal with a non-functioning nuclear non-proliferation regime. If Iran acquires nuclear weapons, it will be the world's most formidable challenge in the Middle East.

At the same time, China has become both a partner in trade and a competitor for resources such as oil, including from Iran. The United States and Europe now have an interdependent relationship with China that links them in critical issues, such as

nuclear non-proliferation in Iran and global competition for energy resources. The Euro-Atlantic agenda urgently needs a strategy with China to deal with a wide range of global problems.

The United States also needs China to ensure a smooth-running global economy and to know when and how Europe and America can cooperate with China, even as we compete. Looking back on the debate over lifting the EU arms embargo against China is a case in point about the uncertainties in the region that will affect the Euro-Atlantic agenda. Lifting the embargo at a time when China enacted new 'anti-secession' legislation against Taiwan was ill-advised. East Asian politics are greatly influenced by unresolved issues surrounding Imperial Japanese Army actions in the region from World War II, which need to be addressed. A serious potential confrontation that could pit the United States against its European allies comes in addition to those historical grievances when Japan recently announced its support for a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan Strait conflict, which aligns the United States with Japan in a bi-lateral security treaty that could be seen as directed against China.

Of course any confrontation, unthinkable as it may be between the Chinese and Taiwanese, could lead the United States to deploy the Seventh Fleet into the Strait. It does not take much to see the possibility of Chinese arms, supplied with EU technologies or arms, directed at Taiwan but hitting United States ships in the Strait. In Congress, the strong Taiwan lobby – there is no Chinese lobby to match – would press for vigorous action against our European friends.

Consequently, we need a much deeper understanding of China and our common interests in dealing with all aspects of that relationship. It is encouraging that the consultation process between the US

and EU has begun to shape a deeper understanding of the potential in the United States' and EU's relations with China.

In the end, the transatlantic relationship can be reborn with a new Euro-Atlantic agenda. How the United States and Germany manage these issues will shape the future of the German-American relations and the world. •

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Germans, Americans, and others have begun the necessary international cooperation with the EU3 – Germany, France, and the UK – to bring European-American diplomatic and military power to bear on the proliferation of nuclear weapons in Iran.

The Evolving US-Nigerian Relationship and the War on Terrorism in Africa

Peter J. Schraeder

The Bush administration entered office with a realist-oriented foreign policy that did not perceive the African continent as an important part of the overall international strategic landscape. This geopolitical vision was altered by the attacks of 9/11, as administration officials underscored the African continent's rising status as an important "second front" in a Global War on Terrorism. The interventionist assumption behind Africa's rising geopolitical stakes is the belief that many African countries are susceptible to and, in turn, will potentially become exporters of terrorism. This is due to either the past emergence of radical regimes that were willing to host terrorist organizations on their soil (e.g., Sudan, which provided a refuge for Osama bin Laden from 1991 to 1996); the inability of weak central governments to effectively monitor outlying regions where terrorist organizations can organize and thrive (e.g., the vast Sahelian hinterlands of Chad, Niger, Mali, and Mauritania); or the threat of state collapse and the loss of state control over the territory as a whole (e.g., Somalia since 1991).

Africa's rising status in the war on terrorism is part of an evolving US foreign policy approach that divides Africa into at least four spheres of foreign policy interest: (1) those countries in the Islamic littoral of the African continent with significant Muslim populations (including predominantly Muslim countries in West Africa such as Nigeria and Senegal) that are destined to receive priority attention due to their geographical, religious and cultural proximity to the Middle East, the perceived epicenter of the Global War on Terrorism; (2) regional powers, typically Nigeria and South Africa, but also Algeria, Kenya and Senegal, that are perceived as crucial to the maintenance of regional stability and therefore "regional anchors" of counter-terrorism efforts; (3) countries deemed important to US economic interests, most notably oil-producing countries in the Gulf of Guinea region stretching from Nigeria to Angola; and (4) the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa,

which remains relegated to the back-burner of US foreign policy. Nigeria, a regional power with oil resources, is considered crucial to combating perceived terrorist threats and to leading regional security initiatives that support the Bush administration's war on terror.

NIGERIA AS A "NATIONAL SECURITY TRIFECTA"

Nigeria, considered during the 1960s to be one of the "brightest stars" of the galaxy of newly independent African countries, fell out of favor with Washington after the emergence of a series of military dictatorships that culminated in Washington's imposition of sanctions (which included a ban on the travel of Nigerian high government officials and their family members to the United States, but ultimately did not disrupt the sale of Nigerian oil to US markets). In 1998, the death of General Sani Abacha, an especially brutal dictator, ushered in Nigeria's most recent experiment with democracy, replete with competitive presidential elections that earned Olusegun Obasanjo – a former military ruler from 1976 to 1979 who spent three years in jail during the Abacha era – two terms of office as president (1999-2003 and 2003-07). Nigeria's political opening has led to a new era of especially close US-Nigerian relations, with one US official referring to Nigeria as a "national security trifecta" for US interests in Africa.

The first element of this national security trifecta is Nigeria's stature as a regional hegemonic power. In addition to having the African continent's largest population (between 130 and 150 million citizens), extensive military capabilities, and oil-based economic power, Nigeria boasts a political leadership intent on playing a leading security role in West Africa and the African continent in general. For example, Nigeria has led several peacekeeping missions in its own regional neighborhood of West Africa that positively contributed to the resolution of civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone, and has hosted peace talks designed to defuse crises in other African re-

gions. International talks held most recently in the Nigerian capital, Abuja, focused discussion on the prevention of further violence and genocide in the Darfur region of the Sudan.

This Nigerian vision, often referred to as a Pax Nigeriana, has been wholeheartedly endorsed by the Bush administration, which has the realist intention of cultivating strategic ties with African regional powers that are capable of maintaining stability within their given regions. According to the State Department's Bureau of African Affairs, Nigeria under Obasanjo has played a "pivotal role in the support of peace in Africa." At the heart of Bush administration support for Nigeria and other African regional powers is the White House's strong aversion to direct US military involvement in peacekeeping operations on the African continent, often derisively referred to during the 2000

Nigeria, a regional power with oil resources, is considered crucial to combating perceived terrorist threats and to leading regional security initiatives that support the Bush administration's war on terror.

presidential campaign as "ill-conceived exercises in nation building." It is for this reason that in 2003 the Bush administration resisted initial pleas from within the West African region and the international community to commit large numbers of US troops to stem fighting in Liberia, offering instead a limited deployment of small numbers of US troops designed to provide logistical support to a larger West African peacekeeping force led by Nigeria.

A second component of the US-Nigerian national security trifecta is the Obasanjo administration's willingness to play a leading role in the Bush administration's war on terrorism. As highlighted by the State Department's 2005 annual survey of terrorism:

- Nigeria took the lead in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union in sponsoring joint intelligence and security conferences on counterterrorism.
- The New Partnership for African Development

(NEPAD), an organization founded by President Obasanjo and other African heads of state, condemned terrorism and called for African nations to take concrete measures to combat it.

- Nigerian security services were particularly cooperative and proactive when asked to investigate potential terrorist threats to US interests.
- Nigerian intelligence and security services worked hard to improve intelligence sharing on counterterrorism issues, and the Nigerian military worked to establish units with counterterrorism capability.
- Nigeria backed UN Resolutions 1267, 1333, and 1368, which supported measures against the Taliban and condemned the terrorist attacks on September 11.
- Nigeria consistently lent diplomatic support to Coalition efforts against the Taliban and al-Qaeda, despite the domestic political ramifications in a country that is home to Africa's largest Muslim population.

Nigeria has also agreed to participate in the US-sponsored Trans-Saharan Counter Terrorism Initiative (TSCII), which promotes an integrated approach to counterterrorism that includes Nigeria and Senegal in West Africa, Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia in North Africa, and the four Sahelian countries of Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger. US officials view Nigeria as an important anchor of this trans-regional program.

The third component of the US-Nigerian national security trifecta is Nigeria's stature as a strategically important oil-producing country. As the fifth largest exporter of oil to the United States, Nigeria has 25 billion barrels of proven oil reserves. Equally important, it comprises part of an African coastal region known as the Gulf of Guinea that is expected to provide as much as 25 percent of US oil needs by 2015. This strategic reality not surprisingly has fostered a series of fledgling US security measures, inclusive of Nigeria, that together can be referred to as the Gulf of Guinea initiative, the primary goal of which is to gradually build up an effective regional security program capable of ensuring the safe transport of the region's oil resources to the United States.

NIGERIA'S ACHILLES' HEEL:**DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION OR DECAY?**

Washington's increasing reliance on Nigeria to ensure regional stability, promote counterterrorism initiatives, and fulfill rising US oil needs is nonetheless worrisome for analysts who focus on the domestic shortcomings of the Nigerian polity. The military has ruled Nigeria for most of its independence era (approximately 30 of the last 46 years), and the current elected "civilian" leadership (whose leader is a former military dictator) is perceived as unable to stem the gradual decay of Nigeria's most recent experiment with democratic rule. It is only a matter of time, according to this pessimistic vision, before the Generals return to prevent the complete unraveling of the Nigerian polity. Even the most optimistic observers of Nigerian democracy are hesitant to argue that Nigeria has reached a critical turning point in its democratic development that makes another military coup highly unlikely. Indeed, if Nigerian history is our guide, the opposite is true.

Nigerian democracy is threatened by the rise of violence between its more than 250 ethnic groups and its Muslim and Christian communities, the latter comprising roughly 50 and 40 percent of the country's total population, respectively. According to the Nigerian Commission for Refugees, for example, approximately 14,000 Nigerians have been killed and more than 3 million Nigerians have been internally displaced from their homes as a result of ethnic and religious violence that has taken place in the aftermath of the transition to democracy in 1999. This violence has been especially acute in the Niger Delta, which serves as the primary source of Nigerian oil wealth. In February 2006, oil production in Nigeria dropped by nearly 20 percent due to the intensification of domestic violence, including the kidnapping of foreign oil workers and the

bombing of oil pipelines by local militias. The Nigerian government typically responds to such acts with heavy-handed military force, which only contributes to further attacks and counter-attacks. These developments are worrisome for the Nigerian economy. Any long-term disruption of Nigerian oil exports will surely have a disastrous effect on the Nigerian economy.

Finally, Nigerian democracy itself is under pressure, as witnessed by President Obasanjo's attempts (which were rejected by the Nigerian Senate in May 2006) to change the Nigerian constitution so that he can run for a third term of office in 2007. The 2007 presidential elections will serve as a critical turning point in Nigerian history: they will either unleash greater religious, ethnic, and regional tensions that will make the country ripe for another military coup and, in the extreme, a civil war that could divide the country (especially if Obasanjo ignores the Nigerian Senate and seeks a third term of office); or they will have a calming effect that will continue the long process of consolidating democratic practices within the country. Moreover, the government's human rights record remains poor.

COLD WAR REDUX?**THE FUTURE OF US-NIGERIAN RELATIONS**

The impending challenge for the Bush administration is how to respond to events in Nigeria when the normative goal of promoting democracy clashes with the strategic goal of containing terrorist threats. The dilemma with such a policy choice is Washington's association with governments that abuse the human rights of their people, as in the case of current US ties with the Egyptian regime of Hosni Mubarak. The US also runs the risk of becoming mired in internal African conflicts that have little if anything to do with the Global War on Terrorism. For example, local leaders denounce their domestic opponents as "terrorist threats" and employ US-supplied weapons as the means for extinguishing those "threats." An overriding preoccupation with terrorist threats may once again lead Washington to overlook the authoritarian excesses of African regimes in favor of their willingness to support US national security objectives (i.e., the war on terror).

One of the primary challenges associated with the expansion of US ties with Africa's oil-rich coun-

The impending challenge for the Bush administration is how to respond to events in Nigeria when the normative goal of promoting democracy clashes with the strategic goal of containing terrorist threats.

tries including Nigeria is the potential blurring of the strategic goals of counter-terrorism and ensuring access to oil. When one adds to this mix that the majority of Africa's petroleum-producing countries constitute dictatorships in which oil wealth controlled by the few leads to resentment, unrest, and, in the extreme, insurgencies by the many determined to enjoy their fair share of these profits, the mix can be explosive. How will US policymakers respond when an oil-producing ally in the Gulf of Guinea seeks military support (or at least a US blessing) to suppress a domestic insurgency, which is born out of economic disenfranchisement but denounced by the government in power as a "terrorist threat"? If history is our guide, the lines between counter-terrorism and access to oil will be blurred by administration officials who will likely choose oil over democracy and who will be tempted to label the insurgency as a terrorist group. Indeed, according to many policy analysts, the lines are already becoming blurred and will only become more so as the US finds itself increasingly dependent on African sources of oil in the decades to come.

It is important to note, however, that democracy promotion has never served as the principal foreign policy objective of the northern industrialized democracies, including the United States. At best it has played a secondary role behind more self-interested foreign pursuits. Rhetoric has also not always conformed to actual policies. Following 9/11, the Bush administration has had to weigh the benefits of democracy promotion when such a policy would potentially alienate important allies in the war on terrorism. In the Horn of Africa, for example, a decision to make democracy promotion the principal US foreign policy objective would have precluded the decision to make Djibouti the only site of a formal US military base on African soil. Indeed, all three of Washington's North African allies (Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia) in the war on terrorism lack democratic political systems.

The logic of current policy was succinctly captured by an officer of the US Embassy in Tunis in 2003 who said: "In short, foreign policy is about choosing, and in this case there is no question that the security interest of combating global terrorism with our allies in North Africa is more important than the degree to which the peoples of these coun-

tries enjoy democratic forms of governance." This statement effectively captures Bush administration foreign policy toward all regions of the African continent, with the hierarchy of foreign interests being (1) counter-terrorism; (2) US economic interests, especially ensuring access to African oil; and (3) subsidiary goals, including democracy promotion, socioeconomic development, and combating HIV/AIDS. The problem with such a hierarchy of interests is that the emerging anti-terrorist consensus in US foreign policy has fostered a return to a strategic approach to the African continent reminiscent of the cold war in which national security interests overshadowed normative goals such as democracy promotion. This would be a dangerous path for the US to follow as it decides how best to promote US national security interests in Nigeria and elsewhere on the African continent, while at the same time nurturing the further consolidation of Nigerian democracy – the latter of which is the true long-term solution for ensuring that African countries do not become the sources of anti-American terrorist activities. •

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RUSSIA AND THE UNITED STATES

From Partnership to Antagonism?

Alexander A. Belkin

Russian-US relations have slipped badly since President Bush looked into President Putin's soul and said he liked what he saw. Vice President Cheney's recent statement in Lithuania that the government of Russia "has unfairly and improperly restricted the rights of the people" is symptomatic of this change and will do little to reduce the slippage. What might we expect for the future? There are two schools of thought on this: One holds that another "Cold War" is inevitable, while the other rejects such a negative assessment and tries to find ways to avoid a crisis of bilateral relations.

Five years ago, the presidents of the two nations put the dangerous deterioration of the relations that occurred at the end of the 1990s on hold. Unfortunately, for many reasons, US-Russian affairs have not developed positively. The good personal relationship between the two national leaders could not provide a sufficient foundation for furthering a new US-Russian rapprochement.

In fact, it was a "mission impossible." The two nations were just out of a four-decade-long Cold War, which cultivated habits of suspicion and confrontation rather than cooperation. The two economies were incomparable; the societies and political systems had a fundamentally different historical heritage that made them incompatible; and the political cultures of the elites were based on different value systems.

During the last 15 years Russia was preoccupied with what James Billington described in his book, *Russia in Search of Itself* as a "dramatic, if chaotic, new search for national identity that followed the collapse of communism." It was supposed to make a complicated and painful transition from an "ancient empire ... unified and governed by an autocratic single ruler supported by large military and security forces and an immense state bureaucracy" to a modern nation-state. The Russians were to resolve the conflict in the national self-consciousness between their wish for strong leadership and their aspiration for human

rights and civil freedoms. The situation was aggravated by the weakness of a state dominated by oligarchs that squeezed the national wealth and manipulated the Kremlin and society through their media assets. As President Putin recently remarked, in the late 1990s "the country was creaking at the seams, actually, a civil war was going on."

The main lines of criticism of the outgoing administration of Boris Yeltsin, both domestic and international, were erratic and ineffective governance; contraction of the economy by half and deindustrialization of the country; wild self-aggrandizement of small elite (the "oligarchs") pursued at the expense of the public good; the disastrous state of public health; the country's loss of identity and purpose; and, finally, the war in Chechnya. Another important target for relentless condemnation in Russia was Yeltsin's letting the US take the lead in foreign policy.

The major efforts of Vladimir Putin's administration during its six years in office were focused precisely on remedies for these deficiencies. In most directions the situation was stabilized, though, as a rule, it was done in a specific style of post-Soviet political culture, one conditioned by centuries of authoritarian rule.

US-Russian relations evolved during these years, through the periods of close cooperation as well as those of restrained tension. The fields of cooperative efforts include nuclear security cooperation. On September 30, 2005 the United States and Russia issued a Joint Statement to mark an important milestone: the completion of the conversion of the equivalent of 10,000 Russian nuclear warheads into fuel for nuclear reactors that provide 10 percent of America's electricity. Now, at the halfway point of this program, the United States and Russia remain committed to completing the down-blending of the remaining material by 2013. There has also been notable cooperation on energy issues, including a bilateral energy dialogue; a large variety of infrastructure

and high technology projects in the power industry; improving Russia's investment climate (including such issues as banking reform, improved corporate governance, and facilitating cross-border leasing to bolster Russian companies' access to capital); market access improvements in both directions, including Russia's accession to the WTO, and protection of intellectual property; cooperation in the information technology arena, where Russia and the United States have unique capabilities and potential; space cooperation; and humanitarian, social, and people-to-people cooperation.

Russia's foreign policy activism has, on occasion, irritated Americans, especially when it challenged US diplomatic efforts.

In its give-and-take foreign policy during the first term, the Putin administration made several significant steps toward meeting the security interests of the West. It disestablished its Lourdes intelligence and communication base in Cuba, and the naval base at Cam Rahn Bay in Vietnam; it did not oppose US base deployment in Central Asia; it withheld sharp criticism over further NATO enlargement as well as the US abrogation of the 1972 ABM treaty; and retreated from the Balkans, giving the initiative there to the West. (Given the continuing problems there, this might not be much of a gift to the West.)

Other issues have been detrimental to bilateral relations. Among them are disagreements and misunderstandings on the US-led war in Iraq, Russia's Yukos/Khodorkovsky affair, US-backed "color revolutions" in Georgia and Ukraine, and the Russian involvement in the Iranian nuclear power program.

During Putin's presidency, a relatively stabilized and more confident Russia shifted from its previous "selective involvement" in international affairs toward a more active and self-sufficient global role. As Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov emphasized recently in an article in the journal *Moskovskiy Novosti* (translation by the author): "[W]e do want to play in the team, be open for well-argued debates, for persuasion. But where there is a shortage of far-sighted leadership, Russia will not shrink away from responsibility, will offer its own analysis of the situation, its

own vision of possible solutions, acting, of course, within the framework of multilateral diplomacy and collective efforts... [I]t would be naive to expect of us a readiness to be content in the world with the role of one being led."

Naturally, Russia's foreign policy activism has, on occasion, irritated Americans, especially when it challenged US diplomatic efforts. Russia's leadership publicly stated that: "Russia from its past history well remembers the infatuation with obsessive ideas of changing the world and cannot identify itself with the similar projects now being put forward, whatever they are called – the promotion of freedom and democracy everywhere or 'transformational diplomacy.'"

Putting it differently, as President Truman and Paul Nitze advised their fellow citizens and the free world at the height of the Cold War in NSC-68, "in relations between nations, the prime reliance of the free society is on the strength and appeal of its idea, and it feels no compulsion sooner or later to bring all societies into conformity with it."

Most likely it was Putin's defiance on the international arena combined with his semi-authoritarian style of dealing with the post-Yeltsin chaos at home that prompted the above-mentioned statement by Vice President Cheney – which everybody here understands as a message of the Bush administration.

As for the accusation of Russia's using its oil and gas supplies as "tools of intimidation or blackmail" to further its political goals, many Russian observers agree that aside from a clumsily executed economic move back to market prices in the deals with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) neighbors (particularly Ukraine), there was a political ingredient in the gas price hike. At the same time it is obvious that "there was definitely more bad politics and corruption in the decade-long practice of selling natural gas to Ukraine at below-market prices... So, is the transition to market prices, the abandonment of paternalism, and the treatment of Ukraine as a completely sovereign state also anti-American policy?"

President Putin responded to the White House salvo in his annual Address to the Federal Assembly on May 10th, saying that Russia "must be able to respond to attempts from any quarters to put foreign policy pressure on Russia, including with the aim of

strengthening one's own position at our expense. We also need to make clear that the stronger our armed forces are, the lesser the temptation for anyone to put such pressure on us, no matter under what pretext this is done."

The president urged the members of the Federal Assembly that "conflict zones are expanding in the world and, what is especially dangerous is that they are spreading into the area of our vital interests." That is why, he continued, "Russia's military and foreign policy doctrines must also provide responses to the urgent issues, namely, how to work in current conditions together with our partners, to fight effectively not just terrorism but also the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and bacteriological weapons, how to settle the local conflicts in the world today and how to overcome the other new challenges we face."

Summarizing this part of his address, Mr. Putin pointed out that "we need to make very clear that the key responsibility for countering all of these threats and ensuring global security will lie with the world's leading powers, the countries that possess nuclear weapons and powerful levers of military and political influence. This is why the issue of modernizing Russia's Armed Forces is extremely important today and is of such concern to the Russian society."

At the same time Putin emphasized that "we must not repeat the mistakes of the Soviet Union, the mistakes of the Cold War era, neither in politics nor in defense strategy. We must not resolve our defense issues at the expense of economic and social development. This is a dead end road that ultimately leaves a country's reserves exhausted. There is no future in it."

Simultaneously he has ranked Russia's foreign policy priorities, downgrading the United States to third-level standing. Putin particularly specified members of the CIS and states of the FSU ("closest neighbors") as Russia's most important partners. The second level of "other partners" in his list includes European Union as the biggest part. Finally, "of great importance for us and for the entire international system are our relations with the United States of America, with the People's Republic of China, with India, and also with the fast-growing countries of the Asia-Pacific Region, Latin America and Africa. We are willing to take new steps to expand the

areas and framework of our cooperation with these countries, increase cooperation in ensuring global and regional security, develop mutual trade and investment and expand humanitarian ties."

The next day, at a meeting with the executives and journalists of the Russian State TV & Radio Broadcasting Company the president, commenting on his annual Address in the paper Kommersant, again stressed that Russia "would build up its relations with the Western colleagues patiently and calm-

Other issues have been detrimental to bilateral relations... disagreements and misunderstandings on the US-led war in Iraq, Russia's Yukos/Khodorkovsky affair, US-backed "color revolutions" in Georgia and Ukraine, and the Russian involvement in the Iranian nuclear power program.

ly" and there would be no return to the Cold War. "I intentionally mentioned this in the address — neither in politics nor in defense strategy," said Putin. "We don't need it. We must secure normal, acceptable conditions for the development of our foreign policy. If we do not stick our nose into other people's affairs and don't declare the whole world to be

our sphere of influence, then we have the resources to absolutely solidly guarantee our own security."

When asked about his harsh labeling of the United States as a "selfish wolf," Putin said that it does not mean a hardening of Russia's foreign policy. "They call us Russian bears, so nothing unusual... It means only that we are going to stand for our own interests," continued Mr. Putin, adding that "our friends on the other side of the ocean" should realize that "we want to live with them normally. We want to be friends with them. We want them to see us as their partners and respect us."

What definitely disappointed domestic and foreign observers and the business community was the lack of the much expected analysis in Putin's address of the relations with China, Russia's stand on Iran, the future of foreign investment in the Russian oil and gas sector, and the prospects of the government's role in business — would it grow or be re-

stricted?

This summer Russia will host the G8 summit in St. Petersburg. It will focus primarily on ensuring global energy security, finding ways to step up the global fight against infectious diseases and seeking to improve the quality and effectiveness of national education systems and professional training. Other major international issues on which Russia hopes to concentrate during its G8 Presidency are counter-terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the settlement of regional conflicts, the development of the global economy, finance and trade, and protection of the environment.

Russia's presidency at the G8 summit could mark the high point of its rapprochement with the West, or, if the war of words and ambitions continues, could turn into a full-fledged dissociation with the easily calculable disastrous consequences for Russia's international position and for its economy.

More than that, in a few months the two nations will enter the next electoral cycle and, accordingly, a lame-duck period for their presidents. This makes the task of maintaining a cooperative relationship between Russia and the United States even harder, since bilateral ties are poorly institutionalized and still rest on personal relationships between the two national leaders. Weakened positions of the presidents would consequently endanger bilateral relations, especially when it has become fashionable in the West to scold Russia and unfashionable to plead for Russian interests. It is not hard to predict that the tide of criticism by the US Democrats of the Russian policy of the Bush administration, already on the rise, would hit both the White House and the Kremlin. While President Putin enjoys broad and unrivaled public support at home, President Bush's rate of approval would hardly help him to defend his policy toward Russia against domestic criticism.

It will take patience and wisdom on the part of both Russia and the United States to find ways to protect the relationship against the obvious dangers of the electoral campaigns and renew the engagement based on better understanding of each side's core interests and the new global realities and challenges faced by each nation. •

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A Perspective on US-Iran Relations

Sanam Vakil

NOTE

The author of the following article provides an Iranian perspective of the US-Iran relationship. The US and much of the international community abhors the series of recent statements made by Iranian President Ahmadinejad to the effect that Israel should be “wiped off the map.” The second major issue is Iran’s move towards acquiring a nuclear weapon. The author’s perspective of President Ahmadinejad’s statements and policies are:

1. He has used Iran’s objective of the destruction of Israel as a domestic political ploy to enhance his political standing within Iran.
2. His nuclear policy is to gain concessions from the West and is being used as a means of international political extortion.

The author’s portrayal of Iran’s position on the two issues is instructive and should give the US and the international community pause. It suggests that Iran’s strategic objective ignores morality, which is the core value that binds civilized nations, and is a clear violation of the UN Charter. If Iran’s nuclear ambition is motivated primarily by its internal political considerations, it has failed to recognize the consequences, which are regional instability and a clear invitation to Iran’s neighbors, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Syria, to acquire their own nuclear weapons.

After twenty-seven years of enmity and isolation, tensions between the United States and Iran have exacerbated to the point of global concern. The US and Iran were once regional allies in the Middle East, with relations grounded in history, mutual goals of containing Communism, and a shared strategic vision. Today, both countries are engaged in rounds of ideological battles and psychological exchange of rhetoric. Indeed, in this time of US-Iranian estrangement little has changed in the laundry list of complaints from the perspectives of Washington and Tehran. Instead, the regional changes to the Middle Eastern frontier have opened a gulf of opportunities for cooperation between the two former allies. Domestic opposition in Washington and Tehran to potential rapprochement, though, has stalled any such prospect, further escalating this cycle of action and reaction. A reading of the historical tea leaves will reveal why relations between these two nations remain stuck.

For both the clerical regime and the US government, the checkered history of recent US-Iranian relations continues to haunt the imagination. Ulti-

mately, the missing link in this relationship is mutual trust. Iranians continuously hark back to American sponsorship of the CIA coup against Prime Minister Muhammad Mossadeq in 1953 and returning the Pahlavi Shah to power. Admittedly, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, in a diplomatic effort, offered an apology for American involvement in Iranian affairs to no avail. The “Great Satan” has pursued a policy of isolation and containment of the Islamic Republic through its declared policies, trade embargoes, and the refusal of the government to release frozen Iranian assets. Further enraging for Tehran has been the congressionally sponsored Iran-Libya Sanctions act (ILSA), implemented in 1996 and renewed repeatedly since then, which prevents foreign companies from investing more than \$20 million in Iran’s energy sector. The bill has a waiver clause providing the president with the power to forego sanctions in the interest of national security.

For Washington, the clerical regime has a laundry list of nefarious activities which run counter to American interests. All American administrations have maintained the integrity of this list. The conflict

exploded with the 1979 Hostage Crisis that continues to perpetuate the American mindset. Even more, one can draw a clear line linking the 1979 Iranian revolution with terrorist attacks in 1983 in Beirut at the Marine Barracks, in 1994 in Buenos Aires at the Jewish Community Center, and in 1996 at Khobar Towers. Aside from the dispute over Iran's nuclear weapons program, over which American policymakers have maintained staunch opposition, Iran has also been targeted for its sponsorship of terrorism organizations such as Hezbollah, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and, most recently, Hamas.

Iran's continued self-imposition into Israeli-Palestinian affairs has been menacing. So has its opposition to the state of Israel, recently magnified by President Ahmadinejad's statement of wanting to "wipe Israel off the map." For the newly-elected president, this statement had domestic, regional and international goals where Ahmadinejad sought to curry favor within the Iranian political elite, which did not support his election. Indeed, no faction has publicly criticized Ahmadinejad in his renewed pan-Islamic revivalist Khomeini rhetoric. Regionally, as well, Ahmadinejad pre-positioned himself as the champion of the Arab street. Such stringent rhetoric was well received in several Arab capitals where the Iranian president proclamation echoed many Arabs' hopes. While in the West, and in diplomatic circles, this statement was criticized, it has also drawn the attention that Ahmadinejad wanted, as he is a novice and marginalized president.

The regime's flagrant violation of human rights is also mentioned often as yet another of its ills. The Bush Administration's aggressive policy poses a challenge for moderates and reformists within Iran as they are subject to frequent pressure, threats and even detention and arrests. Washington has never recognized the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the current Bush Administration maintains a de facto regime change policy.

Most problematic has been the lack of direct

The US military presence encircles the Iranian regime from the Persian Gulf to Central Asia, only increasing the clerical cadre's sense of insecurity.

contact between Tehran and Washington in this twenty-seven year stalemate. Dueling over regional power in the Middle East, the US and Iran have communicated through representatives and various allies such as the EU, Afghanistan, Iraq, Russia, China, and even Israel, through the media, and even lately through Ahmadinejad's tactical letter to President Bush. It is clear that Iran, somewhat unconventionally, is seeking contact with its old foe. Former President Khatami suggested a "dialogue of civilizations." In the most recent presidential election, most of the candidates' platforms mentioned a rapprochement with the US. Most noteworthy to this equation is Iran's avidly pro-American "street," which is hungry for contact. These important changes coupled with the increasing calls for dialogue from the Iranian elite and street are significant. Recent echoes for direct talks have also emanated from Senators Lugar, Biden and Hagel as well as from many senior policymakers bringing new pressure on the Bush Administration. The lack of bilateral communication has only further cracked the cultural and political bridges connecting the Iran and US.

Since September 11, 2001, Tehran and Washington have had a convergence of foreign policy interests in the Middle East. Both seek regional stability and security. Both also seek to advance their respective position of responsibility. It would undoubtedly be a challenge, though, for these two nations to reconcile their historical, ideological, and emotional differences. For Iran, Operation Enduring Freedom was both a blessing and curse. It ushered out not one but two of Tehran's menacing neighbors: the Taliban to the East and Saddam Hussein to the West. These neighbors had ideological and irredentist designs on Iran, and the regime was relieved of such burdensome foes. However, the arrival of American forces as Iran's new neighbors is equally onerous for the regime. It is currently no longer surrounded by status quo powers but instead a super power. The US military presence encircles the Iranian regime from the Persian Gulf to Central Asia, only increasing the clerical cadre's sense of insecurity.

While the Bush Administration initially pursued the Taliban and al-Qaeda, cooperation with the Iranians was inevitable. Iran maintained contacts with the Northern Alliance; and with its decisive proximity it was able to come to American assistance with

search and rescue missions as well as opening its port in Bandar Abbas to transfer supplies to American troops and the Afghan people. Iran's interest in Afghanistan was solidified by its support for Afghan reconstruction efforts. Cooperation with the US stopped in January 2002 when it was revealed that Iran's Revolutionary Guards were responsible for sending military hardware on the *Karine A* vessel to Palestine. President Bush then included Iran in his infamous "axis of evil" speech. Indeed, the internal balance between cooperation and clandestine activities has led to the factional and ideological challenges that have obstructed Iran's position.

In Iraq, Tehran has promoted US interests, which simultaneously work to further its own. Countering prevailing thought, Iran did not attempt to "export its revolution" to Iraq. Instead, it supported the American democratic strategy recognizing that the principle would propel the once repressed Shi'a majority to power. In doing so, Iran has only strengthened its links with the Shi'a groups within Iraq that have strong ties with neighboring Iran, all having sought clerical refuge and support from Saddam Hussein. Tehran took advantage and helped cultivate an Iraqi Shi'a opposition in what we know as al-Dawa and the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution (SCIRI). Additionally, through their Shi'a network and vast resources they have cast a network extending into Basra, Karbala and Najaf as well as into Baghdad to protect their interests. The implications of such ties have had a profound impact as Iran and the United States compete for influence in Iraq with each accusing the other of facilitating regional instability and provoking further chaos.

For the Bush Administration, Iran has been a regional menace obstructing its goals in the Middle East. President Ahmadinejad is considered a god-send who has successfully united the international coalition against Iran with his inflammatory rhetoric. While claiming to support the nuclear negotiation process with Iran, the Bush Administration has, in essence, maintained a de facto policy of regime change towards the clerical theocracy. While waiting patiently for negotiations with the EU3 – France, Germany, and the UK – to fail, Washington has worked methodically to assemble a unified coalition, even bringing non-aligned Russia, China and India in the fore. While the short term objective of unity

has been achieved, the long term result is still uncertain and Iran's nuclear program looms large.

With Russia and China insisting that military force and sanctions are not an option, and with many other countries opposed to the military alternative, the Bush Administration will find itself again wedged between "Iraq and a hard place." Even as the Ahmadinejad government resumes uranium enrichment, the search for negotiation alternatives continues. This constrained position will undoubtedly lead to further paralysis in the UN Security Council and further exploitation of the situation by the Iranian clerical elite.

Washington's policy of regime change in Iran, however, furthers prospects for stalemate in the Security Council. Condoleezza Rice's request for \$75 million for democracy promotion activities in Iran seeks to undermine the clerical government while encouraging civil society to bloom as it did under Poland's Solidarity movement. This direct challenge to the Iranian regime signals American determination to stand firm in contesting the theocratic presence in the Middle East regardless of Security Council action.

The American policy of containment and isolation of the Islamic Republic has only increased Iran's confrontational approach. Pressure on Iran has never been successful. In fact, it has only proved to be the opposite. Ahmadinejad is well aware of the US over-extension in Iraq and waning US domestic support for the war. Indeed, this inexperienced president has exceeded expectations as he has quickly learned to curry favor using issues such as Iran's nuclear program to rally support, not only among his own war-weary population but also among the Arab and Muslim street. Interestingly enough, Iran's transition from détente to a confrontational approach over its nuclear program has bought more western concessions, including from the US. With this new strategy in mind, the Iranian regime has no interest in moderating, knowing full well that it can continue to use its nuclear ambitions as a means of extortion.

Due to the factional constraints within Iranian domestic politics, Supreme Leader Khamenei and other more moderate factions have tolerated Ahmadinejad's nuclear pronouncements, despite new revealing concerns that the president is drawing Iran into a head-on collision with the West. Ahmadine-

jad, while elected on a populist economic platform, seized on the nuclear issue as a means of capitalizing on Iranian nationalistic fervor to increase his popularity in the midst of economic and political criticism. Since his June 2005 surprise election, Ahmadinejad has faced numerous domestic political obstacles such as difficulty in receiving parliamentary approval of his cabinet, in passing legislation, and in being censured by his own party in parliament.

... cooperation can be pursued in the arenas of drug trafficking, economic development, access to oil and gas markets, and even human rights.

The president's tactical forays into nuclear politics are a means of self-preservation because he operates within a factional system that ultimately seeks to marginalize him -- a fate similar to that of President Khatami.

In an obvious game of playground politics, Iran and the United States have been bullying each other in the regional jungle gym. While indeed Iran and the US are asymmetrical powers, Iran has used its regional alliances and unconventional methods of attack to gain regional leverage and attention. With a network of allies and proxies extending to Lebanon, Palestine, Syria and Iraq, the regime hopes to continue its divide and conquer strategy among the international community.

What remains most evident is that, despite the escalating rhetoric between both capitols Tehran and Washington continue to have mutual interests that converge in the arenas of regional stability and security. These include cooperation in the areas of Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Persian Gulf. For the United States, working with Iran to bring stability to these areas is imperative as it is a large regional power with an educated and productive population; and, Tehran also seeks to project its regional influence. If these synergies were capitalized upon, both the US and Iran could use mutual areas of interest as points of confidence building that could in turn lead to moderation on more tenuous issues. Further cooperation can be pursued in the arenas of drug trafficking, economic development, access to oil and gas markets, and even human rights.

The Bush Administration should seek a long term approach with regard to the Islamic Republic. In doing so, Washington will realize that a cooperative and complacent Iran included rather than alienated from the regional security arrangement of the Middle East will benefit the US national interest. This shift on the playground paradigm would require a profound reconciliation of ego and ideology. Twenty-seven years of isolation and dual containment policies have only exacerbated tensions between the two nations. As President Bush recently stated, "We are in a who-blinks-first game." Is it time to change course with regard to the Islamic Republic of Iran? •

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US-VENEZUELAN RELATIONS

Riding the Tide of Anti-Americanism

Cynthia A. Watson

US relations with Latin America are at their lowest point in the past twenty-five years, including the 1980s when the Central American Wars showed the massive difference in approach to the significant challenges of socio-economic reform in that subregion. US-Venezuelan relations, a smaller subset, are downright abysmal with no obvious reason to expect them to improve under the current leadership. The political leaders in both Washington and Caracas exacerbate this poor condition; they generate a state of misunderstanding north and south of the Caribbean Basin and contribute to the growing tensions. This essay considers those issues and offers an assessment of the conditions necessary to improve upon this state of affairs.

Both Latin American and US officials entered the current decade with a great deal of optimism, ignoring noteworthy storm clouds on the horizon in 2000 and 2001. Optimism grew with President George W. Bush's 2000 electoral victory but reflected superficial understanding by both sides. Latin American governments typically reflect an overwhelming dominance by the executive branch of government, personified in the president. Latin Americans retain a residual belief that legislatures and courts are not likely to deter a president from carrying out stated policies and fulfilling commitments. The resulting analytical Latin American framework, which is changing at a glacial pace towards recognizing checks and balances in a liberal democratic tradition, is that presidents in Washington are overwhelmingly powerful individuals who do not follow through on stated policies because they are not committed to their understanding that they must act in accordance with, rather than the idea of, democratic checks and balances. President Bush, in this view, was expected to follow through on his campaign promises, emphasizing his Latin American orientation based on his prior position as Governor of Texas and that of his brother's position in Florida, since both states concern themselves overwhelmingly with Latin

America. Latin American expectations were that President Bush would finally pay them the attention so long lacking in Washington. This was a basic misunderstanding.

In Washington, similarly, expectations were high that President Vicente Fox's 2000 election in Mexico represented a fundamental shift from traditional power bases to genuinely competitive parties interested in engaging in free market, democratic systems. Most Latin American states in the 1990s had embraced various free market reforms, most especially privatization of long-held government assets, while democratic elections occurred in the region. Outsiders did not appreciate, however, that market reforms were not entirely embraced by societies retaining strong statist (government employment) tendencies, and brought with them the unintended consequences of tremendous, obvious corruption along with a growing gap between rich and poor which reverberated through these societies. When these perceptions came up against the reality of President Bush's consummate concern about the war on terrorism instead of US-Latin American relations, Latin America felt burned yet once again. Washington, similarly, could not understand why Latin America did not accept its priorities.

Against this backdrop, Venezuela has been cascading into political turmoil for more than a decade. In light of his strong antics, people have largely forgotten that Hugo Chávez first gained attention in 1992 by waging a golpe de estado against the democratically-elected government that was responding to free market reforms imposed by international financial institutions trying to ameliorate Caracas' domestic economic mismanagement. In 1958, after decades of personal control by an autocratic leader, Venezuela embarked on a period of almost five decades of uninterrupted elections and apparent political pluralism. Venezuela had been the showcase for those who believed that military rule could be ended in Latin America through the creation of po-

litical parties competing for power through regular elections.

Often ignored was that Venezuela's democracy became increasingly plagued by two political parties which were not genuinely representative but were engaged in a systematic rape of the vast petroleum resources of this original Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) member. Instead of seeing their post-1958 standard of living increase as petroleum revenues rose, Venezuela began slowly but irrevocably sliding into economic decay. Instead of investing in infrastructural improvements needed

by a growing population at a time of new generations of technology, Caracas governments repeatedly ignored the infrastructure in favor of enriching the pockets of various politicians

Chávez has found his foil for perpetuating his Bolivarian campaign: President George W. Bush and Washington are blamed for his country's plight.

and the party bureaucracies. The two primary political parties, AD and COPEI, were repeatedly re-elected without answering society needs, substituting graft and corruption for a reasonable political process. Eventually, Venezuelan leadership went to the International Monetary Fund for assistance, resulting in that institution's demand that the two parties engage in genuine reform, causing some of the domestic belt-tightening that Chávez and fellow Army officers believed was hurting the Venezuelan nation when they waged their unsuccessful 1992 coup. Prolonged rioting in Caracas over increases in the prices of basic needs led to more than a hundred deaths and shredded Venezuelan society.

A significant portion of the population agreed with Chávez's charges that international powers sought to repress the Venezuelan people. He won election in 1998, won reelection two years later, aborted a coup attempt in 2002, and survived a controversial 2004 recall. The 2004 recall is noteworthy because its validity has been dismissed by some in the United States but international observer groups headed by former presidents César Gaviria Trujillo of Colombia and Jimmy Carter of the United States saw the recall vote as reasonably fair and accurate. Chávez' appeal was, in part, his proclaimed willing-

ness to address the social injustices instituted by the 'democratic' leadership of COPEI and AD. His proclaimed Bolivarian movement aims to replicate the Pan-American (anti-US) ideology of Venezuelan-born Libertador Simon Bolívar (1783-1830) and is a blatant attempt to use nationalism based on middle and lower class mestizo, instead of the European, identity. Underappreciated in the United States, Venezuela—like most states in the region—suffers widespread racism manifested through class differences which are much more subtle than US racism. Chávez is a mixed race Venezuelan, proud of the African heritage that characterizes many of his compatriots. This "caste" is not nearly as advantaged as those of European origin who tend to prefer Venezuela's integration into the international system to a nationalist preference in economic and political development. Chávez is appealing to those who feel that international system seeks to exploit them. This is an old, tried-and-true Latin American formula for retaining power in the short term in Latin America.

FOREIGN ADVENTURES TO IRRITATE WASHINGTON

Chávez has found his foil for perpetuating his Bolivarian campaign: President George W. Bush and Washington are blamed for his country's plight. Chávez believes he can make this charge stick because he holds the petroleum key that much of the world believes is driving President Bush to engage in various actions around the world. Most of the world does not believe that the Global War on Terrorism is anything other than US policy aiming to control petroleum for US exploitation, not to create a more peaceful world.

Chávez seeks to use petroleum to engage China, Europe, and other Latin American nations to make clear he will not concur with Washington's agenda. Chávez' drive to irritate Washington was made clear in 2000 when he made a much publicized tour of Baghdad with Saddam Hussein.

Additionally, Washington has taken steps bound to create tension with Venezuela under the best of circumstances, much less under the narcissistic Chávez. The April 2002 unsuccessful coup attempt against Chávez frames a Latin America view of the Bush administration. Whether true or not, the United States is believed to have orchestrated the overthrow attempt against Chávez, with the cooperation

of internal groups threatened by his actions. An unfortunate statement supposedly uttered by a senior US political appointee in the State Department that the United States welcomed the new leadership in Caracas still reverberates for those who saw this as traditional US interference in Latin American domestic affairs, as well as evidence that Washington only embraces democracy when it liked the results. Chávez survived the coup but did not forget the reported sentiment. Additionally, the appointment of US Ambassador William Brownfield, a career diplomat with longstanding Latin American experience and little sympathy for Chávez' arguments, has aggravated the relationship. Brownfield's April 2006 visit to a Caracas barrio resulted in an egging of his car. There were charges that the Ambassador went where he was unwelcome.

While considerable debate revolves around whether Beijing or Caracas is driving this deepening relationship, the national interests of each side are benefiting from the ties.

Caracas and Washington differ on a range of issues. Chávez has aggressively reached out to the aging Fidel Castro, clearly intent upon replacing him as the sign of opposition (or mere irritation, depending upon perspective) to Washington in the former "Third World." Chávez has provided Castro with financial assistance and petroleum, as well as ostentatious verbal support.

Petroleum and asserting Third World rights against the developed world, throwbacks to the 1970s, form the basis to Chávez' interaction with the world. He irritates Washington because of his proclaimed support of the growing ranks of "native populist" movements in the region, particularly Evo Morales in Bolivia, Ollanta Humala in Peru, Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua, and Nestor Kirschner in Argentina. In these cases, leaders argue that they cannot conform to international institutional demands for reform because these US-led demands seek to repress the native populations and keep them in a subservient position in the world community.

These anachronistic responses to economic and political disappointments in the region are completely predictable and replicate past Latin American

experiences. Because 1990s political and economic reforms were incomplete, ahistorical to the region, and led to considerable corruption and social dislocation, the pendulum was bound to swing from embracing the 'Washington consensus' to looking for 'native' solutions to the economic, social, and political problems.

More importantly from Washington's vantage point, Chávez has diligently courted Beijing as the People's Republic of China (PRC) has sought to broaden its petroleum access around the world. While considerable debate revolves around whether Beijing or Caracas is driving this deepening relationship, the national interests of each side are benefiting from the ties. Beijing is seeking immediate access to more resources, most especially petroleum, which Venezuela can provide to the international community. Longer term, the PRC is looking for places to invest to gather broader economic benefits. Venezuela represents one of the more welcoming environments for China as Chávez seeks those partners most likely to annoy the Bush administration. Beijing's growing involvement in a region long seen as Washington's sphere of influence is bound to raise hackles.

MAJOR QUESTION ON THE HORIZON

Chávez has been president since 1998 but has not radically improved the conditions of the average Venezuelan. His moves to consolidate power have led to Venezuelan national control over petroleum activities under the 2001 Hydrocarbon Law, which in turn has led to international concerns about investments in the system. A 2002-03 petroleum industry strike led to the firing of 19,000 of the 45,000 striking state petroleum employees, which contributed to the noteworthy official unemployment rate of 12.9 percent in early 2006 (unofficial projections put this rate higher). At the same time, for all the concern regarding Chávez's actions, the United States remains Venezuela's main trading partner.

What reinvestment Chávez is putting into the nation is a major question. Serious questions about the transportation infrastructure, in particular, raise doubts about Chávez' ability to sustain control long term. History is replete with examples of individuals using anti-US rhetoric to rise to power, only to fall when their words outpace their ability to produce any concrete results for a population already tired

and worn from prior regimes' disregard for national needs.

Chávez would probably have already fallen from power in Venezuela had petroleum prices not begun their inexorable rise after the 2003 invasion of Iraq. His actions have done nothing to provide Venezuela with any alternate sources of income and, while promoting his personal role in thwarting US actions around the world, is doing nothing to change the inequality that wracks the lives of average Venezuelans. Historically, few populist leaders have proven able to retain their power after the initial excitement has worn off and is replaced by the reality of continuing deteriorating standards of living for the disadvantaged. Only rising international demands for petroleum is keeping Chávez in power. His attempts to control access to dollars blatantly punishes his many opponents in the business community. He has imposed free-speech restrictions reminiscent of any dictatorship around the world, manipulating democratic means to his own ends.

President Bush's strong sense of personal accountability on the part of other leaders, such as Saddam, Kim Jong-Il, and Chávez, makes it difficult to see much room for negotiation between Washington and Caracas. The last years of the Bush administration will almost certainly continue prioritizing the Global War on Terrorism to the detriment of a Latin American policy to satisfy the region. Chávez, in turn, will not be able to use Venezuelan petroleum as an effective weapon against the United States, due to the fungibility of the international energy market. These factors foretell continued deterioration in the relationship. •

For all the concern regarding Chávez's actions, the United States remains Venezuela's main trading partner.

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The US and India: New Partners

Teresita C. Schaffer

The United States and India are well on their way to developing a new partnership. This represents a remarkable transformation for two countries which had a famously skimpy and prickly relationship for nearly 50 years after Indian independence. Both have work to do to make this a lasting association. But because of changes in the world and in both countries' perceptions of their strategic interests, they have a good chance to succeed.

WHY THE CHANGE?

The new look in US-India relations grew out of nearly three decades of Indian social and economic change. India's economic growth speeded up and population growth fell during the 1980s. By the 1990s, India had emerged as one of the fastest-growing countries in the world. GNP is now expected to keep rising at 6-7 percent per year; at this rate, per capita GNP will double in 15 years. Services account for over half the economy, and the world-famous information technology industry has gone from trivial numbers to 4-5 percent of the economy in a decade and is likely to continue its rapid climb. Information technology and related industries account for over 22 percent of India's export earnings. Manufacturing has grown more slowly than it did in a number of countries, but India's auto parts industry seems to be leading the way for a new period of industrial growth, with growth of over 20 percent in 2003-04 and a sales turnover of US\$6.7 billion. These figures are modest compared to China's economic expansion, but if sustained, they will make India a significant economic player in the next decade.

Internally, India's economic growth has expanded the middle class and reduced the ranks of the poor. It has also been quite unevenly distributed, with much higher growth in India's south and west than in the north and east. Per capita income is nearly five times as high in Maharashtra as in the large, impoverished state of Bihar. One consequence is likely to be that the more successful state governments will simply assert more authority to deal with their own economic

ambitions, accelerating India's growth, but also widening their own economic lead within India.

India's military posture too has changed. Always the most powerful military presence in the Indian Ocean region, India has not only added nuclear weapons to its order of battle, but also undergone a considerable conventional military buildup. At the same time, it has sought a more positive political relationship with one of its major regional rivals, China. A more active dialogue on their border problems coincided roughly with the emergence of China as India's second largest economic partner.

India and Pakistan have had several periods of military confrontation since the two countries went nuclear in 1998. More recently, they have maintained a ceasefire for 2 ½ years and have expanded "people to people" contacts in the disputed region of Kashmir. While the leadership in both Pakistan and India want to maintain their current peace dialogue, there seems to be little chance that their dispute will go away in the short term.

INDIA'S STRATEGIC INTERESTS:

As India's economy and its military have changed, it has also begun to view its foreign policy and its strategic interests through a wider lens. Its primary interest is the same as it always has been, for independent India as for the British Raj: maintaining the security of the country and of the surrounding region, including the Indian Ocean. The traditional problems with Pakistan and China are part of this effort, though as we have seen India now looks to economic as well as military strength as elements in its security vis-à-vis China. India's interest in regional security and in maintaining its influence also extends to its smaller neighbors, Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka.

But India's economic expansion, and its awareness that its future prosperity and security depend on continuing it, have led India's leaders to give much higher priority to the security of India's energy supply and of the sea lanes through the Indian Ocean.

The Indian navy's percentage of military budget allocations rose from 9.6% in 2000-01 to 16.8% in 2006. The quest for energy deals, including equity investments, in countries around the world has become a major Indian objective.

At the same time, India has changed the way it looks at the Indian Ocean. It gives a much higher profile now than in the past to relations with the countries of Southeast Asia. The suspicion with which India viewed the presence of extra-regional naval vessels in the Indian Ocean in earlier years has made way for a more collegial and welcoming attitude toward the US presence, with bilateral naval exercises taking place on a routine basis. This reflects improved India-US relations, but it also derives from the view of many Indian strategic thinkers that China is building toward an eventual presence in the Indian Ocean. If this materializes, the reasoning goes, India will be better off having friendly powers also present and accustomed to working with India.

India's other strategic interest is to lay the groundwork for expanding India's role in the world. The effort to secure a permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council is the visible part of this iceberg, and the one with the smallest chance of success in the short term. But India is also trying to reposition itself as both aid donor and aid recipient; it responded quickly and efficiently when the December 2004 tsunami devastated so many countries in its neighborhood; and it is becoming a regular participant in international gatherings from Davos to the G-8. This is all aimed at creating an air of inevitability for India's presence in the councils of global governance.

US STRATEGIC INTERESTS:

During the Cold War years, India was the big place in between the two major areas of US interest in the Western Pacific and the Middle East. Now, both Asia and India have changed, and India is a major interest in its own right.

The big story in Asia is the rise of China and India. China is emphasizing its desire for a "peaceful rise," and US policy seems to be built on engagement with China. Nonetheless, the prospect of an even more powerful China, taken together with the volatility on the Korean peninsula, the extended economic slump in Japan, and the political uncertainty in Indonesia, makes it essential for the United States

to build a wider and more robust network of friends in Asia. India is the major missing piece.

Indian and US interests in maintaining peace and stability in Asia go hand in hand; so do their interests in the security of the sea lanes through the Indian Ocean. Indeed, this is one of the areas where India and the United States have developed military cooperation in the past: in 2002, India agreed to escort sensitive US cargoes through the Straits of Malacca.

The most urgent issues on the US foreign policy agenda today derive from the war on terror. On the underlying issue of terrorism, Indian and US interests are identical. Both are deeply concerned about the rise of violence by non-state actors, both perceive themselves as targets of such violence, and both want to stop terrorist organizations and the states that support them. They have established a common purpose on a wide range of anti-terrorism work. But when it comes to defining the terrorist threat, the two countries are focused on different actors. For India, Pakistan and the organizations based there are the primary danger. For the United States, Al Qaeda, the Taliban and their friends are the main issue, and Pakistan is an essential ally in the effort to rein in the terrorist enterprise.

The countries at the top of the US foreign policy worry list today are Iran and Iraq, and, here too, US and Indian priorities diverge. For the United States, a stable government in Iraq is the most important single goal in the Middle East; for India, the US invasion of Iraq has complicated the politics of the region, and India has no interest in being part of the post-invasion enterprise. As for Iran, the United States regards it as perhaps the most dangerous state in the world, bent on building nuclear weapons and still committed to a dangerous revolutionary agenda. India sees Iran as an essential part of its energy strategy and a country uniquely able to help India support its strategic interests in Central Asia. India has no interest in seeing Iran develop nuclear weapons; the Indian prime minister has said as much publicly, by way of explaining India's decision to vote with the United States in the International Atomic Energy Agency. But India is seeking a balance of interests in Iran, and does not wish to be sucked into a policy of hostility across the board.

DIFFERENT VIEWS OF HOW THE WORLD IS ORGANIZED:

India's views of Iran and Iraq are out of sync with those of the United States. Similarly, India is willing to deal with countries that the United States regards as dangerous in its pursuit of other strategic goals. For example, it has sought energy deals in Sudan. In Myanmar, India has pursued energy agreements and has also sought to counter hostile Chinese and Pakistani influence. These are the kinds of geographic and political differences that two large countries are bound to have, and the managers of the new partnership will have to learn how to deal with them.

India and the United States also have different views regarding how the world should be organized. The United States is comfortable as the sole remaining superpower. Even in the view of the Clinton Administration, this made a certain amount of unilateral action inevitable. The Bush Administration is much less reticent about taking action and letting others deal with it after the fact. In some respects, this is a characteristic India has welcomed: the Bush Administration's lack of enthusiasm for multilateral regimes like those that regulate nuclear commerce, in Indian eyes, made possible the special arrangement that provided a chance for India to break out of its nuclear pariah status.

But, when it comes to military action, whether for security reasons or in the name of humanitarian intervention, India is less comfortable with US unilateralism. The Indian foreign policy establishment, and the leadership in both major Indian political parties, continues to believe that Indian interests would be best served by a global system in which a half dozen multi-polar power centers – including India – made major decisions together. They recognize that neither Indian power nor the other potential poles can sustain that concept today and that from India's perspective a strong relationship with the United States is the best option. But the Indian leadership has serious misgivings about the unipolar world.

BUILDING THE PARTNERSHIP:

The United States and India both have a strategic interest in giving greater vitality to their new partnership. Leaders from both parties, in both countries, have begun building this enterprise, and much of the bilateral infrastructure it needs is in place. The main

building block currently under construction is the agreement on civil nuclear cooperation announced in July 2005 by Prime Minister Singh and President Bush. It calls for India to separate its nuclear program into civilian and military components, to align its export rules with those of the established international export control organizations, and to participate in negotiating a fissile material cutoff treaty. The first two of these jobs are largely complete; the third is a complex international undertaking which the United States has not taken very seriously to date. The US part of the deal involves making the necessary changes in US law and international agreements to enable civil nuclear cooperation between the United States and the designated, non-military parts of India's nuclear industry. Legislation that would make this possible is now under consideration in the US Congress, and not surprisingly, it has been controversial.

If this agreement goes through, it will give a strong boost to the US-Indian partnership. One can hope that it will also pull India more energetically into international efforts to deter the further spread of nuclear weapons. Still needed, if the two countries are serious about wanting to build up their long-term cooperation, will be a much greater effort to define and articulate elements of a common view of the world. This will not be an easy process. India's intellectual and governmental leaders are naturally pulled toward a more multi-polar outcome, and the United States has never found it easy to create partnerships of equals.

But this time, both have important interests at stake. Asia is becoming the center of gravity in the global economy, and changes in the Asian power structure will have tremendous impact on India's and America's security interests. This is the time for the world's two largest democracies to find a way to turn their common interests into compatible policies. •

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HOW CHINA VIEWS THE US: Friend or Foe Relationship?

Richard E. Friedman

INTRODUCTION

This essay synthesizes China's views on several key issues regarding its relationship with the US. The analysis is based on recent articles and statements made by Chinese strategic thinkers supplemented by personal interviews. I have added commentary to provide a US perspective.

Is China a threat, competitor, or adversary of the US? The answer could be yes to all elements of the threat array. Will China become an enemy of the US within the next two decades? The answer is that US and Chinese policymakers can create the conditions that could lead to enmity or friendship. Will China become a strategic ally of the US? The answer is no, at least not for an extended period of time. Is there likelihood of cooperation and at least tepid friendship? The answer is yes, because this has already happened.

The areas of competition between the US and China are easy to define (for example, competition for energy resources and basic building materials). The definition of what constitutes a threat is more complex. It can mean armed conflict. But it can also mean China's threat to the US vision of status quo – that the US is and must remain the world's sole superpower; that the US remains as the Asia-Pacific regional hegemon; and that the US maintain control of global energy resources. If diminution of US global primacy is the issue, it is clear that China's economic development and rise to power are a major threat to US interests.

Between 1870 and 1900, England enjoyed world primacy, and its colonial empire brought it riches. It was the first country to utilize fully the potential of the Industrial Revolution. There were no significant threats to England's navy and its imperial reach.

After America's Civil War the US began to industrialize and impinge on England's primacy. At first England viewed the upstart Americans as irksome, then bothersome, and ultimately as a threat

to England's primacy. England's strategic realists believed that England should focus solely on its own state interests. Thus, in this context, the US was regarded as a threat to England's security. British hardliners failed to recognize that global economic interdependency was increasing and that the US strategic objective was to get its fair share (and more) of the action. England's fixation on maintaining its primacy prevented it from developing its own set of strategic objectives consistent with a rapidly changing world.

The World's Columbian Exposition of 1893 held in Chicago served as the icon that announced America's arrival as a great state power. China will host the 2008 Olympics – the announcement of China's arrival as a great state power. The US-England analogy to US-China is imprecise, but it should give one pause and serve as a point of departure for the following issues.

THREATS

China's Perspective:

China believes that US critics of China focus on two primary threats from China: the military threat and trade deficits.

The US-China relationship has changed over time and will continue to change. The various phases are: "Who lost China" after the founding of New China in 1949; President Nixon's visit to China in 1972; and management of change after the Cold War. During this period of time, the thrust of US policy towards China was based on the notion that China was a threat to the US. The Chinese threat theory persists today and is deeply embedded in US policymaking.

What is the nature of the Chinese threat, and how does the perceived threat adversely affect US interests? Can the US derail the rising Chinese dragon?

The Chinese believe that the US is a threat to stability because of its quest to retain world hege-

mony; that the US vision of its primacy is inflated and unrealistic; that the US cannot continue to manage world affairs to suit its interests with impunity; and that the threat is a reduction of US world influence, particularly in Asia. The US cannot contain or isolate China. The US has no choice other than to take a pragmatic approach to China's development. This can be done by seeking to influence China's development in ways that serve both US and China's interests.

Another unrealistic US expectation that feeds the US misperception of the Chinese threat is China's friendship with "bad guy" states – North Korea, Iran, Cuba, Sudan, and Venezuela. China raises the issue that during the Cold War the US habitually consorted with unsavory states whenever it suited US interests.

How can the US handle China? China recognizes that US superpower and world dominance will continue for many years. The US has tremendous power advantages. China believes that the US can afford to continue to make mistakes such as military intervention in Iraq, display arrogance that has caused its friends to become anti-American, continue its dependence on imported oil, and fail to use its technological advantage to create new US industry opportunities for its people. The major threat to the US is its own complacency. In this context, the Chinese threat, if it does exist, is subordinate to the US's threat to its own interests.

There is well-founded US-China distrust. However, subsequent to 9/11, there are common interests – counterterrorism and mutual economic dependency – that suggest the need to adjust US policy towards China. Other Western countries have accepted the need to cooperate with and encourage China's development. This would require the US and China to make adjustments, large and small, in their relationship over time. The US needs China's help, and China's bargaining power will increase incrementally based on its economic development.

China believes that the US needs to reexamine the basic premises that have served the US well for the past 25 years. China's ultimate rise as a great world power is inexorable. The world and China, in particular, are changing, and US failure to adapt is a worrisome threat to China.

Commentary:

Remember Russia's President Nikita Khrushchev's statement made to the US in 1956, "We will bury you." This should give pause to both the US and China – assume the worst-case scenario and plan for the best. Neither the US nor China know what direction the relationship will take.

CHINA'S INTERNAL PERCEPTIONS

China's Perspective:

China calls itself a "socialist developing country." Communism, which for the past 55 years has been a "red flag" icon for the US, is gradually fading away.

Beginning in 1784, the US joined other states in their aggression toward and pillaging of China. China believes that it has always been a victim and has not harmed the US in any way. Since the founding of modern China in 1949, the US policy towards China has been political hostility, the fashioning of economic barriers to China's growth and development, military encirclement, and international isolation coupled with persistent media disinformation regarding China. For these reasons, China has a chip on its shoulder.

China believes that successive US administrations, US policymakers, and the US Congress do not have a clear understanding of China's strategic objectives or what is happening in China. China is also extremely sensitive regarding any outside interference in its internal affairs that affect its independence, sovereignty, and national dignity.

Commentary:

The Chinese Communist Party has led the country and is the political nucleus of China. It is the paramount arbiter of China's consultative foreign policy process. However, China's Communist Party is composed of approximately 60 million of China's 1.3 billion population. It has adapted its rigid socialist orientation to enable the radical market reforms that have impelled China's remarkable economic growth for the past decade. There are rising expectations among China's 10 percent urban population, who expect continuing and growing economic prosperity. The have-nots, China's 1 billion rural population, have not participated in China's prosperity. The Communist Party must now fulfill rural expectations.

If it fails to do so, it may lose power.

China takes great pains not to style itself as a great power. Only recently has it become capable of providing basic food and shelter for its population. It believes that it will not achieve moderate prosperity for all of its population for at least another 20 years. During this interim period, China's focus is on its internal development. It contends that it does not have the resources to play a great state power role in international affairs. China will host the 2008 Olympic Games. China does not view the Olympics as its arrival as a great state power, but rather as a mark of its incremental growth and development. However, China has already arrived as a great state power in international affairs, particularly in Asia. Its power and reach will continue to grow.

HOW CHINA FRAMES THE ISSUES

China's Perspective:

China has changed and will continue to change with or without US efforts to impede or facilitate Chinese development. How should the US respond to the reality of a new China and make sound judgments regarding China's development?

Can the US accept China's development and create a mutually satisfactory policy of peaceful co-existence with China? As for China, how can it make clear that its strategic objective is a stable, long-term relationship with the US?

China believes that there is a combination of economic and political strategic considerations that address the above stated issues. Some "honeymoon" areas for US-China cooperation are:

- The Korean Peninsula nuclear crisis: China fears a flood of North Korean refugees and does not wish to encourage nuclear proliferation in South Korea and Japan.
- Counterterrorism: China's Western provinces experience numerous acts of militant Islamist terrorism that compel China to cooperate with the US.
- Regional Influence: China can encourage its ally Pakistan to cooperate with the US.
- Economic cooperation and ties: Forty percent of China's exports go to the US.

Commentary:

The US, for the immediate future, is the senior partner in the relationship. US foreign policymakers and commentators are ambivalent – there is no consensus regarding whether China should be treated as friend or foe. This is excused, in part, because China's strategic objectives and implementation plans are obscure. Ideally, the US should identify what it expects of China, and China should clarify its strategic objectives. Whichever state moves first to break the impasse gains leverage in subsequent negotiations. China has the most to gain by taking the initiative.

ECONOMY AND TRADE

China's Perspective:

China's economic development – an average of over 9 percent annual growth – needs to be placed in perspective. In per capita income, China ranks 100th of the world's nations. China believes that it has only recently solved its main objective of feeding and clothing its people. China believes that it will become a moderately affluent society by 2030, and it will achieve modernization by 2050. China shuns the notion that it is close to achieving great power status in the near future and that it is capable of challenging the US in the areas of trade and economics.

Ten to 15 years ago, China recognized that its closed door policy would perpetuate its poverty. The solution was a major policy shift away from communist economics towards an open-door policy that would enable it to obtain investment funds, technology, and management expertise from the outside world. Pragmatism trumped ideology and has been the underlying rationale for China's extraordinary economic development.

China has acknowledged its problem with Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) – that infringement is rampant in China. The excuse is that China's low-level of technology has prevented it from installing an effective IPR protection system. The US has threatened trade sanctions, and predictably China has threatened counter-trade sanctions against the US. China believes that this area of conflict is an example of a missed opportunity for both sides. Rather than a war of words, the US and China could have cooperated to use US technology to address and resolve the problem.

The US continues to import a huge amount of cheap consumer goods. China relies on exporting labor-intensive consumer goods and a small amount of high-tech equipment. To place this in perspective, China must export 100 million badminton racquets to import one Boeing 747 aircraft.

Seventy percent of China's exports to the US are manufactured by US-China joint ventures located in China. The money earned by these joint ventures comprises a net gain for the US, but is categorized as China's export profit.

The US restricts export of its high-tech dual use technology to China because of concerns that the equipment might be used for military purposes. Large Western Europe companies sell this same high-tech equipment to China. High-tech equipment is fungible, and American companies suffer as a result. China will continue to develop and there will be an increasing demand for imports from the US.

China believes that it is important for Americans to understand the underlying reasons for China's economic growth and its importance to the economies of both countries. It is also important to understand the negative aspects of US trade realities. For many years, the US has been spending more than it earns. By contrast, China has a trade surplus. The US has low personal savings accounts; China has high personal savings. China has become the second-largest creditor of the US.

The US has made a strategic decision to conduct very expensive military operations in Iraq. In the Chinese view, the US policy that it can have a successful "guns and butter" economy is misguided. The reality is that war-related expenses are a major element of the United States' growing budget deficit. This delicate economic balancing act requires that China continue to finance an increasing share of US debt. China abhors the use of military force for two reasons: first, military force, even as a last resort, frequently fails; and second, China cannot afford the use of military force because it will destabilize its economy.

There is a tendency for US critics of China's competitive economic and trade advantage to focus solely on China's low wages. China's competitive advantage is based on an array of other equally important factors, including: research and development technology capability; political stability, attractive

tax incentives for foreign investors; low operational overhead and capital investment costs; well-planned economic reform policies (a capitalistic refutation of communist economics); high quality information technology; and a highly adaptive semi-skilled workforce that is not labor strike-oriented.

The next phase of China's growth will be in its domestic markets. For example, the transition from bicycles to automobiles for China's urban population, and bicycles to motorbikes for the 90 percent of China's rural population – a pool of one billion rural consumers. Economic competitiveness compels China to produce Chinese-made cars and motorbikes for its domestic consumers rather than relying on US imports.

Commentary:

China is well positioned to become a political and trade gleaner. If the US makes an enemy, China can establish outposts and a political presence for trade and, most importantly, energy supply. An example is the continuing conflict between the US and Venezuela. China would be delighted to siphon off some of Venezuela's oil exports. The US relies on 9 percent of its imported oil from Venezuela.

ENERGY RESOURCE COMPETITION

China's Perspective:

Fifteen years ago, China was oil independent. Now it is the world's number two oil importer, trailing only the US. China is transitioning from bicycles to cars, and it will need an enormous supply of oil for the long term, as its industry-based economy continues to grow at an estimated 9-10 percent annually. The best oil fields are already claimed or depleted, and it has become more expensive to extract oil from the ground.

Commentary:

Before the US went to war with Iraq, China had made substantial investments in Iraq's oil production facilities. The US invasion of Iraq has wiped out China's stake in Iraq's oil. China views the US presence in Iraq as primarily oil-motivated.

China is actively pursuing oil and gas deals with US friends and foes. China has \$70 billion worth of oil and gas purchase agreements with Iran. China is reluctant to support US and European efforts to iso-

late Iran and force Iran to abandon its plans to produce nuclear weapons. The US is not China's sole competitor for oil. For example, China is seeking Russian Siberian oil, and Japan has trumped China with a US\$6 billion bid for Russian-Siberian oil.

Oil must be transported from production site to consumer primarily by sea. China is concerned that the US Navy has the power to control the sealanes – another point of conflict and China's justification for enlarging its naval fleet.

CHINA'S MILITARY

China's Perspective:

China's military expenditures are geared to its economic prosperity. China believes that the core of US-China tension is the US belief that China's future economic development will fuel China's military expansion and modernization which will enable China to challenge the US militarily. China's national defense expenditures in 2004 were an estimated US\$25.5 billion, which is approximately 6 percent of the US national defense budget. China's focus on economic investment over the past 25 years has resulted in an actual decrease in percentage of its GDP spent on defense, while US national defense expenditures have risen substantially over the same period of time.

The US has demonstrated its overwhelming military power in Kuwait, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq. However, US military force projection has been tempered by its inability to suppress insurgencies. China has learned from the US experience with asymmetric warfare. China is reluctant to upgrade its military to reach parity with the US military.

China believes that the US military is stretched to its limit in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the US has no capability for additional military adventures in the near-term, with the possible exception of Iran.

Commentary:

Although neither side wants military conflict, the potential for confrontation between the US and China is most likely to occur over scarce oil supplies. China's strategic objective is to keep oil transport sealanes from the Middle East to China open. Proximity favors China in any naval encounter; China will have an advantage over the US. China is establishing its influence in the Pacific through diplomacy, busi-

ness and trade connections, and facility construction. It is unlikely that China will trust the US or India to keep the sealanes open for them.

The lesson learned by China from the US experience in Iraq is that the way to frustrate the US is not by direct confrontation but by the cheaper and more effective alternative of asymmetric warfare.

China's rationale for its military build-up and modernization is self-interest. When states' legitimate self-interests collide, conflict may occur. It's unlikely that China is looking for military confrontation with the US. Rather, the conflict would be a series of Cold War-style confrontations caused by energy shortages. Thus, notwithstanding China's protestations, the US needs to develop a military strategy in the Pacific that conforms to worst-case scenarios.

China will continue to spend more money on its military, particularly its navy. The US strategic objective should be to encourage China to make military investments for defensive rather than offensive purposes. However, it is difficult to define the difference between offensive and defensive weapons capability.

China may pursue the concept of asymmetric warfare as it conceptualizes its military expenditures by prioritizing their submarine and missile capability. China's military preparations should not be viewed as necessarily belligerent. Chinese and US military planners have similar contingency planning responsibilities. There is a need to decipher China's military objectives and conduct. However, in 2003, China spent approximately US\$60 billion on defense, which is triple the amount it spent in 1993. China's military could achieve equivalency with the US if China's economy increases at a steady rate for the next ten years.

HUMAN RIGHTS

China's Perspective:

China contends that it has made substantial progressive changes in its policy on human rights. They acknowledge that the positive changes have resulted from their desire to adhere to international human rights norms. China has participated in discussions regarding human rights with Western countries and believes that it has enhanced mutual understanding of China's position on human rights. China is a sig-

natory to international human rights agreements and has also included the clause “respect and protection of human rights” in its Constitution.

Commentary:

The Tiananmen Square incident of 1989 is a sore subject for China. Most of the young generation of Chinese is unaware of the extent of repressive measures that were taken by the Chinese government.

China is in the process of a difficult transition. The freedom of expression norms of the US, a mature democracy, may not be feasible in China because of their potentially destabilizing internal political effect. China must move towards Western norms of human rights as a condition of becoming a stakeholder in global affairs. However, Western critics scoff at the gap between China’s words and deeds (reference the human rights phrase in China’s Constitution).

The US needs to understand the political dimension of China’s human rights issues. A policy choice was made by China to focus on its economic reform policy: to feed and clothe its people by 2000 and continue its movement towards relative economic prosperity by 2020. The lively political debate that is common in the US may be unsuitable for China at this time. China is sensitive to its human rights problems and attempts by the US to highlight the issue are perceived in China as US meddling in its internal affairs – and are not well received.

US strategy and policymaking are driven by adherence to norms established by a reasonably well informed public, which depends on the availability and free flow of information. US policy decisions are encouraged or constrained by shifts in information-based public opinion. There is no parallel in China. One important aspect of human rights that is frequently overlooked is denial of the public’s right to access timely and accurate information regarding government policies. For the past several years the Chinese government has actively engaged technical assistance from major US search engine companies to maintain a degree of control over Chinese internet users.

The Chinese government has created its own version of world events and its policies for its population. This is different from the US marketplace of ideas. Many Americans are pro-China and are pub-

licly and vociferously critical of US policy towards China. However, there is no reciprocal community of pro-US experts in China who could publicly be critical of China’s policy towards the US. Chinese scholars and journalists are not independent. They know that public criticism of the state is not well-received by China’s government.

Cultural exchanges with the US are important because they are eye-openers for the Chinese, but the cumulative effect is limited because of the difficulty of conveying the realities of American life and values, warts and all, to the Chinese public. A judgment needs to be made – that China is an authoritarian state, but may be in transition to greater openness. However, for the moment, China has an advantage over the US because it has the power to shape public opinion without the messiness of informed public discussion.

THE TAIWAN ISSUE

China’s Perspective:

Cultural integrity is a core Chinese value. Every meter of China is deemed to be inviolable sovereign territory. An ancient Chinese dynastic tradition decreed that an emperor would lose face if China lost a city to a foreign power. China contends that territorial disputes must be settled peaceably and that adherence to international norms are a better way to resolve disputes. China insists that the Taiwanese must recognize the efficacy of peaceful reunification. The analogy they present is that the ongoing US immigration dispute with Mexico involves a tangential issue of “reconquista,” which is the return of southwestern US states to Mexico.

Commentary:

China has recently offered two panda cubs to Taiwan. In China’s view, this was a way to foster Taiwan’s reunification with mainland China. To frame the reunification issue, in an equally inspired metaphor, Taiwan’s government rejected the “Trojan Panda” offer by stating that the cuddly Pandas have claws. Taiwan President Chen said, “Pandas brought up in cages will not be happy,” reiterating Taiwan’s rejection of forced reunification.

China is determined to compel Taiwan’s peaceful reunification with China. There have been a series of incremental, confidence building steps between the

two sides. However, China's courting of the KMT, Taiwan's opposition party, has been condemned by Taiwan's ruling party.

China has deployed approximately 800 missiles targeting Taiwan. At the same time, China recognizes that trade and investment with Taiwan will inevitably increase. China is Taiwan's largest trading partner – a 16 percent increase from 2003.

Implicit in the One-China strategic objective is that both sides have too much to lose if there is military conflict initiated by China. It would have an adverse cascade effect on China's economic development and its trade relationship with the US. This would stultify China's economy and preclude its desired 9 to 10 percent annual domestic growth.

There appear to be inconsistent statements from China regarding its insistence on peaceful resolution of territorial disputes. Note that the Chinese-Indian War of 1962 was a territorial dispute. China has implemented a series of flexible, incremental confidence-building changes with Taiwan. However, this is coupled with bellicose statements and the presence of missiles targeted at Taiwan.

Peaceful, timely, and creative resolution of the China-Taiwan issue is critical to the US-China relationship. Forced reunification would destabilize China's economic progress and have a substantial negative effect on the US economy (from the resulting US boycott of consumer goods produced by China, and diminished loans made by China to the US).

Peaceful resolution of the Taiwan matter could be affected by timing and politics. Taiwan's presidential election will occur in March 2008, a few months before the start of the Olympic Games hosted by China. Taiwan's opposition party, the KMT, has signaled its receptiveness to an innovative political solution that must be initiated by China. This opens the door to the possibility of a creative concept – thinking outside the box. Business conflicts between American corporations may appear to be harsh and abrasive. However, a zone of agreement is usually present, which is the predicate for a deal to be made. The agreement that resolves the dispute may be imprecise and subject to favorable interpretation by both sides to meet their respective needs.

The preamble to the visionary agreement would be that mainland China and Taiwan share a common history, culture, and language. The agreement

could be a simultaneous declaration of a three-step process that:

1. China asserts its sovereignty over Taiwan
2. Taiwan accepts China's sovereignty
3. China grants independence to Taiwan

In time, subject to voluntary economic, trade, and cultural accommodations made by both sides, de facto reunification could be achieved. This proposed concept for agreement may be simplistic and overly optimistic. However, the zone of agreement is present and the risk of China taking military action to resolve the Taiwan matter is too great.

CONCLUSION

The US is the senior partner in the US-China relationship. As such, it has the opportunity to guide that relationship. If the US does not grasp the dynamics of China's ongoing transformation, then China must provide leadership by making clear statements regarding its strategic objectives and implementing policies that are clearly consistent with its objectives. Neither the US nor China knows what the nature of the relationship will be twenty years from now. The younger generation of Americans and Chinese will receive the legacy of decisions made by policymakers on both sides. Unforeseen events are always possible. The prudent course for the US is to address this fundamental issue: Can the US shape its relationship with China in a mutually beneficial way; and, if so, what incremental steps can be taken over time to create a more positive relationship?

The immediate opportunities for US-China cooperation are counterterrorism and nuclear nonproliferation, including North Korea and Iran. A mutually beneficial US-China relationship requires an appraisal of the relationship based on both words and deeds, with appropriate adjustments to be made over time. More importantly, a well-conceived US-China joint venture could produce tangible results for both states. For example, consider a US-China high-tech research project to reduce the need for oil dependence.

China's President Hu visited the US in April 2006. This was an opportunity missed. President Hu had a photo-op in Washington and a series of business meetings in the Pacific Northwest where he discussed airplanes, computers, athletic shoes, and

perhaps Starbucks coffee. President Hu could have used this visit to clarify some of the complex issues in the US-China relationship, but he chose not to do so.

In 2000, the US-China relationship pendulum was at the enmity-adversary point. In subsequent years, one senses that the pendulum began to swing towards the positive. Pessimists and optimists alike have expected clarification of China's strategic objectives. However, the magic moment has passed, and the US-China relationship may have soured. There are ample grounds for the growing belief that China has gained much and the US has been disadvantaged.

An objective set of markers is needed to test the relationship. The following are China-related markers.

- Apart from human rights principles, will China allow its population to have access to information regarding US values and policies?
- Will China open its markets to US goods and services?
- Will China stabilize its currency and allow it to float on global financial markets?
- Will China crack down on Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) piracy?
- Will China prohibit export of its nuclear technology and equipment?
- Will China cooperate fully with the US regarding counterterrorism matters?
- Will China continue to cooperate on world health matters, particularly regarding the anticipated avian flu pandemic?
- Will China soften its objection to Taiwan's representation in the World Health Organization (WHO)?
- Will China use its negotiating power to persuade North Korea and Iran to refrain from developing their respective nuclear weapon capability?
- Will China take precipitate action regarding Taiwan?

The following are markers for US policy towards China.

- Will the US recognize that China's economic development is a legitimate state interest and that there is very little that the US can do to restrain China's economic growth and development?

- Is there a way for the US to calibrate the warning signs that China's economic development policy may falter or fail?
- Would the US be advantaged or disadvantaged by a downturn in China's economic development and possible political failure? What would be the negative effect on the US economy? What would be the effect of China ceasing or reducing its loans to the US?
- Will the US reduce its reliance on China's financing a large part of US debt?
- Will the US develop a policy to enhance its productivity and market share for its exports?
- Will the US formulate a pro-active diplomatic policy for Asia, Central Asia, Africa, and Latin America to counter China's diplomatic offensive in these regions?
- Will the US develop an effective energy policy to reduce its dependency on imported oil? This could include an invitation to China to cooperate on a joint technology project that would replace reliance on oil.

US commentators and policymakers are divided on their respective perceptions regarding China as friend or foe. Both optimists and pessimists have legitimate arguments to support their differing points of view. Candid discussion and identification of areas of conflict are a crucial point of departure for guiding the relationship.

Richard E. Friedman is the President and Chair of the National Strategy Forum.

TAMING AMERICAN POWER

The Global Response to US Primacy

By Stephen M. Walt

W.W. Norton, 2005, 320 pages

Reviewed by Endy Zemenides

Since the end of the Cold War, perhaps the most analyzed subject in international relations has been the unprecedented (at least, in modern times) nature of American power and what should be done with it. Americans themselves, however, do not seem to understand this power. In the late 1990s, polls showed that over 40 percent of Americans believed that the US was just one of several major powers. Today, Americans routinely overestimate the size of China's economy, China's global (rather than regional) foreign policy ambitions, the cohesiveness and capabilities of the European Union, and the military capabilities of Russia. When Americans do accept the notion of US primacy, they tend to see it as a force for good.

In a new and valuable contribution to the debate over American power, Stephen Walt, the dean of the Kennedy School of Government, tells us that the world is worried "because the United States is strong enough to act pretty much as it wishes, and other states cannot be sure that Washington will not use its immense power to threaten their own interests." Walt produces what has been missing from this debate for too long – an analysis of what the world is doing about American power, rather than what the US should be doing with its power.

It is impossible to deny America's primacy, no matter what measure is used. The US economy is 60 percent larger than its closest rival, Japan (in fact, several US states would rank as the largest 50 economies in the world, with California ranking 6th largest). At the turn of the century, US Research and Development expenditures equaled those of the next seven richest countries combined. And, despite all the talk of globalization, trade deficits and foreign oil, the US depends less on other countries than they depend on it. Militarily, US defense expenditures are nearly 40 percent of the global total and estimated to be seven times greater than China's military. Ameri-

can military R & D expenditures are larger than the entire defense budgets of Germany, Great Britain, France, Russia, Japan or China. All of this at a price of only 3.5 percent of GDP. As noted by Paul Ken-

With so much power in the hands of a single country, how do we expect other nations to respond?

nedy, "being Number One at great cost is one thing; being the world's single superpower on the cheap is astonishing." Add all of this hard power to US institutional and cultural influences and you have a power that would make

even Ancient Rome tread carefully.

With so much power in the hands of a single country, how do we expect other nations to respond? Walt provides readers with astonishing empirical evidence that the global response – across the board – is one of resentment. In 2002, even before the Iraq War was launched, only 27 percent of world opinion leaders thought the US was "taking the interest of its partners into account" in conducting foreign policy. In 2004, this number dropped to 22 percent. In Europe – where most of our closest allies are located – there is overwhelming public sentiment (over 71 percent) in favor of the EU becoming a superpower; this includes 52 percent in favor in Great Britain, 80 percent in favor in Italy, and 63 percent in favor in Poland – all countries that were part of the coalition in Iraq. And the world increasingly distrusts US motives (in Great Britain, 33 percent of respondents believed that the war on terrorism was being conducted to control Mideast oil, and 24 percent believed it was conducted for the purposes of world domination; in Turkey – America's closest Muslim ally – the numbers were 64 percent and 61 percent).

This resentment, combined with American failure to understand or empathize, has led the rest of the world – including our allies – to take action. Walt quotes Condoleeza Rice's reply when asked why

Germany and France had opposed US policy on Iraq – “I’ll put it very bluntly. We simply didn’t understand it.” The debate over American power has long assumed that American power was not being “balanced” in the standard sense of the realist school of international relations (i.e., creating coalitions and alliances that stand in opposition to US foreign policy). Now that the world no longer considers US intentions as comparatively benign, a new chapter of balance of power politics is being written. While anti-US military alliances are still not popping up, Walt provides evidence of an increasingly frequent trend of soft-balancing (e.g., Russia working with Iran), internal balancing (the use of terrorism or WMD to counter the US’s asymmetric power) and other tactics that are being adopted in opposition to American power. Walt also provides an excellent analysis of the circumstances under which states will risk opposing American power.

It is not possible, however, to describe the whole world as standing in opposition to American power. The empirical evidence Walt cites shows some positive feelings about American power in India, Israel, Great Britain and others. Walt does not classify these countries as being content with American power, but as countries that are pursuing strategies of accommodation. In his chapter on these strategies, Walt provides a preview of his (in partnership with John Mearsheimer) recent controversial analysis of the influence of the Jewish lobby in the United States. Walt concludes that instead of opposing American power, some states are seeking to manipulate it in pursuit of their interests.

Walt concludes with recommendations for US foreign policy, and this weakens the book a bit. It would have been fascinating to read predictions about future attempts by governments and non-governmental actors to subvert or manipulate American power. For example, what are the consequences if the EU does in fact become a military superpower, or China’s economy overtakes the US’s (and can

therefore spend much more militarily)? What if the Arab-American lobby becomes stronger? Won’t powerful states still resent American power whether it is “imperialist” in nature or it is limited to the role of “off-shore balancer”? A comprehensive analysis of these questions is certainly necessary to take the debate about American power to the next level. *Taming American Power* is an excellent – if incomplete – first step. •

Now that the world no longer considers US intentions as comparatively benign, a new chapter of balance of power politics is being written.

Endy Zemenides is a member of the National Strategy Forum Review Editorial Board. He is a partner and attorney at Acosta, Kruse & Zemenides, a Chicago law firm.

RECENT SPEAKERS

The National Strategy Forum hosts a series of monthly luncheons and events featuring guest speakers who lecture on relevant national security and foreign policy topics.

On April 19, 2006, General Robert Magnus, Assistant Commandant of the US Marine Corps, discussed the US military and the war on terror.

The Marine Corps is working to secure Iraq and fight the insurgency and terrorism in the Middle East, said General Robert Magnus.

Over the course of the 20th Century, the Marine Corps has adapted to the challenges of modern warfare, which has increasingly involved small wars and insurgencies. US forces currently operating in Iraq and Afghanistan are equipped with unparalleled expertise, training, tactics, and weapon technology. But the Marines can only project force temporarily, he said. It is critical for Afghan and Iraqi security forces eventually to take over the efforts to stop the insurgency and terrorism in their own societies.

“The Marines will not lose this war,” General Magnus said. “The truth is they also cannot win this war. The only people who can win against an insurgency are the Afghans and Iraqis themselves.”

US forces are now in the second campaign of a long war – Afghanistan was the first campaign and Iraq, the second. Although the outcome of the US effort in Afghanistan and Iraq appears uncertain, the same ambiguity existed during and after the Revolutionary War and the Vietnam War, General Magnus said. The few certainties that can guide US strategy and action are: the ruthless nature of the enemy and the danger that would result should the US fail in Iraq.

The goal of the insurgency in Iraq is to break the will of the US and the Iraqi people. The enemy is a global network of terrorists that operates from cells in several regions around the world. Its goal is to inflict harm on Americans and threaten the influence of the West.

“This is not an enemy that you negotiate with. This is not an enemy that you walk away from on the playground because you think it won’t happen

again,” General Magnus said. “We need to roll up and destroy these networks.”

General Magnus stated that the Global War on Terrorism is a generational effort that will require long-term dedication. The US needs to address entrenched societal issues such as poverty, world hunger, and religious extremism, all of which perpetuate failed states where terrorism thrives. General Magnus said he believes that Americans will support the US military in the fight against terrorism.

This will also require patience. The problems in Iraq and Afghanistan are “not something we are going to fix in a week.” General Magnus stated that death threats kept the police in the Sunni Arab city of Ramadi from going to work.

“I think what American society needs to do is think very deeply about who we are as people and what kind of nasty world is out there,” he said.

On April 28, 2006, General Anthony Zinni, USMC (Ret.), Former Commander of US Central Command (retired), discussed his book, “The Battle for Peace: A Frontline Vision of America’s Power and Purpose,” which is an analysis of the current world situation and US foreign policy.

Since the end of the Cold War, trends such as globalization and the emergence of powerful non-state actors – terrorist networks, drug cartels, warlords, NGOs, and other international organizations – have created a new world order, General Anthony Zinni said. The United States needs to develop a national security and foreign policy strategy that can effectively deal with the array of new threats that have emerged over the past half-century.

“What faces us now, what is the enemy, is not an alliance of nation states or another sovereign power or political ideology,” General Zinni said. “It is the

fast growing pace of unstable parts of the world that are generating all the problems we worry about today.”

US policy needs to be reoriented away from a Cold War era mind-set towards a broader outlook, General Zinni said. The future challenges to US national security are not going to be confined to state-to-state confrontation. Today, the greatest threats emanate from failing states where existing problems, including humanitarian, public health, environmental, and immigration issues, access to natural resources, organized crime, and extremism, could eventually “wash up on our shores,” producing catastrophic effects.

Former American leaders understood the need to take leadership in the international community through a strategic vision, General Zinni said. For example, President Woodrow Wilson led the US out of isolationism by forging a policy of US engagement in the international community. Following the Second World War, President Harry Truman and George C. Marshall drafted the Marshall Plan and made the decision to join NATO, which effectively prepared the US for the Cold War, he said.

The US does not have a long-term strategic vision. Current foreign policy is overly-simplistic and does not address new global threats, General Zinni said. A new policy should take into account the following:

- The role of the military needs to be clarified. “Does the military fight our nation’s battles or rebuild societies?” General Zinni asked.
- Soft power assets, such as diplomacy, should be emphasized and utilized to complement military efforts, he said. The US can also enhance its image by, for example, encouraging students from the Middle East to study in the US.
- Government agencies need to be restructured to enhance their ability to cross-communicate and share information.

The US government needs to undertake the creation of a strategic vision for US engagement in the world that allows the US to continue as a world leader, rather than becoming a passive actor that reacts to crisis. •

UPCOMING SPEAKER

Catherine Bertini, former UN Under Secretary-General for Management and former head of the World Food Programme (WFP), will address the National Strategy Forum on September 11, 2006 on the subject of United Nations reform.

STRATEGY WATCH

*A Summary of Recent Events
March – May 2006*

MIDDLE EAST

In early March, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice urges Congress to give \$75 million to fund an initiative to promote democracy in **Iran**. It would allow Washington to engage directly with the Iranian people, trade unions, political dissidents, and non-governmental organizations. Iran's supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei says he supports talks with the US regarding the instability in Iraq. In early April, the UN Security Council issues a presidential statement calling on Iran to suspend its uranium enrichment program.

Protestors in Afghanistan riot after a traffic accident involving a US convoy kills at least seven civilians.

Khamenei asserts Iran's right to pursue a peaceful nuclear program. Iran threatens the US with harm and pain for promoting its referral to the UN Security Council. In early April, the Kadima party, founded by former **Israeli** Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, won the largest number of seats, 28, in the Israel's general election; the Labour party won 20; and Likud, 11. Ismail Haniya, the Hamas leader who is now Prime Minister of the **Palestinian** Authority, urges the international community not to punish the Palestinian people for its election of Hamas by suspending aid. The Hamas government deploys its own armed militias to the Gaza Strip. In May, after five months of negotiations, **Iraq's** government approves a new parliament that includes members of the Shia, Kurd, and Sunni parties. The government has not yet filled three key ministries: national security, interior, and defense. Insurgents carry out daily attacks against civilians and security forces in Iraq. The US resumes full diplomatic relations with **Libya** due to its efforts in the war on terror and for dropping plans to acquire weapons of mass destruction.

AFRICA

In early March, President Bush says he sup-

ports using NATO forces to assist a UN takeover of peacekeeping in the Darfur region of **Sudan**. Protestors in Khartoum, the capital of Sudan, oppose the replacement of the African Union with UN forces. US and British officials join talks in Abuja, the Nigerian capital, to pressure the Sudanese government and rebel groups toward peace agreements. In March, **Nigerian** rebels kidnap nine foreign oil-workers, causing oil companies to block one-fifth of Nigeria's oil exports. In mid-May, the Senate in Nigeria allows President Olusegun Obasanjo to run for a third term of office. In May, **Chad** holds presidential elections, despite threats of rebel attacks. In **Somalia**, conflict continues between Islamist gunmen and warlords' Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism.


NORTH AMERICA

The Bush administration and Congress clash over a proposed acquisition that would place Dubai Ports World, a company owned by the government of Dubai, **United Arab Emirates**, in charge of operating six major US port facilities. Dubai Ports World drops the deal amidst security concerns in the United States. President Bush announces that

Thousands of immigrants hold protests in several US cities regarding immigration reform legislation that is being debated in the US Congress.

his successor will likely have to decide to remove American troops from Iraq. In April, **Chinese** President Hu Jintao visits the United States for a formal lunch at the White House and meetings with business leaders at The Boeing Company and Microsoft Corporation. In early May, Zacarias

Moussaoui is convicted for conspiracy in connection with al Qaeda's September 11 attacks and sentenced to life in prison.



Colombian President Alvaro Uribe is elected to a second term.

In parliamentary elections, Greek Cypriots vote for a party that rejects the UN peace plan to reunify the island.

The U.N. Security Council adopts a resolution urging Syria to establish diplomatic relations and a set border with Lebanon.

Australia sends troops to Timor-Leste, where violence erupted after the dismissal of 594 soldiers.

ASIA

A mudslide in the **Philippines** kills more than 1,000 people. In mid-March, **Japan** refuses an offer from **China** to develop gas fields jointly in a disputed area of the East China Sea. In May, Islamic militants are suspected of attacking 35 Hindus in **Jammu & Kashmir**, even after **Indian** Prime Minister Manmohan Singh urges militant groups to shun violence. **Nepal's** government declares a ceasefire with rebel Maoists. Nepalese government officials and leaders of the communist rebel movement meet for peace talks. In May, deaths in a six-member family in **Indonesia** attributed to the H5N1 bird flu virus raise concerns about human-to-human transmission. A 6.3 magnitude earthquake in Indonesia kills some 5,000 people and leaves at least 130,000 homeless.

Russia signs a deal to supply Venezuela with 100,000 Kalashnikov assault rifles.

ist former army officer, and Alan Garcia, a populist former president. In May, the deputy leader of **Honduras** is killed. The US government bans arms sales to **Venezuela**.•

EUROPE

In late March, **Spain's** Basque separatist group, ETA, announces a permanent ceasefire. Romano Prodi, leader of **Italy's** center-left coalition, defeats incumbent Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi in a contested general election. The European Commission recommends postponing the decision to allow **Bulgaria** and **Romania** to join the **European Union**. In early May, the European Union calls off talks with **Serbia** regarding EU candidacy after it misses an internationally mandated deadline to hand over an indicted Bosnian Serb General to the war crimes tribunal in The Hague.

LATIN AMERICA

In **Ecuador**, the government announces a state of emergency in five highland provinces following Indian groups' protests against free-trade negotiations with the US and public spending. In May, the government ends a contract with an American oil company. In early May, **Bolivian** President Evo Morales decrees the nationalization of Bolivia's natural gas industry. He sends troops and engineers with Bolivia's state-owned oil company to Brazilian-run gasfields. **Peru's** presidential election is confirmed as a run-off between Ollanta Humala, a national-

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