



NATIONAL STRATEGY FORUM REVIEW

US STRATEGY IN THE ISLAMIC WORLD

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DEMOCRACY: THE TURKISH EXPERIENCE**

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- The advancement and preservation of democracy is essential to promote human rights, inspire principled cultural achievement, and maximize economic development.
- Informed public opinion and an enduring non-partisan consensus are fundamental parts of national security in a democratic society.

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NATIONAL STRATEGY FORUM REVIEW

LETTER FROM THE PUBLISHER

The US national security strategic vision must be based on an understanding and analysis of the relationship between the West and the Islamic world. There is growing discussion regarding a supposed “Clash of Civilizations” — a looming confrontation between the Western and Islamic worlds. This would be a historical repeat of the twelfth and thirteenth century clashes between Christianity and militant, expansionist Islam.

The basis for the political theory of the Clash of Civilizations may be incorrect because other, more recent, post-September 11 issues have emerged. There may be an alternate political theory: Clash of Strategic Vision, Resources, Communication, and Technology. The Russian experiences of the eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth centuries may be instructive.

Tsar Peter the Great sent a Russian military expedition to Central Asia, which, at the time, was virtually unknown to the West. The Central Asians (the Khan of Khiva) perceived the Tsar’s expedition as an invasion. The Russians were repulsed. Why Russia decided to expand eastward eight time zones is unresolved, particularly in light of its limited resources. One theory advanced in Europe was a Russian plan to rule the world.

Two maxims may be helpful to explain Peter the Great’s policy and to analyze US national security strategy. One, vision without resources is hallucination. Two, they hate us too much and fear us too little.

During the period 1830 through mid-1860, Russia fought in Dagestan against the indigenous

Islamic guerilla leader, the Iman Shmiel. The Russian Army sustained enormous casualties before Dagestan was subjugated. The Iman Shmiel capitulated and was given a pension by the Russians, in whose country he spent his remaining years feeding pigeons in a city park. His son continued sporadic fighting against the Russians for the next twenty years. Also, note the contemporary Russian experience in Afghanistan and Chechnya.

The threshold consideration is whether there is a monolithic political and religious Islam. For example, Turkey’s ninety-nine percent Islamic population flourishes in a secular, western, democratic state. There are significant cultural, ethnic, and religious doctrinal differences among Muslims and within Islam.

The flashpoint may arise from the Muslims who portray the West as the infidel/enemy and who use normative Islam as the justification for acts of terrorism to achieve political objectives. The trend of violence is increasing—abetted by access to weapons technology, hidden funding for terrorist groups, biased religious education, and the rise of Arab television that communicates distorted information and vitriol.

The primary issue is whether the root causes of the Western-Islamic conflict can be identified, addressed, and resolved early in what some commentators have already deemed to be the Bloody Twenty-First Century. The hope is that candid analysis will enhance mutual understanding and point the way to resolution of the complex issues involved.

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Consider the following:

- Is the US an expansionist empire nation? Or, are the hard core militant Islamists seeking domination of the West?
- What does world domination mean in contemporary terms? For example, one result of technology is the ability to use bioterrorism to disrupt the economies of the US and the West and to create widespread fear. US concern regarding international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is profound. In Europe, WMD are a yawn. Is this an internal Western clash of civilizations?
- What is the US strategic vision? Is it President Woodrow Wilson's vision of "making the world safe for democracy"? Or, is it something more pragmatic—making the world safe for America? If it is the latter, democracy may be beneficial for Muslims, America, and the West.
- Is America willing and able to invest its money and blood to implement its strategic vision? US casualties taken in Iraq are dispiriting. Investment of US taxpayers' money abroad to support the vision for homeland security is diluted by countervailing demands to allocate more money for domestic education and healthcare.
- Is the US effectively communicating its vision at home and abroad? Partisan politics during the quadrennial presidential election campaign tend to obscure strategic issues where there could and should be common agreement. US public diplomacy could be used to communicate important US values to the "Islamic Street" to counterbalance misinformation and vitriol being fed to the Islamic population by madrassas and Arab television.

This issue of the *National Strategy Forum Review* examines several important aspects of the Islamic world. Other issues—public diplomacy, finite resources, the dark side of technology, and the untapped potential benefits of communication—are elements of national security strategy that remain to be explored.

We have asked National Strategy Forum friends and scholars to focus on trends of the Islamic world, Islamic terrorism, and how to encourage beneficial change.

We need to listen to foreign critics of US foreign policy to sort out what is valid and what is not. Frequently, foreign critics lack an understanding of American values and strategic objectives. The reciprocal is that Americans and US foreign policymakers may be deficient in their understanding of the values and the motivation of other states. Harsh criticism is valuable because it may provide an insight into the misperceptions of the "Islamic Street" combined with legitimate criticism and useful suggestions. □

UPCOMING EVENTS

On **Friday, January 9, 2004**, the National Strategy Forum will host **Steven Emerson**, Executive Director of the Investigative Project, a leading expert on militant Islamic groups, and author of "American Jihad: The Terrorists Living Among Us."

On **Tuesday, February 17, 2004**, the National Strategy Forum will host **General Joseph Ralston**, former NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Please check our website for further details:
www.nationalstrategy.com

ON THE COMPATIBILITY OF ISLAM AND DEMOCRACY: THE TURKISH EXPERIENCE

Reha Keskinetepe

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Turkish Government.

The dividing line between domestic politics and international relations is more dubious today than ever before. With the added impact of globalization, it has become more difficult to analyze political movements solely by referring to domestic factors or only to international developments. This is especially true for radical movements within Islamic societies that frequently use religious references and resort to violence in their struggle. The emergence of these actors, which have domestic as well as transnational characters, has led many to conclude that extremist groups resorting to violence and terrorism in the name of Islam are direct products of the Islamic faith and Muslim societies at large. Such a conclusion is deceptive.

This misleading perception indicates that the average observer has failed to question the sweeping generalizations about Islam, Muslim societies, and individuals, and that a militant minority within Muslim societies has effectively exploited the sentiments of Muslim

masses and purports to speak on their behalf. Many then ask: Is Islam prone to conflict and unable to generate peaceful and democratic regimes? The catastrophic events of September 11 have blurred the picture further, endangering peace and stability in many parts of the world. Consequently, in our search to understand and find answers, the question of the compatibility of Islam with democracy inevitably appears before us.

The intellectual background in many parts of the West before September 11, mainly set by the unfortunate thesis known as “clash of civilizations”, curtailed the traditional role that enlightened elites would play in offering humane and imaginative answers to problems without losing the support of the masses. As for the Muslim societies, their failure to create the conditions of freer and more participatory regimes has only increased the chances of the clash of civilizations thesis to become a self-fulfilling prophesy.

Before addressing the more important issue of democracy and Islam, a few clarifications on two current matters are in order:

Reha Keskinetepe is the Deputy Director and Directorate General for Policy Planning for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey.

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- When terrorists groups carry out operations against their perceived targets, they could indeed believe in the worthiness of their “sacred”, and political, cause. It is clear that they claim to act in the name of religion. But the mere fact of claiming to act in the name of Islam does not validate their assertion. If we do not accept their rationale behind resorting to terrorism as a method, why should we accept their claim to represent Islam, especially when the overwhelming majority of Muslims worldwide do not?
- Most terrorist groups claiming to act in the name of Islam try to fill a vacuum in the political system. This is a socio-political vacuum created by the continuing shortcomings of the regimes in most parts of the Muslim world. Muslim societies cannot continue to deny their own responsibility in failing to advance their societies and keep pointing to outsiders as the source of their problems. The responsibility of outsiders cannot be denied, but that is another topic for discussion. This weakness is easily exploited by extremist groups, who conveniently monopolize the voice of opposition/dissent and eventually create conditions not any less authoritarian than what they fight against. As such, these extremist and violent groups help perpetuate the undemocratic social practices of their societies, robbing them of the chance to reform peacefully from within.

Having given these explanations, I can now turn to the larger issue: Islam and democracy.

There is an underlying suspicion in the West about how compatible democracy is with non-Western societies at large. Some of the doubts are attributed to the unsatisfactory socio-economic conditions that prevail in developing societies. Another, publicly less vocal explanation is the unsuitability of democracy for these societies due to cultural / civilizational traits.

Societal prejudices aside, giving so little credit to non-Western, for our purposes, Muslim societies is partly attributable to a specific understanding of democracy as developed in the political dynamics of Western societies during the last two centuries. One can argue that Muslim societies have a history of social arrangements that are pro-democratic, albeit not satisfying contemporary definitions of parliamentary democracy. In fact, Amartya Sen recently reminded everyone in his book “Democracy and its Global Roots: Why Democratization is not the same as Westernization,” that non-Western historical roots of pluralism, diversity, and basic liberties, including the period following the birth of Islam, have been largely ignored by students of democracy in the West. What is important is that Islam does not in and of itself pose an obstacle to the establishment of a democratic regime.

Even for the novice observer, there is enough evidence pointing to elements of Islam that would well support democratic structures, let alone a democratic sense of life. The

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Koranic principle of *shura* (a consultative decision-making process), *ijma* (consensus/agreement of the community) and the practice of *ijtihad* (independent analysis or interpretation of Islamic law), as well as the Constitution of Medina point to the essential existence of a democracy-friendly and pluralist view of the world in the Islamic tradition.

Indeed, the golden age of Islam was a major contribution to human thought. As a reflection of the respect for human intellect, medieval Islamic philosophers' reason was considered a source of truth. Pluralism and dialogue were the norm and had no contradiction with personal piety whatsoever. In his book "Overstating the Arab State: Politics and Society in the Middle East," Nazih N. Ayubi observes that even the Islamic, patrimonial Ottoman State demonstrated "remarkable skill in organization and administration, and some very interesting innovations in the area of statesmanship that included, among others, the elaboration of a dynamic system of socio-cultural pluralism."

Such an approach has not, regrettably, come to symbolize much of the political history of Islamic societies since then. But that has more to do with *homo politicus* and the struggles among societies and empires, rather than Islam itself.

Islam, as an awing faith, can provide elements for those who would rather selectively refer to the Koran and the Islamic tradition to legitimize their particular socio-political choices, power relationships or traditions. This

has been the case in the more recent part of Islam's history. But the fact remains that Islam does not foresee a specific system of state. Political regimes that heavily refer to Islam represent national or regional political cultures, not the embodiment of an ideal state of Islam.

Nor is there in today's world a hierarchical authority that can claim to speak for the whole of Islam since the abolishment of the Caliphate by the founders of the Turkish Republic. Moreover, it makes no sense to talk about an Islamic foreign policy. Unlike what extremists would like us to believe, Islam does not need to lay down a blueprint of government, at home or abroad, for Muslims to live happy and meaningful lives. The idea of a united and monolithic Islamic political entity is, therefore, a construction in the minds of some, not a tangible reality, nor a necessity.

Admittedly, in trying to gauge the compatibility of Islam and democracy, one is also obliged to study the experience of different Muslim societies. Unfortunately, most of present day Muslim societies would largely fail the test of democracy. But there is a big exception, big enough to give hope for tens of millions of other Muslims around the world: the case of Turkey.

Though emanating from the particular conditions of its history and tradition, the Turkish experience with democratization is essentially a self-imposed process, a matter of free choice for a predominantly Muslim people. The desire to give Turkish people the best that mankind had

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achieved was the starting point of Kemal Ataturk's reforms. The same goal is the main thrust of present day Turkish aspirations to join the EU. Islam, as a faith, is not an obstacle in this endeavor.

Moreover, Turkey's Islamic identity has not hindered Turkey's interaction with and effective participation and membership in Western institutions and organizations. The successful conclusion of Turkey's accession to the EU will be a further demonstration of the compatibility of a Muslim society with a predominantly Christian populace brought together by and integrating around common, universal and democratic values.

At the same time, the success of the Turkish experience owes much to the principle of secularism. However, unlike what many non-secular Muslims believe, the principle of secularism, attributable to the State, does not hinder people from practicing their religion. On the contrary, by allowing for pluralism rather than a single state religion, secularism functions as a guarantor of all creeds and religious practices. Consequently, the personal piety of Muslims in Turkey exists alongside an official system of government that is in principle secular.

The beneficiaries of parliamentary democracy in Turkey are the Turkish people at large, 99 percent of whom are Muslims. The Turkish experience in political, economic and social development rests on the belief that it is perfectly possible to advance society in all fields, while Islam continues to play an important role

in people's lives. Gradually building participatory politics, democracy has taken root in Turkey and continues to perform a socializing function for all, including the more radical groups. Once societal groups that have their own political agendas get a taste of democracy, the system starts to win them over as new benefactors. Such democratic socialization can be an effective tool to accommodate radical inclinations of the disenchanted masses in Muslim countries.

Turkey is well placed to play an important role in the project to replace the clash of civilizations with the compatibility and harmony of civilizations. One should not, of course, suggest that the Turkish model is directly applicable to other Muslim states. Yet, there is enough substance in Turkey's experience to be a source of inspiration for other Muslim countries. Understandably, the pace and method of reform are for each country to decide. But, the moment of decision has arrived. With globalization changing inter-state relations, economic dynamics, as well as domestic politics all around the world, those societies that cannot come to terms with new realities will feel the negative consequences of globalization, rather than benefit from the opportunities it presents.

As a member of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), Turkey feels obliged to point to the need within the Islamic World for reform; not the reform of Islam, but the reform of the form of governance. It is with this understanding that the Turkish Foreign Minister, Mr Abdullah Gul, has been calling for the Muslim

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world to take inspiration from Islam's intellectual and spiritual wealth and address the political, economic and social shortcomings of their societies.

There is no single or simple formula to achieve this goal. One has to recognize the peculiarities and different historical experiences of different societies. Yet, Muslim societies share a common core that is rich and beneficial. This core is fully compatible with universal values. These values are "universal" because no one can claim a monopoly over humanistic values that are the common inheritance of civilization. Different cultures make their own contributions that end up promoting the constant and multi-faceted development of human civilization. Islam has shown significant accomplishments, but it has so much more to offer.

Each Muslim country will have to find its own solution. Imposition from the outside brings temporary and half-way solutions at best. But, to be able to find their own solutions, Muslim states need to benefit from the intellectual wealth of their people. This human potential prospers when freedom, tolerance and mutual respect come together to form a democratic society, where fundamental rights are protected and the rule of law and good governance reigns. In the same vein, transparency and accountability of the state, encouragement of political and economic participation, and gender equality make societies and regimes stronger in the long run. This is what the Turkish experience is about.

History provides scant reason for Muslim societies to have confidence in foreign powers. Hence, there can be sensitivities to using the tools and concepts developed in the West to bring about change in the Muslim world. But the human polity at large, in essence, forms a coherent whole that shows common characteristics and inclinations. Muslim societies are no exception. Therefore, the wheel does not have to be reinvented. Perhaps Muslim societies will produce their own terms and concepts. Yet the universal values and principles for the well-being of mankind are evident and they are part and parcel of the Islamic faith as well. The challenge is to approach the issue with self confidence and an open mind. An initial step could be to address resolutely one of the cardinal problems indicated in the Arab Human Development Report: the need to stop and eventually close the growing knowledge gap between Muslim countries and the developed world. Others can contribute by offering assistance, encouraging change, and showing respect. □

MILITANT ISLAMIC TERRORISTS AMONG US

Steven Emerson

The attacks on September 11, 2001, were not carried out by generic terrorists without clear political and religious motives. The terrorists were not simply a band of fanatics who, as so many officials and pundits repeatedly stated after 9/11, had simply “hijacked a religion.” Because of a fear of engendering charges of racism by Muslim leaders, a charge that is routinely applied to anything critical of militant Islam, there has been an assiduous effort to avoid labeling the terrorists of 9/11 for what they were: militant Islamic terrorists. Their behavior was informed and guided by their misguided interpretation of Islam. Unfortunately, efforts to sanitize the discussion of Islamic terrorism have led to explanations of 9/11 that exonerate the masterminds and ideological perpetrators of any responsibility for their actions: A special Hollywood broadcast after 9/11 noted that the attacks of 9/11 were simply “pure evil” and had nothing to do with religion.

In fact, the 9/11 attacks had everything to do with religion -- it had to with the doctrinal interpretation of Islam by militants. At the outset, it is critical to point out that militant Islam does not equal Islam. Islam as a religion, like Christianity and Judaism, does not endorse violence. Islam is a vibrant religion that gives spiritual comfort and meaning to its vast number of practitioners around the world. And there are Islamic writers,

intellectuals and clerics who openly and unambiguously repudiate violent Islamic militant ideology. For the peaceful majority of Muslims around the world, it is imperative that these distinctions be made. But in the end, it is not the West that is avoiding these distinctions. It is the militants who are trying to erase these distinctions; by claiming there is no such thing as Islamic extremism, the militants have tried to hide under the protection of the mainstream majority.

Anti-American radicalism was pervasive in the Muslim world long before the events of September 11, 2001, and is not limited to Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda. One need only read translations of the Muslim media in many parts of the world, including the West, to see the resentment, hatred and anger, even in countries that are our strategic “allies.” The persistent denial that radical Muslims were responsible for the 9/11 attacks, with the belief that Israel or the United States had secretly launched the attacks, is further evidence of the rampant radicalism. The extent of radicalism in the Muslim world has gone unrecognized because of premeditated deception, a cloak of religiosity, intimidation, and a tendency by many in the West to dismiss radical statements as nothing more than mere rhetorical posturing.

Often one cannot draw a clear line between fundamentalist religious dogma and radical ac-

Steven Emerson is the Executive Director of the Investigate Project, Washington, D.C., author of “American Jihad: The Terrorists Living Among Us”, and an NBC news commentator.

tion, or between the West and the Muslim world. According to Daniel Pipes, in his article entitled “The Western Mind of Radical Islam,” (*First Things*, December 1995), many of these militants have been educated in the West. Bernard Lewis, in his article entitled “Targeted by a History of Hatred” (*Washington Post*, September 10, 2002), writes that such a belief system, in which anti-Western animus is so entrenched, cannot be remedied by a public relations program launched by outsiders. Rather, any hope for change must come from within the Muslim world itself. As Professors Fouad Ajami (“Iraq and the Arabs' Future,” *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 2003) and Bernard Lewis (“The Roots of Muslim Rage,” *Atlantic Monthly*, September 1990) have long argued, the roots of Arab and Islamic belligerency towards the U.S. are found in the failure of those regimes to adequately meet the needs of their people. A democratic modernization of the Islamic world, mounted from within, is the only way to defuse these murderous emotions.

In the last two years, there has been a genuine, although belated, recognition in the United States that the problem and threat posed by Al-Qaeda is not limited to card-carrying members of this terrorist group. Although Al-Qaeda carried out the horrific terrorist attacks of 9/11, the larger problem the U.S. faces is the militant Islamic culture and mindset that gave birth to Al-Qaeda. In this regard, Al-Qaeda is shorthand for a much larger religious phenomena – militant Islamic fundamentalism – that has spawned violence and terrorism against the United States, the West or western-allied states that are deemed to be the “enemies of Islam.” Within

the framework of militant Islamic fundamentalism, a culture of violent “*jihad*” has become a common denominator, sanctioning violence and terrorism against moderate and secular Muslims, Americans, Westerners, Christians, Jews, and other “infidels.”

To be sure, the Muslim world is not the only religious umbrella under which religious-sanctioned terrorism takes place. There have been Christian, Jewish, Sikh and Hindu terrorists for example.

But today no other religious-inspired violence matches the scope and transnational breadth of militant Islamic fundamentalism. According to research conducted by the Investigative Project (Washington, D.C.), Islamist terrorist attacks have now occurred in or been planned and supported from more than 100 countries around the globe in the past 10 years.

One of the basic problems when confronting radicalism in the Muslim world is the unwillingness by some Western academicians, editorialists and leaders to recognize the pervasive institutionalized support for and dissemination of *jihadist* ideology. In the West, the concept of Islamic extremism is automatically associated with relatively small portions of Muslim society.

The undeniable fact is that Islamic militants dominate or exercise disproportionate influence over the religious, academic, and media institutions in the Muslim world, with the notable exception of several countries such as Turkey and Indonesia. Within the Muslim world, the religious hierarchy has been traditionally controlled by Islamic fundamentalists; major Islamic media institutions, from newspapers to

television, mirror the Islamic fundamentalist influence over the message dictated to the masses.

The Appeal of Al Qaeda

In attacks in Saudi Arabia, Bali, Turkey, Morocco, and Tunisia, Al-Qaeda cells have demonstrated an ability to strike western interests despite intensive multilateral efforts to dismantle the organization since 9/11. Military strikes, law enforcement actions, financial seizures, and international cooperation have severely curtailed bin Laden's ability to operate, but the damage done to Al-Qaeda's present military and financial interests does not address bin Laden's political capabilities, and leaves intact Al-Qaeda's recruitment infrastructure and ideological support system.

Al-Qaeda's most serious challenge to international security lies in its ability to quickly replenish its ranks with dedicated operatives. Underpinning this challenge is an abstract and hate-based ideology of "jihad." Based on an absolutist interpretation of Islamic law, and cloaked in a veneer of extremist terminology, this ideology harnesses and directs angry and alienated people in the Muslim world against non-Muslim scapegoats.

Al-Qaeda's culture of "jihad" engenders a breeding ground for new acts of international terrorism. Al-Qaeda and other Islamic terrorist movements are entirely dependent on their potent ideological message to attract fresh recruits. Under the guise of a social program, Islamic radical movements generate moral and political support in Muslim communities worldwide. The jihadist ideology mandates that "true" believers oppose the "enemies" of

Islam and spread Islamic sovereignty, thus breeding violence and terrorism.

The typical path of indoctrination in the Islamic radical worldview starts at the fundamentalist mosque. Radical *imams* from Long Beach, California to Long Island, New York use passionate religious rhetoric to criticize the West and proclaim the "universal victimhood of Islam." In lectures and study circles, these imams teach students that since Islam is a total system, offering solutions to every problem, the current hardships of Muslim societies are a direct result of Christian or Zionist conspiracies. Islamic bookstores from Falls Church, Virginia to London, UK provide reading materials to substantiate these claims. Acquainted with the radical texts, students form study groups and learn of further options to continue their indoctrination in Islamic theology. These options usually include travel to *madrassahs* in the Arabian Gulf or South Asia and training camps in Afghanistan or other 'lands of *jihad*' where young Muslims pass through the first level of recruitment into Al-Qaeda.

Sociology of Muslim Enmity toward the West

In Muslim countries, widespread resentment and envy of the West and the United States create a fertile ground for the growth of terrorist movements. Political leaders often fan the flames of hatred to divert popular wrath from grotesque levels of misgovernment. Opposition figures and dissident groups, particularly those with religious pretensions, have leaped at the chance to profit from this rancor.

For centuries, Muslims had good reason to consider themselves at the vanguard of civiliza-

tion. They had conquered much of the Old World, beaten off the Crusaders and absorbed the Mongols.

But beginning with Napoleon's invasion and conquest of Egypt in 1798, the Muslim world found that the Christians of Europe had advanced by leaps and bounds. Many humiliations followed on both the military and technological fronts.

Bernard Lewis, the premier scholar of the Muslim world, writes in his article entitled "What Went Wrong" (*Atlantic Monthly*, January 2002):

In the course of the twentieth century it became abundantly clear that things had gone badly wrong in the Middle East—and, indeed, in all the lands of Islam. Compared with Christendom, its rival for more than a millennium, the world of Islam had become poor, weak, and ignorant.

Attempts were made to reform and catch up, but:

The results achieved were, to say the least, disappointing. The quest for victory by updated armies brought a series of humiliating defeats. The quest for prosperity through development brought in some countries impoverished and corrupt economies in recurring need of external aid, in others an unhealthy dependence on a single resource – oil.

Worst of all are the political results: the long quest for freedom has left a string of shabby tyrannies, ranging

from traditional autocracies to dictatorships that are modern only in their apparatus of repression and indoctrination.

'Who did this to us?' is of course a common human response when things are going badly, and many in the Middle East, past and present, have asked this question. They have found several different answers. It is usually easier and always more satisfying to blame others for one's misfortunes.

The obvious scapegoat is the West, now led by the United States.

Iraq: The New Jihad Front

The Iraq war has unleashed the pent-up wave of Islamic fanaticism in Europe, North Africa, the Middle East, and Central Asia. Islamic militants —driven primarily by a blind hatred of America and the Jews—have seized upon the issue of Iraq as a justification for acts of extreme violence. The war has helped unify various terrorist organizations and supporters together in a common cause as they did years ago in Afghanistan in waging a jihad against the Soviets.

To be sure, Islamic militants do not need an excuse to attack the United States. Their hatred of the United States and its values existed before the liberation of Iraq. But there is no doubt that Al Qaeda and other Islamic groups have exploited the Iraq war to open up new fronts against the "crusaders."

Top European intelligence officials have warned that they have seen evidence that Al

Qaeda is taking advantage of the war in Iraq to recruit more jihadis. In an article published by the *International Herald Tribune* on November 21, 2003 (“Al Qaeda is regenerated by the war in Iraq, German says,”), August Hanning, head of the German Federal Intelligence Service, said that the U.S. occupation of Iraq had become a new rallying point for a resurgent Al Qaeda. Hanning noted that intelligence officials believe Islamic activists eager to fight the occupying forces have been trickling into Iraq from Europe in recent months.

In an article published by the *Agence France-Presse* on September 9, 2003 (“Iraq conflict helping al-Qaeda recruitment: French Judge”), France's leading anti-terrorist judge Jean-Louis Bruguiere stated that the war in Iraq has increased recruitment to al-Qaeda and other extremist Islamic organizations. He stated that “September 11 boosted recruitment. For the radicals the attacks were both a victory and a powerful stimulus to action...After that, the war in Iraq gave another push -- even in Europe -- to remobilize the radicals and recruit new Islamists. In Europe we have detained people we did not know before and for whom the war in Iraq played a role [in their decision to join up].”

Recent arrests in Europe illustrate the accuracy of these warnings. Italian authorities' arrests of Islamic militants in March and November 2003 indicate that Ansar al Islam, the Iraq-based Al Qaeda-linked terrorist group, has an extensive recruitment network in Europe. The men arrested in Italy and in Germany have been indicted for conspiracy to commit violent acts with the purpose of international terrorism, in Italy and in other countries. The men organized

on Italian territory a cell that was deeply connected with Ansar al Islam (headed by Mullah Krekar), a group that is closely linked to the terrorist group of Tawhid, whose emir is al Qaeda member Abu Mussab al Zarkawi. The cell provided false documents for the organization, recruited militants to be sent to the camps located mainly in Iraq, collected money necessary for the goals of the organization, and provided other means useful for it. In particular, they provided safe houses where the associates met in order to carry out their activities of proselytism. The recruits who were later sent to the camps were equipped with satellite phones and contacts for members of the organization along the way to Iraq (mainly in Syria and Turkey).

The group in Milan (headed by Mera'i) and the group in Cremona (headed by Mourad Trabelsi, imam of the local mosque) organized the passage of locally recruited militants (who had often already had experiences in Afghanistan) to the camps in Iraq thru Syria. In Syria the recruits were assisted by the network set up by mullah Fouad, who had left Milan in October of 2002 and was going back and forth between Syria and Kurdish Iraq. The group also had a logistic base in Turkey (Istanbul) which was in close contact with the Milan group and was led by Tunisian Bouyahia Maher, who had left Italy in September 2002, and who traveled to Syria and Iran before reaching Ansar training camp in Kurmal.

Incitement by Radical Imams Worldwide

Radical imams have used the war in Iraq as a rallying cry to mobilize support for international jihad, by framing the conflict in terms of the

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oppression of Muslims by a colonialist, imperialist aggressor. Imams have also drawn parallels between the Iraqi occupation and the “occupation” of Palestine, further inflaming the Muslim world. An examination of live sermons by Saudi sheiks from holy mosques in Medina, reported by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) and broadcasted on official Saudi television (TV1, TV2), provides insight into this virulent rhetoric:

- November 7, 2003, Shaykh Abd-al-Bari Bin-Awad al-Thubayti said, “O God, support the mujahidin for your sake everywhere. O God, protect our Muslim brothers in Palestine and Iraq and our oppressed brothers everywhere.”
- October 10, 2003, Shaykh Ali Bin-Abd-al-Aziz Al al-Shaykh said, "O Lord, protect our brother Muslims in Iraq; O Lord protect our brother Muslims in Palestine; O Lord protect our Muslim brothers everywhere. O Lord, end their misfortunes; O Lord, save them from worry and grief."
- June 13, 2003, Shaykh Salih Al Talib said, “O God, support mujahidin fighting for your sake everywhere. O God, support Muslims in Palestine and elsewhere. O God, destroy the Jews, for they are within your power. O God, destroy them and their supporters. O God, protect us from their evils. O God, support our Muslim brothers in Palestine and Iraq.”

An examination of sermons in Italian mosques revealed that the situation is no differ-

ent in Europe. For example, Magdi Allam, a journalist for the Italian newspaper, *Corriere della Sera* (Milan), reported that on November 30, 2003, Abdellah Labdidi, the imam of the Er Rahma mosque in Fermo, said “... the attacks against the British, American, and Italian invaders in Iraq and Afghanistan can be attributed to the defensive jihad, because they respect the dictates of the Koran.” (FBIS will process this article.)

Osama bin Laden has framed the Iraqi war in terms of the global *jihad* and in his communiqués urges the youth to defend their Muslim brothers from the Great Satan. For example, in a tape released in October 2003, broadcasted on Doha Al-Jazirah Satellite Channel Television in Arabic, bin Laden said, “**This is the second message to our Muslim brothers in Iraq. O grandchildren of Sa'd, Al-Muthanna, Khalid, Al-Mu'anna, and Saladin [early Muslim commanders] May God's peace, mercy, and blessings be upon you. I greet you, your effort, and blessed Jihad. For you have massacred the enemy and brought joy to the hearts of Muslims, particularly the people of Palestine. May God reward you for that. You are to be thanked for your jihad. May God strengthen your positions and guide you to achieve your targets.**” He continued, “You should be pleased, **for America has fallen into the quagmires of the Tigris and Euphrates. Bush thought that Iraq and its oil are easy spoils.** Now, he is in a critical situation, praised be God. Today, America has started to cry out and crumble before the entire world.”

Aware of the coalition’s diminishing resolve and the American public’s increasing discomfort with the growing number of casualties after

the cessation of hostilities, the Jihadis have made it their mission to drive the US out of Iraq. Drawing parallels between their success in driving Israel from Lebanon and America from Somalia, they are convinced that if they can inflict a steady stream of casualties on the Great Satan and its coalition partners, Iraq will eventually be liberated from foreign domination.

In the October 2003 tape, Bin Laden also links the Iraqi jihad with the Palestinian struggle: "I call on Muslims, in general, and on the Iraqi people, in particular, to not support the Crusader US forces and their allies. Those who cooperate with the United States or its off-shoots, regardless of names and titles, are infidels and so are those who support infidel parties such as the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party, and the democratic Kurdish parties and their like. **It is not a secret that any government formed by the United States is a traitor and collaborator government just like all governments in the region, including the governments of Karzai and Mahmud Abbas, which were set up to terminate jihad. The road map is nothing but a new link in the chain of conspiracies to abort the blessed intifadah. Hence, jihad must continue until an Islamic government, which rules by God's religion, is established.**"

Bin Laden then urges young Muslims to join the fight against the infidels: "O God, this is one of your days. **Therefore, guide the Muslim youth to jihad for your sake.** O God, strengthen their hearts, help them stand fast, and bring them closer together. O God, **grant your victory to your mujahidin worshippers everywhere, in Palestine, Iraq, Chechnya, Kashmir, the Philippines, and Afghanistan.** O God, help

release our brother prisoners in the prisons of tyrants in America, Guantanamo, occupied Palestine, Al-Riyadh, and everywhere. You are capable of everything. O God, grant us patience, strengthen our hearts, and **help us achieve victory over the infidels.**"

Muslims must flock to Iraq to battle injustice and defend "the Caliphate house": "**As for Baghdad, the Caliphate house, God willing, you will never take it.** We will fight you as long as we have weapons in our hands, and if these weapons fall, our sons will pick them up. Let our mothers be bereaved of us if we leave any friar of you on our land. **How can a person sleep when his main concern is to remove injustice?** You will never be able to take Baghdad as long as there is a sword in our hand. We fight those who fight us and chop their heads with our swords. There will be no peace until infidelity is defeated. God suffices us, and He is our supporter, and you do not have any supporter."

The Use of the Internet to Facilitate Worldwide Jihad

Bin Laden's videos and the fiery rhetoric of charismatic preachers have been disseminated widely through the Internet, as have pictures of Iraqi civilians injured in the bombing campaign. Further magnifying the recruiting power of the Iraq war are the *jihad* videos depicting attacks on US forces and other targets, as well as the endless stream of web postings urging Muslim youth to join the struggle against the infidel occupier. In November 2003, the London-based *Al-Sharq al-Awsat* daily reported that websites such as *Al Neda* and the *Al-Faroq* Islamic website, currently labeled Al-Qaeda's "main channel of

communication” on the Internet, have featured a flood of jihad literature, audio, and video material.

While previous conflict zones, such as Chechnya and Bosnia, inspired mujahidin throughout the world, the Iraq war serves as an even greater motivator because the Chechnya and Bosnia were regional wars. In Iraq, the US, the Great Satan, and its coalition partners are involved in a war against Islam and an unjust occupation that follow a decade of sanctions that killed, according to the Jihadists, “hundreds of thousands of defenseless Iraqi children.”

These recruiting efforts are clearly having an effect as eager foot soldiers are coming out of the woodwork to join the cause. In an interview with Rai Tre Television (Italy) in November 2003, Abdul Qadir Fadlallah Mamour, recently expelled by Italian authorities for his extremist links, claimed, “There are more than half a million young people across the world who are time bombs. As long as the western world keeps on spilling the blood of Muslim people, believe me, my friend, there will always be as much blood [spilled] on the other side.” Even more disturbing is the fact that some of these terrorists seemingly came from middle and upper class backgrounds. As Mamour notes, “The four who carried out the suicide attacks [in Riyadh] are not uncultured people: one has left 2m dollars to his family; one was an engineer; one was an economist, and the last one worked for the Saudi intelligence services.” As another example, Urslaan Khan, a twenty-one-year-old from Yarm, England, was arrested in Iraq on suspicion of attempting to join Ansar al-Islam, an al-Qaeda linked terrorist group. According to BBC news reports published in early December 2003, “Mr.

Khan was taking Arabic Studies at Manchester University's Department of Middle Eastern Studies and was spending his third year at Egypt's University of Alexandria.”

Expanding the List of “Legitimate” Terror Targets

Just as George W. Bush says, “you are either with us, or against us,” Islamists view any nation that supports the Iraqi coalition as a valid target for their terror campaign. For example, after announcing that it was considering sending troops to Iraq, Japan found itself squarely in Al Qaeda’s cross-hairs. In a statement emailed to the London-based Arab newspaper *Al-Quds Al-Arabi* in November 2003 (“Al-Qa’ida Claims Istanbul Bombings, Threatens Attacks in US, Elsewhere”), the Abu-Hafs al-Masri Brigades said, “We say to the criminal Bush and his valets among the Arabs and foreigners, in particular Britain, Italy, Australia and **Japan: you will see the cars of death with your own eyes in the centre of the capital of tyranny.**”

With the target list expanding, radical Muslims throughout the world now see it as their duty to strike, especially if they are living in a country that has been marked for jihad. For example, local Islamic terrorists working in conjunction with Al Qaeda leadership recently launched coordinated bombings in Istanbul. Although Jewish and British sites were targeted, Turkey itself was also clearly targeted because of its support for the coalition. Britain has also found itself at the top of Al Qaeda’s hit list for its strong support of the US in Iraq. Recent arrests, which likely thwarted a series of bombings in England, highlight the jihadists’ intent to punish Britain for its foreign policies.

The *mujahidin* seem to have calculated that rather than traveling to New York to martyr themselves, it is just as easy to do so in Turkey, Britain and Iraq. In their minds, one infidel is just as good as another. They are further spurred on by their realization that (in their mind at least) they will be elevated to holy status in the wake of their martyrdom.

The *mujahidin* are also being encouraged by state sponsors of terror, primarily Syria and Iran, who see an opportunity to strike the U.S. by proxy in much the same way that they use Palestinian terror groups to hit Israel. Mujahidin have flowed undisturbed through Syria and Iran into Iraq, often assisted by these country's intelligence services. An article published in the London-based *Telegraph* in September 2003 ("Iranian Agents Flood into Iraq as Pilgrims and Traders") notes, "Iran has dispatched hundreds of agents posing as pilgrims and traders to Iraq to foment unrest in the holy cities of Najaf and Kerbala, and the lawless frontier areas. Teheran's hardline regime has also allowed extremist fighters from Ansar al-Islam, a terror faction with close links to al-Qa'eda, to cross back into Iraq from its territory to join the anti-American resistance."

A *Sunday Times (UK)* reporter interviewed a group of foreign fighters in Iraq. The report notes, "'our entire group was trained in Syria,' said one of the men, who gave his name only as Jamal. 'My fellow fighters entered Syria illegally. Then we crossed into Iraq. Other groups were trained there after us.'" Jamal then added, "Usama Bin Ladin is a great man...I would be only too pleased to have links with Al-Qa'ida. He has done more than anyone to fight American oppression. He is an inspiration to us." Reading a

statement intended for the coalition, he said, "You are our enemies. We do not want Saddam back but we want you to go home. You are the enemies of Islam and you must leave Iraq or be killed. Leave now, before it's too late."

Jihadi recruiters have had a much easier time mobilizing recruits to fight the U.S. occupation of Iraq than U.S. forces in Afghanistan due to the nature of the conflict. It is much easier for the *mujahidin* to strike US forces in the streets of Baghdad than in the mountains of Tora Bora, where the US' superior military might can be used much more effectively. For example, insurgents can launch hit and run strikes in Baghdad without the fear that B-52s will be called in to launch massive retaliatory bombings.

Conclusion

As accustomed as we are to creating solutions for every problem Americans face, the reality is that there are no silver bullets for the challenges posed by Islamic radicalism. All solutions are going to be painstakingly slow but we need to abide by a set of principles.

1. The first requirement for any hope of change is that we all recognize who and what the enemy is -- it is not an amorphous group of "terrorists," but rather it is those who work to advance the cause of global militant Islam through the spread of its ideology and violence. Unless we can name the enemy without fear, we cannot construct effective ways to counter its strategy. As described by Daniel Pipes, "It is not a war on terrorism, nor a war on Islam. It is a war on a terroristic version of Islam." (Daniel Pipes, "A War Against What?" *New York Post*, Oct. 1, 2002)

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2. We must act consistently in our approach to fighting the battle. Changing our behavior, our policies, our democratic belief system to conform to militant Islamists' "wish list" will not serve our purpose of eradicating the violence. Rather, accommodating their demands will only empower those who wish to see the West fall. The religious dogma that is the underpinning of militant Islam will not change, regardless of our actions.

3. We must continue to provide law enforcement with effective tools to shut down the financing and training of terrorist networks, working with other countries around the world at all levels. The actions taken by the FBI, Department of Justice, Treasury, CIA, Homeland Security and other agencies in shutting down terrorist conduits must be supported on a long term basis—and not have powers suddenly withdrawn because of the false perception that the threat is declining.

4. We must empower genuine moderates in the Islamic world. At the same time, this means not legitimizing militant purveyors of hatred and violence. In practical terms, this means that the United States truly has to stop allowing the State Department the continued license to invite Islamic militants to the United States under the guise of "outreach"; it means that the United States has to stop pandering to Saudi Arabia and demand that they truly cease supporting and financing Islamic militant groups. In the United States, militant Islamic leaders who only pretend to be moderate should not be afforded political legitimacy by being embraced by the White House, Congress or other governmental agen-

cies. This sends a terrible message to the community of genuinely moderate Muslims.

5. The U.S. should help create the seed money for endowed chairs at universities around the world that would sponsor genuine Islamic moderates. Today, much of Middle Eastern academia is dominated by the ideology of militant Islam or anti-Americanism.

6. And finally, we must learn to be patient and strong. The resentment of militant Islam has festered for many years and will not diminish overnight. Anti-Americanism in the Muslim world stems from the anger that many who live in that world cannot freely express toward their ruling governments. The cancerous spread of the ideology and violence from the Middle East to Muslim societies of Africa, Asia and the Pacific is further evidence of the growing extent of the problem. We must stay the course for as long as it will take. □

RETHINKING US POLICY IN AFGHANISTAN

John Dempsey

On May 1, 2003, when speaking about American military activity in Afghanistan, US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld declared that “the President of the United States, General Franks and I have concluded that we are at a point where we clearly have moved from major combat activity to a period of stability.” Only six months later, hundreds of US troops, along with nearly every aircraft stationed at Bagram Airbase, launched Operation Mountain Resolve, described as the most challenging combat operation undertaken by American troops in Afghanistan in the prior two years. Moreover, Mountain Resolve was but the latest in a string of major combat operations undertaken by the United States in Afghanistan in the months following Secretary Rumsfeld’s optimistic assertion. The Defense Secretary was overly optimistic.

Of course, with all eyes on the deteriorating situation in Iraq, the Bush Administration’s declaration of success in Afghanistan was intended to silence mounting criticism of his overall foreign policy.

Despite the rhetoric, Afghanistan remains an insecure, impoverished country in which the United States has important long-term national interests. Some suggest that Washington is finally beginning to recognize this, as evidenced

by the recently passed US\$1.2 billion in supplemental spending for Afghanistan and the confirmation of highly praised Zalmay Khalizad as the new US ambassador in Kabul. Moreover, faced with escalating unrest and an increasingly bold and well-organized resistance movement in Afghanistan, the United States has switched gears, allegedly holding talks with Jaishul Muslim, a grouping of former Taliban deemed less hostile to the Karzai government, to persuade them to abandon their allegiance to the conservative Mullah Omar. And the increasing number of combat operations further suggests recognition on the part of the American military that significant threats remain in Afghanistan, particularly in the south and east of the country.

Whatever the motivation for the recent shift in US policies—many concerns remain. First, while increased financial assistance is welcomed in Kabul, the level and duration of the commitment is still grossly inadequate to address sufficiently Afghanistan’s basic needs. The World Bank estimates a minimum of US\$15 billion is needed over the next five years (and Afghan Finance Minister Ashraf Ghani has put the figure at nearly twice that). Of course, the United States does not bear all of the responsibility for this, and the international donor community as a whole must be reminded of the commitments

John Dempsey is a human rights lawyer working on constitutional and property law reform in Afghanistan. He has worked as a freelance journalist for a number of publications in the United States. He received his Master’s Degree in Foreign Service and J.D. from Georgetown University.

they made in Tokyo in January 2002 (and reminded that even this amount will not be enough to meet the country's reconstruction needs).

Second, the resources that the United States has allocated to the country are not always spent effectively, with some arguing that in certain cases—like the creation of military-run provincial reconstruction teams—the aid actually does more harm than good. Moreover, some US-funded projects, like rebuilding the Kabul to Kandahar Road, may provide a boost to the local economy and carry symbolic significance, but some critics suggest that existing limited resources would have more economic impact if directed to repair bridges and tunnels throughout the country rather than focusing on road surfaces.

Finally, and most importantly, the United States is unlikely to see a stable, self-governing Afghan state in which terrorists cannot find sanctuary unless it rethinks its bet-hedging policy of supporting a strong central government under President Karzai, while at the same time propping up local strongmen. In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks, the United States relied on a number of Afghan commanders to oust the Taliban and continues to ally with them in the heavy fighting in the south and east of the country. Washington has not put much effort into curbing these warlords, whose help it deems necessary in the war on terror. Also, international donors have channeled a large amount of assistance through regional warlords, many of whom are disloyal to the Karzai government, withhold extensive amounts of customs revenue from Kabul and label their opponents as

al Qaeda in order to secure additional US funding.

At the same time, the United States and international community back Mr. Karzai as virtually the only viable option for governing a strong centralized Afghanistan in the near term. Indeed, the UN Security Council sent a high-ranking delegation to Afghanistan in November to bolster Mr. Karzai, whose authority has increasingly slipped to the regional warlords and whose rule does not extend much beyond the capital.

Such contradictions in policy reflect the various United States' interests in the country and the fact that war and reconstruction efforts are happening in parallel. While the Bush Administration appears to be paying more attention to Afghanistan lately, the political and security situation in the country continues to deteriorate. The opaque nature of the constitutional drafting process has been widely viewed as flawed, and the possibility for adhering to the Bonn Agreement timetable by holding national elections in June 2004 seems highly unlikely. Increased attacks on assistance workers, sporadic heavy fighting between commanders in the northern region and daily Taliban attacks throughout the Pashtun belt are evidence of mounting insecurity in the country. At the same time, this year's bumper opium crop led the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime to warn at the end of October that "there is a palpable risk that Afghanistan will again turn into a failed state, this time in the hands of drug cartels and narco-terrorists."

In the face of this, the United States needs

to reassess how best to ensure that Afghanistan does not slide back into the anarchic violence that prevailed in the early 1990s, which opened the door for the Taliban. It needs to calibrate its strategy while considering its various interests in the country, which include combating terrorism, pushing political reform, supporting economic growth, promoting respect for human rights and suppressing the cultivation and trade of narcotics—all with an ultimate goal of having Afghanistan become a friendly, stable, self-governing state that does not provide a haven for terrorists and that is capable of safeguarding its sovereign borders. Of course, the Afghan central government does not have the capacity to maintain peace or control much beyond Kabul, and until it does, the United States and others must fill the void.

The success of any Bush Administration strategy for achieving its goals will depend on a few variables, including the restoration of security in the countryside, the successful disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of local militias, sustained progress in the capacity of Afghan institutions to govern the country's affairs adequately and a commitment from Afghanistan's neighbors not to interfere in its internal concerns. For such a vision to materialize, there are certain actions that the United States should take:

- Explicitly commit its troops to stay in Afghanistan in a new peacekeeping role and encourage the expansion of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) into provincial capitals and rural areas in sufficient numbers to bring widespread peace and stability to the country;
- Explicitly commit to keep its military in the country, and encourage ISAF to do the same, until an Afghan state has been created that has a monopoly on the legitimate use of force in the country and that is able to exercise control of both its internal security concerns and its borders through trained, professional Afghan police forces and an Afghan National Army (ANA);
- Task current and future provincial reconstruction teams with security-related matters, including maintaining the peace, training Afghan security forces and arresting those who perpetrate violence, *including certain recalcitrant regional warlords*—but not to participate in other activities in which humanitarian aid organizations should take the lead, such as providing social services;
- Advocate a delay in national elections scheduled for June 2004 until an adequate national census has been conducted, registration of voters has been carried out without undue intimidation and minimally accepted standards of fairness and transparency have been achieved;
- Encourage the United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan to reaffirm its commitment to the political and social development of the country and to increase technical and material assistance to Afghanistan's governing institutions (including support for rule of law initiatives);

(continued on next page)

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- With the international community, provide necessary resources and personnel to ensure the success of the DDR program;
- Pressure Afghanistan's neighbors to sign an international agreement not to interfere in the internal affairs of Afghanistan and to use best efforts to regulate cross-border traffic of people, weapons and narcotics;
- Make a long-term economic commitment (and pressure other donors to do the same) in line with Afghanistan's needs to ensure that basic economic livelihoods are met, sustainable growth is achieved and to provide job options to Afghans so they are not driven into illicit activities like poppy cultivation;
- Halt the funding and arming of local commanders where such assistance contributes to reducing the authority of the Karzai government and the burgeoning ANA and police forces; and
- Use its economic and military leverage to pressure regional commanders to turn over customs and other requisite tax revenue to the government in Kabul and to crack down on illicit narcotics-related activities.

To be certain, Washington must make a long-term financial and military pledge to achieve its goals in Afghanistan, requiring a combination of the foregoing actions. Despite the level of international support the United States has in Afghanistan, the world does consider Afghanistan

to be America's war. It is in this context that optimistic statements like that of Secretary Rumsfeld on May 1—suggesting that America is readying to wipe its hands of the country—must be considered. The Bush Administration should not count on others to pick up the pieces if it abandons Afghanistan before securing peace in the country. Moreover, were Washington to leave Afghanistan prematurely, it would damage the United States' credibility and show a lack of strategic vision on the part of the Bush Administration. If the recent aid package and stepped-up military activities in Afghanistan signal a real change in strategy on the part of the United States, there may be room for a modicum of optimism. However, unless the military and financial commitment is greatly increased, better focused and sustained for the long term, the likelihood of success in the war on terrorism, and in achieving peace and stability in Afghanistan, is remote. □

THE US MUST ADOPT A SOFTER APPROACH TO THE MUSLIM WORLD

Muqtedar Khan

In the near future, terrorist and military challenges to America will continue to come primarily from the Muslim World. China, Russia and perhaps even India may someday pose a counter-hegemonic challenge to America's global domination, but at the moment the action is in the Muslim World. The military engagements between the US and the Muslim world are peculiar and unprecedented in character. Muslim nations are now frequent targets of American military invasions, Iraq (1991), Sudan and Afghanistan (1998), Afghanistan (2002) and Iraq (2003), even though these states had not directly engaged in hostilities against America; it is Muslim civil society and non-governmental organizations which are indulging in military attacks and counter attacks against the US; Hezbollah in Beirut (in 1983) and Al Qaeda (since 1993).

The peculiarity of American-Muslim hostility is another reason why America has failed to come up with an effective foreign policy towards the Muslim World. In this paper effective policy implies that which leads to healthy, cooperative, mutually beneficial and peaceful relationship which does not allow any side to dominate and exploit the other. While Muslim masses are anti-American, Muslim states are "moderate". Therefore the time has come for America to abandon all its past premises about foreign policy and

articulate a new policy towards the Muslim World. But, this time make sure that the new foreign policy is towards the Muslim masses and not towards Muslim states. Muslim masses are anti-American and Muslim states are moderate essentially because Muslim governments and their foreign policies are unrepresentative. Muslim regimes do what is necessary to perpetuate their illegal regimes and are hardly interested in advancing the genuine interests of their peoples.

If America is to engage the Muslim World positively then it must deal with popular Muslim sentiments, Muslim insecurities and fears, Muslim needs and aspirations and, most importantly, Muslim perceptions of injustices and suffering experienced at American hands. As long as Muslims perceive America as a barrier to legitimate Muslim aspirations, anti-Americanism will thrive.

So far the State Department and the White House have been laboring under the impression that advertising and spin will help reshape Muslim perceptions of America. So they have tried by sending "alternate messages" through TV advertising in Indonesia and occasional Presidential speeches on Palestinian Statehood, Iraqi Democracy and about Islam itself. The President himself has said many times that Islam is a great

Dr. Muqtedar Khan is Director of International Studies at Adrian College (Wisconsin). He is a visiting Fellow at the Brookings Institution and the Institute for Social Policy and Understanding and President of the Association of Muslim Social Scientists. He is author of *American Muslims: Bridging Faith and Freedom* and *Jihad for Jerusalem: Identity and Strategy in International Politics* (Feb, 2004).

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religion. Unfortunately these words have fallen on deaf ears. Actions always speak louder than words and as discussed earlier, recent American actions have been perceived by Muslims as the “new Crusades” or as the “War on Islam.”

I recommend the following strategies that may help alter Muslim perceptions of America.

1. Transform the Self
2. Transform the Discourse
3. Hold a US-Islamic Summit
4. Council for Development

Transform the Self

America must transform its image from an anti-Muslim to a Muslim friendly state. An easy way of doing this is by treating American Muslims with dignity and justice. The growth of Islam in America and the relative freedoms and prosperity that American Muslims enjoyed in America was potentially the best story that America could tell the Muslim World about itself. The success of American Muslims and the health of Islam in America proved that American was neither anti-Islam nor anti-Muslim. However, post 9/11 developments such as the US Patriot act, which effectively deprives Muslims of most of the liberties guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, the cozy relationship between President Bush and Islamophobes, the harassment of Muslim charities and organizations, and the BCIS registration process that discriminates against Muslims, not to mention racial profiling, have all conveyed to Muslims everywhere that American Muslims and their institutions are under siege.

The Bush administration has been very secretive in its conduct. What we need to know is how alienating, isolating American Muslims and

cultivating those who hold malice against them has really helped in the war against terrorism. If the administration can reverse these policies, indeed its very philosophy, American Muslims can become an important asset in the war on terror – by providing human intelligence, becoming cultural interpreters, and giving US efforts a Muslim face. They can also become an important ally in public diplomacy. Sending a large number of “show and tell” American Muslims on diplomatic missions will deconstruct the idea that this is a war against Islam and Muslims. While using a few Muslims discredits them as traitors, using a large number of them, openly, publicly and in prominent roles, will make them and the policy more effective.

Most importantly it will change the American image from that of an anti-Muslim state to one that is the home of a significant Muslim minority. If Muslims worldwide begin to think of America as also the homeland of Muslims, it will fundamentally transform their attitudes and bring great economic, political, cultural and military benefits to America. But these benefits cannot be bought on the cheap and will not come from mere lip service. America must change.

Transform the Discourse

President Bush and the administration have compounded their foreign policy challenges by using a mode of communication – often designed to appease the “cowboy mentality” – that most other nations find offensive, boorish, arrogant and dismissive. For anti-American Muslims the rhetoric from the administration often vindicates their claims about the nature of America. The President’s now famous pronouncements such as “If you are not with us, you are against

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us,” “Axis of evil,” and “we will do it alone,” and his famous use of the word “crusade” are indicative of this arrogant posture so out of synch with the new realities of Iraq. Add to this the rhetoric from Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, who has matched the President’s rhetoric with his own. His comments about “old Europe,” and “we will never allow an Islamic state in Iraq,” have angered both friends and foes.

Today America is the number one target of a deadly organization – Al Qaeda – which is determined to do it harm. In order to deal with this threat the US needs all the cooperation and support that it can get. There are several reasons why nations will not cooperate with the US and may even oppose it. The most important one is the desire of many nations such as France, Germany, Russia, and China to contain America and its new destabilizing influence on the global multilateral order. Some states have interests that compete with those of the US, but adding another unnecessary reason to complicate elicitation of cooperation is foolhardy and it is time American leaders realized this and abstained.

There has been excessive anti-Islamic rhetoric coming from people seen as close to the Bush administration. The President’s personal religious advisor, Franklin Graham has repeatedly characterized Islam as evil. The Christian Coalition, which is a major domestic ally of the President, has launched a broadside against Islam and Prophet Muhammad that has angered and upset Muslims here and abroad. Secretary Rumsfeld’s recent defense of General Boykin who has made bigoted and hateful comments about Islam and Muslims in Christian Churches while in uniform has convinced Muslims that this administration

is anti-Islamic. Even though the President says nice things for reasons of expediency his ‘friends’ articulate his real feelings. This must stop and the President must rush to distance himself and publicly condemn all forms of bigotry and Islamophobia.

US-Islamic Summit

One way to bring out the issues that drive US-Muslim relations into the public sphere for a negotiated settlement of the increasing tension between America and the Muslim population of the world is to host a major international US-Muslim summit. But unlike the past conferences of this type, it should not be a state-to-state affair, but rather a state-to-people summit. It should be America communicating with world Muslims, not with the unrepresentative regimes that govern most of them.

Islamic scholars, from the radical to the moderate, secular and Islamic intellectuals, liberals and moderates, business leaders and advocates of democracy and leaders of civil society institutions and Islamic movement should be invited to the summit to meet and exchange views with American policy makers and the policy community. A summit like this that is widely watched by people of America and the Muslim World can prove cathartic even if the tone is mutually accusatory.

A summit such as this would allow the grievances to be considered seriously by both sides and create an opportunity for the two sides to improve their understanding of each other’s interests and concerns. The ideas and the solutions that can emerge out of such a dialogue will contribute more towards a foreign policy of reconciliation rather than policies of terror and

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counter-terror. So far both sides are indulging in rhetoric of mutual demonization that is contributing to the escalation of warfare rather than opening up opportunities to negotiate and settle.

Council for Development

Developed nations and concerned Muslim groups should constitute a council for development that would raise funds and develop strategies designed to provide the Muslim world a roadmap towards economic development and self-governance. There is now a consensus among the policy community in Washington that democratization is the best antidote to radicalization that causes terrorism. If Muslim societies are allowed the freedom to become self-governing, even if it means that they establish Islamic democracies, then the population at large will begin to feel that their honor and self-esteem is restored. This sense of empowerment will ameliorate the siege mentality and the feeling of being victimized that currently pervades the Muslim psyche.

Muslim societies that feel that their honor is restored will act more rationally in pursuit of material goals such as economic development and political liberalization. But at the moment, many Muslims feel that they are fighting for honor and their faith against a predatory civilization which in the name of freedom is determined to rob them of their freedoms and their resources.

This Council for Development should bring in donor nations such as the US, members of EU and OPEC and multilateral financial institutions such as the World Bank, IMF and the Islamic development Bank (IDB). So far the US and UK have together spent nearly US\$200 billion in

waging wars against Afghanistan and Iraq only to strengthen the hatred against America and actually cause an increase in terrorist activities. The phenomenon of “franchising international terror,” the spontaneous emergence of Al Qaeda type organizations all over the world is a response to the bellicose policies of the US and UK. Surely these nations can do far better by spending only a fraction of the sum in developmental projects in the Muslim World.

The Council would also oversee the gradual process of democratization. The current Bush strategy for implanting democracy in the Muslim World by making false accusations to justify war, then attacking and conquering and occupying to initiate democratization, is not really appealing to Muslims. While pressure is needed, use of violence for political change can be counter productive. The US must find softer ways to pressure the Muslim world, especially the Arab Middle East, to initiate democratic reforms. A multilateral, development-based approach will have a better chance of success.

Conclusion

The present US foreign policy has exacerbated US-Muslim relations. America needs to fundamentally reconstitute its posture and its philosophy in order to arrest the global processes that facilitate anti-Americanism, radicalization and terrorism. So far the US response to terror has merely elicited more terror. US actions are hurting both the Muslim world and the US itself. A more thoughtful and long-term, even compassionate approach from the US can perhaps save both the US as well as the Muslim world from a long, mutually debilitating and horrible clash of civilizations. □

PROFILES OF ISLAMIC STATES

The following matrix provides information regarding 15 Islamic states with significant Muslim populations:

COUNTRY	POPULATION	RELIGIOUS COMPOSITION	GOVERNANCE	ECONOMY
Afghanistan	28.7 m	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Sunni Muslim: 84% •Shi'a Muslim: 15% •Other: 1% 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Type: Transitional •Head of state/ Head of government: President Hamid Karzai. • The Transitional Authority (TA) was established in June 2002 to govern the state following the removal of the Taliban. No constitution has been adopted. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Extremely poor, highly dependent on foreign aid, agriculture, and trade.
Algeria	32.8 m	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Sunni Muslim: 99% •Other (Christian, Jewish):1% 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Type: Republic •Head of state: President Abdelaziz Bouteflika •Head of government: Prime Minister Ahmed Ouyahi 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •The economy is based on the hydrocarbons sector which accounts for 60% of budget revenues and 30% of GDP. •It has the fifth largest reserves of natural gas and is the second largest gas exporter in the world. •There is a high rate of unemployment and low standard of living.
Egypt	74.7 m	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Muslim (mostly Sunni): 94% •Other (Christian): 6% 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Type: Republic •Head of State: President Mohammed Hosni Mubarak •Head of government: Prime Minister Atef Mohammed Abeid 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Expenditures on the national infrastructure and regional tensions have hindered economic growth. •Because of its gas export market and increased tourism, real GDP growth is expected.

Compiled by Lauren Bean, editor of the *National Strategy Forum Review*

PROFILES OF ISLAMIC STATES

COUNTRY	POPULATION	RELIGIOUS COMPOSITION	GOVERNANCE	ECONOMY
India	1 b	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Hindu: 81.3% •Muslim: 12% •Other (Christian, Sikh): 5% 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Head of state: President Abdul Kalam •Head of government: Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •The economy is based on farming, agriculture, modern industry, and support services. •Overpopulation and the public sector budget deficit are obstacles to economic growth.
Indonesia	234.9 m	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Muslim (mostly Sunni): 88% •Other (Protestant, Roman Catholic, Hindu): 12% 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Type: Republic •Head of state/Head of government: President Megawati Sukarnoputri 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Indonesia faces severe development problems and suffers strained relations with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). •It must implement several reforms in order to attract international donors and investors.
Iran	68.3 m	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Shi'a Muslim: 89% •Sunni Muslim: 10% •Other (Zoroastrian, Jewish, Christian): 1% 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Type: Theocratic republic •Head of state: Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Hoseini-Khamenei •Head of government: President Mohammad Khatami 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •The economy is based on central planning, state ownership of oil, agriculture, and small-scale private trading. •Despite increasing foreign exchange oil revenues, Iran has a high rate of unemployment and inflation.
Iraq	24.7 m	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Shi'a Muslim: 60% •Sunni Muslim: 37% •Other (Christian): 3% 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Type: In transition; Iraqi interim authority •Head of state/Head of government: In transition •Security challenges exist in Iraq. Security and political improvements must be made so that a representative government can be established and coalition forces can leave. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Iraq's economy is dominated by the oil sector. •Policies developed by coalition and Iraqi authorities will focus on recovery of the oil sector.

PROFILES OF ISLAMIC STATES

COUNTRY	POPULATION	RELIGIOUS COMPOSITION	GOVERNANCE	ECONOMY
Jordan	5.5 m	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Sunni Muslim: 93% •Other (Shi'a Muslim, Christian, Druze): 7% 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Type: Constitutional monarchy •Head of state: King Abdallah II •Head of government: Prime Minister Ali Abul Ragheb 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Despite debt, unemployment, and poverty, Jordan, in conjunction with the IMF, has made reforms to boost productivity and attract foreign direct investment. •Energy imports (Jordan was dependent on Iraq for discounted oil) and the budget deficit are challenges to economic growth.
Morocco	31.7 m	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Muslim: 98.7% •Other (Christian, Jewish): 2.3% 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Type: Constitutional monarchy •Head of State: King Mohamed VI •Head of government: Prime Minister Driss Jettou 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Morocco faces the problems of a developing country: restraining government spending, keeping inflation within manageable bounds, and achieving sustainable economic growth. •Challenges include: minimizing external debt, modernizing the industrial sector, and preparing the economy for free trade with the US and EU.
Nigeria	133.9 m	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Muslim: 50% •Christian: 40% •Indigenous: 10% 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Type: Republic in transition from military to civilian rule. •Head of state/ Head of government: President Olusegun Obasanjo 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •The economy is based on oil. •Under the new administration, Nigeria will be undergoing various reforms in an effort to improve economic and political conditions.
Pakistan	150.7 m	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Sunni Muslim: 77% •Shi'a Muslim: 20% •Other (Christian, Hindu): 3% 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Type: Federal republic •Head of State: President Pervez Musharraf •Head of government: Prime Minister Mir Zafarullah Khan Jamali 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Pakistan's economic situation continues to improve because of foreign economic assistance. •Dependence on foreign oil and uneven efforts at modernization are obstacles.

PROFILES OF ISLAMIC STATES

COUNTRY	POPULATION	RELIGIOUS COMPOSITION	GOVERNANCE	ECONOMY
Saudi Arabia	24.3 m	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Sunni Muslim: 95% •Shi'a Muslim: 5% 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Type: Monarchy •Head of state/ Head of government: King and Prime Minister Fahd bin Abd al-Aziz Al Saud. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •The economy is oil-based. •It has the largest petroleum reserves in the world and is the largest exporter of petroleum (75% of budget revenues)
Somalia	8 m	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Sunni Muslim: 100% 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Type: Transitional, parliamentary national government •Head of state: Abdikassim Salad Hassan •Head of government: Prime Minister Hassan Abshir Farah 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •The economy is based mainly on agriculture, with livestock accounting for ≈ 40% of GDP and ≈ 65% of export earnings. •Civil war has interfered with any broad-based economic development.
Syria	17.6 m	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Sunni Muslim: 74% •Other Muslim Sects (Alawite, Druze): 16% •Other: 10% 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Type: Republic, military regime •Head of state: President Bashar al-Asad and Muhammad Zuhayr Mashariqa •Head of government: Prime Minister Muhammad Mustafa Miru 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •The economy is based on services, agriculture, and industry. •Population growth compounded by external factors such as the international war on terror and the Israel-Palestinian conflict has caused a decrease in real annual GDP growth levels.
Turkey	68.1 m	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Muslim (mostly Sunni): 99.8% •Other (Christian, Jewish): 0.2% 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Type: Republican parliamentary democracy •Head of state: President Ahmet Necdet Sezer •Head of government: Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •The economy is based on industry (manufacturing), commerce, and agriculture. •Irregular economic growth and the burden of the public sector fiscal deficit are deterrents for foreign direct investment. •Turkey is exhibiting economic growth as a result of strong IMF support.

VISION, VIOLENCE, VITRIOL, AND VALVOLINE: AN ANALYSIS OF THE US VISION FOR THE MIDDLE EAST

Richard E. Friedman

On November 6, 2003, President Bush announced his vision for a Middle East transformed by democracy. That same week 18 US troops died in Iraq in ambush attacks, and a poll of public opinion in Europe named Israel as the number one and the United States as the number two greatest threats to world peace. The following week 18 foreign nationals were killed in their residence in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, in a terrorist bombing, and 25 people (17 Italians, 8 Iraqis) were killed in an attack on an Italian police force in Iraq.

President Bush's statement focused on US efforts to bring democracy to Iraq in the broader strategic context of reforming the Middle East and bringing the people of the region closer to American values. He compared this objective to the successful spread of democracy in Europe at the end of World War II and the expansion of democracy into the former Soviet Union.

One element of the American ethos that is puzzling to Europeans and much of the world is the American humanitarian impulse. One example is the Marshall Plan that was the foundation for European recovery and political stability after World War II.

A second element of the American ethos is the belief that democracy and democratic values are beneficial to the world. This classic liberal doctrine has been espoused by successive US administrations, including this one.

President Woodrow Wilson's strategic vision in the World War I era was to make the world safe for democracy. President Bush's vision may be that democracy could make the Islamic world safer for America.

Democracy in the Middle East might be good

for the US. Self determination, a choice for democracy, could benefit people in the region. However, the task is formidable. In the near term, unguided democracy might be worse for all parties because, according to opinion polls, the populations of many states in the region are more hostile to America than their governments. US public diplomacy can be used to help convince people in the region that democracy offers a better alternative than despotism.

The likelihood of democracy emerging in the Islamic Middle East in the next few decades is debatable. Turkey demonstrates that Muslims can achieve a western, secular democracy. However, there are strong countervailing pressures within Islamic states to reject modernism, westernization, and democracy.

If democracy and political stability are US policy goals, it may emerge in the region as a unique Islamic democracy that incorporates Islamic religious and social reality.

Commonly agreed upon strategic objectives for US foreign policy are personal safety (homeland security) and national economic well-being. Since September 11, discussion has focused mainly on security. There has been little discussion regarding the US economy in the context of Iraq and political instability in the Middle East.

A second strategic issue may be embedded in President Bush's vision of Middle Eastern democracy – Middle East oil. The US is dependent on imported oil (55 percent of US oil consumption is from imported oil; 22 percent of US imported oil comes from Saudi Arabia).

There is common agreement that a major, sustained increase in oil prices would be devastating

to the US and the world economy.

For five decades, Saudi Arabia has been a convenient filling station for the US. Within the Kingdom, there is widespread corruption and vitriolic anti-American religious education. Oil money is used to finance international terrorism (see the book report in this issue entitled, "Sleeping with the Devil: How Washington Sold Our Soul for Saudi Crude.") The monarchy that rules Saudi Arabia is dependent on US military and political support. It has made modest reforms in response to modest US pressure, and Al Qaeda attacks on Saudi oil have focused Saudi energies on its fight against terror. The Saudis have a dilemma: they must placate the US and they must respond to internal Wahhabi pressure to support religious schools where students are taught to hate America. It is likely that a significant amount of government payments made to the Wahhabis has been channeled to international terrorists. This is not fertile ground in which to grow democracy.

The dilemma for US foreign policy is whether or not we are sleeping with the devil in Saudi Arabia. President Bush's vision of democracy for the Middle East and the arc of Muslim states in the region that control vast oil reserves and oil production is noble. However, President Bush's Middle East vision needs to be amplified. Consider the following questions:

- What is the likelihood of democratization in Saudi Arabia?
- What is the possibility of regime change in Saudi Arabia?
- If regime change in Saudi Arabia occurs, what is the likelihood that a new regime would be anti-American and curtail oil production?
- What would be the effect on the US economy of a significant rise in Saudi oil prices?

Prudent foreign policy requires the US to prepare for and position itself for a worst case

scenario. This calls for a realistic analysis of Middle East democracy in the context of oil and the US economy.

If, in the near or mid-term, Iraq becomes politically stable, it may begin the process of democratization. The converse may occur if US troops depart Iraq prematurely. In addition, Iraq may be the US's strategic back-up for Saudi oil. Oil production may enhance Iraq's economy and support democracy.

A stark way to frame the issue is political stability for the Middle East soon, or unemployment for the US later. So far, the discussion has been retrospective: the doctrine of preemption, regime change, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the recent disclosure of the extent of the brutality of Saddam Hussein's regime. Informed discussion should now go beyond Iraq to include:

- US world primacy
- Public diplomacy (The need for a vigorous campaign to inform the world about US policy and values.)
- The benefits of democracy and the recognition that democracy comes in many forms
- US energy conservation policy designed to diminish reliance on imported oil. Alternate energy sources must be explored, and a renewed debate regarding the efficacy of domestic nuclear power generation is needed.

The American people view US primacy and world leadership as givens, but we need to adjust to the unpleasant reality that, for the immediate future, the hunter is the hunted. □

Richard E. Friedman is the President and Chair of the National Strategy Forum, and Chair of the Advisory Committee of the American Bar Association Standing Committee on Law and National Security.

THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN SECURING THE HOMELAND

Matthew Foley

A post-conference report of the McCormick Tribune Foundation Cantigny Conference Series

Introduction

On June 25–27, 2003, a group of experts from local, state, and national levels of law enforcement, emergency response, public health, military, academia, and other fields met at the Cantigny Conference Center in Wheaton, Illinois, to discuss the role of the military in homeland security. The McCormick Tribune Foundation sponsored the conference, which was organized by the American Bar Association Standing Committee on Law and National Security and the National Strategy Forum. Participants raised issues, rather than proposing specific recommendations. There was broad agreement on some issues and differing opinions on others. This conference report synthesizes the issues discussed. The main themes of the conference include the following:

- The government's preparations to counter terrorism, within and across agencies are changing. While different agencies addressed the issue long before September 11, the terrorist attacks of that day set off a new round of reactions, including the creation of the new NORTHCOM command. The role of the National Guard and Reserve Components, in particular, is in flux.
- There was disagreement over the role of the Department of Defense (DoD) in the domes-

tic response to terrorism. Some participants, citing the widespread public support for DoD and its significant resources, argued for a more visible and vigorous effort by DoD to lead preparedness, such as enhancing surge capacity in hospitals. Others, largely from within the Department of Defense, thought that the best way to maintain support for DoD is for it to refrain from an active role in domestic affairs.

- It is important to gain and maintain public support for government action in the wake of a terrorist attack. The best way to obtain this support is to have a clear and consistent message, delivered by trusted communicators, and to make any restrictions on people's movement voluntary to the greatest extent possible.
- There is a need for regular and consistent coordination among agencies. During a crisis, many legal, logistical, jurisdictional, and personnel issues will arise. They will be easier to resolve if the decision-makers have met each other and worked with each other before the incident and have a clear chain of command. Cooperation among agencies is essential in terrorism prevention.

During many of the incidents that were discussed at the conference, people and institutions acted effectively under emergency circum-

Matthew Foley was the Communications Manager for the National Strategy Forum from 2000-2002. He currently attends Georgetown University Law Center.

stances. From the actions of the public in New York City following September 11, to the calm in Toronto and Ontario during the SARS crisis, to the professionalism of the Mississippi National Guard during an anti-integration riot, discipline and cooperation prevailed when panic and resentment might have occurred.

The Appropriate Role of the Department of Defense

Some participants, generally from outside of the Department of Defense, advocated a more active role for DoD in homeland security. They argued that the military possesses unique capabilities and that it commands great respect from the public. In response, advocates of a limited DoD mission argued that funding for DoD is specifically delineated. Any new mission would detract from other missions and, if done without authorization, would be illegal. In addition, they maintained that part of the reason the public holds the military in such high regard is that it stays out of day to day domestic affairs. When Marines assigned to guard the US border with Mexico mistakenly shot and killed a young man, local reaction against the military was harsh.

There was general agreement that “all terrorism incidents are local.” This means that local authorities—fire, law enforcement, emergency management, public health, agriculture and even veterinary authorities—will be responsible for the immediate response to a terrorist incident and will have the best chance to reduce its impact. The DoD can play a secondary, supporting role, including employment of WMD civil support teams. Some participants recommended that DoD simplify its terminology in order to facilitate interaction with first responders. The Gilmore Commission called for a review of the

statutory authority of DoD and its relationship to local and state authorities. Coordination between different agencies at different levels requires advance preparation and exercises.

There was general agreement that following a high magnitude catastrophic incident, such as the decimation of a region, the president would use his Article II authority to reconstitute government in the area. Some argued that it is government’s obligation to plan for the unthinkable, and that the public will expect the government to be fully prepared for a terrorism incident. Some participants argued that the Constitution Article 1, section 8 supports use of the military in extraordinary circumstances. The use of Title 32 or Title 10 is a question of policy, not legality, numerous participants said.

DoD activities include routine, temporary, emergency, and extraordinary operations aimed at deterrence, prevention, and defeat of threats. As the intensity increases, so does the impact on other activities. Routine and temporary activities are relatively easy to plan for and implement. Under the Stafford Act, DoD can assist in an emergency, but it must be subsequently reimbursed. Generally, it is DoD’s logistical resources that would be required following a large scale incident.

The structure of the relationships among new and old institutions is being sorted out. DoD is shifting its focus from a threat-based organization to a capabilities-based organization. This change in strategy was criticized as misguided by some participants.

Homeland security and homeland defense are not synonyms. Homeland security is defined as a national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the US, reduce vulnerability, and maximize ability to respond to an attack. Homeland

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defense is the protection of US territory, population, and critical defense infrastructure from external threats and aggression. Representatives of DoD stressed the distinction between these two activities.

One participant called for greater disclosure and explanation by the military in cases requiring domestic support, citing assistance during the recent Washington, D.C. area sniper case as an example of marginally justified activity. One DoD representative said that his main concern in domestic response to terrorism would be a lack of adequate training of military personnel for the exigencies that may occur.

NORTHCOM

The new NORTHCOM Regional Command was instituted after September 11 to unify land, maritime, and air defense within North America. The Command area ranges from the Bering Strait to the Virgin Islands, including Mexico and Canada. It is similar to other Commands, with the additional mission of providing support to civil authorities.

NORTHCOM's relationship with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) runs through DoD. A DoD representative noted that NORTHCOM is not intended, and lacks the capacity, to infringe on the role of local first responders. This relationship is governed by the Federal Emergency Response Plan. Military assistance is provided only when requested and directed. NORTHCOM and NORAD share a commander. Some participants raised the possibility that NORTHCOM may need apportioned forces and a full set of rules of engagement to clarify the military's authority in homeland defense or in support of civilian agencies.

The Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 prohibits the use of the military for law enforcement purposes. There is a deep and enduring aversion to military involvement in domestic affairs. However, the exceptions are quite broad. Participants suggested that clear definitions of the rules of engagement of domestic missions for the military are needed.

Some participants noted that both liberal and conservative groups are sensitive to the possibility of the use of the military in domestic law enforcement. Even when experts and policymakers favor military involvement in domestic affairs, there is the risk of negative public opinion. A law enforcement representative called for an expanded DoD role in joint task forces because of the department's unique capabilities abroad. In response, a participant from DoD cited restrictions on such involvement.

Likely uses of military support under Title 10 or Title 32 include suppression of civil unrest, surveillance of drug routes, interdiction of smuggling, and augmentation of law enforcement in border security. Though their authority is broad under the Constitution and court decisions involving the Posse Comitatus Act, there is minimal understanding by law enforcement administrators and senior military commanders of Posse Comitatus legal precedents. There was concern expressed that the war on terrorism could "completely vitiate Posse Comitatus" if domestic operations such as the detention of suspected terrorist Jose Padilla are considered to be military operations.

Joint Forces Command

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the principal military advisor to the President,

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Secretary of Defense, and the National Security Council, is required to be involved in homeland security. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff can provide input from the military services, Reserves, National Guard, and from the combat commands. In reviewing a request for DoD support, the Chairman and his staff review the legal issues involved, any threat of lethality, and the financial and readiness cost.

The Joint Forces Command played an immediate and ongoing role in land, sea, and air response to September 11. On that day the Joint Forces Command Crisis Action Team provided fighter aircraft capability to the NORAD commander. Liaison officers were sent to New York, where the New York State and city authorities had primary responsibility. The military had only a marginal role in responding to the September 11 attacks.

The Coast Guard is an armed force at all times under Title 14. In its day-to-day operations, it serves as a federal law enforcement agency under DHS. They have not been placed under DoD for ongoing operations since September 11. One military representative stated that existing legal authorities under the Ports and Waterways Safety Act and other statutes enable the Coast Guard to provide port and maritime security.

Before September 11 local and private authorities were responsible for airport security. Immediately after the terrorist attacks, the National Guard was responsible for airport security for a limited time under Title 32 authority. Now, the Transportation Security Administration manages airport security as a federal mission.

For border security, the DoD detailed personnel to the Immigration and Naturalization Ser-

vices to meet temporary requirements for additional personnel. This was done to avoid violating the Posse Comitatus Act, which restricts the use of DoD personnel in domestic security. Some participants suggested that this fiction was unnecessary because of the broad exceptions in the Posse Comitatus Act.

Agency Liaison

There is a need for preparation, planning, and prior communication among various departments and levels of government. Programs such as Los Angeles' Terrorism Early Warning Group and Joint Terrorism Task Forces that encourage preparation and intelligence sharing among police, fire, health departments, the National Guard, federal law enforcement, and other agencies have been successful. These groups need to meet frequently to maximize their usefulness. Preparation and cross-agency communication also allows resource sharing. In the 1992 Los Angeles riots, it took several days for command and control issues to be resolved. Only recently have governors begun to receive secret level information from federal agencies. The FBI has been criticized too for limited sharing of information; some maintained that this is due to the Bureau's tendency to verify information as much as possible before disseminating it to the agencies.

There are important restrictions regarding the privacy of medical records. The dissemination of medical records to public health and law enforcement agencies, which would be the primary users in a catastrophic incident, raises complex issues. However, limited dissemination of medical records after a declared health emergency is authorized by law. The reciprocal is that public

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health and law enforcement activities require real-time intelligence information in the event of a catastrophic terrorism incident.

The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention is educating state and local agencies on forensic epidemiology and bringing together law enforcement and public health experts to examine ways in which law enforcement and public health may take the lead in educating lawyers and the public regarding legal issues affecting the general public in the event of a catastrophic terrorism incident.

When an incident requires a variety of responders, such as public health, first responders, emergency management, the military, and law enforcement, there will be many conflicting jurisdictional issues that should be resolved before a terrorist incident.

Public health is a police power, and the Tenth Amendment reserves police power functions to the states. Unfortunately, many states have anachronistic laws that are not designed for a catastrophic terrorism incident, although some have recently adopted model state health emergency laws.

First responders argued that assistance from DoD is essential for surge capacity and logistics during a crisis, and for research and development before a crisis. Training, planning, and predeployment are necessary to prepare for chemical and bio-terrorism incidents. Liaison with DoD is important because first responders know what assets may be required and what assets the military may provide in a crisis. Many first responders are facing budget cuts due to state budget crises.

The Navy's Emergency Preparedness Liaison

Officer Program advises states regarding available military assets. The National Interagency Civilian Military Institute, a National Guard field operation agency, brings together and educates key players in a geographical area and coordinates response regarding best practices in consequence management.

Because of recent economic pressures for profitability, surge capacity at hospitals is extremely low. Hospital CEOs expect the military to provide assistance in the event of a crisis. DHS may use its funds for training hospital personnel.

National Guard and Reserve Components

DoD is developing a concept of operations that supports the efforts of lead federal agencies, such as DHS and the Department of Health and Human Services, and state governments. DoD response includes:

1. DoD has funds that are available for state planning projects. Incidents that require direct action by state governors for man-made or natural emergencies involving the National Guard troops and federal assets, may be reimbursed by the lead federal agency if the Stafford Act is invoked.
2. If events might require DoD involvement and it is likely and desirable for state governors to plan and conduct operations, DoD may provide, planning, training, and equipment funds. Governors provide state funds with potential reimbursement under the Stafford Act.
3. The same situation exists as described in number two, but the purposes are preventive and anticipatory; e.g., airport security,

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counter-drug, border security, and critical infrastructure protection. Governors conduct operations under federal guidelines with funding from DoD or an appropriate lead federal agency.

4. If events require direct DoD action/intervention, then: (a) appropriate National Guard/Reserve Command forces are placed in a high alert status with appropriate state/federal agreements, (b) planning, training, equipping funds are provided by DoD, and (c) operations are conducted and funded under DoD chain of command.

The 35-year old Operation Garden Plot maintains an active duty reaction force and authorizes federal funds for states to plan, equip, and exercise forces for use under the Governor's control. Participants called for a newly defined relationship between the Guard and Reserve within each state.

Today, thousands of Guard troops are stationed abroad. Last year, the National Guard provided more than three million man-days of combat, combat support and combat service support in more than 85 nations around the world. Currently, military forces are operating at a high operational tempo, which has had an adverse effect on manning, recruitment, and retention. National Guard and Reserve support is especially useful in addressing bio-terrorism threats because of their expertise and equipment.

The National Guard deploys to overseas combat theaters to join regular Army and Army Reserve units in direct action. Guard units remaining in the United States will constitute an important strategic reserve in the event of new hostilities around the globe. The Guard will continue to play a large role in homeland security by

protecting critical infrastructure assets and participating in consequence management.

A key way in which the Guard can provide assistance is as a partner with industry and universities within the existing infrastructure. Some groups have advocated a "coalition of the willing" among states that want to join a regional structure and offer their Guard for federal purposes defined in Title 32. This would be coordinated with NORTHCOM.

Role of the Public

In September of 1962, two thousand white civilians rioted to prevent the integration of the University of Mississippi. In response, President Kennedy federalized the Mississippi National Guard and invoked the Insurrection Act, Title 10 Section 332. Twenty thousand regular Army troops and 11,000 National Guard were deployed. Mississippi National Guard members all reported despite their dislike for integration. The federal troops were able to move in quickly to restore order. Prior education of the public and the media regarding federal authority was cited as a key factor in avoiding more widespread disturbance.

This incident demonstrated the role of a federal military force in promoting positive objectives. Still, there is widespread suspicion of federal agencies. Polls show that many more people trust local officials than federal officials. Planning for response to terrorism must account for how people will react to various government actions and their concerns during a crisis. □

RECENT SPEAKER

On September 10, 2003 Colonel William Smullen, former Chief of Staff, US Department of State, addressed the National Strategy Forum members on the formulation of US foreign policy.

Colonel Smullen states that US foreign policy is based on several variables: political personalities, domestic priorities, moral considerations, political reality, and US national interests. He identifies four fundamental US imperatives:

1. Generate opportunities for creating international economic growth and accumulating wealth and prosperity within the US.
2. Sustain American leadership around the globe.
3. Protect security in the maintenance of US supremacy and superpower status.

For the past two years, US foreign policy has been driven by the events of September 11, which created a new national strategy paradigm for the US. The post-war reconstruction of Iraq presents an important moment in history for the US - an opportunity to demonstrate that the US does not intend to become a colonial power.

Colonel Smullen states that in order for the US to avoid being characterized as the “playground bully,” it must take steps to “set a moral compass.” Effective public diplomacy is the greatest US foreign policy tool. The US must explain what it is doing and why it is doing it.

International cooperation is imperative for the reconstruction of Iraq, success in the global

war on terrorism, and international economic growth. The US must strengthen its international relationships with countries such as France, Germany, and Russia, and international institutions such as the United Nations, NATO, and the European Union.

The US cannot afford to overstretch its military. Today, the US military is providing oversight in 120 of the 190 countries around the world. However, the situation in Iraq necessitates additional money and troops. The best option for the US is a multinational force to help restore law and order and maintain security in Iraq.

Colonel Smullen states that the US must maintain its balance between becoming the “global cop” and isolating the rest of the world. To do that, the US must move past its frustration with those who oppose its efforts and convince the world that what it is trying to achieve in Iraq, Afghanistan, and around the world is peace and security for all nations. □

**DESERT QUEEN: THE EXTRAORDINARY LIFE OF GERTRUDE
BELL: ADVENTURER, ADVISOR TO KINGS, ALLY OF LAWRENCE
OF ARABIA**

By Janet Wallach

Anchor Publishers, 1999, 464 pp., \$27.50

Reviewed by **Roberto Powers**, Consul General,
US Consulate Casablanca

Janet Wallach's *Desert Queen* takes the reader on a fascinating voyage commencing in an era of Victorian sensibilities and constraints right up to the mid-1920s. Her recounting of Gertrude Bell's life and travails is a most inviting one, for it is easy to read even for non-historians and for those who know little about the Arab world or the creation of the modern Middle East. It is the story of a woman who was driven by an unquenchable desire to discover the world and to escape beyond the confines of her gender and birthright in Victorian England. In the end, she succeeded in both of these challenges that she set for herself, but also suffered significant bouts of depression and loneliness. Gertrude Bell initially discovered the world through her arduous studies and reading. She soon found even these avenues to be far too limiting. In creating her own world, a world most often divorced from women whom she found profoundly uninteresting and with whom she felt uncomfortable, she went on to become one of the most powerful "Persons" in Mesopotamia after World War I. Achieving this stature appeared to be one of the strongest forces motivating her throughout her life and one that led her to ambitions well beyond her home, England, and the

confines of her gender. This achievement, however, was not without a heavy price, for she desperately wanted to have a family of her own. Instead, she made Iraq her home and Iraqis her family.

Wallach's portrayal of Gertrude's early childhood focuses on the pivotal role that her father, a man who made his fortune through industry and toil, played throughout her life. With him as a role model and confidant, she was determined to make her mark in everything she undertook. This was evident in the manner she approached her studies at Queen's College, and even more so while later studying at Oxford. Convincing her father, however, to allow her to pursue her studies at Oxford after having distinguished herself at Queen's College was the radical step that would alter her fate—taking her beyond a world of domesticity to “entering the realm of the elite and the powerful, a world ruled and peopled almost completely by men.” Being one of only a handful of girls at Oxford was what inspired Gertrude most, confirmed her superior intelligence and reinforced her confidence. It also earned her a reputation for arrogance that stuck with her, and set her on a path of extensive travels throughout the Arab world whose only parallel would be the exploits of Lawrence of Arabia himself. Although convinced that she had only to want something in order to get it, the obstacle she

Roberto Powers is the US Consul General, Casablanca, Morocco. He joined the US Department of State as a Foreign Service officer in June 1986. His assignments have included postings in Seoul (South Korea), Kinshasa (Democratic Republic of Congo), Washington, D.C. (Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor), the Foreign Service Institute in Tunis (Arabic language training), and Damascus (Syria). He won the 2001 Barbara M. Watson Award for Consular Excellence in May 2001 from the US Department of State.

could never overcome ultimately was an overwhelming sense of loneliness and solitude.

In commencing her travels in the Middle East, Gertrude first discovered the enigma of Jerusalem—a land meaning so much to so many. In *Desert Queen*, Wallach excels in her description of the sights and sounds of Jerusalem, and Gertrude’s travels onward to Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Iraq. The world of souks, smells and colors that intrigued Gertrude, and that she found so different from home, has changed little over the decades. The Arab way of life, the customs and the people hold the same fascination today for Westerners, as had been the case for Gertrude at the turn of the century. Unlike in England, Gertrude found that she could be a “Person” in the Arab world, and she reveled in this. In England, Wallach aptly notes that she was but “a daughter of the Victorian Age, bred in a world dominated by men concerned with nothing less than aggrandizing the Empire, raised in an era graced by women considered to be no less than the bearers and guardians of the English race.” In the Middle East, Gertrude was able to go beyond the boundaries of tradition. In doing so, she saw herself as the equal of any man, although she remained convinced that most women were not.

Through her travels in the Arab world, Gertrude became a vital source of information about the East. The loneliness that drove her to fill every moment by doing something enabled her to establish contacts and relationships with Arab nationalists who could potentially serve as allies against the Ottomans and as critical sources of information in England’s war with the Turks. The degree of intimacy and strong ties with the Arabs that Gertrude was able to establish was achieved by sitting in their tents and their salons, drinking their coffee and sharing their bread. Gertrude well understood how important it was to get to know Arab culture by experiencing it firsthand. Her drive to confront the Arabs on their own terms, in their own lan-

guage and in their own setting, coupled with “the power of her mind that won men over”, positioned her to analyze the power and politics of local Arab leaders and to judge their potential for loyalty to the British.

Gertrude’s knowledge of Arab tribes and relationships between them made her a unique source of information for the British Government. Ironically, the trouble that she forecasted between Arabs and Jews, along with the schisms she noted between Shiites and Sunnis, are issues that still plague the stability and geopolitical balance in the region today. Her understanding of the vital role that oil would play in the Middle East, coupled with her profound understanding of the fundamental problems stemming from the illiteracy and marginalization of Muslim girls and Muslim women also remain important issues with which the region must still grapple. Gertrude’s keen insight and authority on the Arabic people, Arabic tribes and Arab lands singled her out as a woman with an uncommon understanding of world issues — past, present and future. The fact that she was the only woman among the 40 official delegates summoned by Churchill to determine the fate of Mesopotamia, Transjordan and Palestine, attests to her unique standing among British officials and the local populations. Her battle cry, “Iraq for the Iraqis,” calling for self-rule is one that resonates even more resoundingly today than ever before.

Janet Wallach’s biography of Gertrude Bell is a “must” read for students of foreign affairs and diplomacy as well as for men and women, young and old, who long to go beyond the confines and the dictates of the world in which they live. It portrays the extraordinary life of an adventurer and an adviser to kings ultimately cast aside by her people, but whom the Arabs “made one of their own.” *Desert Queen* is a poignant reminder that great achievements are not without great personal sacrifices. □

SLEEPING WITH THE DEVIL: HOW WASHINGTON SOLD OUR SOUL FOR SAUDI CRUDE

By Robert Baer

Crown Publishers, 2003, 226 pp., \$24.95

Reviewed by **Patrick L. Moore**

Churchill once said that Russia was a mystery wrapped in a riddle inside an enigma. By comparison, Robert Baer's picture of Saudi Arabia makes Russia look like a nursery rhyme. As we look deeper into the concentric circles of Middle Eastern complexity, we begin to appreciate that, if half of what Baer says is true, we can anticipate an Iliad of trouble down the road.

What is at stake is the blood of material civilization – oil. With just a few, well-placed explosive charges, critical Saudi production facilities could be crippled. Tom Clancy did the same thing in his plot in *Red Storm Rising* when he had Islamic militants sabotage the largest Soviet refinery in existence. Our economy and several others could be put into freefall and the House of Saud could be toppled, leaving those gigantic petroleum reserves in the hands of our worst enemies. Accordingly, what happened, happens, and will happen there is extremely important to us.

As Baer briskly relates, we talked Saudi Arabia into being our oil bank. In return for our protecting them, we got discounts on their oil, a fair certainty of supply – and that most elusive of conditions in geopolitical relations, “stability.” The deal was first struck in 1945 when F.D.R. visited King Ibn Saud and set up the framework

to replace Britain as the dominant power in the region. As Winston Churchill put it, the “prize” for controlling the oil of the world was “mastery.”

There were, however, internal conflicts in the arrangement from the beginning. The Saudis were not mainstream, ninety-percent majoritarian, Sunni Muslims. Rather, they belonged to the very prickly, austere and intensely simplistic Wahhabi sect. Unfortunately, that group seems to be constitutionally hostile to the core values of the West (an embarrassment to some, and a challenge to others, of the ruling elite). So, as Baer reveals, our main allies in the region ended up being the fundamentalist's fundamentalists.

How did we miss that? The answer is a theme of its own in the book. It was a sad and sorry failure in strategic intelligence that haunts us to this day, the kind of mistake our country has made over and over again. Especially, how did we not notice that fact when we collaborated with them in raising and training cadres of fundamentalist fighters for the Afghan resistance? We missed it again when later we joined in funding the Taliban (and continued to do so at the urging of our State Department, even after we knew the turbaned “students” were slitting throats in the name of God and thus not the “stabilizing” influence in the region we had hoped they would be).

Patrick L. Moore is a Chicago-based attorney and writer.

Over time, the imbalance of the Wahhabi, super-rich, royal, fundamentalist sympathizers (with many thumping the tub for *jihād*) being in league with the energy hungry, pluralistic leader of the infidel free world, caused the relationship to tilt, wobble and then spin out of orbit. The Saudis couldn't suppress the Jekyll-Hyde internal conflict and some began bankrolling questionable characters and causes to salve their conscience, tutoring them in the starkly hostile creed they followed.

As Baer points out, we have to see the implications of fifteen out of nineteen "September 11" hijackers being Saudi citizens; of the wife of the Saudi ambassador to the United States somehow contributing to "charities" that grubstaked two of the hijackers, and of other wealthy Saudis apparently sending money to those who really shouldn't get it. Ironically, their extracurricular activities have evidently come home to roost. The monster they helped create is turning on its wealthy benefactors with increasing violence, bent on revolution and royal blood.

Our own cheerful participation warmed the compost of Saudi decay. Acting as the enabler for a royal family with medieval aristocratic power and new-found, new age riches, we encouraged them to purchase more military hardware than they needed. We purposely overlooked the character of the ethical (and sometimes indicted) agents who took bribes bigger than some countries' revenues and called them "commissions). Our people joyously jumped into the revolving door culture of State Department, DOD, Agriculture, etc., turning into paid consultants to the Saudis or their interests, with hardly a missed paycheck. They spent like drunken sailors, but we played the petro-procurer and pumped money out of them as fast as we could.

The unnatural synergy also corrupted our State Department into thinking of itself at times as a semi-independent duchy, disregarding the interests of America to serve its own agenda (or retirement plan). The most insane example is probably the "Visa Express" program, an arrangement for handing out visas to enter the U.S. with less formality than getting a card at a small town library. The idea of shutting the program down must have seemed as bad or worse than another "September 11," since it continued for months after that date and was only reluctantly put down.

In *Sleeping with the Devil*, Robert Baer leads us through a layered hell of avarice, short-sightedness, betrayal and finally stupidity. Saudi, American, Democrat, Republican – it doesn't matter. There is more than enough blame to share. But from here on, Baer teaches us that greed and ignorance can no longer be the guiding principles of our foreign and energy policy. We need intelligence agencies that actually know things, friends who act like friends (mainly to us), allies without political dry-rot or fiscal hemorrhaging, and a diplomatic institution without Burgundian ambitions. What Baer shows us is that we have look in the mirror and say, "hey pal, don'cha know there's a war on?" □

STRATEGY WATCH

A summary of recent events

September - December 2003

Asia

In late September, 150,000 demonstrators take to the streets in **Taiwan** demanding a formal change of the island's name from the Republic of China to Taiwan. The **Chinese** government transfers control of its borders with North Korea from the police to the People's Liberation Army. **South Korea's** government proposes the largest increase in defense spending in seven years. **China, Russia,** and four **Central Asian** countries sign an agreement to establish a regional anti-terrorism center in Uzbekistan. In early October, **South Korean** president Roh Moo-hyun leaves the ruling Millennium Democratic Party. He calls a referendum on his leadership and states that he will resign if he loses in the elections. **North Korea** declares that it is taking "practical measures" to strengthen its nuclear "deterrent." It also declares that it does not want Japan to be involved in any future talks on its nuclear program because it is an obstacle to peace and is not trustworthy. In late October, North Korea announces that it would consider an offer from America if it ensured written security assurances in return for dismantling its nuclear program. At a summit in **Bangkok**, leaders of the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation call for improved efforts to stop the spread of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

Middle East

In late August, 100 people are killed, including top Shiite cleric Ayatollah Muhammad Bager al-Hakim, in a car bombing at the Imam Ali Mosque in Najaf, **Iraq**. In an effort to retaliate, Israelis target Sheikh Yassin, the founder of Hamas. Hamas suicide bombers kill 15 Israelis in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. The **Palestinian** parliament meets to resolve the conflict between President Yasser Arafat and Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas. The Kurdistan's Workers' Party (PKK), or KADEK, declares that its four-year ceasefire with **Turkey** is unsustainable. In **Indonesia**, Abu Bakar Basyir, a radical Islamic cleric, is sentenced to four years in prison on the charge of treason as the leader of Jemaah Islamiyah, accused of the Bali bombings and of links to Al-Qaeda. Imam Samudra, an Indonesian man, is sentenced to death for masterminding the bombing in Bali last October that killed over 200 people. **Indian** soldiers kill Ghazi Baba, a top Kashmiri militant and leader of Jaish-e-Mohammad, inciting a violent upheaval in which 200 people are killed. Weeks later, police in India-controlled Kashmir reportedly kill Nasir Mehmod Ahwan, the deputy leader of the same group. In late October, India outlines reforms to improve relations with Pakistan and quell the dispute over Kashmir. **Syrian** President Bashar Assad appoints a new reformist minister. In mid-September, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) gives **Iran** until October 31st to defend and disprove suspicions

THE NSF REVIEW STRATEGY WATCH

In **Turkey**, two truck bombings devastate two Istanbul synagogues killing 24 people. Two weeks later, 27 people are killed in two car bombings.

In mid-October, **Russia** declares that it will delay plans to complete a nuclear reactor in Iran by one year because of technical difficulties.

North Korea declares that it is taking “practical measures” to strengthen its nuclear “deterrent.”

Iraq's American-appointed Governing Council joins the Arab League to fill the vacancy left by Saddam Hussein. Iraq's economy will be privatized, with the exception of its oil industry, which will remain a state monopoly.

about its nuclear program. Weeks later, Iran's foreign minister, Kamal Kharrazi, says that his country will continue to enrich uranium. In late October, Iran's government announces that it would sign a protocol to convince the IAEA that it is not trying to build a nuclear bomb. In early November, Iran admits to the IAEA that it has been producing plutonium, a nuclear weapons-grade material. **Israel** decides that the controversial "security wall" should be built around Ariel, a large settlement that is deep in the occupied West Bank. **Turkey's** government persuades its parliament to vote for Turkish troops to be deployed in Iraq to help American forces keep the peace. Weeks later, Turkey informs the US that it will not send troops to Iraq. **Serbian** and **Kosovan** officials meet in Vienna for the first face-to-face meeting since NATO drove the Serbian army out of Kosovo in 1999. **Afghanistan** introduces a law banning armed factions from politics. Weeks later, it unveils a draft constitution. **Pakistan** conducts its third nuclear-capable missile test. In late October, a hotel in Baghdad is the target of a rocket, killing an American lieutenant-colonel. The next day, four suicide bombers attack the Red Cross headquarters killing 40 Iraqis and one American soldier. Weeks later, 15 soldiers are killed when their helicopter is shot down near the town of Fallujah. In early November, a suicide attack on the headquarters of the Italian military police in the southern Iraqi city of Nasiriya kills 27 people. In **Turkey**, two truck bombings devastate two Istanbul synagogues killing 24 people. Two weeks later, 27 people are killed, including the British consul general, in two car bombings.

North America

In early September, the United States proposes a resolution to the United Nations requesting approval for the creation of a multinational force in Iraq which includes a call for the Iraqi Governing Council to submit a plan for a constitution and elections. Weeks later, Iraq's American-appointed Governing Council joins the Arab League to fill the vacancy left by Saddam Hussein. It announces that Iraq's economy is to be privatized and opened to foreign investment, with the exception of its oil industry, which will remain a state monopoly. President George Bush asks Congress for \$87 billion for further military and reconstruction costs. In mid-October, the UN Security Council passes a resolution authorizing the presence of an American-led force in Iraq and requiring the Governing Council to produce, by mid-December, a timetable for a constitution and elections. The US accuses Syria of backing terrorists, harming American interests in Iraq, and developing dangerous weapons. An American air force translator working at Guantanamo Bay is charged with espionage. A Muslim army chaplain and a civilian translator are also arrested on suspicion of spying. Paul Martin, a former finance minister, replaces Jean Chretien, Canada's Prime Minister, who plans to step down in December.

Europe

Anna Lindh, **Sweden's** foreign minister, dies after an assailant stabs her in her Stockholm department store. One month later, Sweden's prime minister, Goran Persson, selects another woman, Laila Freivalds, as the new foreign minister. In

mid-September, leaders of **Britain**, **Germany**, and **France** agree to move ahead towards defense cooperation under the European Union's auspices. Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, the **Dutch** foreign minister, is appointed NATO's secretary-general replacing Britain's Lord Robertson, who is due to step down at the end of this year. In mid-October, **Russia** declares that it will delay plans to complete a nuclear reactor in Iran by one year because of technical difficulties. The **European Commission** issues its annual report on the readiness of the countries preparing to join the European Union. It states that **Turkey's** readiness for entry depends on its willingness to settle the Cyprus dispute. In late November, President Jacques Chirac convenes a summit of political leaders to discuss and condemn the rise of anti-Semitism in **France**. **Serbia** fails to elect a president for the third time this year. In **Georgia**, president Eduard Shevardnadze resigns amid protests. One week later, Georgia's parliament appoints interim president Nino Burdzhanadze.

South America

In **Mexico**, Vicente Fox replaces two technocrats in his cabinet with experienced politicians from his own party to tighten his grip on the government. **Argentina** defaults on payment of \$2.9 billion to the IMF, the largest sovereign debt default in history. The next day, it reaches a deal with the IMF to refinance \$21 billion-worth of debt with multilateral lenders. Eight foreign tourists are kidnapped by gunmen, thought to be ELN guerrillas, in the northern jungles of **Colombia**. Weeks later, a young British victim es-

caped from the kidnapers in a jungle region in northern Colombia. **Brazil's** president, Luiz Ignacio Lula de Silva, visits Cuba to sign agreements with Fidel Castro to boost trade between the two countries. **Bolivia's** president, Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada, resigns after 80 people are killed after the army failed to suppress strikes and protests.

Africa

A French-led European force hands over peacekeeping operations in Bunia, **Congo** to a UN force. In **Nigeria**, a sharia appeals court acquits Amina Lawal, a woman convicted of adultery by a lower court last year and sentenced to death by stoning. Rebels in **Cote d'Ivoire** suspend their participation in the power-sharing government. Both sides accuse the other of attempting to thwart the peace effort. In early October, **Rwanda** holds its first parliamentary elections since the genocide in 1994; the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) wins.

RESEARCH REPORTS

Summaries of recent articles presenting new ideas on international affairs

Which Europe for Turkey?

By Zuhul Yesilyurt Gündüz

Internationale Politik, Summer 2003

Pp. 48-52

Zuhul Yesilyurt Gündüz teaches political science and international relations at Baskent University in Ankara.

“For many Turks, being integrated into the EU is the litmus test of Europe’s recognition of their success in attaining a European level of civilization.”

Zuhul Yesilyurt Gündüz examines Turkey’s quest for membership in the European Union (EU) – past, present, and future.

Gunduz writes that Turkey’s quest for EU membership is rooted in its history. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s aim after founding the Turkish Republic in 1923 was to create a secular and western state in order to become a member of “the golden apple”, a term used by the Turks to describe Europe. Over the past 40 years, Turkey has taken several steps toward improving its eligibility for EU membership including the 1963 Association Treaty with the European Economic Community (EEC), the establishment of the Customs Union with the EU in January 1996, and participation in the 1991 Helsinki summit which granted Turkey the status of EU candidate. In recent years, Turkey has implemented various reforms to meet the “Copenhagen criteria” outlined in the 1993 summit setting standards of democratization: improvements for freedom of expression, assembly, press, and re-

spect for human rights and abolishment of the death penalty.

The US has been Turkey’s most ardent supporter. Despite the US-Turkey tension regarding Iraq, the United States joins the new government of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan in its effort to accelerate Turkey’s goal. Gündüz writes that the “Americans regard Turkey as both a partner in Europe and an example for the world’s one billion Muslims.”

Gündüz outlines various reforms that must be implemented before the December 2004 review including: adaptation Turkey’s democratic standards to those of Europe, abolition of all restrictions on human rights, and amendment of the constitution to provide for EU jurisdiction. On the economic side, Turkey must lower inflation, stabilize its economy, and improve the country’s social security net. Ultimately, the author believes it will come down to whether or not Turkey accepts the basic political values and principles of Europe including parliamentary democracy, rule of law, social justice, and respect for human rights.

Turkey is driven to achieve a goal that has existed for decades. Despite setbacks, Turkey will forge ahead with the reform program, not because it is vital for EU membership, but because “the people of Turkey deserve it”. □

Iran's Nuclear Calculations

By Ray Takeyh

World Policy Journal, Volume XX, No. 2

Summer 2003

Pp. 21-28

Ray Takeyh teaches at the National Defense University, where he is director of studies of the Near East and South Asia Center.

Iran is at a crossroads with its nuclear weapons program. It has built several facilities for the enrichment of uranium and the production of plutonium and has the capability to produce a nuclear bomb within the next ten years. Ray Takeyh argues that it is not “inevitable that Iran will be the next member of the exclusive nuclear club,” and that “a more clever US diplomacy of carrots and sticks” can dissuade Iran from crossing the nuclear threshold.

Iran has evolved under the leadership of moderate cleric Muhammad Khatami. Its interests lie in “preserving its independence and safeguarding its vital interests” through an “interlocking set of commercial and strategic ties with critical international actors such as the European Union and the Gulf States.” Although Iran does have incentives to acquire a nuclear weapon, given its dangerous neighborhood, the disincentives may bear more heavily on their decision of whether or not to go nuclear.

According to the author, the most significant task for Iran since its inception has been to negate the Iraqi and American challenges. For years, these two powers dictated Iran's defense priorities. Now that Iraq is no longer a challenge, America has become Iran's sole strategic problem. The US strategic preemptive posturing and its characterization of Iran as part of the “axis of

evil” have only confirmed Iran's fears of “US encirclement.” If pushed too far, Iran may see crossing the nuclear threshold as its only option. This predicament is fueling a political debate inside Iran. There is a consensus on sustaining a nuclear program; however, there is no such accord on acquiring a nuclear weapon. The conservatives would be more inclined to violate Iran's treaty commitments, given their distrust of international treaties and diplomacy and the West. The US must be sensitive to this debate when developing policies to thwart their nuclear program.

Takeyh writes that the US has made “impressive gains and managed to delay and frustrate Tehran's quest for nuclear technology.” Still, the road to nuclear disarmament in Iran is paved with obstacles — one being the Russian Federation. Moscow has provided assistance to Iran for years to further its own economic and geopolitical interests. Moscow does not trust the US because of its focus on missile defense, withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, and disregard for European opinion.

According to the author, the best option for diminishing Iran's aspirations for a nuclear weapon is a multilateral alliance with the European Union, Russia, and the Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia. Iran must understand that good relations with these nations depend on compliance. Furthermore, the US must stop using “shrill rhetoric and imperious presidential doctrines (National Security Strategy)” to prevent nuclear non-proliferation. □

RESEARCH REPORTS

The Falseness of Anti-Americanism

By Fouad Ajami
Foreign Policy, September/October 2003
Pp. 52-61

Fouad Ajami is the Majid Khadduri professor at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies and a contributing editor to US News & World Report.

Fouad Ajami writes that implicit in the reports published by the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press and BBC is that “the United States, in its hubris, summoned up” anti-Americanism. He argues that anti-Americanism existed long before September 11 and that the post-September 11 public opinion reports are misleading.

Ajami writes that anti-Americanism expressed by several countries originates from past tensions. Greece, a country in which hatred of the United States “is now a defining feature of political life,” has for many decades expressed spite towards the US, because of the alienation felt by its people from Western Christendom and the US support for the 1967-1974 military junta. France’s anti-Americanism is based on “envy of US power, and of the United States’ universalism.” It began during the 1990’s when the US economic model proved more successful than France’s protected version of the market. Shortly thereafter, America was labeled a threat to France. Following September 11, France exhibited sympathy towards the US; however, that sympathy quickly dissipated once the United States declared a war on terror. The author writes that “anti-Americanism indulges France’s fantasy of past greatness and splendor and gives France’s unwanted Muslim children a claim on the political life of a country that knows not

what to do with them.”

Ajami argues that other countries, individuals, or groups demonstrating backlash worldwide against the US are simply duplicitous. In the Muslim world terrorist groups express their abhorrence of the United States by bombing the US embassies — the same embassies that are “besieged by visa-seekers dreaming of the golden, seductive country.” Ajami attributes Jordan’s anti-Americanism to its conditions of poverty and a regional sense of disinheritance from its neighbors. He writes that Turkey jumped on the anti-American band wagon to improve its position with Europe, and the anti-Americanism of Saudi Arabia, a country that designs its cities “in the image of the US suburbs and urban sprawl”, stems from its dependence on the US and the Arabian American Oil Company.

Ajami writes that “the United States is destined to be emulated and resented at the same time” for it bears the burden of modernism. The anti-Americanism expressed by many countries is misdirected, and there is not much the US can do to stop it.

Building Intelligence to Fight Terrorism

By James M. Steinberg, Mary Graham,
and Andrew Eggers
The Brookings Institution
Policy Brief, #125
September 2003 (9 pages)

James B. Steinberg is the vice-president and director of Foreign Policy Studies at The Brookings Institution. Mary Graham is a visiting fellow in Governance Studies. Andrew Eggers is a senior research analyst in Governance Studies.

The authors propose that US policymakers build an entirely new intelligence system to counter terrorism.

The administration and Congress have implemented several changes since September 11 in an effort to improve “the quality and integration of intelligence information” including tighter airport security, added federal resources to state and local public health and emergency communication systems, and several federal counter-terrorism programs including the US Patriot Act, the Critical Structure Information Act, and TIA (Terrorism Information Awareness). According to the authors, these changes “represent important building blocks for a new generation of intelligence policy,” but have raised serious concerns regarding the protection of civil liberties.

In order to build a new and effective intelligence system to support a new era of national security threats, policymakers must “replace the formal, hierarchical intelligence structure with a horizontal, cooperative, and fluid architecture that gets information from those who have it to those who need it through development of virtual communities of information sources, analysts, and users.” According to the authors, advancements in information technology can facilitate this transformation.

One of the chief considerations when building a new intelligence system must be the protection of openness and privacy. The government will need a more extensive intelligence reach to protect the American public and the critical infrastructure of the US from terrorists. This will require long-term acceptance by the American public. According to the authors, this can be achieved with “the adoption of clear, public guidelines governing the collection, retention,

and dissemination of information, and the development of strong procedures for oversight and accountability.”

The authors provide a framework for beginning the process of reconstruction:

- Emphasize information sharing to enhance security by multiplying sources of information.
- Maintain high hurdles for sharing personally identifiable information .
- Protect important secrets.

Improving security while protecting personal privacy requires “clear guidelines, information technology, and procedures that provide accountability and oversight that can assure public confidence and strengthen the nation’s intelligence system.”

Rebuilding the Atlantic Alliance

By Ronald D. Asmus

Foreign Affairs

September/October 2003

Pp. 20-31

Ronald D. Asmus is a Senior Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States and a Senior Adjunct Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. He is author of “Opening NATO’s Door: How the Alliance Remade Itself for a New Era,” and served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs from 1997 to 2000.

Ronald Asmus argues that the US-European alliance is not ruined, and that the US and Europe must “coalesce around a new purpose and a new grand strategy.”

Despite the rift between the US and Europe, Asmus writes that “history has shown that if the United States and Europe share common goals,

European allies welcome American strength and the difference between them can be managed.” If the alliance is to be rebuilt, the United States and Europe must again define a common purpose centered on meeting the current major strategic challenges including: anchoring a democratizing Ukraine to the West; abolishing Europe’s remaining totalitarian dictatorship in Belarus; helping Russia to complete its transformation into a democratic, pro-Western strategic partner; and developing a new strategy for countries in the Caucasus and Central Asia.

The most important strategic challenge is the Middle East, a region in which many countries are regressing and breeding the greatest threats to America and Europe. A joint strategy requires more than just military strength – it requires changing the dynamics that spawn terrorists and terrorist groups. In order to achieve this, the US and Europe must work together to establish peace in Iraq, promote regime change in Iran, reevaluate the US alliance with Saudi Arabia and Egypt, and rebuild Afghanistan.

Both the US and Europe are vulnerable to terrorists and rogue states armed with WMD. Accordingly, both must make improvements to advance US-European cooperation. Both countries need the capacity to intervene militarily beyond their borders to respond to threats and deter potential threats, and to execute long-term peacekeeping operations. Europe does not have to replicate US military defense, but must develop the capacity to join the US in future coalition operations.

Asmus writes that the US “must take the initiative to set a new direction and establish a new framework that could bring the two sides together.” This requires that the US treat Europe as a partner and reaffirm US support for a

strong, unified, and pro-Atlantic Europe. Europe must abandon the notion that unilateralism is uniquely American — French President Jacques Chirac has his own policy of “go it alone” and “act as a counterweight to American power.” Europe must also “realistically appraise” international institutions such as the UN. Moreover, both countries must improve dialogue and “reinstate the network of consultations that has formed the bedrock of transatlantic cooperation for the past half-century...”

Transatlantic strategic cooperation is one of the reasons why the second half of the twentieth century was better than the first. A common strategy and framework is mutually beneficial.

Stumbling Into War

By James P. Rubin

Foreign Affairs

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Pp. 46-66

James Rubin is a Visiting Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics and was US Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs from 1997 to 2000.

The author examines the diplomatic maneuvering of the Bush administration for the war in Iraq and explains why the United States could not gain widespread support. He outlines five mistakes made by the US:

1. The shifting justification for the war.

The US had compelling reasons to go to war including eliminating a brutal dictator and establishing democracy in the Middle East. However, Rubin writes that “diplomatic consistency

was lost when differing corners of the American bureaucracy stressed different reasons for the war” — the State Department stressed Iraq’s violations of the UN resolutions and the Defense Department emphasized Saddam’s link to Al Qaeda, a link which was never established. Furthermore, both departments reinforced the imminent failure of the UN process, which incited doubt throughout the world as to whether or not the US would be “satisfied with anything less than war.”

2. The failure to synchronize its military and diplomatic tracks.

Rubin writes that “military timetables seemed to determine rather than support US foreign policy,” and the administration showed no willingness to adjust its timetable for the diplomatic efforts. Rubin suggests that the deployment of US troops could have been slowed or material could have been left out of the Persian Gulf while troops were rotated. To foreign observers, war seemed inevitable.

3. The failure to anticipate Saddam’s decision to comply partially with UN demands.

The US was prepared for full compliance or refusal to comply with Resolution 1441, but not partial compliance. He attributes the lack of preparedness to the division within the administration. Rubin writes that the right way to deal with this outcome would have been to develop a timetable for Iraq’s disarmament and a way to determine whether or not Iraq had met the terms. The absence of any plan left the allies “scrambling for support of a resolution endorsing war” in February.

4. The inability of the US to secure a majority for a second Security Council resolution.

The US and Britain decided to seek a second resolution in February, 2003. At the same time, Berlin, Moscow, and Paris formed an alliance to thwart any American-led invasion in Iraq. Despite this alliance, the US could have secured a majority by pursuing the Latin American and African nations, but it did not. Rubin attributes this failure to a lack of diplomatic groundwork in those regions. The US also failed to exhibit any flexibility in its timetable, offering a one-week extension to UN weapons inspectors and Iraq until March, destroying the compromise plan developed by the British diplomats.

5. The harsh rhetoric and style of the administration.

Rubin writes that “above all, it was the so-called preemptive strike doctrine” featured in the National Security Strategy September 2002, “that harmed America’s diplomatic cause.” This doctrine became the backdrop for the US campaign and undermined any effort to enforce the UN resolutions. Adding to the widespread distrust of US intentions was the administration’s disregard for treaties, US policy in the International Criminal Court (ICC), its disparaging attitude toward NATO, and its total support for Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon.

The US did not have a “coherent and comprehensive strategy.” Unfortunately, the diplomatic fiasco over Iraq has caused damage to the international system and the US reputation. If confronted with a similar problem in the future, the US “must more carefully calibrate force and diplomacy,” and secure the support of the international community. □

RESEARCH REPORTS

The Art of the Bluff

By Ian Bremmer
The National Interest, Fall 2003
Pp. 33-37

Ian Bremmer is President of Eurasia Group (a research and consulting firm), senior fellow at World Policy Institute and a columnist for the Financial Times.

Ian Bremmer writes that Saddam Hussein oftentimes practiced hasty risk-taking without any forethought – Iraq’s 1980 invasion of Iran, the 1990 invasion of Kuwait, and his 1993 plot to assassinate the senior President George Bush. Hussein posed an imminent global threat and, consequently, President Bush opted to oust the Iraqi leader.

According to the author, “Kim Jong Il has been as cautious as Saddam was rash.” North Korea’s relationship with the United States has been deteriorating since North Korea violated the 1994 Agreed Framework. Following September 11, American policy became increasingly rigid regarding WMD and terrorism. President Bush was candid regarding his distrust of the Kim regime when he publicly labeled North Korea part of an “axis of evil” in January 2002. Why did North Korea wait until December 2002 to initiate a conflict with the US?

Bremmer writes that the primary reason for Kim’s delayed response was the December, 2002, elections in South Korea. Kim feared that the Grand National Party (GNP) would win the elections which would have meant termination of the “sunshine” policy and loss of political leverage against the US. To avoid irritating the GNP, North Korea attempted to initiate dialogue with the US. However, South Korean President

Roh Moo-hyun’s victory allowed “Pyongyang more room to react to the change in American policy.” Since the elections, Kim has made several threats to the US and to his neighbors, specifically Japan, in an effort to advance his agenda.

According to Bremmer, Kim “has nothing to offer” short of disarmament and “we should not expect anything dramatic from North Korea.” However, his nuclear weapons programs, ballistic delivery systems, and conventional forces ensure the security of his regime and therein lies the threat. If North Korea begins exporting nuclear materials and technology, “Kim will have fueled a crisis of global proportions.”

Given these conditions, Bremmer agrees that the best option for any form of resolution with North Korea is a “sustained multilateral pressure particularly from China” and the proposed multilateral talks. □

THE NATIONAL STRATEGY FORUM, INC.
53 West Jackson, Suite 516
Chicago, IL 60604

(312) 697-1286
(312) 697-1296 Fax
nsf@nationalstrategy.com
www.nationalstrategy.com