

**NATIONAL
STRATEGY
FORUM
REVIEW**

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- The goal of United States national strategy is a genuine and just peace, sought in common cause with the community of free and independent nations.
- The advancement and preservation of democracy is essential to promote human rights, inspire principled cultural achievement, and maximize economic development.
- Informed public opinion and an enduring non-partisan consensus are fundamental parts of national security in a democratic society.

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LETTER FROM THE PUBLISHER

The National Strategy Forum focus is national security strategy. The timeframe is the next four to ten years. We try to identify major trends and their consequences. Our strength is the ability to frame and ask questions, rather than answer them.

Every four years, congruent with the presidential election, we supplement our usual format by forecasting major trends and their consequences that may occur over the next four years. Our forecasts made in January, 2001, are summarized on page 40. We self-grade the result as B-plus or A-minus.

Security-related issues tend to be inter-related - groups of issues create emerging trends that are not readily discernible in real time. US allies and adversaries have strategic objectives that are dynamic, rather than static; unforeseen events occur randomly. The NSF objective is to try to make sense of this stew of variables to enable our members and US foreign policymakers to think strategically, rather than tactically.

Each year the NSF develops a “curriculum” for our members consisting of our monthly Forum lecture series, the National Strategy Forum Review (our quarterly publication), and national security-related conferences. Collectively, these programs are designed to provide our members with non-partisan, objective information that is fundamental to informed discussion. Please see our list of year 2004 programs on page 51.

The starting point is to ask the right questions, recognize the range of variables, and hope that a reasonably high percentage of correct choices are made. Following are high priority

issues that should be addressed. We have asked friends of NSF who are experts in their respective fields to share their views with us.

Dependency on imported oil, particularly from the Mideast, may become the most important US strategic issue for the next decades. Many US foreign policy decisions will be based on protecting the economy and ensuring continuing prosperity. The US and other industrialized states, including Western Europe, Japan, and China, are oil-based societies—a reason for potentially intense competition. Oil reserves are finite and it is unlikely that foreign investment will be made to enhance the oil production infrastructure of unstable states. Some states that are net oil exporters will become oil importers because of their growing domestic demand. There has been virtually no candid, informed political and foreign policy discussion of US foreign oil dependency that is captured in the starkest phrase “Blood for Oil”. Consider whether US oil dependency is the major US strategic concern that will drive future US foreign policy decisions.

Following are high priority issues that will affect future policy:

The Enemy

Militant Islamist Terrorists have proclaimed a holy war (jihad) against the US. Although presumably small in number, they have demonstrated their ability to terrorize civilian populations – the Madrid train bombings and the 9/11 attacks. How does the US strengthen its rela-

tions with the Muslim world, particularly with secular Islamic states Turkey and Tunisia? How will the US Islamic population disassociate itself from Militant Islamic Terrorists?

**Vulnerability of the
US Critical Infrastructure**

US industry, energy transmission, financial centers, etc., are vulnerable to terrorist attack that would have a widespread adverse effect on the US economy. Note the recent event near Milwaukee where a few bolts were removed (by vandals or others) from two electric transmission towers, causing them to fall on the adjacent railroad tracks, resulting in loss of power at Mitchell Field, the Milwaukee airport, and the surrounding communities. How will the US protect itself (the effectiveness of the US Department of Homeland Security)? What are the costs involved? What is the potential threat of security measures to civil liberties?

Intelligence Gathering

The failure of the US intelligence community to provide precise information regarding Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capability has been condemned as an "intelligence failure" and resulted in major legislative restructuring of the intelligence community. Will US intelligence capability be enhanced significantly as a result of its reorganization? Will a robust intelligence capability be sufficient to insulate the US from future terrorist attacks? The USA Patriot Act is under attack by civil libertarians; supporters believe that the Patriot Act has removed the barrier that prevented information sharing by the FBI and the CIA. Can common ground be

reached that will balance civil liberties and law enforcement concerns? Counterterrorism computer technology can acquire an enormous amount of personal data from government and commercial sources. Personal privacy no longer exists. Can a balance be reached between the need to "connect the dots" rapidly and the need to insulate citizens from unwarranted intrusion?

Catastrophic Terrorism Incidents

The possibility of a catastrophic terrorism incident (CTI) involving a WMD is substantial. The threat of a nuclear incident is less than a biological, chemical, or radiological incident because of a greater need for funding and a higher likelihood of detection. Technology is readily available to construct WMD. The consequences of a CTI are severe. Centers of commerce, industry, finance, and schools are vulnerable and the consequences would be overwhelming. Are we planning for the "morning after" such an event so as to ensure continuity of government and the private sector?

Iraq

The US invasion and occupation of Iraq has created many unforeseen subordinate issues: the doctrine of preemption; US alliances – unilateralism vs. multilateralism; induced democracy, and the limits of military force projection. Whether Iraq will emerge as a stable state may not be known for several years. Iraq, by itself, has stultified informed public discussion of other strategic issues, including Iraq's oil resources and US dependence on Mideast oil. The corollary issues may be more important than Iraq. How can the foreign policy strategic discussion

LETTER FROM THE PUBLISHER

move beyond Iraq? What are the lessons learned?

Energy Dependence

Sixty-five percent of the world's oil resources are located in the Gulf states – from which the US imports 20% of its needs; western Europe 43%, and Japan 68%. US dependence on imported oil has grown exponentially to over 50%; US domestic oil resources and production capability are rapidly decreasing. Competition for scarce oil will increase dramatically over the next decade, particularly from China. Saudi Arabia has been a supply and demand safety valve for the US in time of crisis. As the ongoing US military transformation into a highly mobile regional fighting force continues, that force will be employed and deployed to protect vital foreign sources of oil supply for the US. Will the US develop a comprehensive policy to reduce US domestic energy consumption? Will the US develop alternate energy sources on an accelerated basis (for example, hydrogen fuel cells)? Is there a potential for a joint research alternate energy source project that would involve the US, China, Western Europe, and Japan?

Regionalism

US foreign policy has been Eurocentric and focused on the former Soviet Union during the Cold War years. America has ignored its immediate neighbors – Canada and Mexico, and all of Latin America. An opportunity has been wasted. There is a belated recognition of the importance of Asia to US economic and security interests. The US has an opportunity to provide leadership and shape the strategic relationship between the

US and China (see the article on US-China relationship on page 33). Can the US turn its attention to Asia without diluting the historical importance of Europe and the Transatlantic Alliance? Can the US develop a public policy “charm offensive” based on a foreign policy that takes into account the strategic objectives of other states – can we listen first and pronounce later?

Partisan Political Worldview and Foreign Policy

It is highly likely that any US Administration will continue to be vigorously attacked by the political opposition on virtually every major, and minor, foreign policy issue and implementation. If Senator Kerry had won the presidential election, it is likely that the vitriol of the opposition would be as intense as was leveled at President Clinton during his two terms in office. Although democracy is a messy business, the stakes are higher than at any time in US history. The combined intellectual potential of all Americans is a great, virtually untapped resource. The golden age of a bipartisan foreign policy that emerged immediately after WWII resulted in the Marshall Plan, for example, and three decades when America was a beacon of liberty and an object of affection for most of the world. Can US foreign policy be re-directed in President Bush's second term in office? Can reasoned rebuke be offered that would result in mid-course correction of US foreign policy, if needed? Can the US regain the moral high ground by word and deed that will counter widespread dislike of America? Can US foreign policy be crafted relatively free from domestic social issues that spill over into foreign policy discussion? □

TERRORISM: THE NEW THREATS

John Allen Williams

The end of the Cold War was expected by many to usher in a new era of peace and prosperity, with a large "peace dividend" for the American people now that military expenditures could safely be reduced. Too little was done as new threats grew, although they announced themselves in a series of terrorist attacks against the U.S. both at home and abroad.

The attacks of September 11, 2001 and subsequent events have at last focused U.S. attention on these new threats. The issue is no longer the size of a peace dividend, but how to fight a new (and misnamed) "war on terror." It is not a war on terror, of course, but a national struggle against those who would use terror to advance their goals or as a catharsis for their own internal demons.

In the Spring, 2001 issue of the *National Strategy Forum Review* it was still accurate to say, "The U.S. has not suffered what we may call a catastrophic terrorist event, defined as any attack using chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear materials, or a conventional attack causing mass casualties (over a thousand). This situation is likely to change, with implications for the nature of American society as well as national security.... Even some steps that would be effective in terms of the problem could be dangerous to civil liberties."

Responding to evolving terrorist threats poses

a serious dilemma: how can an open system protect itself from those who would use terrorism to harm it, without at the same time changing the nature of the system? The new threats have both state and individual level dimensions, and the response must occur both abroad and at home. Responses "over there," do not pose new threats to the constitutional order, however controversial they may be. Responses "over here" against threats from individuals do.

Traditional state-on-state threats, however lethal, were easier to deal with intellectually. Responses were primarily military in nature and posed little threat to domestic civil liberties, notwithstanding excesses such as the anti-communist witch hunts of the late 1940s and early 1950s. The U.S. responded with state-level instruments of policy, such as the military and intelligence services, that were generally focused outward. Indeed, laws such as the *Posse Comitatus* Act of 1878 ensured that regular military forces would not be used for domestic law enforcement, save for the direst emergencies.

The new threats, many of which emanate from states or are facilitated by them, have an individual-level component that greatly complicates combating them. There was a time when only states could inflict catastrophic damage; unfortunately, technology has decentralized that capability to individuals and small groups.

TERRORISM

Whoever the “archer” may be, the “arrows” are likely to be individuals whose danger is magnified by their ability to inflict great damage. If they are willing to perish in an attack, or even regard their own death as a good thing, it becomes difficult and sometimes impossible to deter or to stop them.

At this time, the most dangerous terrorists identify themselves with a radical form of Islam that poses at least as great a threat to moderate forms of that great religion as to anyone or anything else. The threat is not from terrorism in the abstract, but by those who would employ it. At the moment that would most likely be radical Islamists, but there is no potential shortage of those willing and able to use terrorism as a form of asymmetric warfare against the global superpower. It is worth noting that the greatest example of domestic terrorism prior to September 11 was Oklahoma City. The perpetrator may have had more assistance in launching his attack than we yet understand, but there appears to be no foreign connection.

Much attention has been given to the threat from Weapons of Mass Destruction, or WMD. These nuclear, radiological, biological, or chemical agents pose the greatest danger of catastrophe, but attacks with high explosives or aircraft remain the most likely threat. One shrinks from imagining the effect on public life in the United States if it were threatened by the kind of suicidal homicide bombers faced by Israel. While not “catastrophic terrorism,” the effect on people’s feeling of safety would be incalculable and the ultimate effect on civil liberties unpredict-

able.

The threat is not only the damage of an attack and its effect on the citizenry, but also the response of everyday Americans who will not put up with such attacks. The public would demand increased protection from their government, with resulting legislation and regulations making the more controversial sections of the Patriot Act read like the Bill of Rights by comparison. Public backlash can best be averted by averting catastrophe in the first place.

For this reason, those who care about civil liberties should ensure that the struggle against those who use terrorism is successful. Those engaged in this struggle should also ensure that necessary legislation does not overreach, extending unnecessarily into the realm of private relations. Reasonable people will differ on where the lines should be drawn, and each side should resist temptations to demonize the other.

The search for homeland security must use all elements of national power to be effective: military, legal, financial, political, and moral. Discussions about eliminating the “root causes” of terrorism may be fruitful, but cannot substitute for the nasty business of dealing with the terrorists who have already decided that their enemy is the United States.

What does “victory” look like in this struggle? Both candidates in the recent presidential election had it right, although each was rewarded for his candor by an attack from the other. This war will never be won in the traditional sense. There will always remain some residual danger of terrorist attack. A successful struggle will be

one which beats back the terrorist threat to a level in which citizens can go about their daily lives with a realistically minimal fear of attack and in which the likelihood of a truly catastrophic attack approaches zero. Unfortunately, it will never be completely eliminated, and succeeding generations will need to remain on guard. □

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ISLAMIST EXTREMISM: PAKISTAN, AFGHANISTAN, AND CENTRAL ASIA

Ahmed Rashid

Nearly three years after September 11, Islamist extremism still poses a major challenge in the region of Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran and Central Asia while dictatorial regimes backed by the US have become more authoritarian and less willing to deal with extremism through democratization and educational and economic development. If the second Bush administration continues its policies of the past three years, the region will continue to be an incubator of extremism and growing poverty, which could lead to social explosions especially in Central Asia.

Al'Qaeda, its extremist allies and other Islamic groups are now operating in more than 60 countries where anti-Americanism is growing and universal ideas such as democracy and respect for human rights are being increasingly associated with Western concepts that are labeled as unacceptable to the Muslim world. Iraq has proved a magnet for extremists from around the globe including Pakistan, Central Asia and Afghanistan. At least seven members of Lashkar-e-Toiba, a radical Pakistani based pan-Islamic group, are known to have been killed fighting American troops in Iraq.

The successful October 9 presidential elections in Afghanistan in which more than 70 percent of the voting population participated and

which elected President Hamid Karzai to a five year term of office has been a decisive step forward in reducing the threat posed by the Taliban and Al'Qaeda in Afghanistan. Karzai, a moderate and visionary leader who is strongly backed by US forces, can now be expected to deal more decisively with his country's problems such as democratization, drug control, disarming the militias and warlordism.

It is essential that in his second term Bush continues to maintain a military presence in Afghanistan, steps up aid and support for the reconstruction of the country and pursues policies that encourage other major donors such as the European Union to step up their aid. The war in Iraq had created a major diversion of the world's attention from Afghanistan and created rifts between the US and the EU, which have affected aid and reconstruction. Bush must now build bridges with these allies and set aside differences, enabling the world community to focus together on helping rebuild Afghanistan.

Ironically, Karzai is an anomaly, emerging as the most democratically elected leader in the region. In an exchange for their support in the so called "war on terrorism", the first Bush term has strengthened Pakistan's military ruler President Pervez Musharraf and the autocrats ruling the five Central Asian Republics – Uzbekistan,

Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. In all of these states public hopes and aspirations that the US involvement in their region after 9/11 would mean greater support for political and economic reform and stronger US pressure on their leaders to carry it out have been dashed. As a result, anti-Americanism and the popularity for an 'Islamic answer' to the problems they face are visibly growing.

The first Bush term also gave Musharraf a pass on Pakistan's covert nuclear technology assistance to Iran, Libya and North Korea thereby encouraging other countries such as Iran and North Korea to test US resolve by going down the path of nuclear weapons acquisition and present the world with a *fait accompli*. Therefore, tougher US policies towards nuclear proliferation in Iran and North Korea sound increasingly hollow.

At the same time US policies in Iraq and elsewhere have helped strengthen the hands of hard-liners in Iran where a political crisis is imminent as the moderates have no viable contender to fight the general elections scheduled for 2005. The hard-liners are also determined to pursue nuclear weapons in defiance of the international community. The refusal of the Bush administration to deal with the moderates in Iran, especially in areas where US-Iran interests are somewhat similar such as Iraq, Afghanistan and curbing Sunni Muslim extremism, has weakened the moderates.

There are already visible signs in the region that that the neo-conservatives in Washington may now target Iran. This would exacerbate

tensions with Shia Muslims creating enormous unrest in Iran. It would also increase pressure on US allies in the region to support any US initiative in Iran, such as Pakistan and Afghanistan which have large Shia populations.

The second Bush term needs to become a stronger advocate of democratization in the region as part of its continuing "war on terrorism." Islamist extremism is growing because of the local regime's incompetence, dictatorial attitudes and unwillingness to carry out reforms rather than any direct US actions. However, the US is directly blamed because the first Bush term showed no willingness to push these regimes or mount a public diplomacy policy to show it stood on the side of reform rather than stagnation.

Pakistan will remain the most problematic country for the new Bush term. Despite elections and the rehabilitation of parliament, President Musharraf has allied himself with some Islamic parties and implanted military control over the country's political development even more decisively, resulting in increased polarization between the military on one side and Islamic and democratic forces on the other. At the same time, Musharraf has declined to carry out reforms in key sectors such as education and human rights, thereby strengthening the hands of the extremists. The Bush second term must continue to pursue its policy of discreet intervention to bring India and Pakistan to the negotiating table to resolve the Kashmir dispute.

Apart from Kazakhstan - which has substantial oil revenues and has allowed a controlled

ISLAMIST EXTREMISM

system of multi-party democracy - in varying degrees all the Central Asian Republics are experiencing increasing poverty, lack of political and economic reforms and a continuation of rule by the same oligarchies that have been in power since the Soviet era. The lack of middle-of-the-road political parties or democracy means that opposition to these regimes is increasingly taking the shape of adherence to underground radical Islamic groups. The fact that some 60 percent of the population is under 25 and the majority is jobless could result in social and economic explosions in several countries that lack democratic alternatives. The Islamist extremists would be in a position to benefit if this should occur. All the Central Asian authoritarian leaders have felt threatened by the sudden explosion of democracy in Afghanistan.

The war on terrorism is in fact not a war, but a constant struggle to confront Islamist extremists while effectively implementing diplomatic and economic programs intended to compel these regimes to reform. So far, the US has only relied on military force and its own military presence in the region to contain extremism. Unless there is going to be a more nuanced policy dealing with the issues of political and economic reform, the region will experience more turmoil and instability. □

Ahmed Rashid is a Pakistani journalist based in Lahore. He is the author of three books including "Taliban" and "Jihad." He has covered Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia for the past 25 years and writes for the *Far Eastern Economic Review* and *The Wall Street Journal*.

FAILED STATES

Robert Rotberg

Nation-states fail because they are convulsed by internal violence and can no longer deliver positive political goods to their inhabitants. Their governments lose legitimacy, and the very nature of the particular nation-state itself becomes illegitimate in the eyes and in the hearts of a growing plurality of its citizens.

The rise and fall of nation-states is not new, but in a modern era when national states constitute the building blocks of legitimate world order, the violent disintegration and palpable weakness of selected African, Asian, Oceanic, and Latin American states threaten the very foundation of that system. International organizations and big powers consequently find themselves sucked disconcertingly into a maelstrom of internal conflict and messy humanitarian relief. Desirable international norms such as stability and predictability thus become almost impossible to achieve when so many of the globe's new nation-states waver precariously between weakness and failure, with some truly failing (Afghanistan, Burundi, the Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Haiti, Liberia, Sudan, among others), or even collapsing (Somalia now, Lebanon, Sierra Leone, etc. before.) In a time of terror, moreover, appreciating the nature of and responding to the dynamics of nation-state failure have become central to critical policy debates. How

best to strengthen weak states (three dozen or so in the developing world) and prevent state failure are among the urgent questions facing the new administration in Washington.

Nation-states provide political goods such as security, rule of law, political freedom, economic opportunity and appropriate monetary environments, arteries of commerce, education, health services, the encouragement of civil society, and the regulation of the environmental commons to their citizens. States succeed or fail when they succeed or fail to deliver adequate quantities and qualities of these and similar categories. Such performance criteria test states, and many of the poorer or more conflicted states in the developing world repeatedly fail these tests. Most noticeably, and most prone to failure, are those states which cannot ensure their inhabitants minimal levels of security of person, or cannot secure a state's borders. The existence of internal conflict, as in Burundi, the Congo, and Sudan automatically disqualifies a state from success; so do the absence of an effective rule of law and substantial absences of political freedom or economic opportunity. But several nation-states, such as Belarus and Zimbabwe, can teeter on the brink of failure without truly failing so long as they quash dissent and are free of all-out civil war. The weak states are those possibly prone to failure, all scoring low on the supply of

FAILED STATES

several or more political goods. High Gross Domestic Product (GDP) states and those without internal antagonisms and with robust rules of law always score high and are considered strong states. Nevertheless, some seemingly strong states can rapidly plunge through weakness to failure (witness Cote d'Ivoire in 2001) when the denial of political freedom and equal opportunity provokes internal dissent and outbreaks of hostility.

It is not the absolute intensity of violence that identifies a failed state. Rather, it is the enduring character of that violence, the fact that much of the violence is directed against the existing government or regime, and the inflamed character of the political or geographical demands for shared power or autonomy that rationalize or justify that violence in the minds of the main insurgents.

The civil wars that so characterize failed states usually stem from or have roots in ethnic, religious, linguistic, or other intercommunal enmity. The fear of "the other" that drives so much ethnic conflict stimulates and fuels hostilities between regimes and subordinate or less favored groups. Avarice also propels that antagonism, especially when greed is magnified by dream of loot from discoveries of new, contested sources of wealth, such as petroleum deposits, diamond fields, other minerals, or timber.

There is no failed state without disharmonies between communities. Yet the simple fact that many weak nation-states include haves and have-nots is more a contributor to than a root cause of failure. Human agency almost always

precipitates a cascade of failure. For electoral or other purposes, a ruler or a ruling clique favors one people, group, or clan over his or their own, or legislates wholesale discrimination (as in Sri Lanka against the Tamils). That action destabilizes a country, and often leads directly (and sometimes over several years of abuse) to conflict and failure.

Failed states, in sum, are tense, deeply conflicted, corrupt, and dangerous. Their rulers prey on citizens. Health and educational systems deteriorate, real incomes plummet, infrastructures rot, roads vanish, power lines collapse, infant mortality rates rise, and food shortages occur. Life becomes brutish and short for most citizens; those close to the ruler or ruling clique correspondingly amass wealth from the shadowy opportunities that accompany failure.

Prevention of state failure can happen when stronger neighbors, larger powers, or the United Nations employ effective preventive diplomacy to keep failing states from abusing their minorities or behaving as kleptocrats. More often, outsiders fail to notice or act, states fall into failure, and only the intervention of troops from France (Cote d'Ivoire), Britain (Sierra Leone), or Australia (East Timor) successfully arrests further mayhem and destruction. Then combatants must be disarmed, demobilized, and reintegrated, usually the task of the UN, order restored, and the rule of law revived and the economy jump-started.

The new administration in Washington will find that future Congos, Haitis, and Afghanistans (to mention only three) can be prevented, and

then resuscitated, only if and when the U. S. fully supports the efforts of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, strengthens our woefully weak diplomatic presence in Africa and Asia, and starts to pay attention as much to the developing world as to the Middle East. Otherwise, the role of failed states as potential reservoirs of terror will intensify. □

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STRATEGIC OUTLOOK 2005: THE KOREAN PENINSULA

Kirk W. Larsen

The United States faces three important strategic challenges in Korea in the near-term future: the North Korean nuclear weapons issue, managing a potential collapse of North Korea, and restructuring the U.S.-South Korean relationship. Each issue poses unique challenges but all are intertwined in such a way as to make resolution of one challenge more likely to lead to resolution of the others and vice-versa.

The North Korean Nuclear Challenge

American intelligence estimates indicate that North Korea possessed enough plutonium to make 1-2 nuclear weapons in the early 1990s. If recent North Korean claims to have reprocessed all of the spent fuel rods in its Yŏngbyŏn nuclear facility are accurate, then the amount of nuclear fuel possessed by North Korea could be sufficient to make 6-8 weapons. The United States also claims to have strong evidence of a separate program based on enriched uranium but the extent and capabilities of such a program remains unclear. North Korea has yet to conduct a nuclear test; nor has it definitively demonstrated the possession of intercontinental ballistic missiles of the type required to directly threaten the United States. Therefore, the degree of the threat

posed by North Korea's nuclear program remains a matter of considerable debate as is North Korea's true intentions regarding its nuclear programs.

What is less debatable is the potential threat posed by the North Korean sale of nuclear weapons or materials to third parties, including terrorist groups, who might use them to attack the United States. This dimension of the North Korean nuclear issue transforms its threatening potential from the regional to the global level. Equally significant is the "demonstration effect" of acknowledging and accepting North Korea as a nuclear weapons state, a result that might seriously damage an already weak international non-proliferation regime.

The Bush Administration's uncompromising policy of insisting that North Korea abandon its nuclear programs before discussing any American compromises and concessions has apparently kept North Korea from unequivocally demonstrating its nuclear capabilities via a test of a nuclear weapon. On the other hand, several rounds of six-party (U.S., DPRK, ROK, PRC, Japan, and Russia) talks have resulted in little or no progress towards the elimination of the North Korean nuclear weapons program. Some observers concluded that the DPRK was awaiting the outcome of the November 2004 U.S. Presidential

election before making any diplomatic moves. But even after Bush's victory, the DPRK has been slow to demonstrate any significant willingness to re-enter negotiations.

While continued talks are clearly preferable to a military confrontation, negotiations carry their own set of challenges. Some call for the U.S. to offer a "grand bargain" that would resolve not only the nuclear standoff but also other long-term problems and issues such as human rights, missiles, and conventional forces on the Korean peninsula. Proponents of negotiation argue that only with such a sweeping offer can the U.S. and its allies fully test North Korea's true intentions. The challenge to such an approach is the prospect of the DPRK rejecting an American offer. The DPRK has clearly stated that it regards economic sanctions, a likely result of a North Korean refusal to accept a "grand bargain" as an act of war and has repeatedly declared that it will threaten both South Korea and Japan with destruction should such a war begin.

Negotiating with North Korea is clearly preferable to fighting with it. Still, American and other negotiators should seek to continue the process only with the understanding that even if the DPRK genuinely desires to give up its nuclear weapons programs, North Korean officials are tough bargainers who are skilled at extracting the maximum amount of concessions for the minimum amount of compromise. Furthermore, North Korea's fiercely independent nationalism will make it extremely difficult for any North Korean regime to accept the most intrusive aspects of the American demand that an agreement result in Complete, Verifiable, and Irreversible

Disarmament (CVID).

Will the DPRK collapse soon?

The DPRK has outlasted generations of observers and pundits who have predicted its demise. The longevity of North Korea owes much to a combination of a perversely effective regime of surveillance and repression, and the willingness of the North Korean people to endure unimaginable hardship while all the time blaming foreigners rather than their leaders for their predicament. Despite some halting attempts at economic reform, the Kim Jong Il regime has yet to create conditions in which North Korea can feed itself absent significant inputs of foreign aid. Continuing economic hardship, international donor fatigue, and a small but steady stream of defectors all point to the possibility that the current situation is not sustainable. Still, one shouldn't necessarily bet against the DPRK outlasting yet another generation of naysayers.

It is important to recognize that not all of the powers in the region share the opinion that a collapse of North Korea is desirable. The People's Republic of China and South Korea clearly do not wish to encourage a collapse in North Korea. South Korea fears the immense economic and social dislocations that would follow any rapid German-style unification of the two Koreas. China worries about the loss of an important buffer state and the prospect of hundreds of thousands of refugees pouring across the Sino-Korean border. Recognizing these differences of opinion is important for current advocates of "The End of North Korea" in Washington. Also

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important is the recognition that the removal of an oppressive regime does not automatically and immediately translate into stability and improved human rights for the previously oppressed people. Nor does it automatically follow that the end of the Kim regime will mean the end of North Korea. A military coup and/or a joint Chinese-North Korean stabilization of the DPRK might very well result in the continuation of a separate state.

The challenge facing American policymakers is, then, first to determine whether regime change and/or collapse is the most desirable outcome; second, to harmonize the attitudes and approaches of other powers in the region toward regime collapse (admittedly a difficult process); and, third, to plan and prepare for post-regime future scenarios more realistically and comprehensively than apparently was done in the case of Iraq.

Managing the U.S.-ROK Relationship

The United States also needs to mend and modify its increasingly contentious relationship with South Korea. A growing number of South Koreans support their president Roh Moo-hyun's attempts to express and pursue differences of opinion concerning North Korea and the U.S. role on the peninsula more generally. This newfound assertiveness is an indication of a more general transformation of the ROK from an almost entirely dependent client-state of the U.S. to a vibrant economic power that is eager to have a much greater say in its own destiny. To date, the United States appears to have assumed that Korean gratitude for American assistance during the

Korean War and in the following decades will prevent the ROK from pursuing policies that are dramatically divergent from those of the U.S. Such an assumption rests on increasingly shaky ground.

The United States needs to acknowledge the growing gap between American and South Korean opinions. A recent public opinion survey indicates that one in five South Koreans feel that the ROK should side with North Korea in the case of conflict between the DPRK and the United States. While this may not correlate with how South Korea might actually behave in a crisis, it is an indication that the days of unquestioning acceptance of American designs are over. This challenge can be dealt with both from a public relations standpoint but also from a more fundamental reassessment of the mutual values and interests that both sides still share. Recent agreements on troop relocation and reduction are promising steps in this direction. Mending the relationship with South Korea will make it more likely that the North Korean nuclear issue will be resolved and any potential North Korean collapse will be effectively managed. □

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TRANSFORMATION OF THE US MILITARY

Sam C. Sarkesian

The challenges of the 21st century strategic landscape have created difficult problems for the US military. Fearing that the US military may become increasingly obsolete in this new landscape, the President as well as Pentagon insiders have spelled out a policy of “Transformation of the Military.” In 2002, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld stated “We need to change not only capabilities at our disposal, but also how we think about war. All the high-tech weapons in the world will not transform the U.S. armed forces unless we also transform the way we think, the way we train, the way we exercise, and the way we fight.” While on the surface the concept appears clear, its conceptual meaning and impact on the US military is clouded. Does transformation refer to mind-sets, military doctrine, armaments, strategic and tactical perspectives, organizational issues, or all of these? It is the view here that transformation refers to all of these. If that is the case, then there is a complex and complicated process that needs to be put in place to achieve success. For a more comprehensive view of military transformation, please see The Project on Defense Alternatives publication entitled “9/11 and the Meaning of Military Transformation.”

To help unravel this process we should first focus on three primary considerations: military mind-sets, leadership challenges, and the rationale for transformation. Transformation is more comprehensive in depth and scope than these

issues. Nevertheless, to gain any meaning of the word transformation, it is important to begin with the thought processes underpinning transformation. But first, a brief glance at the recent past can set the stage for understanding the current military transformation process.

Military Transformation—A Brief Glimpse at the Recent Past

Change (transformation) in the US military has taken place from lessons learned in various wars. This is not to suggest that the US military learned all of the important lessons and shaped the future accordingly. Indeed in certain instances the US Army reentered the “dark ages.” Nonetheless, certain military changes have usually occurred as part of lessons learned in various wars. In the aftermath of World War I the US military underwent some change in the use of aircraft, tanks, and artillery. Following World War II, similar changes took place in air power, atomic weapons, weaponry, and tactical doctrine. But most of these changes were within the scope of Clausewitzian principles. Conventional war doctrine supported by massive air and naval power became the key. This was further justified as the era of two superpowers emerged. In that era, the primary concern was state versus state confrontation and state coalitions versus state coalitions based on conventional warfare

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principles as well as nuclear weapons--nuclear deterrence.

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the rise of the US as the lone superpower (and world hegemon) the US military remains fixed on the Clausewitzian concept of war with the center of gravity fixed on the adversaries' armed forces. Although facing a new strategic landscape, until recently the US military remained fixed on its conventional posture. There was some movement, however, to redesign the US military to perceived threats. In the early 1990s, the "Revolution in Military Affairs" aimed at developing a new type of military designed to respond to the lone superpower strategic landscape. This included a more technological-driven military, combat based on precision firepower and reduced "boots on the ground" concepts, as well as the possibility of civilians being directly involved in war. Much of this appeared to be debate rather than action oriented. About the same period, the Information Age Warrior was unveiled. This included such things as night vision, individual communications, devices, body armor, and many of the armaments and devices now seen with our troops in Iraq and Afghanistan. The increasing technological knowledge and cyber-space concepts relevant to warfare remained distant from military realities.

In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, the new war created a complex security environment; one that was removed from state to state warfare and large land armies. Yet the US military remained fixed on the model that emerged from Gulf War I—a conventional state-to-state model that became the model for future wars. In

the aftermath of Gulf War I however, it was clear that international terrorism and non-state actors were shaping the security landscape. Gulf War I had become an outdated model for future wars. The US military had to rethink and reshape its system to be relevant to the threats and perceived conflicts of the 21st Century. This led to the need to transform the military not only to respond to such an environment, but also to maintain its credibility in conventional warfare. This is a daunting task, as revealed in the US experience in Afghanistan and Iraq. Yet even in Operation Enduring Freedom, precision guided munitions and Tactical Air Controllers on the ground with US Special Forces inside Afghanistan changed the role of air power from standard missions to more precise electronic guided air strikes.

Military Transformation— Into the 21st Century

What does transformation mean in the current period? And how is the military responding to efforts at transformation? An Office of Force Transformation (OFT) was created in the Department of Defense. This consists of the Director, Deputy Director, and five sections: Strategy, Technology Implementation, Operational Concepts, Risk Management, and Implementation Approaches. In an article entitled "Transformation and the Changing Character of War" featured in the July/August 2004 *ROA National Security Report*, Vice Admiral Cebrowski, director of the OFT Strategy section, writes that "Transformation is first and foremost about changing culture."

According to one account military transformation as conceived in the current period may have various purposes and even serve different ends. In this view, military transformation has at least three meanings: adaptation; defense reform; military-technical changes. First, military transformation focuses on adapting to the new security landscape. Essentially the military must become proficient across the conflict spectrum, that is full spectrum dominance. Second, the Pentagon must streamline its infrastructure and become more efficient in its management practice. Finally, the military must adopt new information technology and restructure the armed forces accordingly.

In 2004 Secretary Rumsfeld stated that “Future dangers will less likely be from battles between great powers and more likely from enemies that work in small cells, that are fluid and strike without warning anywhere, anytime...” Such threats appear to be driven by the notion of “the new war” that emanates mainly from non-state actors--international terrorism on a global scale. Such a military force is designed to be lighter, more mobile and information age technology-proficient, ranging from precision firepower and cyber communications to lighter, more mobile systems designed to be deployed anywhere in the world in a short period of time. Land forces face the most difficult challenge. The US Air Force and US Navy are also involved in the process of transformation. The Air Force is re-examining the role of fighters and bombers, its role in land warfare, and the use of unmanned aerial vehicles, among other things. The Navy is focused on electronic devices, its

role in land warfare, and the role of combat vessels in control of the sea, among other things. (There is much debate within military circles on such issues). Equally important questions remain about the affect of transformation on the Total Force concept—the Federal Reserve Forces and the National Guard.

Transformation—Problems and Challenges

Military transformation must begin with a strategy designed for 21st Century warfare—easier said than done. This means a change from the Clausewitzian concept of warfare and the focus on conventional capability, particularly in terms of doctrine and mind-sets. Full spectrum dominance is the ultimate goal. In the past the conflict spectrum stressed capability in conventional conflicts extending to nuclear war. There was little whole-hearted attention given to unconventional conflicts. But full spectrum dominance means capability ranging from peace-keeping and nation building to unconventional and conventional conflicts as well as nuclear capability. However, full spectrum dominance remains in question, as seen in the involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq, and other parts of the world. The critical role of Special Operations Forces, particularly the US Army Special Forces, remains challenged by the conventional military syndrome.

Nonetheless, the first steps taken to transform the military appear to be in the right direction. This may be diminished by the problems emerging from the bureaucratic system established to transform combined with budgetary

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issues, the lack of consensus on implementation of transformation, and the need to rethink concepts of wars and small wars that may not challenge US vital interests. All of these matters need to be clarified and the need for transformation made clear. The most challenging issues in military transformation are the changes needed in mind-sets, leadership, and the rationale for change. New thinking about a technology proficient military and the challenge of non-state adversaries and conflicts necessitates a mind-set beyond Gulf War I warfare. These require mind-set at all levels of the military that understand the need for full spectrum dominance and what that means. This also requires military leadership—again, at all levels—that is proactive; an orientation that accepts responsibility for actions not necessarily dictated by higher commands.

In sum, there is a pressing need to clarify the meaning of military transformation so that it is better understood by those in the military, national leaders, elected representatives, and the American public. How to bring together an understanding of US response to the new war and the US role as the lone superpower are difficult issues. The combination of military transformation and the ongoing efforts to respond effectively to the new war and efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq, add to the complex issues of the new war. There are many questions, but few clear answers. The hope is that the Department of Defense has the answers. □

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INTELLIGENCE RESTRUCTURING: JUST THE FIRST STEP

Suzanne Spaulding

Demands on the intelligence community have changed significantly over the last decade and expanded exponentially after the terrorist attacks three years ago. For example, there is a far greater demand for “actionable” or tactical intelligence; domestic intelligence; intelligence sufficiently precise and accurate to inform a policy of pre-emption; and intelligence focused not on a specific country or region but targeting a truly global threat. The men and women in our intelligence agencies have brought remarkable talent, dedication, and hard work to meeting those challenges, often with inspiring success. Yet, these challenges have also highlighted important shortcomings, not all of which can or will be addressed in the legislative reform efforts under consideration at the time this article was written. These remaining problems will need to be identified and addressed in the coming months and years.

It has been said that 9/11 represented a failure to connect the dots and that the pre-war intelligence on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) connected the dots to the wrong conclusion. As discussed below, these shorthand assessments overlook the failure to collect enough dots in the first place. However, they are handy bumper stickers for the problems with the intelligence analysis in each case.

Thoughtful proposals to address the information sharing challenge have been made by the

Markle Foundation, the 9/11 Commission, and various legislative initiatives. It is likely that the final reform bill will include some version of a National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), to fuse intelligence information and plan joint counterterrorism operations. But the legislation is less likely to fix the problems at the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which still struggles with the challenge of bringing together and making sense of information from the intelligence community, the entities that make up the DHS, state and local entities, and the private sector.

Sharing of information between agencies is only part of the solution, however. Establishing secure trusted information networks that allow analysts throughout government, outside government, and even outside the U.S., to share theories, ideas, questions, and information in real time using well-defined policies and technology to manage the flow rather than bureaucratic hierarchies—that would be truly revolutionary.

The analytic shortcomings that led to the miscalculation on Iraq’s WMD programs could also benefit from an environment that prompts more robust discussion and debate among analysts. Many critics believe the key problem was “group think.” Indeed, it seems clear that by the time the intelligence community was preparing the *National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq*, just days before the Senate voted on the resolution

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authorizing the use of force, there was significant pressure to reach definitive conclusions despite the sketchy and inconclusive nature of the underlying intelligence. The absence of proof that the weapons had been destroyed was taken as proof that they still existed. In addition, although members of the Senate had asked for this assessment to help them decide whether to vote for war, the analysts felt that the White House had basically made the decision to invade Iraq and that they were warning commanders what they might face. Thus, they were more willing to err on the side of overstating the risk. Legislative proposals for greater use of “red teams” to challenge intelligence assessments before they are finalized may help identify and fix some of these biases.

There are also long-standing, systemic problems plaguing proliferation analysis. For example, the failure to warn about the nuclear tests of India and Pakistan in 1998 was attributed in large part to an emphasis on tracking technology rather than adequately focusing on, and integrating, leadership analysis and regional/geopolitical factors. The report of the President’s advisory panel on WMD, due in March 2005, should prompt additional reforms to improve intelligence on this critical issue.

Ultimately, however, the analysis will only be as good as the information upon which it is based. We need better collection. This is where a true National Director of Intelligence (NDI), as proposed by the 9/11 Commission, could make the greatest difference. Contrary to the common refrain, HUMINT (intelligence gathered by human spies) is not the panacea. It’s true that we

need to have spies that look, speak, and operate more like their targets. In addition, however, today’s key collection agencies, the CIA, the National Security Agency, and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, must achieve the unity of effort achieved by the military when the *Goldwater-Nichols* bill created unified commanders who control all of the military assets in their theater of operations. The NDI must be, in effect, the “unified commander” for intelligence. In addition, we need to continue working to find ways to effectively tap the vast amount of open source information related to intelligence targets.

Post-9/11 intelligence changes also raise legal and policy issues that are not yet being addressed. For example, the Department of Defense (DOD) now asserts the authority to undertake a wide range of activities related to “preparation of the battlefield” in anticipation of military actions. In the Global War on Terrorism, the potential battlefields are legion and, with DOD’s Homeland Defense mission, include the United States. Activities that once may have been viewed as covert actions, governed by a careful set of legal requirements and restrictions, could now be considered part of the preparation of the battlefield and covered by the “traditional military activities” exemption from the covert action definition. *Posse Comitatus* is often cited as a restriction on military activities inside the US but it only applies to “law enforcement activities” and presumably would not apply to “traditional” military operations. Preparation of the battlefield also includes intelligence collection efforts. Traditional oversight mechanisms and policies need to be updated to reflect these

new missions.

The FBI is also being asked to undertake a fundamentally different role since 9/11 and the full implications of that shift have yet to be understood and reflected in the legal framework. At issue is the move from a system predicated on criminal activity, where prosecution was the presumed objective, to one predicated on suspicion, aimed at prevention rather than prosecution. Clear constitutional requirements have been developed over many years for ensuring that government action to detect, deter, and punish crimes is consistent with constitutional protections for individual rights and liberties. Barring prosecutors from using evidence obtained improperly, for example, serves as a relatively effective deterrent to abusive government behavior. However, if prosecution is no longer the goal, this deterrence becomes far less effective. Again, Congress should consider whether existing oversight and policy safeguards need to be updated.

Additional legal and policy issues awaiting resolution center around activities such as the collection of intelligence from detainees, including US citizens designated as enemy combatants; the use of intelligence in criminal and administrative proceedings; and how international law applies to intelligence collection.

The intelligence community must significantly improve its ability to address threats such as terrorism, proliferation, and failed and failing states in a manner that is consistent with Americans' expectations and values. The reform efforts prompted by the 9/11 Commission Report are just the first step. □

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A NEW UN APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL SECURITY IN AN AGE OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

Elizabeth Rindskopf Parker and Bryan Pate

An examination of the strategic issues facing the second administration of George W. Bush would certainly be incomplete without a discussion of the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction. In fact, it is difficult to conceive of how any developed nation today could avoid placing non-proliferation at the forefront of its foreign policy concerns. By now, the world should recognize that the threat of a catastrophic nuclear, biological or chemical attack knows no boundaries and is potentially equally as available to state actors as to individuals. The United States in particular has cause for concern. As the world's only superpower, it is surely on the short list of likely targets were such an attack to occur. In fact, it is difficult to overstate the significance of this strategic threat to America's interests at home and abroad.

Thus, the adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) this year is welcome news. It represents an advance in the international effort to contain the spread of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. The United States was the central driving force behind the resolution, and continues to support its effective implementation. Ensuring that Resolution 1540 emerges as a significant impediment to the spread of weapons of mass destruction to international terrorist groups and "rogue states"

should be a central goal of our foreign policy as the Bush Administration goes forward into its second term.

What does Resolution 1540 provide? Unanimously adopted under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, the resolution is binding upon all member states, and requires each state to establish "domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their means of delivery" Further, it specifically mandates that every state must implement a list of counter-proliferation measures, including better physical security, more effective law enforcement and improved border controls. Most importantly, the resolution addresses non-state actors by requiring every member state to pass domestic laws criminalizing the manufacture, possession, transportation or use of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery. Finally, the resolution prohibits states from attempting to engage in, assisting or financing these activities.

Yet, although Resolution 1540 has been a part of international law for six months, it remains unclear how effective it will be. By the end of October, every member state was required to have submitted a report on its plans for implementing the resolution to a Security Council Committee chaired by Ambassador Motoc of

Romania. The results of this crucial first step in the resolution's implementation should be an early indicator of its acceptance and support around the globe.

The adoption of Resolution 1540 is significant for a second reason. It marks only the second time in the history of the United Nations that the Security Council has adopted a resolution under Chapter VII which governs state security conduct that is not tied to a particular event. The first resolution adopted by the Security Council under Chapter VII that did not address a particular situation or specific state conduct was resolution 1373 (2001), which was adopted immediately after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. That resolution imposed general measures on states to combat terrorism. More importantly, the resolution breaks with the established pattern of relying on multi-lateral treaties to combat the spread of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. Thus, the resolution could prove to be a decisive moment in the U.N.'s approach to governance, as well as a turning point in securing nation-states from the threat of non-state actors.

Resolution 1540 also reflects the importance of the internal features of all states' legal systems to their collective international security. It seeks to fill a gap in international law created by the existing legal framework governing non-proliferation. That framework consists of three principal multi-lateral treaties, each with its own requirements, and an uneven network of enforcement mechanisms. These three treaties are the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the 1972 Convention on the

Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (BWC), and the 1993 Convention on the Prohibition of Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (CWC). The NPT was enacted to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons from nuclear states to non-nuclear states. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is empowered to implement the conditions of this treaty on signatory states. The CWC was implemented to combat the spread and use of chemical weapons. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) is the authority designated to ensure the conditions of the treaty are fulfilled. The BWC was designed to prevent biological agents from being used as weapons in war. There is no agency charged with implementing its provisions on signatory states.

These treaties were designed and implemented to prohibit the offensive use of a chemical, nuclear or biological weapon by any state, but not to combat the threat of non-state actors. Further, not all of the 191 member states of the United Nations have yet agreed to the entire set of treaties. There are some 189 parties to the NPT, only 137 of which are party to the Statute of the NPT. There are 151 states parties to the BWC, and 164 states parties to the CWC. As a result, prior to the adoption of Resolution 1540, there was no cohesive international legal approach to preventing the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by non-state actors.

With the enactment of Resolution 1540, the Security Council has made a bold departure

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away from the treaty-based regimes of the past. In doing so, it has drawn criticism. Some worry that the resolution will undercut the current treaty-based security structure. Others argue state disenfranchisement because traditional Security Council resolution processes have been ignored. These states point to the fact that fifteen states enacted a resolution binding on 176 other countries in an area of international law that has been governed by multi-lateral treaties for almost forty years. Such a deviation, they claim, is unprecedented and not the proper role for the United Nations. The United States and the Security Council must appreciate the roots of these concerns, and overcome dissenting opinions through leadership and action. Now is not the time to falter.

The new resolution is a part of the Security Council's efforts this year to reinforce the patchwork quilt of multi-lateral treaties governing international non-proliferation efforts. These efforts recognize the need to address the threat of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons being acquired by non-state actors. This new body of law is currently in its nascent stages and additional legislation will be needed to make it an effective impediment to this potentially devastating proliferation. Although the ultimate success of measures like Resolution 1540 will depend on every nation in the world, their survival over the next few years will hinge on the support and attention of the most powerful nations. The United States will certainly have a vital role to play in sustaining and implementing these revolutionary laws. The incoming administration must commit to preventing the spread of weap-

ons of mass destruction to terrorists. Ensuring that Resolution 1540 is implemented effectively so that every nation-state is a participant in this effort is one of the best ways to turn our commitment to non-proliferation into a successful policy. □

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AN ECONOMIC AGENDA FOR PROSPERITY AND LEADERSHIP

Rachel Golden

The election over, now the President must concentrate on strengthening American prosperity and leadership. He will encounter many challenges along the way. At home, the President faces burgeoning budget deficits, rising inflation, and the possibility of stagflation due to oil shocks. Many Americans are feeling uneasy about their jobs and wages, especially as the economies of China and India emerge on the strength of their low wages, increasingly skilled workers, and rising entrepreneurial and technological prowess. On the global front, the President will continue to be concerned about globalization because of its impact on security and stability. He must find the blend of policies (development assistance, trade and investment, debt relief) that can help mold globalization in ways that maximize the benefits of financial and trade integration while minimizing its harm. This paper describes the challenges the President will face as he seeks to increase America's power and influence in the world. It also presents an agenda to turn those challenges into opportunities.

Domestic Challenges

Paul Volcker, Peter Peterson, and C. Fred Bergsten warn of a looming catastrophe that the fiscal and current account deficits present. Alan

Greenspan warns that our country will not be able to meet its promises to retirees. And a Washington Post editorial speculates that in the future, the President may have to choose between retirees and national security.

The fiscal budget is in disrepair. If the President chooses to reduce the red ink by forsaking expenditures that are necessary to educate our children and improve the nation's healthcare, increase transportation and communication efficiencies, and improve the functioning of government, it could have serious consequences on American competitiveness, power, and prestige.

The current account, too, is in deficit. Many people believe that the President should be as concerned about the nation's growing dependency on foreign creditors as on foreign oil. For example, if Asian countries become less willing to hold our debt, then interest rates will rise and the value of the US dollar will decrease. This could abort the US economic recovery, throw the global economy into a tailspin, lead to protectionism, and create chaos.

Prosperity continues to elude large groups of Americans, as evidenced by the growing numbers filing for bankruptcy and living in poverty. Finding a job that pays as well as the one lost is a daunting task. Low-wage jobs are the fastest growing category of job growth. A quarter of the

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workforce earns less than \$8.50 an hour, before taxes. Forty three million people are without health insurance. Service jobs, that once seemed safe, are being outsourced.

Across-the-board pressures are building for protectionism. Instability and insecurity in the Middle East, as well as rising demand for oil within a global system running on full capacity, has resulted in sharp rises in oil prices, at the same time as consumers and businesses have experienced double-digit increases in their health insurance premiums. It is only a matter of time before Americans stop supporting the building of schools and firehouses in Iraq while similar facilities are being closed at home for lack of money.

Global Challenges

Globalization affects international security and stability because it is both a system enhancer and disruptor, as discussed in the Spring 2004 issue of the *National Strategy Forum Review*. In theory, an international liberal economic order is a win-win situation. However, in practice, not everyone wins. In many parts of the world, those who have government connections or belong to particular ethnic or religious groups become winners through corruption, nepotism, and favoritism. Where this occurs, political legitimacy is undermined, identity politics (movements mobilized around ethnic, racial or religious identity for the purpose of claiming power) is sparked, violence and intra-communal strife are initiated, and weak states turned into failing ones. This situation is not conducive to the expansion of democ-

racy or prosperity. The President must find ways to turn these “bad neighborhoods”, largely in the Middle East, Central Asia, and South Europe, into good ones by strengthening political and legal institutions and governance, and promoting economic and financial transparency.

Growing economic integration has produced economic growth and wealth. However, it has also produced a global over-supply of labor, especially in the Middle East. Everywhere lack of work, or jobs with decent pay, has triggered feelings of powerlessness, social exclusion, lack of opportunity, hopelessness, and frustration. Terrorists, nationalists, criminal groups, warlords, and paramilitary groups have used economic insecurity to attract supporters, build private militias, and recruit suicide bombers. The President must use development assistance, trade treaties, investment, debt relief, and the promotion of entrepreneurship to end the attraction and support of such groups.

Finally, while globalization has, on balance, been good for the majority, its ills have led to the formation of an anti-globalization movement comprised of victims, their allies, and others, some of whom are more anti-American than anti-globalization. Many in this movement believe that globalization means “Made in America” and for the benefit of corporations, while harmful to the environment, workers, and the poor. Since America enjoys the benefits of globalization, the President must find ways to counter the anti-globalization movement’s growing popularity. For example, because free trade is increasingly becoming a rules based system, the President must advocate for opening markets gradually and

proportionally so that countries have time to adjust.

An Agenda for Prosperity and Leadership

The following is advice to the President on how to turn the challenges cited above into opportunities that expand freedom, security, and prosperity. It is an action plan that encompasses principles, values, and a code of conduct that reflects America’s national interest, as well as what America is and hopes to be.

- Recognize that economic growth alone will not restore America’s fiscal health. A tax increase or a change in the way taxes are collected is necessary, preferably not primarily at the expense of those whose major source of income is wages. The additional revenue should be used to pay down the debt, provide for costs, such as Social Security, Medicare, and pensions that are not adequately budgeted, and leave a healthy fiscal legacy for our children and grandchildren. Americans should be urged to save more.
- Promote freer trade. Recognize that because of the global oversupply of labor, trade policies should not undercut employment in poor countries or distort agricultural trade, even when advanced by major financial supporters. Trade treaties should provide labor standards for workers.
- Recognize that freer trade alone is not enough to eliminate poverty. A focus on national development is critical. Give economic aid more strategically and improve public diplomacy. Meeting the Millennium

Development Goals should be a high priority.

- Promote globalization, but work strenuously to eliminate the harm it inflicts. Understand that foreigners often have different values, goals, and perceptions than Americans and that a “my way or the highway” approach often leads to resentment and destabilizing behavior.
- Promote the freer movement of labor, but be sensitive of the need to protect America’s borders. Visa applications should be processed more expeditiously, especially for foreign students and businessmen.
- Talk up hope and opportunity, talk down US protectionism. Americans should realize that protectionism in today’s globalized world could be destabilizing and harmful to America.
- Balance the need to counter terrorism with sensitivity to civil liberties and the needs of legitimate businesses.
- Promote American business abroad, but not by rigging the bidding process to eliminate foreign competitors, as is happening with reconstruction projects in Iraq.
- Work for better coordination of international policies that stimulate global demand.
- Recognize the important role that NGOs and the private sector play in promoting good governance and strengthening markets. Most international NGOs are financially fragile. Find ways to make them more sustainable and increase their capabilities. Be supportive of international financial organizations, like the World Bank, IMF, and

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WTO, yet encourage these organizations to be more democratic, transparent, and accountable.

- Promote market-based solutions, while seeking opportunities to dismantle policies that contribute to unnecessary regulation. Flexible labor markets should be supported, but safety nets should be provided. The rule of law, openness, transparency, and accountability should be vigorously encouraged, while corruption should be suppressed.

Conclusion

In the end, all politics are local. However, in a borderless world, what happens in America affects what happens elsewhere, and vice versa. Thus, the President MUST focus on US prosperity. But he also must seek to change the framework within which we and others operate. The advice offered above is intended to make America stronger and align others' interests with ours. □

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PERSPECTIVES OF A US-CHINA STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP

Richard E. Friedman

Earlier this year, the Chinese government invited me to China to meet with government officials, research institute directors, and academics to discuss the feasibility of a complementary US-China strategy that would strengthen bilateral relations.

There is cause for optimism about the proposition that the US can exercise its primacy and leadership by shaping the US/China political terrain. However, my optimism is tempered by legitimate concerns voiced by respected US commentators that suggest that there are negative trends that are moving the relationship in the wrong direction (See the *June 2004 Report to Congress of the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission*). My Chinese hosts recognized this. Their view is that tension and conflict issues should be addressed cooperatively with the expectation that many, but not all, issues can be resolved or ameliorated. Conflict and tension is inevitable, but it is in the interest of US national security that rough patches be managed by friends and partners rather than by adversaries. There is a need for government and civilian leaders of both countries to exchange visits that would result in enhanced understanding of mutual culture and goals.

My concerns about the US/PRC relationship follow:

1. If China continues its rapid economic growth, it will translate its prosperity into military power resulting in security competition with the US in Asia.

My response is: The US should consider developing policies that would support China. One assumption is that the US has a dynamic rather than static economic potential that will counter the negative effect of China's economic growth on the US economy. China's domestic political stability is based on meeting the expectation of China's population that prosperity will continue to rise. If this goal is not met, the Communist Party (CCP) could be tempted to turn to military adventurism in the region (similar to Argentina and the Falklands War). Induced nationalism would result in anti-Americanism and the likelihood of a positive relationship with China would be diminished.

2. China may attempt to dominate Asia and become the regional hegemon; US longstanding policy is not to tolerate peer competitors in Asia or Europe.

My response is: Better practice suggests that the US should restrain China from becoming the regional hegemon by recognizing the principle of

US-CHINA STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP

US shared regional power with China, Japan, India, and, to a lesser degree, with Russia, South Korea, and Vietnam.

3. The Taiwan independence issue may not be settled diplomatically and China could take military action to reunify Taiwan with China.

What should the US do to resolve the China/Taiwan reunification-independence issue? My response is: The US should continue to adhere to the long-standing "One China" principle and ensure that it does not send imprecise or conflicting signals to Taiwan that would encourage independence.

4. A US/PRC energy security competition may result in a re-armed Japan.

In the US, Europe, and Japan, new demand for energy is outpacing supply. Energy demand from Asia will account for up to 80 percent of worldwide growth and oil consumption and will surpass North America's oil demand by 2020. China's energy demand is voracious and may double by the year 2020. An oil dominated world energy economy may induce unavoidable US/PRC competition.

Following are summaries of some of the topics of discussion from the Chinese perspective:

A Rising Power

- China aspires to great power status, but it recognizes that it will not attain this goal for 20-30 years. It must resolve its internal domestic problems before it becomes a global

power. These problems include growing inflation, massive migration resulting in unemployment and underemployment, widespread corruption, environmental problems, and shortages of basic materials including electricity and water, steel, cement, and lumber.

- China's Gross Domestic Product per person is \$1,660 compared to US GDP of \$36,300.
- Seventy percent of China's 1.3 billion people live in rural areas. There is great disparity between prosperity in urban and rural areas.

China's Perception of

US World Primacy and Leadership

- China regards the US as the major state power globally and in Asia, and there is a desire to build and strengthen the US/PRC relationship if the direction is consistent with China's strategic objectives.
- My hosts noted that there was negligible "hate America" attitude among the Chinese leadership and people.
- There is disappointment that the US has squandered its leadership potential subsequent to the end of the Cold War.
- US primacy is regarded as being unilateral, arrogant, and absolute. The cure is respect and advance consultation.
- Stylistic concerns: the US must respect China as an equal; sometimes the US ignores courtesy norms.

China and the US in the Asian Region

- The PRC goal is to avoid creating a regional rivalry with the US that would result in a US

policy of containment involving a US alliance with India and Japan.

- India is at least ten years behind China's economic development. A strategic alliance involving the US, India, and China would involve one-third of the world's population and a major part of the world economy.
- Japan is sensitive to its diminishing power in the region and, if it feels threatened militarily or economically, it may re-arm. Japan must be a full partner in any US/PRC regional consortium.
- The US must recognize that its primacy in the region may be coming to an end. The US should take the lead in establishing a new balance of power in the region involving the US, China, India, and Japan.

Human Rights

- US criticism of China's human rights policy is based on misperceptions and the US does not take into account the cultural and political imperatives that are involved.
- The US must recognize its human rights shortcomings when it criticizes China and other states.

Iraq

- China has minimized its criticism of US policy in Iraq because it would not change US policy and it would interfere with closer relations with the US.
- China believes that the US is mired in Iraq and has not focused on the importance of Asia.

Democracy

- China has adopted elements of democracy but it is loath to identify itself as being on the path leading to democracy.
- The PRC perspective is that American-style democracy may not be in the best interest of many developing states.

Communism

- My hosts believe that many Americans and US policymakers view China through the eyes of long deceased Senator Joe McCarthy and that the US fails to understand the rapid political and doctrinal changes that have been made as predicates to China's global market economy.
- Marxism is an anachronism and is not useful for China's orientation towards the contemporary world. The Communist Party is all-inclusive and is not limited to workers.
- The CCP recognizes that it is vulnerable because of a rising middle class and accessibility of communication (the internet and cell phones).
- The CCP must adapt to changed circumstances before it is over-run by contemporary change. The CCP research arm was a leader in moving China towards its market economy policy.
- The present orientation of the CCP is to solve problems rather than preach doctrine. China has a fragmented internal political structure. The CCP provides the political glue that holds the structure together.

US-CHINA STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP

Terrorism and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

- China is vulnerable to acts of terrorism.
- There have been many acts of terrorism in the western provinces with large Muslim populations that have not been reported.
- China's view of terrorism is similar to that of Europe—less important than the US priority. Counterterrorism is a police function rather a military function.
- China will continue to participate in an international regime that bans the export of WMD technology.
- China will cooperate fully with the US in intelligence gathering. They see this type of cooperation as an opportunity to strengthen their relations with the US.

Globalization and the US Trade Deficit

- Globalization and world trade is the vehicle for China's prosperity. China will participate in international trade organizations and continue to adapt its market economy to international norms.
- China is sensitive to the US trade deficit with China. They recognize that the US trade deficit and job loss are important US domestic political issues, and that China will be blamed.
- China's foreign direct investment policies benefit US corporation subsidiaries that operate in China and return profits to the US. General Motors recently invested \$3 billion to manufacture vehicles in China. US con-

sumers benefit from lower prices.

- China wants to purchase dual use technology from the US. However, US technology export restrictions force China to make technology purchases elsewhere.
- China holds approximately 10 percent of all US securities.

The Economy

- China favors state-owned enterprises that are inefficient and do not make investments in technology research. China depends on foreign investment for its domestic industries.
- China's companies tend to be non-collaborative within their respective industries; they depend on foreign innovation.
- China may be faced with looming economic problems: a \$5 billion foreign trade deficit; increasing inflation; rapid real estate development that may result in over-building and a burst real estate bubble; and shortages of steel, cement, lumber, electricity, and water.
- The current economic growth trend will decrease because the backlog of basic unfilled demand will be met; it is anticipated that annual economic growth will be reduced in future years.

Policymaking

- Policymaking is a consultative, bottom-up process involving five or six consultative bodies.
- There was uniform agreement among high echelon representatives of the consultative bodies on many of the issues discussed, but

nothing that approached a “party line,” with the exception of a uniform view regarding the gravity of the Taiwan independence issue.

Chinese Military

(People’s Liberation Army, the PLA)

- China’s economic prosperity will enable the PLA to modernize. Their goal is to move towards high technology similar to the US military model. However, a relatively limited amount of money is available for military modernization - much less than the US military budget.
- The PLA is sensitive to the political dimension of military modernization because of the anticipated US negative reaction. My military hosts asserted that modernization is for defensive purposes and that there is no likelihood of a PLA/US military confrontation, other than Taiwan.
- The US military presence in Asia is not perceived to be a threat to the PLA.
- The PLA “lecture” to me was that the US must do everything possible to prevent Taiwan’s independence. The issue was framed as one of pride and honor. The message is that Taiwan’s independence would require China to respond militarily and that indirect US military involvement would be anticipated.
- The potential threats to China are a re-armed Japan, and unresolved disputes with India and Russia. None of these threats are deemed imminent.
- As an example of PLA’s defensive military

posture, they asserted that they have no plans to build an aircraft carrier fleet.

- The PLA has five seats on the Communist Party Central Committee. This will be reduced to two seats as an example of the PLA’s desire to voluntarily diminish but not relinquish its political role in government.

The Olympic Games (2008)

- The Olympics provides China with an opportunity to demonstrate its importance to the world. Beijing and Shanghai are extraordinary modern cities.
- China is engaged in a charm offensive that will continue through the run-up to the Olympic Games. Conflict with the US in the pre-Olympics period would be disastrous to the success of the Games.
- China believes that Taiwan may base its independence strategy on China’s political and economic vulnerability during the period 2004-2008.

North Korea

- China sees its role in North Korea as a facilitator rather than as the lead state in negotiations with North Korea.
- China has minimal power over North Korea, but they will continue to work with other states to resolve the problem. □

Richard E. Friedman is President and Chair of the National Strategy Forum.

TUNISIA: A JOURNEY THROUGH A COUNTRY THAT WORKS

Georgie Anne Geyer

Interlink Publishing Group, Inc., MA, 2003

206 Pages

Reviewed by Lauren Bean, editor, *National Strategy Forum Review*

"Democracy is not instant coffee."

– Tunisian Foreign Minister Habib Ben Yahia

Georgie Anne Geyer, an award-winning journalist and nationally syndicated columnist, shares her unique, in-depth perspective of Tunisia, "a country that works." Ms. Geyer traveled to Tunisia throughout the 1990's. This book is an account of those trips and her findings, "together with 30 years of intensive journalistic coverage of the entire Middle East." The book is not a travelogue though she provides spectacular imagery of the Tunisian people and places and a comprehensive history of Carthage and modern Tunisia. She characterizes the book as "developmental political travel literature."

Tunisia disproves the misconception that democracy is limited to one region or one religion. Turkey is the exemplar of how to build and maintain a successful secular, Islamic democracy in the Middle East and Tunisia is similar in many respects. Geyer writes that Tunisia is the only country in the region "to make a really successful transition from colonialism to sovereign

nation, from traditionalism to reasonable modernism." It has been recognized by the United Nations, the World Bank, and the European Union as one of the most successful and progressive countries in the Arab world.

The author credits much of the success of Tunisia's economic, political, and social development to the country's architect and first president, Habib Bourguiba, who became president in 1957 following the end of French colonial rule in 1956. Geyer calls Bourguiba "a Tunisian Machiavelli with a high moral compass," a "man of specificity and possibility." To many in the Arab world and abroad, his ideas were unprecedented. Over the course of his three-decade long rule, he created a solid infrastructure that supported Tunisia's transition to democracy, and he implemented policies aimed at modernizing Tunisia and its people on an incremental basis. In the end, Bourguiba would fall short of his objective of building a stable platform upon which Tunisia could develop. However, the principles of Bourguibism provided the framework for his successors and future development of the state.

The paradox of Bourguiba is that he was a strict authoritarian ruler of a single-party state

who envisioned a modern Arab state characterized by the economic, social, and political empowerment of his people, the revival of the Tunisian culture, the advancement of women, individual enterprise, secularism, tolerance and respect, free education, and a competitive economy. He was keenly aware of Tunisia's weaknesses. He understood that rapid change would destabilize the state and that development must be gradual – "a day-to-day, generation-to-generation process." He understood that violence and war, so prevalent in other Arab countries, would impede modernization. He believed that he could insulate Tunisia from the destructive trend that plagued the Arab world - pernicious militant Islamist ideology.

Geyer writes that Islamist groups across the Middle East, including those in Tunisia, were influenced by Marxism and other ideological movements, and that they were fighting for the same goals as Bourguiba and his Neo-Destour party – decolonization, reform, and a modern state. However, she notes that Tunisian Islamists saw Bourguiba as "too culturally close to the West and too much assimilated by it." When the Islamist movement emerged in Tunisia in the 80's, Bourguiba was unprepared to deal with it.

How did Tunisia defeat the threat of militant Islamism before it could threaten the state? In 1987, President Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali, who was prime minister at the time, seized power from Bourguiba, who was declared senile. The new government under Ben Ali implemented a multi-faceted approach that combined security,

judicial, economic, and social action, and education and culture. They dismantled the Islamists' networks, cut off their sources of funding, took measures aimed at improving the poorer regions where terrorists could recruit followers, and reinforced the tenets of Bourguibism – tolerance, respect, and freedom.

During the 90's, Tunisia "made a pact" to redirect and unify the country under a workable, step-by-step strategy that included the adoption of democracy, intellectual and organizational pluralism, tolerance and respect, national solidarity, a commitment to its Arab identity, openness to other cultures, and its commitment to Islam as a source of pride and inspiration.

Today, Tunisia continues on the path to democratization. However, Geyer notes that it suffers setbacks with its record of human rights abuses, which has made it the target of criticism by such groups as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, and allegations that Tunisia's "free elections" are staged. (President Ben Ali won his second term with 99 percent of the vote in 1999 and his third term with 94.5 percent of the vote in October 2004.)

Tunisia is learning from its history and its mistakes. Tunisia understands the process of change as well as the importance of strategic thinking. Most importantly, Tunisia understands that democracy takes time and it is a model for how an Arab country "can modernize, not against the West, but with the West, while at the same time maintaining its own dignity and culture." □

ON TARGET:

A Scorecard of NSF Forecasting of Major Trends Made in 2001

For the Spring 2001 issue of the *National Strategy Forum Review*, the NSF asked friends and scholars to identify future major national security issues. The issues that we identified and their underlying rationale were on-target (see the matrix below). It is important to note that these forecasts were published three months before the September 11, 2001 catastrophic terrorism incidents.

The National Strategy Forum's niche is strategy – synthesizing complex issues and looking

over the horizon to what may lie ahead. The major issues identified in the spring 2001 *NSF Review* provided a framework for subsequent strategic thinking, articles published in the *NSF Review*, conferences, and our monthly lecture series.

It is important to note the two major issues we did not identify: diminution of the United Nation's political role and the tension between a unilateral and multilateral US foreign policy.

WORLD TRENDS	FORECASTS
Militant Islamist Terrorism (Ahmed Rashid)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Identified Militant Islamist Terrorism as a growing phenomenon and a threat to the Muslim World and the West. • Identified Militant Islamist Terrorism movements as organized, trained, motivated, and armed within non-democratic states. • Emphasized the need for a greater US awareness of Islam. • Islamic issues and debates and Muslim awareness of the benefits of democratization and economic development. • Emphasized the need for greater US diplomacy with Muslim countries.
State Failure (Larry Seaquist)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Highlighted the strategic importance of failed states, in particular, failed states in the Middle East, including Afghanistan. • Emphasized the capacity of failed states to fix themselves with assistance from the US.
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY	FORECASTS
Threats to US Security (R. James Woolsey)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Identified two types of threats the US would face in the early 21st century: rogue states (North Korea and WMD) and terrorism (Osama Bin Laden). • Emphasized the importance of homeland security, intelligence sharing, and peacekeeping.

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY	FORECASTS
Catastrophic Terrorism (John Allen Williams)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Emphasized that the US is vulnerable to terrorist attacks because of marginal governmental intelligence. Identified the lack of national preparedness for catastrophic terrorism and the need for contingency planning and the creation of the US Department of Homeland Security. Emphasized the importance of civil liberties and the legal risks posed by actions that might be required during a catastrophic terrorism incident.
Sanctions and Engagement (Meghan O' Sullivan)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Examined the use of conditional engagement (use of economic and political incentives to reform rogue states) and unconditional engagement (use of incentives to bolster non-state actors to foster cooperation with the US). Identified the pros of engagement instead of the use of sanctions.
US Military in the 21st Century (Sam C. Sarkesian)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Emphasized the need for a realistic national strategy to provide direction to the US military, increased ability to adapt to new challenges such as urban and guerilla warfare, and increased resources commitments.
National Missile Defense (Niall Michelsen)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Examined the future of the ABM treaty, predicting its termination, and the future of the US National Missile Defense system.
WORLD RELIGIONS AND MAJOR POWERS	FORECASTS
US Middle East Policy (Carl Rizowy and Neil Weiner)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Identified US interests in the Middle East (security, stability, and development, progress without turmoil, human rights, democracy, and rule of law). Emphasized the need for preventing dangerous regimes from obtaining WMD materials, demonstrating military presence, joint exercises, and diplomatic messages.
US and Western Europe (Matthew Foley)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Examined the relationship between the US and its Western European allies and tension with the European Union. Identified areas of conflict including US "hegemony" and Iraq. Identified areas of cooperation including trade, NATO, and democracy.
South Asia and Southeast Asia (Julie A. MacDonald)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Identified important developments in South and Southeast Asia, including the emergence of India as a key strategic player, the collapse of Indonesia as the region's anchor, and the tensions that could arise as a result, including China's response to India's growth. Emphasized the need for flexible and rapidly adaptable US strategies in these regions.
US-China Relationship (Bernard Cole)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Identified contentious issues such as trade, religion, military, diplomatic relations (susceptible to negotiations and peaceful resolutions), and Taiwan - the flashpoint for military conflict.
Russia and the Geopolitics of Eurasia (Jacob W. Kipp)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Emphasized the significance of Russia's role (led by Vladimir Putin) as a force for regional stability, a major nuclear player, and challenge to the US national defense system.
US and Japan (Adlai Stevenson)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Emphasized the soundness of the US-Japan relationship, despite a few trade disputes. Stressed that any conflict that could arise over Taiwan-China relations, the Korean Peninsula, or the Middle East could force Japan to make a choice between the US and East Asia.
Central and Eastern Europe (Richard Farkas)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Reinforced the need for a more clearly defined US strategy in the region, a greater commitment to states in Central and Eastern Europe, and unobtrusive US counsel to these regions including an emphasis on the defects of nationalism and economic stability.

RECENT SPEAKERS

On September 14, 2004, Nicholas Rostow, General Counsel and Senior Policy Advisor, U.S. Mission to the United Nations, addressed National Strategy Forum members on the role of the United Nations in counterterrorism.

Ambassador Rostow states that the threat of terrorism existed long before the world declared a “war on terror” and that the United Nations member countries face the same dilemma today that they faced decades ago – how to deal with terrorism. The old definitions that define terrorism do not address the magnitude of the contemporary challenges faced by the UN and other international organizations. Although the definition of terrorism differs by country, shared values exist as well as consensus regarding the gravity of the threat and the need for a multilateral approach.

Rostow rebuts the misconception that the UN is defunct. He asserts that the UN has an indispensable role to play in the war on terror and that the UN has made gradual progress since the September 11 terrorist attacks. For example, pursuant to resolution 1267 of the Security Council resolution, the UN established the Committee of the Security Council in 1999 to identify terrorist groups and track their financing resources. The Committee has recorded over 400 entities. The Committee’s functions were modified in January 2002 to include overseeing the implementation of multilateral sanctions against Osama Bin

Laden, Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and other affiliated groups or individuals.

In 2001 the UN adopted Resolution 1373, which requires UN member states to take a series of actions to combat terrorism, such as adopting laws and regulations and establishing administrative structures to prevent and suppress the financing of terrorist acts, to improve border controls, and to increase information sharing and law enforcement cooperation. Resolution 1373 established the Counterterrorism Committee (CTC) whose function is to oversee implementation of Resolution 1373 and to increase the capacity of Security Council member states to combat terrorism. The cooperation of states with the CTC has been encouraging. Rostow states that the next step for the Security Council and the CTC is to send agents to assess the progress of member states. In addition to 1373, the UN adopted resolutions 1368 and 1377, which confirm the right of self-defense and declare terrorism as the gravest threat to international peace and security.

Despite its progress, the UN faces critical infrastructural problems including its inflated bureaucracy, turf wars among its divisions, a conflict of interests among members regarding counterterrorism versus human rights, and, most important, an adverse perception of the US by UN member states “that permeates UN efforts”.

Rostow states effective counterterrorism requires the cooperation of other international or-

ganizations and the international community. Together, the US and the international community must establish a clear definition of terrorism.

Prior to his current position, Mr. Rostow served as Staff Director of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and Special Assistant to Presidents Reagan and George H.W. Bush and Legal Adviser to the National Security Council under National Security Advisers Colin Powell and Brent Scowcroft. □

On October 12, 2004, Enders Wimbush, Director of the Center for National Security Studies and Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute, addressed National Strategy Forum members on the security challenges posed by Asia and the role of the US in determining the shape of Asia over the next several decades.

Enders Wimbush states that the most vexing security challenges confronting the US are likely to emerge from Asia in the near future. Thus Asia, more than the Middle East, will compete for the attention of America's next administration.

According to Wimbush, the intersection of three vectors will determine the shape of "new Asia":

1. US resolve or lack thereof to play a key role in creating a new security architecture for Asia.

For most Asian strategists, the post-Iraq period has already begun. There is a deep anxiety concerning America's aversion to persistent

casualties, the cost of the war, the uncertainty of success in a largely unknown Islamic world, and the military overstretch in Iraq. As a result, Asian strategists are developing hedging strategies to compensate for a lessening of US commitment in Asia.

2. The process of managing an economically robust and dynamic China

How should Asia think about a robust China in the context of America's uncertain commitment to traditional Asian interests? China is dynamic and it is sucking everything into its regional economic vortex. Today China is the largest trading partner of most major American states as well as US allies including Japan, South Korea, and Australia. The counterweight for offsetting China's economic power has traditionally been US presence in the region, which enables them to make choices China might not otherwise approve. Despite growing insecurity regarding China's economy, China does have a positive role to play in curbing instability in the region. Wimbush states that the US will have to "pull China in" to deal with this issue.

3. The deterioration of the security environment stretching from the southern Philippines to the Persian Gulf in the Archipelagos

The problem is manifold — Indonesia's persistent instability, the looming radicalization of Malaysia, and the revolutionary turmoil and terrorist activity in the southern Philippines. All pose a threat to next-door neighbors, including Australia and Singapore. Another challenge is the region's rampant Islamist militancy that has been fed by Saudi contributions through grass-

RECENT SPEAKERS

roots schools, mosques, hospitals, and madrasas. Wimbush states that Islamist militancy is stimulated and stirred by large numbers of militants and terrorists from the Arab world, Pakistan, and elsewhere. Indonesia is the world's largest Muslim state and it is important to remember that most of the world's Muslims live in this region.

Another factor that will shape Asia's new landscape is the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Wimbush states, "It would be foolhardy to ignore the possibility that the Asian security landscape contains the seeds of a serious, rapid, and interactive breakdown of the traditional constraints on proliferation of WMD." The proliferation of WMD is a persistent and growing fear for Asians that will require new preventative strategies. It is likely that more state and non-state actors will gain nuclear capabilities.

According to Wimbush, WMD proliferation throughout Asia is likely to have two origins: first, the failure of Asian states to impede - and, in fact, sometimes facilitate - the proliferation of nuclear material and technology. North Korea and Iran are harbingers of a trend that will be difficult to stop and will require different kinds of strategies. The second source of proliferation will occur if any Asian states join "the nuclear club." This will set off a cascade of others. For Asians, the prospect of a nuclear Japan is particularly alarming. Should Japan become threatened economically by China, it might see nuclear weapons as a hedge against excessive Chinese influence. Wimbush asserts that this is not a theoretical discussion and that Asian strategists are developing hedging strategies to anticipate a

nuclear Japan. Strategists fear that lesser powers, including Indonesia and Malaysia, will "go nuclear" also. The US and Asia are examining the context of those who seek to acquire nuclear capabilities: What are the objectives of those that seek to acquire nuclear weapons? What are their belief and behavioral structures? What is the deterrent value of their nuclear weapons? Is a common policy on nuclear containment or non-proliferation useful?

Wimbush states that another key issue will be energy security, a very powerful driver of most Asian strategies. Energy demand from Asia will account for up to eighty percent of worldwide growth and oil consumption and will surpass North American oil demand in 2020. Most of the increased demand will come from China and India. Where will this oil production come from? The majority of Asian oil imports will have to come from the Middle East, from which thirty percent of the world derives its oil.

Concerning the issue of China and Taiwan, Wimbush questions whether there is an accommodation that would appease both states and how the US can facilitate or mediate a resolution. He notes that one option is trilateral talks among the US, China, and Taiwan.

With regard to North Korea, Wimbush asserts that bilateral and six-party talks are viable options. It is important that China be included in talks because it is adjacent to North Korea. There is a need for clear objectives. The same considerations apply to Iran - what are the strategic objectives? Can these objectives be achieved without military intervention?

Prior to his current position, Enders Wimbush spent 10 years in the private sector with Booz

Allen Hamilton and Science Applications International Corporation analyzing future security environments for both government and corporate clients. □

On September 20, 2004, Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul, addressed National Strategy Forum members on the US-Turkey strategic partnership and the role of Turkey in Iraq.

Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul states that the US and Turkey share a common interest in rebuilding a free, prosperous, and stable Iraq and that Turkey, despite criticism from skeptics, fully supports US efforts in Iraq. He notes that it is important to Turkey that the political and territorial integrity of Iraq be protected. “If there is a fire in your neighborhood, you feel the heat, and we feel the heat.”

Foreign Minister Gul states that Turkey has assisted the US in meeting its logistical needs in Iraq (for example, three thousand trucks carry goods such as gasoline and water from Turkey to Iraq each day), but that Turkey and the US need to have greater cooperation, consultation and coordination concerning Iraq.

Turkey is concerned about northern Iraq, particularly the oil-rich city of Kirkuk that is home to Arabs, Kurds, and Turkmens, and the possible establishment of a Kurdish state. Turkey fears that an Iraqi Kurdish rebellion could incite a similar response among Kurds who reside in adjoining southeast Turkey. Gul states that “Kirkuk is a small Iraq,” and “any artificial attempts to change the democratic structures there will create enormous problems.”

Gul emphasized that Turkey is committed to the war on terror and he acknowledged that international cooperation is vital to success.

With regard to Turkey’s pending European Union (EU) membership, Gul states that such a decision would be proof that Islam and democracy are compatible. Over the past two years, Turkey has upgraded its democratic structure through a series of reforms including increased human rights standards as well as economic reforms. Turkey’s EU membership will also enhance the US-Turkey strategic partnership and the Transatlantic Alliance.

Gul states that Turkey wants to find a lasting solution to the Cyprus issue, but that the Greek Cypriots have obstructed Turkey’s peace initiatives. Gul is optimistic that increased dialogue between Turkey and Greece will result in a resolution.

Replying to a question on Israel and Palestine, Gul said that it is important to encourage reforms and positive change in the broader Middle East (for example, the Group of Eight, G8, statement on Gaza withdrawal) and that it is crucial to keep open minds and be realistic about possible outcomes.

Prior to his current position, Foreign Minister Gul served as Prime Minister of Turkey (November 2002 – March 2003). He is a founding Member of the Justice and Development Party (AK Party). □

STRATEGY WATCH

*A summary of recent events
August 2004—November 2004*


Africa


In mid-August, 150 peacekeepers from the African Union arrive in Darfur, **Sudan**. The UN gives the Sudanese government two weeks to demonstrate that it is trying to quell the Arab militias that have driven 1.2 million black Sudanese from their homes. In late August British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw visits Darfur and reports that there are signs of progress (for example, more increased humanitarian access and security within refugee camps), but that more needs to be done in Sudan. In early September the UN Security Council concludes that the Sudanese government failed to disarm Arab militias or stop attacks on civilians. In late October the International Committee of the Red Cross declares that Darfur faces an “unprecedented food shortage.” **Burundi** threatens to send troops into the Congo to suppress Hutu militias following the massacre of 160 Congolese Tutsi refugees. In late August the chief Tutsi-led political party pulls out of the Congolese government inciting fear that the country will once again erupt in civil war. The US lifts sanctions against **Libya** allowing it access to \$1.3 billion in frozen funds and the removal of blocks on trade and investment. In mid-October the European Union (EU) foreign ministers agree to lift the arms embargo on Libya. Wangari Maathai, a **Kenyan** environmental and human-rights activist, is the first African woman to win the Nobel Peace prize. Subsequently, she stated that AIDS is a virus created by “evil-

minded” scientists to kill blacks. Amnesty International reports that at least 40,000 women have been raped in the past six years in **Congo**, mostly by combatants, and that the victims receive insufficient medical help.

Asia

In mid-August Maoist rebels announce a blockade of **Nepal’s** capital, Katmandu. The blockade lasts one week. In late September staff at the United States embassy in Nepal are withdrawn after bomb attacks on American targets in Katmandu. In **India** a bomb kills eighteen people on India’s Independence Day in the north-eastern state of Assam. **Pakistan** sets a \$1 million reward for information leading to the capture of six “most wanted” Al Qaeda terrorists. In **Bangladesh** protests over the attempted assassination of the country’s opposition leader Sheikh Hasina paralyze much of the country. **South Korea** reveals that its scientists secretly enriched a small amount of plutonium in 1982 and uranium in 2000. Following the admission, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) sends inspectors to South Korea twice. Jiang Zemin resigns as chief of **China’s** armed forces; his chosen successor, Hu Jintao, president and general secretary of the Communist Party, will take over his post. **Ma-**





US Secretary of State
Colin Powell submits his
resignation.

The United Nations
mission in Sudan states
that the Darfur region
remains unstable.

Russian President Putin an-
nounces he will appoint rather
than elect regional governors
and that he wants to strengthen
party control over parliament.

Peru suspends the first public trial of Shining
Path rebel leader Abinaiel Guzman as the
second of the three judges presiding over the
case stepped down citing a conflict of interest.

STRATEGY WATCH

laysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines reject Australia's plans to create six new Australian Federal anti-terrorism police squads. **Taiwan's** prime minister states that it might acquire missiles to counter a growing threat from China. In mid-October Taiwanese President Chen Shui-ban calls for direct talks with China, which are rejected by the mainland. In early October Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono is formally declared president of **Indonesia**. In late October Abu Bakar Basyir, a radical Islamic cleric, goes on trial in Indonesia in connection with the Bali bombing of 2002. **Pakistani** President Pervez Musharraf proposes that Kashmir possibly become a condominium with India - a divergent proposal from Pakistan's traditional position that Kashmiris should vote to accede to one country or the other.

Caucasus

In early September thirty-three pro-Chechen militants lay siege to a school in Beslan in the Russian province of North **Ossetia**. More than three hundred children and adults are killed. Russian President Vladimir Putin blames the government of Georgia for the increased fighting in South Ossetia, but states that Russia will do what is necessary to restore Georgia's territorial integrity and announces far-reaching measures to strengthen Russia's power to fight terrorism. Georgia's separatist **Abkhazia** region will hold elections after the highly disputed October 3

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presidential elections; Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili denounced the election as illegitimate.

Europe

In mid-September **Russian** President Putin announces he will appoint rather than elect regional governors and that he wants to strengthen party control over parliament. This ignites concern in Europe and the US over Russia's increased authoritarianism.

Eight **British** men are arrested in anti-terrorism raids in early August. Two are charged with conspiracy to murder and plotting to use explosives, chemicals, and radioactive materials. **German** protesters take to the streets in protest of welfare cuts. In early September the UN tribunal in the Hague appoints a lawyer and to defend former **Yugoslav** president Slobodan Milosevic for his war-crimes. Milosevic is accused of ordering the 1995 massacre of 7,000 Muslims in Srebreniza. After months of delays because of Milosevic's ill health, the trial resumes in mid-October. In early October the **EU** recommends opening negotiations on **Turkey's** accession to the EU. A final decision will be made in December 2004. In **Belarus** a referendum and parliamentary elections are condemned as fraudulent after Alexander Lukashenka wins approval to disregard constitutional term limits. In late October the Turkish-Cypriot government of northern **Cyprus** resigns.

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Elections are expected within the upcoming weeks. **Greece** makes a formal diplomatic protest to Turkey over alleged violation of its air space.

Latin America

Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez wins nearly sixty percent of the vote in a recall referendum. Opponents allege that the electronic voting machines were manipulated. A sample audit by foreign election observers disproves their allegations. In mid-September, Venezuela announces that it is establishing state-owned telecom firms to compete with two privatized companies – Verizon (US) and Telefonica (Spain).

The **Israeli** Knesset (parliament) approves Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's plan to withdraw from the Gaza Strip and parts of the West.

Colombia's government changes its policy on exchanges of captives and offers to release 50 FARC rebels in exchange for 72 hostages, including three American contract employees of the US Department of State. FARC rebels reject the offer. In southern Colombia, some 40,000 Indians protest violence against their communities and the Colombian government's security policies. In **Panama**, Martin Torrijos, the son of former dictator and national hero, is inaugurated as president. He seeks to re-establish diplomatic relations with **Cuba**, which broke down after his predecessor pardoned four Cuban exiles charged with assassination attempts on Cuban president Fidel Castro in 2000. In late October Cuban President Fidel Castro announces that after No-

vember 8, 2004, the dollar will no longer be accepted in Cuba and that there will be a 10 percent commission for converting dollars to pesos.

Middle East

In late August the Grand Ayatollah Sistani, Iraq's most senior cleric, leads a convoy of supporters to Najaf, **Iraq** hoping to end the siege of the Imam Ali mosque led by Muqtada al-Sadr, the rebellious Shia cleric, and his militia. In early September the offices of Ayatollah Sistani organize a truce between the Iraqi interim government and Muqtada al-Sadr. In late September Militant Islamist terrorists led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian with links to Al-Qaeda, behead two American contractors and a British captive in Iraq. In mid-October al-Sadr's militias begin to hand over their arms to the Iraqi police. Militant Islamist terrorists in Iraq execute twelve Nepalese hostages who were working as

In **Afghanistan** three Americans are charged with waging freelance war on terror, which involved running a private prison, kidnapping, and torture.

cooks and cleaners. In late October a massacre of 48 recruits of the Iraqi National Guard by terrorists posing as police officers raises fears that rebels had effectively infiltrated the country's new security forces. In November some forty-one people are killed by car bombs in Baghdad. United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan advises **Israel** to drop plans to expand its West Bank settlements. In late October the Israeli Knesset (parliament) approves Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's plan to withdraw from the Gaza Strip and parts of the West Bank. **Turkey** aban-

STRATEGY WATCH

dons its plans to criminalize adultery as part of a new penal code after strong protest from the EU. In **Afghanistan** three Americans are charged with waging freelance war on terror, which involved running a private prison, kidnapping, and torture. In late October Hamid Karzai wins Afghanistan's first presidential election. **Iran** declares that it has successfully test-fired a long-range "strategic missile" and that it is now prepared to deal with any regional threats and even the "big powers." According to weapons and intelligence analysts, Iran's new missiles can reach London, Paris, Berlin and southern Russia. France, Germany, and Britain begin drafting a resolution for Iran in preparation for a meeting with the UN. **Palestinian** Leader Yasser Arafat dies at a hospital in Paris. Former Palestinian Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas is elected chief of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO).

North America

In mid-August President Bush announces that 70,000 troops, nearly one-third of the US overseas fighting force, will return home gradually. In late August military tribunal hearings begin for the terrorist suspects held at Guantanamo Bay. In early September Lawrence Franklin, a mid-level official from the US Department of Defense, is under investigation by the FBI for allegedly sharing classified documents with Israel, including a draft National Security Presidential Directive that outlines a more aggressive U.S. national security strategy regarding Iran. A US-commissioned report finds no evidence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, but concludes that there is considerable evidence

that Saddam Hussein intended to resume production when sanctions were lifted. In early November, President Bush is re-elected for a second-term. US Secretary of State Colin Powell submits his resignation. President Bush nominates National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice as his successor.

NATIONAL STRATEGY FORUM HIGHLIGHTS

2003-2004

Recent Speakers:

- ✦ *Stewart Baker*, General Counsel, Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the US Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction and former General Counsel of the National Security Agency (NSA), discussed bioterrorism and how the US intelligence community can deter a WMD attack.
- ✦ *Enders Wimbush*, Director of the Center for National Security Studies and Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute, discussed the security challenges posed by Asia and the role of the US in determining the shape of Asia over the next several decades.
- ✦ *Abdullah Gul*, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Turkey, and *Faruk Logoglu*, Turkish Ambassador to the United States, addressed the Turkey/US relationship in light of the war in Iraq and Turkey's desire to join the EU.
- ✦ *Nicholas Rostow*, General Counsel and Senior Adviser, US Mission to the United Nations, spoke about the UN's efforts to combat terrorism, namely through the UN's Counterterrorism Committee.
- ✦ *Margaret Tutwiler*, US Department of State Assistant Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, spoke on the subject of the new direction of US public diplomacy.
- ✦ *Dr. Mehmet Aydin*, Turkish Minister of State, addressed the compatibility of democracy and Islam.
- ✦ *General Joseph Ralston*, former Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), spoke about the changing role of NATO and its current security challenges.
- ✦ *Steven A. Emerson*, founder of the Investigative Project, a group dedicated to the research of radical militant Islamist groups.
- ✦ *Joel F. Brenner*, Inspector General, National Security Agency, spoke about the history of the agency, its responsibilities, and its challenges.
- ✦ *Colonel William Smullen*, former Chief of Staff for Secretary of State Colin Powell, spoke on the formulation of US foreign policy -- a calculus of power for America.

Conferences:

- ✦ *The Role of the Military in Securing the Homeland*, Cantigny Conference Series sponsored by the McCormick Tribune Foundation
- ✦ *Counterterrorism Technology and Privacy*, Cantigny Conference Series sponsored by the McCormick Tribune Foundation
- ✦ *Schools: Prudent Preparation for a Catastrophic Terrorism Incident*, sponsored by the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation

National Strategy Forum Review:

- ✦ *Strategic Outlook 2005-2009*, Winter 2004
- ✦ *Latin America: Why is it Important?*, Fall 2004
- ✦ *The Future of the Transatlantic Alliance*, Summer 2004
- ✦ *US Strategy in the Islamic World*, Winter 2003
- ✦ *US Foreign Policy – A Search for a Common Purpose*, Spring 2004
- ✦ *Multilateral Approaches to Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and International Terrorism*, Fall 2003

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