Book Review: Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA, By Tim Weiner

Doubleday, 702 Pages, $27.95

Reviewed by Arthur I. Cyr

The book’s title derives from President Dwight D. Eisenhower, expressing frustration near the end of his administration. Vexed by seemingly insoluble problems of effective intelligence, especially regarding surprise attack, and the complacency of his CIA director and others, the President at the last meeting of his National Security Council complained that he was leaving the people “a legacy of ashes”.

Tim Weiner provides detailed history of the Central Intelligence Agency since the Second World War. There are insights concerning both successes and failures, especially during the long struggle of the Cold War. However, full evaluation of this study requires reading between the lines.

Weiner is an investigative reporter, and his work reflects relentless pursuit of details along with often perceptive description of personalities. Specific historical information is too often lacking in discussion of American foreign policy, including in regard to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the more general conflict with al Qaeda. Weiner’s treatment is therefore particularly welcome.

Yet he goes too far in concluding that the CIA represents a study in failure. That is unfair, even by the evidence in his book, and reflects too simplistic a distillation of the wealth of useful information he has collected.

Eisenhower’s statement about ashes directly reflected unhappiness with very senior colleagues. Weiner, attentive to personalities, highlights the roles of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and CIA Director Allen Dulles during those years, noting that near the end both increasingly were showing the afflictions of age. In the case of John Foster, fatal cancer added a distinctive burden to his final two years at the State Department. In the case of Allen, the President privately expressed keen awareness of his complacency and other shortcomings, but stated he knew of no truly promising replacement.

Yet overall the Eisenhower intelligence record is comparatively quite successful, reflected in his steadily growing reputation among historians and other scholars. During years of very intense Cold War conflict, the United States government was generally effective in avoiding major foreign policy reversals, maintaining international stability and protecting national interests.

There was constant tension with the Soviet Union, China and their allies, and a number of crises, but no major disasters. Strategic reversals were limited to the ascension of Fidel Castro’s communist regime in Cuba. Devastated South Korea was given comprehensive aid, laying the foundation for later enormous political as well as economic success. The wisdom of economic development as a counter to communism was reflected in policies toward the European Economic Community, Japan and other parts of the globe.

The Eisenhower White House demonstrated constant attention to detail, appreciation of the enormous difficulty of securing accurate information, and ruthless dedication to success of operations. The President was keenly aware of the challenges in both human and technological intelligence. Covert operations in Guatemala and elsewhere were undertaken with the assumption that risk of failure was high. There was realistic understanding that such projects are inherently ugly; close CIA-Mafia cooperation began during these years. Technological tools were constantly emphasized. The U-2 spy plane, a direct Eisenhower initiative, provides dramatic – and important – evidence for this point.

While teaching at Harvard University, Henry Kissinger sponsored a defense studies seminar that featured Washington officials and other notables, including prominent academics. Students were given exposure to a remarkable range of personalities, opinions and expertise.

Visiting speakers included Professor Eugene Skolnikoff of MIT, an expert on science policy who had worked in the Eisenhower White House. When a graduate student made a disparaging reference to Ike, Skolnikoff cut him off, noting that President was always thorough, effective in probing personalities as well as substantive reports, able to absorb rapidly very large amounts of information. In contrast to most politicians, Eisenhower was a superb executive. To aid any particularly obtuse academics in the room, Skolnikoff underlined that public appearances were not necessarily reality, especially in Washington politics.

While Weiner is highly critical of the overall performance of the CIA, he does acknowledge public successes. During the Vietnam War, the agency was consistently effective in gathering useful information, perceptive and subtle in analysis, and far sighted in seeing fundamental long-term difficulties for the American position.

Because the CIA was so critical, Vietnam commander Gen. William Westmoreland and his staff walled off the agency from military intelligence. One important consequence was action by Congress late in the war to force cooperation. Short of the total struggle and total commitment of the Second World War, bureaucratic politics and turf protection came to the fore in the intelligence realm as it has in other fields.

Weiner is positive about CIA Directors Richard Helms during the Vietnam years, and also Robert Gates later as the Soviet Union was collapsing. Likewise, he provides persuasive evidence the CIA was providing strident warnings about impending terrorist attack to an indifferent Bush White House just before 9/11.

Related to this, his discussion of Bush administration focus on finding justification for a preconceived invasion of Iraq is truly disturbing. In addition to criticizing Vice President Richard Cheney and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, Weiner highlights the ill-fated brief tenure of Porter Goss as intelligence czar under President George W. Bush. Goss greatly politicized the agency and drove out many qualified professionals.

Eisenhower’s legacy of ashes statement provides striking imagery, and in retrospect no little irony. A related book with a notable title, rich in Cold War history, is “The Color of Truth” by Kai Bird (Simon & Schuster, 1998). He also wrote “The Chairman”, an esteemed biography of John McCloy, the very influential American foreign policy figure.

“The Color of Truth” deals with the careers of two other U.S. foreign policy leaders, McGeorge and William Bundy, especially during the Vietnam era. “The color of truth is gray”, the inspiration for the title, was a statement by McGeorge Bundy, addressing the generally ambiguous realm of national security intelligence. Weiner glosses over this fundamental fact about espionage in his harsh overall evaluation of the CIA.

Arguably a democracy has some decisive strengths vis-à-vis dictatorships in the vexing intelligence realm, including lack of ideological commitment to uniformity or automatic deference to central authority. This in turn encourages realism and – ideally – imagination, two assets for any intelligence operative. Nearly two centuries ago, the French observer of political development and friend of American democracy Alexis de Tocqueville insightfully described these inherent strengths. Generally, the performance of Allied intelligence during the Second World War confirms this proposition.

Over the decades the CIA has demonstrated strengths and weaknesses, important successes as well as failures. The next President will have the opportunity as well as challenge to improve U.S. intelligence. For that purpose, this book provides useful history, but not balanced evaluation. The author is critical of the CIA to a degree that goes beyond the evidence, context and mission. The study should definitely be read, but not in isolation.

Arthur I. Cyr is Clausen Distinguished Professor and Director of the Clausen Center for World Business at Carthage College in Kenosha, Wisconsin.