The Demographic Challenges of the US Army
By Lawrence Korb and Sean E. Duggan

In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee in March of 2005, Army Vice Chief of Staff, General Richard Cody, told lawmakers "what keeps me awake at night is what this all-volunteer force will look like in 2007…I think it ought to keep all of you awake."¹ What worried General Cody in the spring of 2005 was maintaining the quality and standards of an all-volunteer Army with soldiers returning from their second and third tours in Iraq and Afghanistan since September 11. What General Cody did not envision in the spring of 2005 was that by December of this year, 13 of the Army’s 43 combat brigades would be serving their third tour and 5 would be serving their fourth tour in a combat zone since September 11. His boss, the Army Chief of Staff General George Casey, put it correctly on August 30, 2007 when he said, "the tempo of our deployments are not sustainable." ²

The frequency and duration of deployments of U.S. servicemen and woman to Iraq and Afghanistan has put an incredible strain on the All-Volunteer Force (AVF). Through December of 2006, over 1.4 million active and reserve troops have been deployed.³ In order to maintain force levels in both Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army has struggled to both recruit significant numbers of volunteers and retain the right service members with critical skills returning from deployments in the midst of an increasingly unpopular war. As a result, with the Iraq war well into its fifth year and the war in Afghanistan approaching its seventh, the quality and excellence of the U.S. Army is under siege.

Before a more in depth discussion of the looming trends threatening the capability and effectiveness of the Army, it is important to note that except for the total Army (both active and reserve components), the current manpower situation of the four armed services is in good shape. The Navy and Air Force, which are not involved in large numbers in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, are actually forcing people to leave because fewer personnel are needed to operate their new high-tech weapons. The Marine Corps, which currently furnishes about 10 percent of the force in Iraq, is only one-fifth the size of the Army and has been able to maintain its quality standards up to now. Consequently, this report will focus on the total Army and the challenges it faces.

The Army’s ability to meet force requirements in Iraq and Afghanistan depends in large part on the service’s ability to attract new volunteers. Recruitment became a significant concern in 2005 when the Army missed its recruitment goal by 8 percent, failing to reach its target by the largest margin since 1979.⁴ Perhaps what is most disturbing about this trend is the enormous effort the Army was already exerting in order to meet the 2005 goal. According to Peter Singer of the Brookings Institution, "the Army added 1300 new recruiters and raised the recruiting budget five times what it had been previously. And yet they were still making that miss in ‘05."⁵

These numbers have continued increasing in the years since, as the Army scrambles to recruit more troops in one of the most difficult recruiting environments in the history of the all-volunteer force. In 2006, the Army spent $353 million on enlistment bonuses, $583 million on recruiting and advertising, and another $700 million on pay and benefits for recruiters.⁶ In order to meet Army recruitment goals, this unprecedented spending spree has been extended into 2007.

After failing to meet its recruitment targets in both May and June of this year—and behind in its FY2007 recruiting goals—the Army began offering a $20,000 "Q.S." enlistment bonus in August. The "Q.S.," or "Quick Ship" bonus, requires that the signee ship out to basic training within 30 days of signing; meaning that a new recruit can be on the ground, in a combat situation in as little as three to four months, depending on what additional training is required for a soldier’s particular job specialization. Army officials acknowledge that the "Q.S" bonus played a large part in their success at meeting their July goal after the two month slump.⁷ In fact, 92 percent of the 4,149 recruits who signed contracts between July 25 and August 13 were "Q.S." signees.⁸

One of the reasons these enormous bonuses have become necessary is the declining perceptions of what the Army labels "influencers": mothers, fathers, teachers, sports coaches and the like who hold a great deal of sway over young persons considering joining the service. According to Army statistics, these influencers are increasingly discouraging the young people around them from joining the Army. Major General Thomas Bostick, the head of U.S. Army recruiting, has acknowledged that the willingness of mothers to encourage their children to join the Army has decreased from 40 percent in March of 2004 to 25 percent now, while the willingness of fathers has dropped from 50 percent to 33 percent over the same period.⁹

Even more troubling for the long-term readiness of the force is the fact that the Army has relaxed the standards for those who it allows in. Although the Army has prided itself on its achievement of its 2006 recruitment goals, upon closer inspection, this self congratulation is not warranted. In 2006, the Army raised its maximum age for enlistment twice, first from 35 to 40 and then from 40 to 42 while it shortened the enlistment period for some recruits from four years to 15 months.¹⁰ That same year, the proportion of new Army recruits with high school diplomas dropped to 87 percent in 2005 and 81 percent in 2006—the lowest levels in at least 20 years.¹¹ Further, in the last three years, the amount of recruits who scored in the lowest category, Category 4, has gone up six fold.¹² In 2006, the Army even recruited an 18 year-old autistic man to be a cavalry scout - one of the Army’s more dangerous assignments.¹³

To further expand its diminishing pool of recruits, the Army has allowed recruits with criminal backgrounds to enlist at an alarming rate. Such offenders have been allowed to enlist after committing crimes such as aggravated assault, robbery, and vehicular homicide. According to the Department of Defense, their numbers have risen about 65 percent in the last three years alone, increasing to 8,129 in 2006 from 4,918 in 2003.¹⁴ Shockingly, the number of these moral waivers given in 2006 is more than triple the some 2,260 granted only a decade ago.¹⁵

These moral waivers have even been extended to recruits with felony convictions. In 2006, felons allowed to enter the Army increased to 11 percent of the 8,129 moral waivers granted that year, from 8 percent in 2005.¹⁶ As of September 1st of this year, more than 9,000 recruits have received moral waivers to join the service. That’s 11 percent of all new enlistees in FY2007, which ends Sept. 30.¹⁷ That Steven Green, the Army private who is alleged to have raped and killed a 14-year-old Iraqi girl and her family, was allowed to enlist in the Army even though he was a high-school drop out with three criminal convictions is a testament to the perils of continuing on this course.

Michael Dominguez, principal deputy undersecretary of defense for personnel and readiness, recently stated that "the numbers of people who meet our enlistment standards is astonishingly low."¹⁸ As long as the nation continues this war of choice in Iraq, meeting recruiting targets will remain challenging, but that is no reason to lower the standards of the force.

In the wake of the Vietnam War, the Army became a "hollow force," lacking the resources (in terms of training and equipment) and ready personnel to provide sufficient forces to support ongoing missions while modernizing. While today’s Army is not near the nadir of this era three decades ago, there are a number of factors that point to an accession crisis that threatens the quality of the current officer corps and that of the near future. If not properly addressed, the Army will continue to face a severe officer shortage in both numbers and quality.

The Congressional Research Service has noted that Army projections show its officer shortage—which will be approximately 3,000 line officers in FY 2007—will grow to about 3,700 officers in FY 2008, and will continue at an annual level of 3,000 or more through FY 2013.¹⁹ This FY 2008 shortage will include 364 lieutenant colonels, 2,554 majors, and 798 captains who entered in FYs 1991 through 2002.²⁰ In response, the Army has begun promoting junior officers at record levels by reducing the promotion time to the rank of captain (O-3) from the historical average of 42 months from commissioning to the current average of 38 months. The promotion time from Captain to Major has also been reduced from 11 years to 10 years while 97 percent of eligible Captains have been promoted to Major as compared to the desirable rate of 80 percent. At the same time, 98 percent of first Lieutenants have been promoted, as opposed to the regular 90 percent. Meanwhile, the Guard and Reserve confront a corresponding shortfall of a staggering 7,500 officers.²¹

To combat the officer shortfall, the Army has begun paying heavy sums in order to retain crucial officers. Called a Critical Skills Retention Bonus, the incentive is similar to the bonuses available to senior non-commissioned officers and warrant officers in high priority specialties and career fields. These bonuses can range from $40,000 to $150,000, depending on one’s military occupational specialty (MOS) and length of service extension.²²

Behind this shortage of mid-level officers lies a corresponding shortage of entry-level officers from the U.S. Military Academy and university Reserve Officers’ Training Corps programs (ROTC). In order to meet the current ROTC goal, Army officials acknowledge that they need at least 31,000 participants in the program, but in FY 2006 only 25,100 had enrolled.²³

This trend also continues at the Army’s premier academy, West Point. According to statistics compiled by the academy, of the 903 Army officers commissioned upon graduation in 2001, nearly 46 percent left the service last year -- 35 percent at the conclusion of their five years of required service, and another 11 percent over the next six months. Further, more than 54 percent of the 935 graduates in the class of 2000 had left active duty by this January, the statistics show. These figures mark the lowest retention rate of graduates after the completion of their mandatory duty since at least 1977.²⁴

In 2003, when the class of 1998 faced the decision to either stay on in the force or to leave, only 18 percent quit the force. With the war in Afghanistan going well at the time and without the heavy toll of the Iraq war, a much higher rate of cadets chose to remain in the Army. Interviews with former West Point superintendents, graduates, and retired officers point to the wear and tear on officers and their families from multiple deployments in Iraq as the key reason why these officers are leaving in such large numbers. "Iraq is exerting very strong influence on the career intentions of junior officers," said retired Lieutenant General Daniel Christman, a former superintendent of West Point.²⁵

To be sure, high retention rates will be inextricably linked to more predictable deployment schedules—and not only among officers. Last spring, however, the Pentagon extended deployments of troops in Iraq to 15 months and announced that soldiers would get no more than a mere 12 months at home, breaking with its former policy of no more than one year deployed for ever two years at home for active duty troops. Presently, this rotation rate is inadequate for sustaining substantial retention rates in the future because it breaks the social contract with our troops.

This conflict, which the administration deems "the long war," requires that the nation deploy knowledgeable, veteran soldiers and marines to combat increasingly experienced and determined enemies. Without high retention rates, this is impossible.

Retention, but at what cost?

In the interim, a series of stop-loss measures have been implemented to keep the numbers up. Stop-Loss, a policy that requires service members to remain in the military beyond their contract separation date (sometimes as long as two years), has affected some 70,000 enlisted soldiers. Further, the Army has also begun pulling back former active duty or reserve personnel from the Individual Ready Reserves, about 15,000 since 9/11. According to retired General Barry McCaffrey the military has also started "jerking" some 20,000 "sailors and airmen into ground combat roles and taken them away from their required air and sea power duties" to meet the requirements of the Army.²⁶

The Army has also reduced the amount of basic-training drop-out rates in order to keep troop levels up. In the first six months of 2006 only 8 percent of recruits failed out of basic training, down from 18 percent in May of 2005. Given the lower quality of recruits noted above, the fact that more seem to be graduating basic training seems to be counterintuitive. So why is this happening? The likely answer is that the Army has been forced to make a difficult trade-off: sending less than the best qualified troops into the field or less troops altogether. Given force requirements in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army has chosen the former.

In fact, anecdotal evidence seems to confirm this contention. Sergeant 1st Class Chuck Nye of Fort Jackson, South Carolina, argues that not enough recruits are being kicked out. He believes that there is pressure to keep recruits in the ranks. The Army, he says, is desperate. "There are some units where you’re not going to kick anybody out, I know that for a fact, right here on Fort Jackson. Or if you do its going to be really hard, the guys way up high, they’re never going to hear them tell them that."²⁷

The toll of the war in Iraq has created ripple effects throughout the entire Army. As recruiting standards loosen and waivers and bonuses increase, the potential for misrepresentation and abuse will undoubtedly increase. Still, reinstituting conscription does not seem to be a politically viable option at the present time. But, as the ground forces attempt to expand by nearly 100,000 troops in the coming years, our civilian and military leaders must ensure that it does not sacrifice its quality standards. It is better to have a smaller, higher quality Army than a larger, lower quality force. If we cannot get sufficient numbers of the right people on a volunteer basis, as Lt. General Lute, President Bush’s war czar noted, returning to the draft will have to be considered. •

Lawrence J. Korb is a Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress and a Senior Advisor to the Center for Defense Information. Sean E. Duggan is a Special Assistant to the National Security team at the Center for American Progress.

Footnotes

[1] Anderson, Jon, “Army Vice Chief of Staff Cody Worried About Future of All-Volunteer Miltiary,” Stars and Stripes, March 19, 2005.

[2] Barnes, Julian, “Mixed Marks for Iraqi Security Forces,” Los Angeles Times, August 31, 2007.

[3] Congressional Budget Office, “The All Volunteer Military: Issues and Performance,” July 2007, P. I

[4] “Army’s Recruiting Lowest In Years,” Associated Press, September 30, 2005.

[5]Singer, Peter, “The State of the Military Today,” Brookings Institution, http://www3.brookings.edu/comm/events/20070629.pdf

[6] Hefling, Kimberly, “Army Looks to Expand Incentives,” Associated Press, August 9, 2007.

[7] Shanker, Tom, “Army, Shedding a Slump, Met July Recruiting Goal,” New York Times, August 11, 2007.

[8] White, Josh, “Many Take Army’s ‘Quick Ship’ Bonus,” Washington Post, August 27, 2007.

[9] Donna Miles, “New Initiatives Raise Hopes for Army to Reach Recruiting Goals, Defenselink, September 4, 2007.

[10]Moskos, Charles, “Saving the All-Volunteer Force,” U.S. Army Website, http://www.army.mil/professionalwriting/volumes/volume3/september_2005/9_05_2.html

[11] Congressional Budget Office, “The All-Volunteer Military: Issues and Performance,” July 2007, P 15.

[12] Singer, Peter, “The State of the Military Today,” Brookings Institution, http://www3.brookings.edu/comm/events/20070629.pdf

[13] Martinez, Luis, “Army Recruitment of Autistic Teen Raises Questions,” ABC News, May 12, 2006.

[14] http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/14/us/14military.html?ex=1329109200&en=06c953182b1c51bb&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss

[15] Alvarez, Lizette, “Army Giving More Waivers in Recruiting,” New York Times, February 14, 2007.

[16] Ibid

[17] Tan, Michelle, “Gang Activity on the Rise in the Ranks,” Army Times, August 31, 2007.

[18] Wood, Sara, “Army Boosts Enlistment Bonuses,” Defenselink, August 2, 2007.

[19] Government Accountability Office, “Military Personnel: Strategic Plan Needed to Address Army’s Emerging Officer Accession and Retention Challenges,” January, 2007, P. 27.

[20] Ibid. P. 27

[22] Ibid. P 27

[23] Tice, Jim, “Captains Could Soon Get $20K Retention Bonus,” Army Times, April 23, 2007.

[24] Government Accountability Office, “Military Personnel: Strategic Plan Needed to Address Army’s Emerging Officer Accession and Retention Challenges,” January, 2007, P. 6.

[25] Bender, Bryan, “West Point Grads Exit at High Rate,” Boston Globe, April 11, 2007.

[26] Ibid.

[27] General Barry McCaffrey, Testimony Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, April 17, 2007.

[28] Bowman, Tom, “Low-Key Drill Sergents Retain Recruits,” NPR, August 3, 2007.