Demographics and Destiny: Trends We Need to Understand in the 21st Century
By Endy Zemenides

    "Muslim assertiveness stems in considerable measure from social mobilization and population growth. . . Muslim population growth will be a destabilizing force for both Muslim societies and their neighbors. The large numbers of young people with secondary educations will continue to [p]romote Muslim militancy, militarism, and migration."

            - Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order 
              (1996)

A decade ago, Samuel Huntington, who some considered overly alarmist at that time, warned of the potential problems stemming from the demographic explosion of Islam, a civilization "whose people are convinced of the superiority of their culture and are obsessed with the inferiority of their power." Huntington especially stressed the challenges presented by "youth bulges" (when 15-24 year olds make up 20% or more of the population) in the Muslim world. The trends in the three decades previous to The Clash had coincided with turbulence in the Muslim world (in Algeria, Bosnia and Iran for example.) In 1996, Huntington projected youth bulges in the first two decades of the 21st century in 17 Muslim states, including Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Sudan, Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, and Afghanistan.

"Demographics" are typically defined as "the physical characteristics of a population such as age, sex, marital status, family size, education, geographic location, and occupation." While demographics are often key factors in the study of economics, sociology, and other fields, they are not always taken into consideration in discussions of national security. This is because demographic factors are infrequently the direct cause of conflicts between nations.

Huntington asserted that demographic factors can exacerbate existing tensions or make manageable problems spiral out of control and lead to armed conflict. Without an overarching framework or organizing principle by which international relations can be better understood, we fail to consider demographic factors at our own peril. In fact, demographic factors are more important than ever, and perhaps as important as any factor in international relations.

Consider the following: the two longest standing issues before the United Nations Security Council are the Israeli-Palestinian dispute and the Cyprus issue. One of the major sticking points in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process is the issue of the right of the return of the Palestinian refugees. If all the Palestinian refugees and their descendants (estimates range from 4 to 8 million people) were to return to their original home within Israel this would lead to a demographic shift which would end Israel’s status as a Jewish state. Israel’s current population is composed of about 5.8 million Jews and 1.3 million Muslim and Christian Palestinian Arabs. Thus Israel’s continued resistance to the Palestinian "right of return". On Cyprus, Turkey has imported a significant number of settlers from the Turkish mainland (who never lived side-by-side with Greek-Cypriots) and have so changed the demographics of northern Cyprus that they have also altered the framework for a solution. If demographic factors are not accounted for in these two situations, they will be on the Security Council’s agenda for decades to come.

10 DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS THAT CAN  SHAPE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS The aging of the developed world. Youth bulges in the Islamic world. Long term population decline in Russia. The rise of urbanization/megacities in the developing world. Negative birth rates in Europe. The developed world’s reliance on immigration. The Islamization of Europe. The steep increase in the number of Chinese and Russians with lung cancer, heart disease and other pollution-related health problems. Population growth around limited renewable resources. Fertility rates in the developing world.

What are the effects of demographics on national security issues? Recent trends suggest at least four:

International relations theory posits that a nation’s power rests on the pillars of economic strength, military might, and cultural attractiveness (or "soft power").

The effects of demographics on economic strength can be most readily calculated, and they are potentially the most daunting. Over the next two decades, the developed world will experience unprecedented growth in its elderly, and a major decrease in the working age population as a percentage of the overall population. Today’s 3:1 ratio of working taxpayers to retired pensioners will fall to a ratio of 1.5:1. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) projects that by 2030, one in four people in the developed world will be aged 65 or older; today, it is one in seven.

The potential US national economic disruption caused by the retirement of the Baby Boomers is well known. Despite the universal acknowledgment of these profoundly negative economic consequences, Social Security and Medicare reform are not on the immediate horizon. Many of the promises made during this presidential campaign season – for example, making tax cuts permanent or establishing universal health insurance – will require further borrowing.

Some economic projections have the developed world committing up to an extra 16 percent of their GDP to fund pension liabilities. Peter Peterson of the Blackstone Group has dismissed paying for these unfunded liabilities via taxes, as it would raise the tax burden on workers in the developed world by 25 to 40 percent. The alternative of heavy borrowing – and its resulting deficits and consumption of savings – will prove as deleterious to economic growth.

No matter how global aging is analyzed, it is clear that by 2030 the economic strength of the developed world will be seriously compromised. This can result in the developed world losing much of its direct influence – via foreign aid (which will most likely have to be cut to meet pension liabilities) or access to its markets (which it will not be able to readily cut off since it will need every source of revenue) – on the economies of the developing world.

Most importantly, the economic challenges of an aging developed world will decrease the level of resources available for other levers of power, especially military forces. Entitlement spending will increase – and unlike welfare, this spending will be protected by an influential and well organized lobby. Drastic tax increases and massive borrowing are politically unfeasible. Cuts have to be found somewhere, and military spending represents the next greatest item in most national budgets. This can work in the reverse as well, because the rapidly expanding economies of India and China will be able to increase the resources available to develop their militaries.

The decrease of the working age population makes the developed world more reliant on immigration. As state economies become more reliant on immigrant populations, the immigrant population becomes more politically important in host countries. Within a decade, it may be impossible for congressional delegations from California, Texas, Arizona and New Mexico to take hard line stances in Congress against Mexico. European governments may become increasingly reluctant to put pressure on Arab states.

Demographics can indirectly affect military power because economic scarcity deprives the military of resources. Demographics, however, can also have a much more direct impact on military troop levels.

An aging developed world that demands more from a smaller population of younger workers will have a more limited recruiting base for its military. Even if the draft is reinstated, it may prove to be politically unsustainable, because parents would be faced with sending their only male child to war.

With less manpower, the developed worlds’ militaries will have to rely on more firepower (i.e., increases in technology and weaponry). The developed world’s dilemma is that high tech weaponry creates budgetary pressure at a time when it will be looking for budgetary relief.

The problem is apparent in Russia today. Russia faces enormous demographic challenges – low life expectancy and long term population decline. With these population pressures, Russia has been more aggressive about using levers of power – from its oil and gas to its market – to become more influential in the countries and regions that it borders. There is also some indication that Russia under Putin is starting to put the issue of weapons of mass destruction back on the table. The Arms Control Association has noted reports that Moscow has worked on a new generation of chemical agents called "novichoks," which are allegedly designed to circumvent the Chemical Weapons Convention and evade Western methods of detection and protection against chemical weapons. It’s possible that other low population growth states – most critically, the EU states – will focus their military budgets on weapons of mass destruction to make up for the relative lack of military manpower.

With the developed world’s largest and most active military, the United States faces a big dilemma. The result could be a U.S. strategic posture that ranges from "offshore balancer" to defensive or even neo-isolationist. It is certain that demographic trends are going to challenge the U.S. ability to maintain a forward presence throughout the world.

In 1950, 17 percent of the world’s population was urban. Today, one-half of the world lives in an urban area. By 2015, there will be 23 "megacities" (with populations of at least 10 million) in the developing world.

In the Kosovo campaign and the present war in Iraq, developing countries are locating key parts of their military infrastructure within urban centers, betting that Western militaries will be less likely to risk civilian casualties by bombing these complexes. Moreover, in Iraq, victory cannot be complete until urban areas are brought under control, and it is within these very urban areas that the advantages of high tech weaponry are neutralized. In light of the explosive growth of megacities and other urban centers, Western militaries will need to develop a proficiency in asymmetric warfare.

Population growth in areas with limited renewable resources is bringing the world closer to true resource wars every day. In arguing that a war over water is a near and present danger, Michael Klare has pointed out that the Jordan River flows through Israel, the Palestinian territories, Lebanon and Syria; the Tigris-Euphrates passes through Iran, Iraq, Iraqi Kurdistan, Syria, and Turkey; and the Indus through Afghanistan, Pakistan, Kashmir, India and China.

With the exception of Israel and Iraq, all of these countries are experiencing population growth, and in most cases, youth bulges. Access to water will be a top priority – and most likely, a national security issue – for all of these states. The ability of one country to cut off another (for example, the Grand Anatolia Project to build dams for hydroelectric power in Turkey will restrict the flow of Euphrates water to Syria by 40 percent and to Iraq by 80 percent) may result in the new casus belli in these volatile regions. 

There is no question that demographics must be closely analyzed in any serious study of international relations. At the same time, there is no certainty as to what these demographic trends tell us about the future. For example, despite all the challenges an aging developed world faces, immigration and a 21st century brain drain could alleviate the consequences of this aging – if not reverse them. On the other hand, China’s rapid economic development has come at the cost of lax environmental standards (if any) that have lead to a population exposed to deadly levels of pollution. China faces its own dilemma: rein in its present rate (and method) of economic growth, or keep exposing its population to high levels of pollution. (The World Bank and World Health Organization estimate found 750,000 pollution related deaths in China per year, and that only 1 percent of China’s urban population of 560 million breathes air considered safe by the European Union.) The social unrest, rising health care costs, and lower productivity and life expectancy stemming from pollution will pose more challenges for the Chinese government.

Analysis of demographic trends can provide an estimated sort of timeline. We know that the developed world has to enact some type of pension reform within the next decade to avoid a major economic crisis. We know that by 2010, most key states in the Muslim world will be experiencing youth bulges and that greater opportunities and alternatives to militancy must be provided for Muslim youth. We know that hundreds of millions of people will rely on and compete for the waters of the Jordan, Tigris-Euphrates, and Indus rivers. Demographic trends suggest that the US must recognize the enormity of the looming demographic issue and develop its comprehensive demographic strategic plan.•

Endy Zemenides is a partner with Acosta, Kruse & Zemenides. He is a member of the National Strategy Forum Review Editorial Board. He has also been a lecturer at DePaul University’s Political Science Department.