Understanding Asymmetric Warfare: Threats and Response
By John Allen Williams

Advanced technological societies have entered an era in which they are vulnerable to unanticipated and deadly attacks from opponents weaker in traditional measures of military power. September 11 showed clearly how a nation’s sophisticated technology could be turned against it by a small number of highly motivated attackers, supported by a non-governmental terrorist organization. With the resources of a state behind it, such an attack could be even more deadly. In retrospect, as with Pearl Harbor, neither the attack nor its method should have been such a surprise. But even if that specific event could not have been anticipated, the decentralization of the ability to cause great destruction from nation-states to non-state organizations and even to small groups was already apparent.

As a result of these changes and further reflection on US experiences in such places as Vietnam, Somalia, Afghanistan, and Iraq, strategists are giving renewed consideration to the question of "asymmetric warfare." In addressing this issue it seems useful to begin with theoretical considerations, then move on to historical examples and US asymmetric advantages before suggesting some policy implications.

To anticipate our conclusions:

• The concept of "asymmetric warfare" needs to be narrowed to be useful.

• Asymmetric warfare is not a new phenomenon.

• The US has many advantages in dealing with asymmetric warfare.

• Policies must be constructed to maximize US advantages.

• The greatest impediments to improvement are not failures of technology but of imagination and willingness to alter traditional ways of thinking and organizing.

Asymmetric warfare (sometimes called asymmetrical warfare) has become such a popular concept that its meaning – and hence its usefulness – has become blurred. The underlying feature of the concept is that of differences between opponents that create vulnerabilities. No two prospective opponents will be alike in all respects. The question becomes what differences are relevant in a prospective engagement. An overly broad use of the term deprives it of analytical utility. Four areas of asymmetry seem particularly useful to consider, however.

The most commonly discussed area of asymmetry is technological. This concern is rooted in the decidedly mixed successes technologically advanced nations have had in defeating much less sophisticated opponents, particularly when the latter are highly motivated and operating on their home territory. The US experience in Vietnam and the French experiences in Indochina and North Africa spring to mind. A counter example, the success of the British in Malaya, shows that success is achievable, but only with ruthless determination, sound strategy, highly trained troops, and special circumstances beyond the scope of this paper. The basic point is incontrovertible: the side with the simplest uniforms often wins.

A second area is organizational. Western militaries, whose organizational structures grow out of Max Weber’s hierarchically structured bureaucratic model, have many advantages, particularly in resource allocation and management, but not necessarily in agility of thought or execution. Large organizations develop their own internal political dynamics and inertia, and are vulnerable to decentralized and sometimes ad hoc organizations that can, as the Air Force says, turn inside them.

A third area is moral. This gets to the heart of what is often called the American way of war, although it is found in other militaries as well. Americans prefer conflicts where issues of right and wrong are clearly delineated and combatants are distinguishable from noncombatants. Direct US attacks on noncombatants are not unknown (Dresden and Hiroshima come to mind), but need to be justified on some strategic basis when they occur. It is difficult for the US military to operate in the grey areas of ambiguous conflicts where the combatants are difficult to identify or may use women and children as human shields. It is even harder for the US government – let alone the public – to support unconventional engagements when the costs are so much more apparent than the benefits.

A fourth area is cognitive. Western strategists cannot easily imagine the kinds of attacks which their societies might some day experience. One reason for this is that some kinds of attacks are so atrocious as to be beyond the pale of reasonable alternatives for the US. Another is that society and the political process erect tacit but very real boundaries around what scenarios can safely be discussed or planned for. Shortly after September 11 the Department of Defense turned to Hollywood creative types to help them imagine what "unthinkable" attacks might be possible. Some thought this bizarre, but others recalled a Tom Clancy novel that ended with an attack that was an eerie foreshadowing of September 11.

Not all differences between opposing forces or societies constititute asymmetrical warfare. Militaries have always sought to find some flaw in the enemy’s armor or some difference which would give them an advantage. The tactic of "tactical concentration," in which the main forces of the enemy are held in check by some feature of time or geography while your forces prevail at a strategic center, is as old as warfare itself.

Wilhelmine Germany made the mistake of engaging in a symmetrical naval contest with Great Britain. So long as Germany was a land power and did not occupy land across the strategically vital English Channel, it was more of a nuisance than a mortal threat to England. Once Kaiser Wilhelm began construction of his "High Seas Fleet," complete with modern battleships that could help it wrest control of the Channel, Britain had no choice but to respond. Ironically, if the Germans had used their naval construction budgets to construct a much larger fleet of U-boats, the war might have gone quite differently, with England driven to her knees by the loss of her merchant shipping.

Most engagements of the two World Wars were essentially symmetrical, with militaries of similar structure, capabilities, and organizational principles combating one another. For example, the German "blitzkrieg" strategy of the Second World War erased the defensive advantage that dominated the First World War borrowed from interwar French strategic thought (but not, unfortunately for the French, practice). It was developed in the course of early campaigns and was carried out with forces essentially the same as those of the French. The result of the Battle of France was not a foregone conclusion and, indeed, the French armored forces may have been superior technologically to the German. Insofar as it was an asymmetrical campaign, it was due to cognitive failures of the French, who imagined a different set of battles than actually emerged and had their best forces burrowed inside the concrete of the Maginot Line – the highly developed example of the trenches of 1914-1918.

In the Pacific theater, as Admiral Nimitz wrote after the war, the US Navy planned well for the eventual battles that were fought, but did not anticipate the Kamikaze attacks – one supposes for cultural reasons. More tellingly, the US Navy did not anticipate Pearl Harbor, either, despite war games of the 1930s that showed its vulnerability to just such an attack.

Discussions of asymmetric vulnerabilities are a useful corrective to assuming – as the US too often does – that its immense economic and military strength mean that it will prevail whenever it asserts itself with sufficient force. Why the fallacy of this assumption needs to be relearned so frequently is mystifying, but there is an underlying insight: strength in a conflict is preferable to weakness. Techniques of low intensity conflict adopted by US adversaries would not necessarily be their first choice, but given the other advantages the US possesses, these actions are all that are available to them. No sane opponent would choose conventional engagements with the US military as a preferred option.

The US did prevail in several asymmetrical conflicts, as Sam C. Sarkesian pointed out in his classic America’s Forgotten Wars. These included the Seminole War and the Philippine Insurrection – both fought with tactics that would not be acceptable today. Post-Civil War campaigns against Native American tribes also demonstrated that the advantage is sometimes to the best equipped and most ruthless.

Indeed, the American Revolutionary War was to a large degree an asymmetrical war, with the Colonists fighting the world power of the era. British forces were subjected to hit and run raids by local forces and unable to reprovision themselves effectively. With the important and ultimately decisive exceptions of Saratoga and Yorktown, the Americans tended to lose the symmetrical force-on-force battles.

What are the common factors in successful attempts by dominant powers to prevail against opponents using asymmetrical advantages against them? The theoretical considerations above may be helpful in answering this question. First, technology enables powers to dominate both the physical and the information space if used correctly. The key is not to become dependent on technology to the detriment of sound strategy and properly trained and motivated forces. The US had strategic mobility in Vietnam and dominated the air space, but was not able to achieve a victory nonetheless.

Second, forces were trained and organized to make use of whatever advantages they had – technological or otherwise – and to minimize the effect of deficiencies.

Third, however misguided some of the US wars may seem in retrospect, the US pursued them with ferocity and dogged determination. Operations generally occurred without media attention and with a public not yet remote from the military, unsure of the value of US commitments, and unattuned to military requirements.

Fourth, the military sooner or later figured out how to fight the wars it was called upon to fight. The learning curve was not always as steep as it could have been, but with enough time the military eventually understood the problems it faced and how to deal with them. Current public disquiet about the Iraq war shows that time is a scarce commodity, but the American public was remarkably patient and trusting until recently.

The lessons of history read more like Rorschach inkblots than the stone tablets of Moses. What one "learns" is highly colored by personal factors and preferences. With that caveat in mind, the following policy implications seem worthy of mention:

• The US will always have a problem in dealing with asymmetrical conflicts, given our traditional mind set and the impact of legacy systems acquired for the kind of wars we prefer to fight. Being aware of this tendency is the first step to mitigating its effect.

• The military must somehow reward officers who take risks, who think and publish creatively and constructively. Similarly, personnel in nontraditional career paths, such as special operations forces, should not be disadvantaged by a promotion system that cannot adequately evaluate their performance.

• The US must improve its planning processes to deal with unanticipated radical shifts in the threat and to recover when the unexpected happens – as it surely will.

• The military must do all it can to bridge the gap between itself and a civil society distant from (but not necessarily hostile to) the military. Public outreach will be part of the solution, which should also include graduate education of the best officers in elite civilian institutions and a better understanding of the use of reserve forces – not only as force multipliers, but as essential links with the civil society from which military capabilities ultimately spring.

• Given the inherently nasty nature of some asymmetrical conflicts, the US must choose its battles carefully and ensure that they are worthy of the sacrifices their successful prosecution will require.

• Once joined, the battles must be fought relentlessly, but not at a sacrifice of the values defended. Inevitable lapses in judgment and errors in execution must be accounted for and corrected.

• Awareness of other cultures is crucial, but it must be combined with an appreciation of US culture and the humane and democratic values which underpin it.

It would be naïve to believe that even the most careful preparation will protect the US from attack, prevent strategic surprise, or ensure the successful prosecution of asymmetrical conflicts. But a solid understanding of forces confronting the US and creative ideas on how to deal with them are essential for minimizing the number of such attacks and reducing the severity of their consequences. •

John Allen Williams is Professor of Political Science at Loyola University Chicago and is Chair and President of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society. Dr. Williams serves on the Editorial Board of the National Strategy Forum. He is a frequent media commentator on military policy and civil military relations.