The Lethality of Improvised Weaponry in Irregular Warfare
T.X. Hammes

Over the last four years, America has received a painful lesson in the effectiveness of mating basic explosives to off-the-shelf technology such as cell phones, garage door openers and even simple pressure plate circuits. For ten years prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Pentagon was seeking high-technology "transformational weapons." It is ironic that the truly transformational weapons have been the low technology Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIED), and Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPG) employed against US forces. These simple weapons systems have literally transformed how American forces fight in Iraq. Rather than dismount and move among the people to gain intelligence, US forces hunker behind complex barrier systems or drive armored vehicles past the people. These weapons have even forced the Iraqi police to hide from their own people. And despite literally billions spent on the official Joint IED (Improvised Explosive Devices) Defeat program, IEDs remain the biggest killer and maimer of US troops in Iraq.

The effects of these weapons have triggered discussions on the surprising lethality of low tech weapons against modern armies. Unfortunately, focusing on the lethality of the weapons minimizes the problem. In fact, IEDs are just the most recent example of the real challenge – the lethality of human creativity.

The second deadliest terrorist attack in modern times used simple chains, locks, and matches. On August 19, 1978, persons unknown locked the outside doors of the Rex Cinema in Abadan, Iran and started a fire. Three hundred and seventy-seven people died in the fire. The initial reaction was to blame the fire on the Savak, Shah Mohammad Reza’s intelligence branch. The accusations led to widespread riots and were one factor in the downfall of the shah. Later analysis pointed to Ayatollah Ali Khamenei as the perpetrator, but by then the attack had accomplished the desired goal. The key factor in its success was the creative, if brutal, idea of using low technology tools to attack a normally safe element of society.

In 1995, Timothy McVeigh used diesel fuel and ammonium nitrate fertilizer to create an ANFO bomb that shattered the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City. Even the detonator was low tech – Primadet, a commercially available detonation cord used in legitimate civilian blasting operations. The London Underground bombers also achieved maximum effect with low technology weapons. The July 7, 2005 blasts in the London Underground were so intense that police observing the immediate damage stated the bombers had used military grade explosives. Not until later did they determine the bombs were really acetone peroxide, a homemade explosive.

In Iraq the insurgents have simply collected varying types of explosives from the huge amount of ordinance the war left scattered around the country. Using basic electronics skills, they have converted cell phones, garage door openers, TV remote controls, toy airplanes, car remotes, and a wide variety of simple electric switches to provide for command, timed or pressure detonation of their devices. They have also created daisy chained explosions by using telephone wire to connect bombs, multiple electronic receivers, and standard military detonation cord.

None of these actions should surprise us. Even when explosives or fire are not available, men are adept at killing with whatever material their society provides. In the Vietnam War, sharpened bamboo stakes were used in a variety of man traps. While generally not lethal, they required the unit to medevac the casualty.

In each case, the key was not the level of technology of the weaponry but the creativity of the terrorist in combining readily available, often non-lethal, materials to create a high degree of lethality. Further, creativity allows terrorists to adapt rapidly. As our troops got better at spotting wires leading to IEDs and then neutralizing them, the insurgents sought wireless solutions in the form of cell phones, garage door openers, etc. When it leaked that we were using jammers to block the signals from garage door openers or even cause early detonation, some insurgents started using TV remote controls because the infrared beam was impervious to electronic jamming. At the same time, they sought more sophisticated encoded garage door openers and began to use the high-powered wireless phones available in Iraq. They also added a remote safety switch to ensure that we could not electronically detonate the bomb while they were planting it. Only when they were safely away from the bomb would they arm it.

Besides the ready availability of the material, these devices have the huge advantage of being nearly invisible in modern society. It is impossible to prevent people from carrying cell phones or driving a civilian vehicle. While the insurgents know our overhead systems can track every vehicle in an area, they simply accept that and drive a very common type. Thus, even when we get a tip on a vehicle, it is extremely difficult to find the one white van in the tens of thousands in Baghdad at any given time.

Strategic Impact

The insurgents do not focus on lethality at the tactical level; their real emphasis is on the strategic impact of their attacks. In January 2002, Ubeid Al-Qurashi, a close aide to Osama bin Laden, wrote an article for their bi-weekly Internet news magazine. In it, he stated that Muslims should not despair at the results of the recent US invasion of Afghanistan. While things might look bad, Al Qaeda had adopted Fourth Generation Warfare and this form of warfare had repeatedly allowed the weak to defeat the strong by breaking their political will. He noted that Fourth Generation Warfare is based on the concept that insurgents can wear down even powerful states by conducting protracted, low level insurgency campaigns. The key is to make the attacks continuous and visible.

Since that time, Al Qaeda has consistently encouraged its followers to apply Fourth Generation Warfare. On July 10, 2006, the Global Islamic Media Front Preaching Information Department released a document so that "a combination of this discussion and that of the fourth generation warfare, are brought upon the Mujahideen for awareness and to urge them to focus their propaganda and psychological attacks to achieve victory in this new war."

The insurgents are striving to achieve their strategic aims by sustaining individual, but high visibility, tactical acts. They know they cannot defeat the US militarily so they must break our will. They plan to do so by running a global strategic communications plan to convince the American public the war cannot be won. In fact, the constant reports of IEDs, US casualties, pipeline attacks, massacres, and torture have ground down US political will to the point that the Senate Majority Leader has openly stated the war is lost. The insurgents are confident that their use of simple, available technology is winning the war for them.

Hizbollah achieved the same aim in their Summer 2006 war with Israel. Because Hizbollah kept launching rockets until the last day of the war, they achieved a psychological victory over the Israelis. Despite the low lethality of their rockets (they killed only 43 Israeli civilians,) the fact that they kept fighting against Israel’s high technology air and ground campaign greatly increased Hizbollah’s prestige and political power in Lebanon. In contrast, post-conflict Israel embarked on a long period of soul searching and an aggressive program to "fix" the Israeli Defense Forces. Once again, simple, low-tech weapons had produced strategic and psychological effects.

In addition to the strategic impact on an opponent’s political will, available technology has the capability of shocking and destabilizing the world economy. In 2006, a small group of disgruntled Nigerians riding speed boats seized the Liberty Service, an oil industry service ship, and kidnapped four members of the crew. They then cut several pipelines and attacked a flow station. Shell shut down operations in the area and cut oil exports by 220,000 bpd. Oil prices jumped almost $1. Since the US uses 20MBPD, the effect was a $20M dollar a day tax on the US economy. This was achieved with a handful of men, a couple of speed boats, and some very basic explosives.

Recent events demonstrate that human creativity is capable of not only retaining its lethality but allows cheap, low-technology weapons to produce strategic effects. Unfortunately, insurgents are using websites to exchange ideas on how to dramatically increase the lethality of their low-tech attacks – and they believe these new approaches will produce even greater strategic effects.

Achievable WMD

The United States has expended a great deal of blood and treasure in an effort to ensure that terrorists don’t smuggle Weapons of Mass Destruction into America. Yet, we have done very little to protect ourselves from terrorists employing everyday materials to create WMD effects in our cities.

The most obvious target is the toxic industrial chemicals/materials industry. Many of the compounds essential to our daily lives are extraordinarily lethal – yet they are spread throughout our society. The ubiquitous presence of these materials means that massive chemical attacks can be executed in many places throughout our country. What makes the lack of security for these chemicals particularly troubling is that some terrorist websites have discussed the 1984 Bhopal Union Carbide disaster as a possible model for an attack on the US. They note the methyl isocyanate leak killed thousands and left tens of thousands with life-long damage to lungs and eyes.

The websites have also discussed the 1947 disaster in Texas City, Texas, where two ships carrying a total of 8,500 tons of ammonium nitrate blew up in port. The blast was in the low kiloton range and killed nearly 600. Websites have noted the potential to recreate that blast using the larger ships that commonly carry ammonium nitrate today. Only recently has the Coast Guard started inspecting inbound ships filled with ammonium nitrate – unfortunately, the inspections are based on the erroneous idea that the Coast Guard knows what each ship entering US waters is carrying.

If either of the accidents above had been intentional, it would have qualified as a WMD attack. The creativity terrorists have demonstrated on 9-11 and in Iraq, combined with their on-line discussions, indicate they are not only capable of but seriously considering conducting such an attack.

Lethality of creativity

The convergence of open source information, loyalty to radical causes and a desire to make a major impact in a strategic communications campaign have increased the probability that a small group will conduct a WMD-like attack on the United States. In summary, the key factor in evaluating potential threats to the United States is not the level of technology and enemy controls but the creativity he has demonstrated. •

Thomas X. Hammes is a retired Marine Corps Colonel. He is author of The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century.