NSF INSIDER VIEW
Foreign and Defense Policy
in the Obama Administration
By John Allen Williams
Early indications are that the Obama administration foreign and defense policies will be more evolutionary than revolutionary. This does not mean that changes are not significant or that they will not, over time, mark significant new directions in policy. Some shifts are already apparent in four areas: the badly misnamed “war on terror,” military personnel and procurement, counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and relations with allies – especially Great Britain.
First, President Obama ordered the closure of the detention camp at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba and barred the use of torture, as promised in his campaign. These decisions were the easy ones; more difficult will be finding secure and humane places for the detainees. Some of them are essentially stateless and many are too dangerous to let go.
Other Bush administration security policies are under review, but the Obama administration is not moving as quickly to reverse them as many hoped or feared. Much may be happening below the surface, but there are no early indications of drastic changes in polices toward intelligence collection, in particular.
Second, major changes are underway in the areas of military personnel and procurement. The Army and Marine Corps will be increased in size – a very expensive proposition that will call for cuts elsewhere in defense – to meet the manpower-intensive needs of counterinsurgency operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. Hardware programs such as the Air Force F-22 “Raptor” fighter are getting a hard look. Perhaps ironically, some of the fighter’s strongest supporters are Democratic senators and congressmen who see it as an economic jobs program for their constituents.
The “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy restricting the service of open homosexuals in the military is on its way out. The administration is moving slowly in this, however, seeking to build consensus among military leaders to smooth the transition and provide political cover. The change will not be without difficulty, including the sorting out of benefits for domestic partners and interpretations of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). Since the policy is mandated in Title 10, U.S. Code, the president cannot change it by an executive order. It will require congressional action, as well. The most likely result is that the current prohibitions on sexual harassment and sexual assault in the UCMJ will be applied without concern for gender. The domestic partner issue will not be dealt with if it can be avoided, pending more consensus on the issue of gay marriage. Since the military is a reflection of society, more tolerant societal attitudes will make the adjustment easier, but it will not be without problems. These need to be anticipated and policies developed to deal with them.
Third, the Obama administration is shifting attention and resources from Iraq, where against all odds the war is going reasonably well now, to Afghanistan, where it is not. The administration has a number of highly qualified advisors on counterinsurgency (COIN), and appears to be listening to them – as the Bush administration finally did in late 2006. The strategy of General David Petraeus (now heading the U.S. Central Command, with responsibility for both theaters) and his former deputy General Raymond Odierno (now commander in Iraq) to use forces primarily to protect the people rather than for conventional military operations is firmly in place.
The strategy of trying to “turn” former enemies was successful in Iraq with the “Anbar Awakening” that saw the allegiance of most Sunni tribes switch to the side of the Iraqi government. It will now be tried in Afghanistan, where moderate elements of the Taliban and Taliban supporters will be appealed to, if such can be found. No one seriously believes that the Afghanistan conflict has a military solution, although the military will surely be part of it. The administration realizes that Afghanistan and Pakistan are part of the same problem, with Pakistan the far more serious component. The appointment of Ambassador Richard Holbrooke as a special representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan (the addition of Kashmir issues to his charter being successfully opposed by India) is a sign of this realization.
Fourth, changes on the diplomatic front are underway, some of which may be disquieting. There are early indications of relaxation in our embargo of Cuba (in place since 1962, yet the country is still run by a Castro). This will please farmers and enrage many citizens of Miami. Of more import, because of the relative popularity of the current president compared to his predecessor, this administration is in a better position to make requests of our NATO allies. Among these will be for more help in Afghanistan and taking in some released Guantanamo inmates as the facility shuts down. Given the clamor for this action on their part, it will be an offer more difficult to refuse.
Of possible concern is an apparent reduction in the felt importance by President Obama of the “special relationship” between the U.S. and Great Britain. Assuming, with Oscar Wilde, that “a gentleman is never unintentionally rude,” one wonders along with much of the British press whether several recent actions symbolize a new and lower U.S. priority for that relationship. Prime Minister Gordon Brown’s recent visit was the occasion for several of these, including the lack of a presidential greeting at the airport, no joint Rose Garden press conference, and a dramatically asymmetrical exchange of official gifts. One commentator pointed out that the set of DVDs of great American films presented to the Prime Minister could have been ordered from Netflix. This was in return for a pen holder made from a British ship fighting the slave trade, a sister ship of HMS Resolute, from whose timbers the presidential desk was made in 1880 and presented to the U.S. by Queen Victoria. The earlier return of a bust of Winston Churchill given to George W. Bush after September 11 made many wonder if this was an early sign of a fundamental change. Should President Obama decide to return his desk to the British, as well, that would be a more significant indication that something new is in the wind.
It is important to remember in analyzing an administration so early in its term that apparent policy directions may actually be a result of a new administration settling in and finding its way. Accordingly, not too much should be made of them. Indeed, the apparent snubs to the British may be due to an inexperienced administration overwhelmed by other issues. It is also possible that a new policy on the ethics of gift exchanges, including value limitations, has bled over into the foreign arena. If so, that should have been announced publicly. Policies will evolve, and they will surely provide opportunities for further comments.
John Allen Williams is Professor of Political Science, Loyola University Chicago and Chair and President of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society. He is a member of the National Strategy Forum Review Editorial Board.