NSF INSIDER VIEW

Rethinking U.S. National Strategy

By Richard E. Friedman


Ideally, U.S. national strategy should be based on realistic objectives. A strategy that is designed to meet its objectives should include tactics for implementation and an understanding of the strategic objectives of friends, competitors, and adversaries so that foreign policy is not formulated in a vacuum. The ideal execution rarely occurs because putting out fires on a day-to-day basis preempts the energy and resources of policymakers. The following two examples demonstrate this problem.

The battlefield detainee prison at Guantanamo Bay (Gitmo) has become an icon for the belief that the U.S. has avoided the Rule of Law. Closure and release of prisoners from Gitmo raises several difficult issues:

• The release of prisoners may result in acts of terrorism by those who are released. The blame may be placed on government officials.
  
• Questionable evidence upon which the person was detained or evidence obtained by torture may taint continuing detention and trial.
  
• There is an unresolved legal issue regarding the appropriate forum for trial: military commissions and rules of evidence, or federal district criminal courts.
  
• Where to send prisoners after they are released? They may be tortured or killed when they return to their home state.
  
• What disposition could be made of released prisoners, if there is no state that will accept them?

The Bush II Administration focused on tactics -- what to do with battlefield detainees -- which is a legitimate concern. But it failed to accept the recommendations of legal scholars and civil libertarians regarding alternate methods of providing due process to terrorists. Many advised against the opening and operation of Gitmo.

The second issue that demonstrates the need for a more realistic national strategy is nuclear non-proliferation. The Obama administration has pledged to seek elimination of nuclear weapons under the non-proliferation treaty regime. The U.S. and Russia hold 95 percent of the world’s nuclear arsenal. Iran is determined to acquire a nuclear weapon. It is unlikely that North Korea will voluntarily abandon its nuclear weapon program.

The existing nuclear non-proliferation regime is becoming marginal or irrelevant. Sensitive technology is now more available to states and non-state terrorists groups, provided that they can acquire a relatively small amount of fissile material. There is consensus that within the next two decades 30 entities could possess nuclear weapon capability.

There are tangible steps that could be taken to reduce the number of nuclear weapons and strengthen the existing nuclear proliferation regime. However, reduction is far different than elimination of nuclear weapons. Is elimination of nuclear weapons a valid strategic objective or is it a feel good tactic?

U.S. and Russian leaders have no more than 30 minutes to respond to a real nuclear weapon launch or computer warning error. The Bush II administration created a missile warning system (Shield) in Eastern Europe without considering Russia’s strategic objective and strong objection.

The Obama administration is now considering eliminating the Shield deployment in Eastern Europe, scheduled for July, 2009. This in return for Russia’s commitment to use its leverage to persuade Iran to abandon its nuclear weapon development program. The Shield could be adapted to address the strategic objectives of both Russia and the U.S. and could protect the interests of both states.

Is the US initiative a tactic or is it a component of a cogent, long-range strategy based on Middle East political stability and the likelihood of Iran abandoning its nuclear program? Could this joint project accelerate the reduction of the U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals?

The lesson to be learned is that consultation with friends and competitors regarding their strategic objectives could result in realistic and achievable mutual benefits.

Had the Bush II administration consulted with legal experts regarding Gitmo and reflected on the emerging battlefield detainee matter from a strategic perspective the ensuing global condemnation of the US and damage to its leadership image could have been avoided. A grand strategy for the Middle East is more complex because of the interdependence of US oil needs, militant Islamism and terrorism, the potential for an Iranian nuclear weapon and the potential for a nuclear arms race in the region. The ongoing US discussion with Russia regarding Iran’s nuclear weapon program may be either a discrete issue, or it may involve Russia’s use of its oil and gas to threaten Western Europe and its objective of regaining control of its former Central Asian Republics, including Georgia. Major contemporary events may only be tactical components of strategy.

Richard E. Friedman is President of the National Strategy Forum.  He also serves as Counselor with the American Bar Association Standing Committee on Law and National Security.