KEY REGIONS AT A GLANCE
Enhancing a Security Dialogue With China
By Henry Levine
Overall, the Bush Administration did a great job on China policy. The Administration’s free trade principles helped it steer away from destructive trade actions, to the benefit of Americans and Chinese. Perhaps most important, as (then) Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian sought to further a Taiwan independence agenda, President Bush clearly let both sides of the strait know the U.S. wanted neither to take unilateral actions that would change the status quo. This statement helped maintain stability in cross-Strait and in U.S.-China relations at a critical moment.
But for all the success of the Administration’s China policy, there was one misstep: a reining in of military-to-military exchanges. A number of Administration officials came to their positions hyping “the China threat”. The tragedy of September 11 caused them quickly to shift their focus. Not only was China a potential ally in the war on terror, but senior national security figures skeptical of China were soon fully occupied in another part of the world. That said, and though China did not get the full brunt of their focus, strong signals discouraging deepened military exchanges with China went out through the DOD system.
The 2001 EP-3 collision and recent incident in the South China Sea between U.S. and Chinese ships are just two examples of why such exchanges are so important. We need the intensified interaction that helps both sides learn how to avoid or (if necessary) deal with crises or near misses. But the roots of this issue go deeper.
Over the course of 25 years, I have observed the striking evolution in the backgrounds and attitudes of my civilian Chinese counterparts. In the early 1980s, it was rare to find a counterpart who had spent extensive time abroad. Though intelligent, these officials were uncomfortable in dealing with foreign counterparts and they suffered from a lack of familiarity with international norms, especially as practiced in the real world. For example, it is one thing to read the rules of the WTO. It is another to have the understanding of them that comes from experience in international business and trade negotiations.
Today, when U.S. officials travel to Beijing they are sitting across from a group of sophisticated, self-confident, and experienced international diplomats. Many differences in perspective and interests remain, but discussions today are substantive in a way that was impossible when Chinese officials had only glimmerings of how the outside world operated.
The contrast with the Chinese military establishment is striking. Of all of the entities in China today, the PLA almost alone remains highly cloistered. Colleagues who interact with the PLA describe meetings that bring me back to the early days of my encounters with civilian officials. And the PLA remains apart not just from foreigners. Within China it operates as a largely independent entity, supervised by the highest member of the Chinese Communist Party, but more or less severed from the rest of the Chinese government at levels below this. To have seen the driver of a military vehicle involved in a traffic accident drive away from the scene despite the entreaties of a traffic cop is to see a concrete expression of this reality. To see the Foreign Ministry taken by surprise and out of the loop following the EP-3 and South China Sea naval incidents is to see a more substantive example.
An isolated, insecure PLA is not in the U.S. interest. For this reason, the Obama Administration has the opportunity to make a significant contribution to the stability of U.S.-China relations by embarking on an activist program of exchanges with the Chinese military. We need to get to the point where, not only do counterparts sit together in classes and tour each others’ facilities, but where, when the day is done, they sit down together over beers and get to know each other.
One step in particular might help facilitate the interaction we need. The U.S. Secretaries of State and Defense sit down every year together for security discussions with their counterparts from Japan. There is a similar forum with Australia. Why not use the same mechanism for enhancing security dialogue with China? Maybe add the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the PLA’s Chief of Staff, so the uniformed military is represented too. This would help bilateral understanding and civilian-military coordination on the Chinese side and pave the way for deepened exchanges at lower levels.
I know that despite the best of intentions on the U.S. side there may be reluctance from the Chinese side to engage. But we should not let ourselves be discouraged by this. At his March 24 press conference, President Obama, in speaking about his approach to the challenges his administration is facing referred to his belief in “persistence”. He noted that on tough problems we may not see results immediately, but he would keep at it and over time we would make progress.
I think that is a great perspective to bring to U.S.-China relations overall, and to the important issue of enhancing relationships with the PLA in particular. This should be a high priority item, persistently pursued.
Henry Levine’s twenty-five year government career included assignments at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing, as U.S. Consul General in Shanghai, and as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Asia. He is currently a Senior Director with Stonebridge International, a strategic advisory firm in Washington, DC, and Chair of the Intensive China Areas Studies Course at the State Department’s Foreign Service Institute. He is a frequent speaker before business groups on U.S.-China economic relations. The views expressed in this article are the author’s alone and not necessarily those of any organization with which he is affiliated. Visit the author’s blog, “Behind the Curtain: An Insider’s Guide to U.S.-China Relations”.